GEORGE 
HERBERT 
PALMER 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2015 


https://archive.org/details/genetichistoryofOOfost_0 


A  GENETIC  HISTORY  OF  THE 
NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


A  Genetic  History  of  the 
New  England  Theology 


By 

FRANK  HUGH  FOSTER 

Author  of  The  Fundamental  Ideas  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church 
Christian  Life  and  Theology 
Etc. 


CHICAGO 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  PRESS 
1907 


Copyright  1907  By 
The  University  of  Chicago 


Printed  February  1907 


Composed  and  Printed  By 
The  University  of  Chicago  Press 
Chicago,  Illinois.  U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE 


The  following  work — suggested  by  the  professional  obli- 
gations of  a  professor  of  church  history;  continued  and  at 
last  completed  under  a  sense  of  pious  duty  toward  the  great 
men  who  toiled  tO'  hand  down  to  their  posterity  an  undi- 
minished and  perfected  system  of  doctrinal  truth;  neces- 
sarily the  fruit  of  long  labors,  interrupted  by  other  engage- 
ments, but  resumed  and  completed  when  opportunity  has 
offered — is  now  presented  tO'  the  public.  It  has  been  written 
directly  from  the  sources.  The  selection  of  material  has 
been  determined  by  the  purpose  to  write  a  genetic  history, 
and  not  a  mere  record  of  opinions,  however  interesting 
they  might  be  in  themselves.  By  the  aid  of  great  libraries, 
above  all  that  of  Harvard  University,  from  which  I  have 
received  hundreds  of  tracts  for  examination,  but  also  of 
that  in  the  Congregational  House,  of  the  Massachusetts  His- 
torical Society,  the  Athenaeum,  the  Boston  Public  Library, 
and  the  libraries  in  Union  Theological  Seminary,  New 
York,  in  Oberlin  and  Olivet  Colleges,  and  in  Andover  and 
Pacific  Theological  Seminaries,  it  has  been  possible  to 
examine  all  the  important  sources.  Acknowledgments  are 
hereby  made  to  the  publishers  of  the  American  Journal  of 
Theology  and  of  the  Bibliotheca  Sacra  for  permission  to 
use  matter  which  had  already  appeared  in  their  pages. 
There  have  been  no'  predecessors  in  this  particular  line  of 
study  of  our  theology  from  whom  I  could  draw ;  but  I  take 
the  opportunity  tO'  acknowledge  my  indebtedness  to  the 
late  Professors  Gottfried  Thomasius,  of  Erlangen,  for 
my  conception  of  historical  method,  and  Edwards  A.  Park, 
of  Andover,  for  much  help  of  a  historical  character,  both 
personal  and  through  his  historical  writings,  as  well  as  for 


V 


vi 


PREFACE 


the  dogmatic  point  of  view  of  the  whole  period.  Professor 
George  P.  Fisher  has  afforded  a  splendid  example  oi 
scientific  treatment  of  our  theology  in  his  historical  articles, 
by  which  he  became  the  pioneer  and  unsurpassed  chief  of 
American  dogmatic  history.  And  to  ease  and  success  in 
discovering  and  handling  the  vast  apparatus  which  has 
passed  under  my  eye,  the  marvelous  bibliography  of  the 
great  historian  of  Congregational  polity,  Dr.  Henry  M. 
Dexter,  has  contributed  indispensable  aid.  Some  consider- 
able additions  to  Dr.  Dexter's  lists  will  be  found  in  the 
notes  tO'  the  following  text. 

Descendant  of  Puritan  and  Pilgrim  as  I  am,  born  and 
baptized  in  one  of  our  most  ancient  Massachusetts  churches, 
trained  at  our  oldest  university,  and  taught  my  profession 
at  the  center  of  intensest  interest  in  "the  New  England 
theology,"  it  would  be  strange  if  I  had  not  begun  this  history 
with  a  feeling  of  the  warmest  appreciation  of  our  New  Eng- 
land Fathers  and  a  conviction  that  they  had:  originated  a 
school  destined,  under  whatever  changes,  to  the  exercise  of 
a  long-extended  influence.  These  sentiments  are  reflected 
upon  the  earlier  pages  of  the  book  in  many  a  phrase  which 
I  have  left  standing.  With  the  progress  of  the  work  my 
point  of  view  and  my  feeling  have  changed  together.  The 
final  historical  review  of  the  whole  period  has  made  me 
a  critic  of  the  school  and  its  work,  and  led  me  tO'  the  per- 
ception of  a  fact  that  was  long  hidden  from  me^ — that  it 
was  not  without  reason  that  a  strong  reaction  set  in  against 
this  theology  about  the  year  1880.  I  find  myself  no  longer 
reckonable  to  its  adherents.  But  all  the  more  does  it  seem 
to  me  important  to  learn  from  this  great  movement  the 
lessons  it  has  to  teach  the  present  time  and  all  the  future,  to 
appropriate  its  good  and  to  avoid  its  evil.  And,  certainly, 
no'  American  theological  scholar  can  claim  tO'  understand 
the  course  of  religious  thought  among  us,  whoi  has  not 


PREFACE 


vii 


made  himself  familiar  with  this  greatest  indigenous  school 
of  American  theology. 

The  chief  peculiarity  of  the  style  of  the  book  is  the  large 
use  made  of  quotation  from  the  authors  discussed.  My 
object  has  been,  not  merely  to  secure  thereby  the  true  objec- 
tivity of  the  report  I  have  given,  but  also,  in  the  certainty 
that  very  few  of  my  readers  will  have  access  to  the  originals, 
tO'  give  them  an  acquaintance  at  first  hand,  though  brief, 
with  these  pioneers  and  fathers  of  our  theology. 

So  I  send  out  the  book;  and  to  the  historian's  com- 
mendation I  add  the  dogmatician's  exhortation  :  Prove  all 
things;  hold  fast  that  which  is  true. 

F.  H.  F. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

THE  HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND 

Introduction  

Rise  of  a  school  of  theology  in  southwestern  New  England.  Influ- 
ence upon  America.  Place  in  the  course  of  the  world's  thought. 
A  result  of  life.  Pursued  the  same  cycle  as  other  movements  else- 
where. A  homogeneous  school.  A  microcosm.  The  history  to 
be  genetic.    General  view. 

Chapter  I.    The  First  Century  in  New  England,  1620-1720 

John  Robinson.  Harmony  with  the  common  Calvinism  of  his  day. 
The  Puritans.  WiUiam  Pynchon's  book.  Norton's  reply.  Pyn- 
chon's  rejoinder.  Essentially  a  protest,  not  constructive.  Systems 
of  divinity  in  these  early  days.  Anne  Hutchinson.  Her  exaggera- 
tions of  Calvinism.  Confusion  upon  the  nature  of  faith.  Degenera- 
tion of  the  churches.  Depressing  preaching.  The  doctrine  of 
inability  to  repent.  Half- Way  Covenant.  Further  decKne.  Solo- 
mon Stoddard  and  the  Lord's  Supper.    Unconverted  ministry. 

JONATHAN  EDWARDS 

Chapter  II.    Edwards'  Earlier  Labors  

Edwards  the  man  for  his  times.  Early  intellectual  history.  His 
Calvinism.  Personal  qualifications  for  the  problem  before  him. 
Beginning  of  his  ministry.  Boston  sermon  in  1731.  Sermons  on 
Justification  in  1734.  Edwards'  conception  of  his  task.  Holds  to 
inability.    Treatise  on  the  Religious  Affections.    Witness  of  the 

L  Spirit.  Place  of  Christian  Experience.  QuaHfications  for  Com- 
munion. 

Chapter  III.    The  Treatise  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will 

Edwards'  view  of  the  fundamental  difficulty  of  the  times.  His  start- 
ing-point in  the  treatment  of  the  will.  Was  the  motive  an  efficient 
cause  ?  Division  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind.  Whitby  and  his 
theory  of  the  will.  Edwards'  reply.  Relation  to  Locke.  Substance 
of  Edwards'  work.  Edwards'  meaning.  Necessity.  Ability.  Lib- 
erty. The  reductio  ad  ahsurdum.  Criticism.  Service  of  the  work. 
Origin  of  evil.    Edwards'  place  in  the  history  of  this  doctrine. 

Chapter  IV.    Edwards'  Remaining  Metaphysical  Treatises  .  . 
John  Taylor's  Doctrine  of  Original  Sin,    Good  features  of  the  work. 
Its  true  meaning.    Various  repHes  to  Taylor.    Edwards'  reply.  The 

ix 


X 


CONTENTS 


argument.  Mediate  imputation.  All  sin  voluntary.  Connection 
of  the  race  with  Adam.  Results  for  New  England  theology.  Ed- 
wards' growth  as  a  constructive  theologian  and  controversialist. 
Dissertation  concerning  the  Nature  of  True  Virtue.  Previous  his- 
tory of  ethical  theory.  Cumberland.  Hutcheson.  Substance  of 
Edwards'  work.  Relation  to  the  previous  thinkers.  Summary  of 
Edwards'  services  to  theology. 

EDWARDS'  CONTEMPORARIES  AND  COLABORERS 

Chapter  V.    Joseph  Bellamy  107 

Bellamy  a  pastor.  Minor  tracts.  The  True  Religion  Delineated. 
Relation  to  the  theory  of  virtue.  Suggestions  as  to  ability.  Preach- 
ing immediate  repentance.  Original  sin.  Election.  This  not  arbi- 
trary. The  atonement.  Grotius  and  his  theory.  Introduction  of 
this  theory  into  New  England.  Connection  of  Grotius'  thought  with 
Bellamy's  view  of  God's  character.  Transfer  of  the  theory  to  the 
Grotian  standpoint.  General  atonement.  Total  depravity.  Treatise 
upon  the  permission  of  sin.  Connected  with  Edwards'  brief  treatment 
of  the  theme.  Philosophy  lacking.  Optimism.  "Sin  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good."  Moody's  attack.  Bellamy's  Vindica- 
tion. The  question  of  freedom.  Summary.  The  gain  the  school 
has  made. 

Chapter  VI.    Samuel  Hopkins  129 

Difference  between  Bellamy  and  Hopkins.  Hopkins'  first  tract  upon 
Si7i  an  Advantage  to  the  Universe.  Mayhew's  sermons  on  Striving 
to  Enter  the  Strait  Gate.  The  answer  of  his  error  to  be  derived  from 
the  new  theory  of  virtue.  Total  depravity  the  center  of  the  contest. 
Avoidance  of  philosophy  in  the  reply.  Nothing  short  of  immediate 
repentance  acceptable  with  God.  Controversy  with  Mills.  With 
William  Hart  and  Moses  Hemmenway.  The  new  treatise  upon  the 
Nature  of  Holiness.  Hopkins  identifies  sin  with  selfishness.  Will- 
ingness to  be  damned. 

Chapter  VIL    Hopkins'  System  of  Theology  162 

Hopkins'  learning.  His  agreement  with  the  past.  Idea  of  a  system. 
The  Scriptures.  Order  of  arguments  in  proof  of  the  existence  of 
God.  Trinity.  Greek  elements.  Modifying  ideas  of  Hopkins'  sys- 
tem. Treatment  of  freedom.  Progress  upon  Edwards.  The  doc- 
trine of  decrees.  God's  plan.  Leibnitzian  optimism.  Relation  of 
decrees  and  foreknowledge.  Hopkins'  supralapsarianism.  Original 
sin.  All  sin  voluntary.  Ability  and  inability.  The  atonement: 
objective;  Grotian  in  its  view  of  the  relation  of  God  to  the  sinner; 
Christ's  obedience  a  part;  general.  Regeneration.  Conversion. 
Saving  faith.    Imputation.    General  estimate  of  the  system. 


CONTENTS 


xi 


THE  DEVELOPING  SCHOOL 

Chapter  VIII.    Eschatology  and  Atonement  189 

Jonathan  Edwards  the  Younger.  Introduction  of  Universalism  into 
America.  Relly  and  John  Murray.  Huntington's  Calvinism  Im- 
proved. The  early  interest  of  the  New  England  school  in  eschatology. 
Edwards,  Bellamy,  Hopkins.  Good  to  arise  from  eternal  punishment. 
Hopkins'  unpopularity.  Number  of  the  lost.  Success  of  Murray. 
Smalley's  reply  to  Rellyanism.  Suggestion  of  a  new  theory  of  the 
atonement.  The  younger  Edwards'  sermons  introducing  the  new 
theory  to  general  acceptance.  Stephen  West.  Charles  Chauncy's 
Salvation  of  all  M en.  Edwards'  reply.  Its  relation  to  the  new  theory 
of  the  atonement.  Strong's  reply  to  Huntington.  Successive  steps 
in  the  development  of  the  New  England  theory  of  the  atonement: 
Emmons;  Grifhn;  Burge;  N.  W.  Taylor;  Finney.  Relation  of 
election  to  the  atonement.    Artificial  elements  of  the  doctrine  rejected. 

Chapter  IX.  The  Development  of  the  Theory  of  the  Will  .  .  .  224 
Early  modifications  of  Edwards.  Reception  of  Edwards'  theory. 
James  Dana  attacks  Edwards'  determinism.  Stephen  West's  reply. 
Driven  by  Dana  to  make  all  efficiency  to  reside  in  God.  Relation 
to  Hopkins.  Dana's  rejoinder.  Samuel  West's  reply  to  Stephen 
West.  First  proposal  of  the  threefold  division  of  the  faculties  of  the 
mind.  Good  statement  of  freedom.  Presses  Edwards  hard.  Why 
he  received  little  attention.  The  younger  Edwards  replies  to  Samuel 
West.  Does  not  accept  West's  suggestion  as  to  the  faculties  of  the 
mind.  New  explanation  of  the  elder  Edwards'  causation.  Edwards 
removes  efficient  causation  even  from  God.  Emmons  and  his  doc- 
trine of  created  free  volitions.  Burton's  Essays  introduce  a  new 
epoch.  Threefold  division  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind.  Burton's 
necessitarianism.  N.  W.  Taylor.  Previous  New  Haven  philosophy. 
Taylor  maintains  a  true  efficiency  in  second  causes.  "Power  to  the 
contrary."  Influence  of  motives.  "Certainty."  Relation  to  Ed- 
wards. Upham.  Place  in  American  philosophy.  The  laws  of  the 
will.  Freedom.  Finney:  the  argument  from  consciousness.  Fair- 
child  and  the  classification  of  motives.  Samuel  Harris  as  the  highest 
point  of  this  development.  Definitions  of  choice  and  freedom.  How 
was  Taylor's  proposal  of  freedom  to  be  received  in  Andover  ?  Ed- 
wards A.  Park.  Relation  to  Edwards.  Adopts  the  explanation  of 
Edwards  given  by  the  younger  Edwards.  Still  substantially  a  su- 
pralapsarian.  False  view  of  the  nature  of  God.  The  emphasis  of 
Park  really  thrown  upon  freedom.  Consequences  of  this.  The  dis- 
sonance never  reconciled  in  Park's  system.  The  doctrine  of  free- 
dom sacrificed  to  that  of  the  divine  perfection. 


xii 


CONTENTS 


THE  GREAT  CONTROVERSIES 

Chapter  X.    The  Unitarian  Controversy  273 

The  problem  before  New  England  theology  at  the  opening  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  Roots  of  the  Unitarian  controversy  reach  back 
to  the  beginning  of  EngHsh  Protestantism,  Change  in  England 
from  Arminianism  to  Unitarianism.  Emlyn's  Humble  Inquiry.  His 
real  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  the  two  natures  in  Christ.  Calvin- 
ism had  not  answered  this  objection.  King's  Chapel,  Boston,  be- 
comes Unitarian.  Jatnes  Freeman.  Timothy  Dwight.  The  Hollis 
professorship  at  Harvard  and  Henry  Ware.  Noah  Worcester's 
Bible  News.  The  year  181 5.  Summary  of  positions  then  held  by 
New  England  theology.  Channing's  Baltimore  sermon.  Attacks 
the  Trinity,  reiterates  Emlyn's  objection,  but  presents  no  distinct 
view  of  Christ  himself.  Channing's  relation  to  the  New  England 
school.  Stuart's  reply  to  Channing.  Emphasizes  the  numerical 
unity  of  the  Godhead.  Reduces  "personality"  to  "some  distinc- 
tion" in  the  Godhead.  Rejects  the  idea  of  eternal  generation. 
Discloses  the  essential  fallacy  of  Unitarianism.  Fails  to  answer  the 
peremptory  challenge  of  the  doctrine  of  the  two  natures.  The  true 
strength  of  the  orthodox  position.  Depotentiation  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  Trinity  as  a  result  of  the  controversy.  Andrews  Norton. 
His  Statement  of  Reasons.  Introduces  the  historical  argument.  His 
general  statement  of  the  Unitarian  position.  Woods's  Letters  to  Uni- 
tariafts.  Ware's  reply  to  Woods.  The  Unitarian  movement  begins 
in  the  doctrine  of  depravity.  Common  ground  between  the  Uni- 
tarians and  orthodox.  Reiteration  and  enforcement  of  the  Unitarian 
demand  for  a  rationale.  N.  W.  Taylor.  Summary  of  the  situation 
at  the  close  of  the  controversy. 

Ch.\pter  XL  The  Universalist  Controversy — Concluded  .  .  .316 
Progress  of  Universalism  to  Unitarianism.  Winchester.  His  doc- 
trine, ultimate  restoration  of  all.  Hosea  Ballou.  His  Atonement. 
Effected  the  transfer  to  Unitarianism.  His  final  doctrine,  no  future 
punishment.  Balfour's  exegetical  labors.  Popularity.  No  future 
punishment.  Numerous  replies.  Emmons.  Efforts  to  sustain  res- 
torationism.  Moses  Stuart  and  his  exegesis.  Final  repudiation 
of  Ballou  and  Balfour. 

Chapter  XII.  The  Systems  of  Theology,  1 800-1840  ....  340 
Form  of  Emmons'  system.  Effect  of  this  upon  the  system  itself. 
His  philosophy.  Park's  view  of  Emmons'  "  Berkeleianism."  Con- 
nection with  Hopkins.  Early  services  of  Emmons  in  the  contro- 
versies. Belongs  to  the  generation  before  the  Unitarian  controversy. 
His  doctrines  of  the  Trinity  and  Christology.    Eight  distinctive 


CONTENTS 


tenets  of  Emmons,  (i)  Holiness  and  sin  consist  in  free  voluntary 
exercises.  The  "exercise"  and  "taste"  schemes.  Burton's  theo- 
ries. Emmons' rephes.  (2)  Men  act  freely  under  the  divine  agency. 
Emmons'  appeal  to  two  separate  faculties  of  reason  and  conscious- 
ness. Does  not  distinguish  between  guilt  and  deformity,  nor  be- 
tween repentance  and  self-loathing.  (3)  The  least  transgression  of 
the  divine  law  deserves  eternal  punishment.  (4)  Right  and  wrong 
are  founded  in  the  nature  of  things.  (5)  God  exercises  mere  grace 
in  punishing  or  justifying  men  through  the  atonement  of  Christ 
and  mere  goodness  in  rewarding  them  for  their  good  works.  (6) 
Notwithstanding  the  total  depravity  of  sinners,  God  has  a  right  to 
require  them  to  turn  from  sin  to  holiness.  (7)  Preachers  of  the  gospel 
ought  to  exhort  sinners  to  love  God,  repent  of  sin,  and  beHeve  in 
Christ  immediately.  (8)  Men  are  active,  not  passive,  in  regenera- 
tion. 

Woods.  General  characteristics  of  his  system.  Mediating  position. 
The  "judicious"  divine.  Comparison  with  Emmons.  Holds  to 
the  "taste  scheme."    Summary  of  his  views. 

Dwight.  General  characteristics.  Conformity  to  the  New  England 
school.  Rejection  of  extremes.  Obscuration  of  the  philosophical 
element.  The  system  of  duties.  Founds  virtue  in  utility,  but  was 
not  a  "Utilitarian." 

THE  RIPENED  PRODUCT 

Chapter  XIII.    Nathaniel  W.  Taylor  

His  innovations  the  result  of  his  desire  to  defend  the  truth.  Place 
of  his  doctrine  of  the  will.  The  Concio  ad  Clerum.  His  position 
as  to  the  prevention  of  sin.  The  outworking  of  the  new  idea  of 
freedom.  (i)  The  controversy  with  Harvey.  Harvey's  inability 
to  understand  Taylor's  position  on  the  will.  His  further  misunder- 
standings. Taylor's  reply.  He  introduces  the  idea  of  a  true  moral 
government.  Taylor  unable  to  answer  fully  Harvey's  questions  as 
to  certainty  upon  the  basis  of  the  new  theory.  Taylor's  explana- 
tion of  the  origin  of  sin  in  the  child.  (2)  The  controversy  with 
Woods.  Incapable  of  understanding  Taylor.  Takes  himself  a 
middle  position  between  Hopkins  and  Taylor.  Difficulty  in  the 
subject  of  the  will.  Taylor's  reply.  Makes  Woods  agree  substan- 
tially with  himself.  (3)  Controversy  with  Tyler.  Spring  on  the 
means  of  regeneration.  Taylor's  review  of  Spring.  Taylor's  descrip- 
tion of  the  process  of  regeneration.  "Self-love."  A  neutral  point 
in  the  soul  to  which  motives  could  appeal.  Reply  of  Bennet  Tyler. 
Failure  to  understand  Taylor  and  the  reason  of  this.  Taylor  not 
without  blame.  Summary  of  Tyler's  positions.  Taylor's  reply. 
The  true  question,  What  is  a  free  moral  agent  ?    Further  course 


xiv 


CONTENTS 


of  the  controversy  without  practical  results.  Tyler's  positions  un- 
changed to  the  last.  Taylor's  change  in  his  positions  as  indicated 
by  his  posthumous  lectures.  Breaks  away  from  subjection  to  Ed- 
wards. Change  in  his  views  as  to  the  prevention  of  sin.  Place  of 
Taylor  in  the  history. 

Chapter  XIV.    The  Later  New  Haven  Theology  401 

Horace  Bushnell.  His  personality.  Qualifications  and  disqualifi- 
cations for  the  task  of  theological  construction.  His  theory  of  lan- 
guage. Emphasis  on  the  religious  life.  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity. 
Comparison  with  Ritschl.  Christian  nurture.  Bushnell  as  an 
apologist.  The  atonement.  Bushnell's  heroism.  Fisher.  Chiefly 
an  apologist.    Samuel  Harris. 

Chapter  XV.    The  New  School  in  Presbyterianism  430 

Relations  of  Congregationalism  and  Presbyterianism.  Lyman 
Beecher.  Effects  upon  him  and  other  Presbyterian  leaders  of  their 
obligation  to  the  Confession.  His  interpretation  of  Augustine. 
Henry  B.  Smith.  Pupil  of  Enoch  Pond.  Pond's  system.  Smith's 
relation  to  Emmons,  Pond,  and  Woods.  His  German  education. 
Remained  a  member  of  the  New  England  school.  Did  not  accept 
all  of  the  advanced  positions  of  the  school.  Theory  of  the  atone- 
ment. Does  not  follow  Taylor  in  his  modifications.  On  the  other 
hand,  has  nothing  himself  to  say  in  removing  defects  or  advancing 
the  New  England  system.  Smith  as  an  apologist.  Failure  to  under- 
stand the  new  age.  Shedd.  Reacts  from  the  New  England  school 
to  the  elder  Calvinism.  Albert  Barnes.  Agreed  substantially  with 
New  England.  General  atonement  the  central  doctrine  of  the 
gospel.  Light  cast  by  this  phase  of  our  theology  upon  its  true 
meaning. 

Chapter  XVI.    The  Oberlin  Theology  453 

Finney.  Relation  to  Taylor.  Early  accepted  the  main  New  England 
views.  The  rise  of  the  Oberlin  theory  of  sanctification.  Relation  to 
Edwards'  theory  of  original  sin.  The  simplicity  of  moral  action. 
Cochran's  discussion  of  the  subject.  The  contribution  of  this  dis- 
cussion to  New  England  theology.  The  doctrine  of  the  simplicity  of 
moral  action  not  original  in  Oberlin.  Emmons.  Finney's  system. 
Agrees  with  New  England  as  to  the  Scriptures,  the  existence  of  God, 
the  Trinity,  and  Christology.  The  foundation  of  the  theology  in 
free  will.  Moral  obligation.  Finney's  remarkable  agreement  with 
Taylor.    Rise  of  sin  in  the  child.    J.  H.  Fairchild. 

Chapter  XVII.    Edwards  A.  Park  471 

Place  of  Professor  Park  in  the  history  of  New  England  theology. 
Follows  the  Scotch  school  in  philosophy.    His  system.  Method 


CONTENTS 


XV 


and  spirit.  Distinguished  between  natural  and  revealed  theology. 
Method  in  obtaining  proof  of  the  Bible.  Proof  of  the  divine  be- 
nevolence. Method  of  this  proof.  ImmortaUty.  The  prevention 
of  sin.  Relation  to  Taylor.  The  divine  benevolence  God's  compre- 
hensive moral  attribute.  The  theory  of  virtue.  The  idea  of  justice. 
The  love  of  God  the  determining  principle  of  the  theology.  Proof 
of  the  Bible.  Rationalistic  character  of  this.  Preparation  for 
further  discussions.  Definition  of  inspiration.  Miracles.  The 
Trinity.  Proof  of  the  divinity  of  Christ  exclusively  scriptural.  Re- 
mains substantially  upon  Stuart's  ground.  Characterization  of  the 
"New  School."  Decrees.  Calvinism.  Doctrine  of  sin.  "Sin  consists 
in  sinning."  Definitions  of  sin.  The  proximate  occasion  of  sin,  cor- 
ruption or  original  sin.  The  remote  occasion,  the  fall  of  Adam. 
Our  connection  with  Adam  left  unexplained.  Hesitation  between 
the  taste  and  exercise  schemes.  The  atonement.  The  most  com- 
prehensive form  of  the  New  England  theory  ever  presented.  Re- 
generation. Does  not  follow  Taylor  fully  here.  Held  back  by  his 
allegiance  to  Edwards.  Means  of  regeneration.  The  "essential 
Christ."  The  author  of  regeneration.  Sanctification.  Utilitarianism. 
Eschatology. 

Conclusion  ,   .  543 

The  sudden  collapse  of  New  England  theology  as  an  accepted  system 
of  thought.  Calvinism,  apparently  essentially  aggressive,  really 
paralyzing  to  spiritual  activity.  Injurious  to  practical  rehgion. 
Calvinism  had  to  be  subjected  to  a  thorough  criticism  and  recon- 
struction. Attitude  of  the  early  New  England  fathers:  Calvinism 
substantially  right,  only  needing  restatement.  Things  effected  by 
the  theology  in  this  effort  at  restatement.  Ethicizing  the  theology. 
Familiarizing  the  mind  with  the  idea  of  modification.  This  con- 
stituted a  preparation  for  the  future.  But  New  ICngland  theology 
failed  (i)  when  it  sacrificed  freedom  to  the  Calvinism  of  the  system; 
(2)  when  it  failed  to  grasp  the  full  meaning  of  an  a  posteriori  method 
in  theology;  (3)  when  it  failed  to  answer  the  objections  put  to  it  by 
Unitarians  and  other  opponents.  Hence  it  was  unable  to  furnish 
methods  or  materials  for  the  new  epoch.    Hence  it  perished. 


THE  HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND 


INTRODUCTION 

Among  the  great  events  oi  the  eighteenth  century 
was  the  rise,  in  an  obscure  corner  of  the  civih'zed  world,  of 
a  new  school  of  theology.  The  place  was  southwestern 
New  England,  the  region  fed  intellectually  and  spiritually 
by  the  recently  founded  Yale  College.  The  leaders  were 
natives  of  New  England,  of  the  pure  English  stock,  edu- 
cated for  the  most  part  at  Yale — parish  ministers  in  small 
villages  and  hamlets,  and  occasionally  missionaries  upon 
the  near  frontier,  practical  religious  leaders  who  were  stim- 
ulated to  constructive  thought  by  definite  religious  neces- 
sities in  their  own  charges.  One  might  have  thought  that 
a  movement  so  originating  and  in  such  a  place,  far  from  the 
great  centers  of  thought  and  the  great  accumulations  of 
scholarly  material,  led  by  men  indifferently  trained,  could 
never  be  of  interest  to  the  Christian  world  beyond.  But 
New  England  was  destined  in  the  divine  providence  to  be- 
come the  principal  element  in  the  development  of  a  great 
nation;  and  the  theological  movement  begun  by  Jonathan 
Edwards  when  he  preached  his  sermons  upon  "Justification 
by  Faith"  in  Northampton,  in  1734,  acquired  an  impor- 
tance for  the  whole  Christian  civilization  when  it  became 
the  molding  force  of  a  great  part  of  the  constructive  re- 
ligious work  done  in  the  United  States  of  America.  For 
this  was  its  future.  It  became  the  dominating  school  of 
thought  in  New  England  Congregationalism,  and  this  de- 
nomination took  the  initiative  in  the  greatest  forward 
movements  of  American  Christianity  in  all  its  formative 
years.  In  foreign  missions,  in  home  missions,  in  the  found- 
ing and  equipping  of  theological  seminaries,  in  the  plant- 
ing of  colleges,  in  revivals,  in  denominational  co-operation, 
Congregationalism,  during  the  period  of  the  supremacy  in 

3 


4 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


its  midst  of  the  Edwardean  theology,  took  the  unquestioned 
lead  among  American  churches.  Its  practical  labors  grew 
directly  out  of  its  theology,  just  as  its  theology  grew  di- 
rectly out  of  its  practical  problems.  Thus  the  obscure 
fountain  widened  into  the  mighty  stream. 

In  its  wider  relations  and  its  deepest  sources  this  move- 
ment is  not  to  be  fully  comprehended  unless  it  is  put  in  its 
place  among  the  religious  movements  of  the  whole  Prot- 
estant world.  However  prominent  it  may  be  in  Ameri- 
can thought,  it  is  but  one  of  the  movements  which  have  be- 
gun here.  American  history  is  in  many  respects  unique. 
For  the  first  time  since  the  church  passed  out  from  the 
freedom  which  its  obscurity  and  weakness  had  given  it 
into  the  light  of  publicity  and  under  the  yoke  of  the  state, 
in  the  time  of  Constantine,  it  has  found  in  America  an  op- 
portunity on  a  large  scale  to  develop  its  thought  and  to 
form  its  life  under  the  unconstrained  operation  of  its  own 
inherent  forces.  At  the  same  time  a  multitude  of  problems 
of  the  most  weighty  kind  have  been  presented  to  it.  It  has 
not  only  had  a  new  country  to  subdue,  repeating  thus  in 
some  respects  the  problem  which  Rome  had  to  attempt 
after  the  beginning  of  the  German  migrations,  but  it  has 
had  conditions  to  meet  which  have  sprung  from  the  rise  of 
a  new  civilization  largely  made  by  itself  and  then  brought 
into  conflict  with  the  older  civilizations  of  Europe  as  main- 
tained by  myriads  of  immigrants.  While  its  problems  have 
been  chiefly  practical,  their  solution  has  reacted  upon  the 
formation  of  doctrine.  Far  from  hindering  the  modification 
of  theology  or  the  attainment  of  new  views  of  truth,  this 
attention  to  the  practical  has  favored  change  and  progress. 
Indeed,  such  has  always  been  the  case.  It  was  the  vigorous 
life  of  the  early  church  that  made  its  doctrinal  productivity 
so  great.  The  rise  of  the  missionary  orders  and  the  devel- 
opment of  Scholasticism  in  the  Middle  Ages  were  two 


INTRODUCTION 


5 


phases  of  the  same  vital  growth.  The  Reformation,  which 
was  first  of  all  a  movement  in  the  sphere  of  life,  was  also 
productive  of  the  greatest  development  of  systematic 
thought  which  the  church  has  seen  in  any  one  age.  It  has 
therefore  been  in  perfect  conformity  to  the  law  operating 
elsewhere  that  multitudes  of  speculations  have  arisen  in 
America,  resulting  sometimes  in  the  creation  of  new 
ecclesiastical  communions,  sometimes  in  the  development 
of  heresies,  sometimes  merely  in  the  formation  of  distinct 
theological  schools.  Some  have  perpetuated  themselves 
to  the  present  day;  many  have  perished  after  having  con- 
tributed their  portion  to  the  influences,  good  or  bad,  which 
are  forming  the  religious  life  of  the  nation.  And  such  is 
doubtless  to  be  the  course  of  things  through  a  long  period, 
the  end  of  which  is  far  beyond  the  limits  of  vision. 

But  the  relations  of  New  England  theology  are  not  ex- 
clusively, or  even  principally,  to  other  currents  of  thought 
in  America.  The  Reformation  united  the  great  nations  of 
the  Teutonic  family  which  it  took  out  of  the  fold  of  Rome 
by  a  community  of  interests,  not  only  political  and  religious, 
but  also  theological.  The  same  currents  of  thought  flow 
successively  through  them  all.  The  same  cycle  of  in- 
tellectual events  recurs  in  each.  Even  the  periods  are  re- 
markably coterminous.  Internal  forces  of  similar  char- 
acter in  some  cases,  in  others  the  direct  influence  of 
thought  communicated  by  all  the  methods  by  which  men 
exert  influence  upon  one  another,  lead  to  similar  results. 
Differences  of  language  and  customs  are  not  able  to  pre- 
vent this.  Remoteness  and  rarity  of  communication  do  not 
destroy  it.  Ties  of  blood  and  intimate  political  relations 
serve  only  to  facilitate  it.  The  channels  of  communication, 
like  subterranean  streams,  it  may  sometimes  be  impossible 
to  trace.    The  whole  phenomenon  depends  upon  a^id  illus- 


6 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


trates  the  fundamental  unity  of  Protestantism  amid  all  its 
superficial  diversity. 

Thus,  the  Reformation  in  Germany  as  a  constructive 
period  may  be  said  to  have  been  brought  to  a  close  by  the 
compilation  of  the  "Formula  of  Concord"  in  1577.  Upon 
construction  alwa3^s  follows  systematization,  and  the  next 
period  was  that  of  the  scholastic  Lutheran  orthodoxy,  the 
natural  course  of  which  was  interrupted  by  the  Thirty 
Years'  War,  which  brought  in  its  train  great  religious  de- 
moralization and  theological  deadness.  Pietism,  which 
began  with  Spener's  Collegia  Pietatis  in  1670,  was  an  un- 
successful attempt  to  revive  the  national  spiritual  life,  and 
resulted  in  scarcely  anything  more  than  helping  to  intro- 
duce the  rationalistic  movement,  which  began  about  1750 
and  terminated  about  the  time  of  Schleiermacher's  death 
in  1834.  The  restored  Lutheran  orthodoxy  has  since  that 
time  been  seeking  to  deepen  its  insight  into  the  Christian 
system,  and,  amid  the  distractions  of  a  peculiarly  unfavor- 
able position,  to  develop  the  life  of  the  church.  Construc- 
tion, systematization,  corruption,  restoration — such  are  the 
cycles  through  which  Lutheran  theology  ran. 

The  same  cycles  reappear  in  Calvinism.  It  had  its  con- 
structive period  in  Switzerland,  France,  and  Holland,  end- 
ing formally  in  the  Synod  of  Dort  in  16 18.  In  this  period 
was  embraced  its  first  great  conflict,  that  with  Arminian- 
ism.  Thereupon  follow  side  by  side  the  development  of 
scholastic  orthodoxy  and  that  of  Arminianism,  till  both  end 
in  theological  decay.  The  principal  arena  of  conflict  trans- 
ferred to  England,  where  for  more  than  a  century  the  re- 
formed theology  had  been  constructing  its  system,  and  had 
constantly  grown  more  Calvinistic  and  more  Puritan,  we 
have  for  a  time,  after  the  Synod  of  Dort,  the  theological 
struggle  merged  in  the  political,  till  Calvinism,  triumphant 
with  the^  triumph  of  Parliament,  could  formulate  its  theol- 


INTRODUCTION 


7 


ogy  in  the  Westminster  Confession  in  1646.  This  was  the 
period  of  the  great  systematic  divines.  It  is  overwhehned 
with  reverse  when  in  1660  Charles  II  brings  in  the  mon- 
archy again,  and  with  it  the  period  of  Latitudinarianism 
(1680-1700).  The  Latitudinarians  were  Arminian  in 
their  tendencies,  and  this  form  of  theology  may  be  said  to 
have  had  control  in  England  largely  during  the  eighteenth 
century  in  connection  with  an  Arian  movement,  both  con- 
stituting a  real  corruption  of  the  evangelical  theology  of 
Westminster.  But  in  the  same  century  an  evangelical 
Arminianism  under  the  lead  of  John  Wesley  (1738  ff.) 
began  the  movement  of  restoration,  as  a  result  of  which  a 
mild  Calvinism  prevailed  very  largely  in  the  churches  of 
England,  established  and  dissenting,  from  about  1800  to 
1832. 

The  fundamental  connection  of  New  England  with  all 
this  international  ferment  and  development  is  seen  in  the 
remarkable  fact  that,  in  spite  of  its  apparent  and  real  iso- 
lation, the  same  great  periods  of  theological  history  are 
repeated  here  with  almost  identical  dates.  The  Puritans 
and  Pilgrims  had  shared  in  the  constructive  period  of  Eng- 
lish Protestantism  at  home.  They  planted  New  England 
just  as  Puritanism  was  on  the  eve  of  triumph  in  the  moth- 
er-country, though  they  were  far  from  perceiving  this. 
They  shared  in  its  victory,  and  appropriated  its  results 
when  in  1648  they  adopted  the  Westminster  standards 
as  their  own.  They  had  their  period  of  theological  corrup- 
tion, arising  from  indigenous  causes,  but  also  originated 
and  promoted  in  part  by  influences  communicated  from  the 
debased  England  of  the  Restoration  after  the  year  1660. 
From  1720  to  1750  the  Arminian  tendencies  of  the  moth- 
er-country powerfully  affect  the  life  of  the  colonies.  In 
1750  these  begin  to  give  place  to  Arianism,  which  con- 
tinues to  be  a  threatening  force  within  the  New  England 


8 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


churches  till  the  year  1833.  ^^t  in  New  England  there 
is  a  more  immediate  reaction  against  theological  corruption 
than  in  either  Germany  or  England.  The  Arminian  move- 
ment is  met  almost  at  its  beginning  by  the  youthful  Jona- 
than Edwards  in  his  sermons  on  justification  in  1734, 
and  by  his  Freedom  of  the  Will  in  1754.  With  the  earlier 
of  these  dates  New  England  theology  as  a  distinct  school 
begins.  It  thus  long  antedates  the  labors  of  the  German 
Schleiermacher,  and  coincides  closely  with  the  conversion 
of  Wesley  (1738).  It  soon  develops  the  disposition  to  meet 
the  new  conditions  with  a  new  presentation  of  the  truth, 
which  is  the  principal  merit  of  Schleiermacher,  and  it  dis- 
plays the  same  devotion  to  evangelical  truth  and  to  the 
practical  work  of  saving  souls  which  appear  in  Methodism. 
Its  restoration  is  a  restoration  of  the  historic  Calvinism, 
which  it  modifies,  but  to  the  spirit  of  which  it  remains  true 
to  the  end. 

These  facts  show  how  fully  New  England  theology  is 
a  world-phenomenon.  Beginning  in  the  first  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  it  continued  till  late  in  the  nineteenth. 
Within  these  limits  it  was  always  in  motion.  It  struggled 
with  great  forces.  It  produced  great  treatises.  It  de- 
veloped great  truths.  It  inspired  great  activities.  But  it 
was  singularly  homogeneous,  since  it  derived  its  motive 
forces  from  a  single  source.  The  materials  with  which 
the  New  England  writers  wrought,  and  the  later  impulses 
which  they  received  from  various  quarters,  were  English, 
Puritan,  Calvinistic  exclusively.  Universalism,  which  like 
a  flint  struck  out  the  ablest  thoughts  which  New  England 
set  forth  upon  the  atonement,  was  an  English  distortion  of 
Calvinism.  Unitarianism,  which  furnished  the  occasion 
for  the  perfection  of  many  of  the  characteristic  New  Eng- 
land doctrines  in  anthropology,  was  transplanted  from 
England  to  America,  and  developed  in  the  isolation  of  a 


INTRODUCTION 


9 


country  which  knew  no  source  of  fruitful  ideas  but  the 
mother-land.  If  Moses  Stuart  dealt  with  German  writers, 
translated  German  grammars,  and  referred  copiously  to 
German  authorities  in  his  doctrinal  discussions,  it  is 
doubtful  whether  he  ever  received  a  single  dogmatic  idea 
from  any  source  outside  of  the  line  of  English  Puritan 
thought,  orthodox  and  unorthodox.  Nathaniel  W.  Taylor 
was  a  purely  American  product.  Edwards  A.  Park,  who 
had  studied  in  Germany  and  was  familiar  with  the  German 
language  and  literature,  introduces  no  materials  from  such 
quarters  into  his  theological  lectures.  Nevertheless,  New 
England  theology  was  a  world-phenomenon.  It  was  borne 
upon  the  same  currents  as  carried  the  theology  of  other 
lands  through  similar  rounds  of  degeneration  and  restora- 
tion. The  English  sources  upon  which  it  depended  were 
themselves  replenished  from  the  universal  Protestant 
thought.  Unknown  modes  of  communication  brought 
ideas  upon  invisible  wings  to  this  remote  corner  of  the 
world  from  many  another.  The  life  which  pulsates  in  all 
its  veins  is  the  one  life  of  all  Protestant  Christendom. 

This  double  interest,  therefore,  belongs  to  the  study  of 
New  England  theology:  that  of  a  restricted  subject  of  in- 
vestigation, where  the  phenomena  can  be  all  brought  into 
the  field  of  vision,  and  their  causal  connections  determined, 
and  that  of  a  significant  and  representative  movement,  in 
which  as  in  a  mirror  the  great  movements  in  the  onward 
march  of  the  world  are  reflected.  Even  the  microscopic 
can  be  microcosmic.  In  many  respects  New  England 
theology  is  a  microcosm. 

These  considerations  increase  our  sense  of  the  impor- 
tance of  its  study;  but  they  also  prescribe  the  method  of 
that  study.  It  is  a  growth,  a  development,  which  we  have 
before  us.  An  adequate  history  cannot,  therefore,  be  mere 
annals,  a  "chronicle,"  an  unconnected  heap  of  opinions.  A 


lo  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

history  of  doctrine  is  not  the  same  thing  as  a  register  o£ 
discordant  and  meaningless  theories.  Ideas  grow.  One 
writer  is  dependent  upon  another.  A  thought  is  found  in 
one  man  as  a  seed,  it  germinates  in  another,  it  comes  to 
form  and  fruitfulness  in  others.  The  stages  of  this  growth 
should  be  marked,  the  connections  of  these  men  noted. 
The  action  and  reaction  of  mind  upon  mind,  of  idea  upon 
idea,  is  the  interesting  thing  in  the  history.  A  true  history 
must  therefore  be  genetic.  Ideas  in  their  genesis,  their 
growth,  and  their  fruit  are  its  theme.  Not  all  of  the  opin- 
ions of  every  writer  need  to  be  considered  by  it,  but  what 
has  had  an  influence,  contributed  to  growth,  or  in  some 
way  carried  on  the  work  of  the  school  of  thought. 

The  object  of  this  book  is,  therefore,  to  construct  a  truly 
genetic  history  of  New  England  theology,  a  history  which 
shall  perform  the  service,  not  merely  of  recording  the  vari- 
ous distinguishing  views  of  the  several  writers,  but  of  set- 
ting forth  their  productive  work  in  the  circumstances  un- 
der which  they  developed,  in  comparison  with  the  errors 
which  they  were  designed  tO'  meet,  in  their  consistency  with 
other  views  which  the  writers  held,  and  in  their  connection 
with  the  theolqgy  which  has  sprung  out  of  them  as  produc- 
tive intellectual  causes. 

The  story  begins  with  the  first  landing  of  immigrants 
upon  the  New  England  shores,  and  traces  the  history  of 
the  first  century  as  the  background  upon  which  the  growth 
of  the  New  England  theology  proper  is  to  be  depicted,  a 
century  in  which  the  natural  results  of  the  defective  theo- 
ries of  the  original  Calvinism  of  England  and  New  Eng- 
land united  with  the  universal  tendencies  of  frontier  life  to 
produce  degeneration  and  decay.  The  influence  of  theo- 
logical degeneration  in  the  mother-country,  with  its  Deism 
and  Arminianism,  contributed  to  accelerate  the  downward 
movement.     The  protagonist  of  the  theological  revival 


INTRODUCTION 


II 


was  Jonathan  Edwards,  who,  dying  in  1758,  left  to  his  two 
friends,  Hopkins  and  Bellamy,  the  task  of  extending  and 
developing  the  new  views  of  truth  which  he  had  more 
suggested  than  formulated.  Before  Hopkins  left  the  stage, 
the  controversy  with  the  original  Universalists,  in  which 
the  younger  Jonathan  Edwards  was  the  leader,  was  in  full 
course.  Then  came  with  the  beginning  of  the  last  century 
the  Unitarian  controversy,  with  its  attendant  development 
of  anthropology.  The  school  of  Taylor,  its  antagonism 
against  Tylerism,  the  rupture  with  Presbyterianism,  the 
foundation  of  Oberlin,  till  we  have  at  last  the  Andover  of 
Park  and  the  Oberlin  of  Fairchild,  crowd  the  scene  with  a 
various  and  brilliant  succession  of  figures  of  the  highest 
interest  and  importance.  Such  is  the  theme  of  this  work 
in  briefest  outline,  and  to  its  development  the  history  may 
now  turn  without  further  delay. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND,  1620-1720 

The  first  immigrants  to  New  England  were  the  Pilgrim 
Fathers,  who  landed  at  Plymouth  in  1620.  Though  the 
church  collected  at  Scrooby  was  the  direct  result  of  the 
Puritan  movement  in  the  English  universities,  the  Pilgrims 
were  for  the  most  part  themselves  of  humble  origin,  and 
were  little  fitted  to  contribute  much  to  the  theological  de- 
velopment of  the  new  state.  There  is  but  one  figure  among 
them  of  sufficient  intellectual  eminence  to  engage  the  at- 
tention of  subsequent  generations,  that  of  John  Robinson,^ 
the  pastor  of  the  Httle  flock  at  Leyden,  who  was  member 
of  two  universities,  and  a  foremost  disputant  in  the  ranks 
of  the  defenders  of  Congregationalism.  His  heroic  devo- 
tion to  principle,  the  picturesque  vicissitudes  of  his  career, 
his  intellectual  power  and  breadth,  his  prophetic  vision,  and 
above  all  his  sincere  and  deep  piety,  made  him  a  constant 
subject  of  quotation  and  an  acknowledged  authority 
among  all  the  New  England  churches. 

The  writings  of  Robinson  which  have  come  down  to 
us  ^  are  chiefly  occupied  with  those  matters  which  lay  near- 
est to  his  heart  as  a  Separatist.  We  have  thus  a  long  and 
elaborate  discussion  of  ecclesiastical  polity,  treating  nearly 
all  the  topics  in  controversy  between  the  Independents  and 
the  Church  of  England.  There  is,  however,  one  consider- 
able treatise  upon  doctrinal  theology,  the  Defence  of  the 

^  Born  1575;  died  in  Leyden,  1625;  graduated  at  Cambridge;  bec&me  a 
fellow  in  1598-99;  minister  in  Norfolk  in  the  English  church;  suspended  for 
scruples  about  vestments,  etc.  ;  ministered  some  time  secretly  to  the  congregar 
tion  at  Scrooby;  emigrated  with  them  to  Holland  in  1608;  member  of  the 
University  of  Leyden,  161 5.  Discussed  Arminianism  publicly  with  Episcopius. 
See  the  "Life"  in  the  edition  of  his  works.  (This  chapter  originally  appeared  in 
the  American  Journal  of  Theology.) 

2  Collected  in  an  edition  entitled  The  Works  of  John  Robinson,  etc.,  with 
Memoir,  etc.,  by  Robert  Ashton,  3  vols.  (London,  1851). 


12 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


13 


Doctrine  Propounded  by  the  Synod  at  Dort,  which  serves 
to  show  the  harmony  of  doctrinal  view  between  the  Sepa- 
ratists and  the  Puritan  movement  in  general,  and  later  ex- 
erted a  positive  influence  in  prolonging  that  harmony 
throughout  New  England.  It  is  what  it  purports  to  be, 
strictly  a  "defence,"  and  in  no  respect  goes  beyond  the  com- 
mon Calvinism  of  the  day,  or  rises  above  its  level.  It  is 
completely  deficient  in  the  philosophical  element;  but  this 
is  less  to  be  wondered  at  in  an  age  when  Descartes  had  not 
yet  introduced  the  methods,  and  called  forth  the  spirit,  of 
modern  philosophy.  It  is,  therefore,  scarcely  necessary  to 
dwell  upon  this,  the  first  in  the  long  series  of  doctrinal 
treatises  produced  by  the  Congregational  leaders.  It  may 
be  dismissed  with  the  following  brief  extracts,  which  will 
be  suflicient  to  exhibit  its  flavor  and  distinguishing  char- 
acteristics. 

Robinson's  reticence  upon  one  of  the  great  perplexities 
of  theology  is  indicated  m  the  following  passage : 

If  any  demand  how  this  can  be,  that  God  who  forbiddeth  and  hateth 
sin,  yet  should  so  order  persons  and  things,  by  his  providence,  and 
so  from  eternity  purpose  to  order  them,  as  that  the  same  cannot  but 
be?  I  answer,  by  free  acknowledgment,  that  the  manner  of  God's 
working  herein  is  to  me,  and  to  all  men,  inconceivable ;  and  withal 
avouch,  that  he,  who  will  not  confess,  that  God  can,  and  could  in 
Adam's  sin,  by  his  infinite  wisdom  and  power,  most  effectually,  and 
infallibly,  in  regard  of  such  event,  order  and  dispose  of  things,  with- 
out violation  to  his  holiness,  or  violence  to  the  creature's  will,  as  no 
mortal  man  is  able  to  conceive  the  manner  thereof,  is  himself  in  a 
high  degree  guilty  of  that  pride  which  was  Adam's  ruin,  by  which 
he  desired  to  be  as  God  in  knowledge.  Gen.,  chap.  3.  Who  is 
able  to  understand  the  manner  of  God's  working,  in  giving  the  Holy 
Ghost  to  man,  and  in  directing  the  tongues  and  pens  of  the  proph- 
ets infallibly,  and  so  as  they  could  not  err?  Much  less  discern- 
ible is  God's  manner  of  working  in,  and  about  the  creature's 
sinful  actions.  And  because  many  take  great  offense  at  this  doc- 
trine of  truth  and  work  of  God,  I  will,  the  Lord  assisting  me,  plainly 
and  briefly  as  I  can,  prove  that  all  events,  even  those  most  sinful,  in 
regard  of  the  creature's  work  in,  and  of  them,  come  to  pass  neces- 


14 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


sarily,  after  a  sort,  in  respect  of  God's  providence,  as  being  a  hand 
steady  and  which  swerveth  not,  in  ordering  the  creature  in  and  unto 
the  same. 3 

He  thinks  that  the  alleged  inconsistency  of  God's  com- 
manding Adam  not  to  sin,  and  yet  decreeing  that  he  should 
sin,  is  sufficiently  removed  by  the  following  distinctions : 

For  us,  we  do  not  hold,  that  God  decreed  Adam's  sin,  as  they 
conceive,  that  is,  either  to  approve  it  or  command  it  or  compel 
unto  it,  nothing  less;  but  we  affirm  that  God  decreed  to  leave  Adam 
to  himself,  in  the  temptation  and  not  to  assist  him  with  that  strength 
of  grace,  by  which  he  could,  if  he  would,  have  upheld  him;  and  so 
to  order  both  him  and  all  things  about  him,  in  that  his  temptation, 
as  that  he,  by  the  notion  and  sway  of  his  own  free  will  following  his 
natural  appetite  to  the  pleasant  but  forbidden  fruit  and  that  false 
persuasion  wherewith  his  understanding  was  by  Satan  overclouded, 
should  both  choose  and  eat  the  forbidden  fruit.* 

There  is  an  evident  struggle  in  his  mind  to  maintain  a 
certain  freedom  of  the  will  of  man  from  compulsion,^  and 
in  general  to  hold  to  that  more  generous  type  of  theology 
characteristic  of  English  Puritanism  in  distinction  from 
continental.^  Thus  he  is  distinctly  sublapsarian,"''  though 
he  holds  firmly  to  a  limited  atonement.^  But  when  all 
credit  for  the  influence  upon  his  system  of  clearer  intui- 
tions of  truth,  or  of  the  plain  common-sense  of  which  he 
had  a  considerable  share,  has  been  given,  the  general  ac- 
cord of  the  whole  with  that  extreme  application  of  the  doc- 
trine of  divine  sovereignty  and  of  the  helplessness  of  man 
which  was  to  spread  a  deadly  paralysis  through  all  the 
spiritual  life  of  New  England,  is  apparent  from  such  pas- 
sages as  the  following: 

They  [Calvinists]  believe,  as  the  Scriptures  teach,  that  all  men  in 
Adam  have  sinned,  Rom.  5:12-15;  and  by  sin  lost  the  image  of  God 

3  Robinson,  Works,  Vol.  I,  pp.  274,  275. 
*  Ibid.,  pp.  280,  281. 
5  Ibid.,  pp.  274  et  al. 

«  Compare  the  Westminster  Confession,  chaps,  iii,  ix,  and  x. 

Works,  Vol.  I,  p.  289. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  329. 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND  15 


in  which  they  were  made;  so  as  the  law  is  impossible,  Rom.  8:3; 
unto  them  by  reason  of  the  flesh,  and  so  cannot  possibly  but  sin,  by 
reason  of  the  same  flesh  reigning  in  the  unregenerate,  and  dwelling 
in  all :  which  these  light  persons,  expressly  confess  .  .  ,  .  :  and  that 
this  so  comes  to  pass  by  God's  holy  decree,  and  work  of  providence 
answerable,  not  forcing  evil  upon  any,  but  ordering  all  persons  in 
all  actions,  as  the  supreme  Governor  of  all :  and  that  the  wicked, 
being  left  of  God,  some,  destitute  of  the  outward  means,  the  gospel; 
all  of  them,  of  the  effectual  work  of  the  Spirit,  from  that  weak 
flesh,  and  natural  corruption,  daily  increased  in  them,  sin  both  neces- 
sarily as  unable  to  keep  the  law,  and  willingly,  as  having  in  themselves 
the  beginning  and  cause  thereof,  the  blindness  of  their  own  minds,  and 
perverseness  of  their  will  and  affections;  and  so  are  inexcusable  in 
God's  sight.9 

The  founding  of  the  Massachusetts  colony,  about  ten 
years  later  than  the  Plymouth,  brought  a  different  class  to 
New  England.  There  were  many  men  of  education  and 
wealth  among  the  laymen  of  Boston,  and  its  clergymen 
were  largely  university  men,  well  read  in  divinity,  and  in- 
tense in  their  attachment  to  the  Calvinistic  system.  The 
overthrow  of  the  monarchy  in  England  resulted  in  1646  in 
the  formation  of  the  Westminster  standards.  They  were 
hardly  issued  when  they  were  adopted  in  Massachusetts 
(1648)  as  the  general  standard  of  doctrine  among  the 
churches,  and  v/ere  later  (1708)  welcomed  in  Connecticut 
with  equal  cordiality.  Old  Calvinism,  shaped  by  the  pre- 
vailing acceptance  of  the  Westminster  Confession,  contin- 
ued to  be  the  dominant  and  well-nigh  unchallenged  system 
in  the  New  England  churches  even  after  Arminianism  had 
begun  to  make  serious  inroads  at  the  beginning  of  the 
eighteenth  century. 

For  a  while  there  could,  of  course,  be  little  theological 
production  amid  the  labors  of  subduing  the  wilderness. 
The  standard  writers  of  the  old  countries  were  enough  for 
the  time.    Among  these  Wollebius,^^  a  sublapsarian,  free 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  398  f. 

Compendium  theologiae  christianae,  etc.,  published  in  many  editions,  1633 
and  subsequently.     In  1650  it  was  translated. 


i6  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

from  the  deformities  of  scholasticism,  and  Ames/^  whose 
Medulla  was  employed  as  a  textbook  in  the  colleges,  were 
the  principal  favorites.  Indigenous  production  was  called 
forth  by  a  cause  of  a  somewhat  startling  and  unpleasant 
nature.  This  was  the  appearance  of  a  book  entitled  The 
Meritorious  Price  of  Our  Redemptionj^^  by  a  layman,  a 
man  of  considerable  prominence  as  the  founder  of  Spring- 
field, William  Pynchon,^^  which  contained  sentiments  too 
much  at  variance  with  the  current  system  to  be  received 
with  equanimity.  It  was  the  first  outbreak  of  the  independ- 
ent spirit  of  Congregationalism,  and  it  was  sternly  sup- 
pressed. The  book  was  first  burned,  and  then  refuted  by 
order  of  the  General  Court,  and  Mr.  Pynchon  found  it  con- 
venient to  return  to  England,  where  he  died. 

Pynchon's  work  was  the  protest  of  plain  common-sense 
against  the  current  representations  of  the  atonement  which 
taught  that  Christ  suffered  the  very  torments  of  the  lost, 
and  against  the  theory  of  imputation  upon  which  such 
representations  depended.  He  objected  most  strongly  to 
these  ideas  because  they  involved  the  thought  that  Christ 
bore  the  wrath  of  God,  whereas  in  fact  his  sufferings  were 
inflicted  upon  him  by  the  rage  and  enmity  of  "the  old  ser- 
pent." His  argument  is  principally  scriptural,  and  is  de- 
rived both  from  the  silence  of  Scripture,  which  relieves  us 
from  the  necessity  of  believing  that  Christ  suffered  the  in- 
finite wrath  of  God,  and  from  its  positive  affirmations, 
which  he  often  discusses  at  great  length.  It  is,  further,  not 
necessary  that  Christ  should  bear  the  punishment  of  our 

1^  Medulla  theologica,  etc.     (Amsterdam,   1623) ;  many  editions  subsequently. 

^2  Published  in  London,  1650.  The  refutation  by  John  Norton  was  entitled: 
A  Discussion  of  That  Great  Point  in  Divinity,  The  Sufferings  of  Christ,  etc. 
(London,  1653). 

1^  An  incorporator  of  the  Massachusetts  Company;  came  to  America  in 
1630;  first  settled  at  Dorchester,  then  at  Roxbury;  was  soon  treasurer  of  the 
colony;  emigrated  to  Springfield  in  1636;  returned  to  England  in  1652;  died 
October  29,  1662. 

14  "Preface  to  the  Reader.'* 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


17 


sins,  since  his  obedience  is  enough  to  satisfy  for  the  sins  of 
the  elect.  We  see  thus  that  Pynchon  did  not  abandon  the 
idea  of  a  Hmited  atonement.^^  And  then  Christ  could  not 
suffer  the  pains  of  hell,  for  they  consist  either  in  the  "pain 
of  loss,"  or  separation  from  God,  which  he  did  not  suffer, 
or  in  the  "pain  of  sense,"  which  consists  in  eternal  suffer- 
ings, which  also  he  did  not  suffer.  He  gives  utterance  to  an 
axiomatic  truth,  afterwards  to  play  a  considerable  part  in 
New  England :  "The  rule  of  God's  justice  doth  require  that 
soul  only  to  die  which  sins  ....  Ezek.,  chap.,  18.  By 
this  rule  of  justice  God  cannot  inflict  the  torments  of  hell 
upon  an  innocent,  to  redeem  a  guilty  person."  He  also 
suggests  the  word  "chastisement"  as  a  suitable  one  to  de- 
scribe the  nature  of  Christ's  sufferings.  Against  imputa- 
tion, he  urges  its  injustice,  for  God's  imputation  is  always 
connected  with  guiltiness ;  and  also  the  fact  that  imputation 
would  destroy  the  possibility  of  Christ's  being  a  redeemer, 
for  the  redemption  consists  in  the  mediatorial  obedience, 
and  Christ  would  then  have  been  a  disobedient  sinner. 
Pynchon  then  goes  on  to  say: 

That  which  Christ  did  to  redeem  us  from  the  curse  of  the  law 
was  not  by  bearing  the  said  curse  really  in  our  stead  (as  the  com- 
mon doctrine  of  imputation  doth  teach),  but  by  procuring  his  Father's 
atonement  by  the  invaluable  price  or  performance  of  his  own  media- 
torial obedience,  whereof  his  mediatorial  sacrifice  of  the  atonement 
was  the  finishing  masterpiece.  This  kind  of  obedience  was  that  rich 
thing  of  price  which  the  Father  required  and  accepted  as  satisfactory 
for  the  procuring  of  his  atonement  for  our  full  redemption,  justifica- 
tion, and  adoption. 1^ 

And  then  he  adds,  with  an  idea  closely  akin  to  that  of 

Anselm,  if  not  actually  a  filtration  down  through  the  ages 

from  that  first  great  writer  upon  this  theme : 

God  the  Father  was  more  highly  pleased  with  the  obedience  of 
the  Mediator  than  he  was  displeased  with  the  disobedience  of  Adam. 

Op.  cit.,  p.  2;  cf.  pp.  87,  88. 
Ibid.,   p.  81. 
Ibid.,  pp.  83,  84. 


i8 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


If  so,  then  there  is  no  need  that  our  blessed  Mediator  should  pay  both 
the  price  of  his  mediatorial  obedience  and  also  bear  the  curse  of  the 
law  really  for  our  redemption.  I  never  heard  that  ever  any  Turkish 
tyrant  did  require  such  a  double  satisfaction  of  any  redeemer  for 
the  redemption  of  galley  slaves  ....  to  pay  both  the  full  price  which 
they  demanded  for  this  redemption  of  their  galley  slaves  and  to  bear 

the  punishment  of  their  curse  and  slavery  also  in  their  stead  

Why  then  doth  the  doctrine  of  imputation  make  God  the  Father  to 
be  a  harder  creditor  in  the  point  of  satisfaction  than  ever  any  rigid 
creditor  was  among  men?  ....  The  gross  substance  of  that  blood 
that  was  shed  ....  is  not  to  be  taken  by  itself  alone  considered  for 

that  precious  price  We  must  take  the  blood  of  Christ  .  .  .  , 

for  his  mediatorial  obedience.^^ 

Pynchon  consistently  rejected  the  imputation  of  Christ's 
obedience  to  the  beHever,  which  he  thinks  inconsistent  with 
justice  as  well  as  useless,  for  ''the  law  binds  every  singular 
person  to  perform  exact  obedience  by  his  own  natural 
power,  without  any  help  from  any  surety  whatsoever,  or 
without  any  supernatural  help  of  faith."  Besides,  the 
active  obedience  of  Christ  cannot  be  imputed  to  us  for  a 
variety  of  reasons.  He  did  not  perform  all  the  acts  re- 
quired of  us,  since  he  did  not  enter  all  the  conditions  of  life. 
Then,  he  was  bound  to  obey  for  himself,  and  the  acts  of  his 
legal  obedience  were  not  mediatorial.  Pynchon  also  ex- 
plains the  true  nature  of  justification  as  consisting  simply 
in  "the  Father's  merciful  atonement,  pardon,  and  forgive- 
ness. It  is  a  gracious  acquittal,  as  when  a  father  forgives 
his  son  and  receives  him  into  favor." 

Norton  in  his  refutation  of  Pynchon  thus  expressed  his 
own  doctrine. 

The  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  as  God-man  mediator  according  to  the 
will  of  the  Father  and  his  own  voluntary  consent,  fully  obeyed  the 
law,  doing  the  command  in  a  way  of  works  and  suffering  the  essen- 
tial punishment  of  the  curse  [note  the  word  "essential"]  in  a  way 
of  obedient  satisfaction  unto  divine  justice,  thereby  explicitly  fulfill- 
ing the  first  covenant;  which  active  and  passive  obedience  of  his, 
together  with  his  original  righteousness  as  a  surety,  God  of  his  rich 

18  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  84,  85. 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


19 


g-ace  actually  imputeth  unto  believers,  whom  upon  the  receipt  thereof 
by  the  grace  of  faith,  he  declaretb  and  accounteth  as  perfectly  right- 
eous, and  acknowledgeth  them  to  have  right  unto  eternal  life. 

The  reply  was  keen  and  able,  but  it  was  simply  a  defense 
of  the  old  theology  according  to  the  command  of  the  Gen- 
eral Court,  and  added  nothing  to  the  common  understand- 
ing of  the  theme.  In  a  personal  interview  with  him,  Nor- 
ton seems  to  have  made  more  impression  upon  Pynchon, 
for  in  a  communication  to  the  General  Court  he  stated 
that  he  was  now  "inclined  to  think  that  his  [Christ's]  suf- 
ferings were  appointed  by  God  for  a  further  end,  namely, 
as  the  due  punishment  of  our  sins  by  way  of  satisfaction  to 
the  divine  justice."  After  his  return  to  England  he  re- 
curred to  the  theme,  publishing  in  1655  ^  Further  Discus- 
sion of  That  Great  Point  in  Divinity,  The  Suiferings  of 
Christ,  etc.,  in  which  he  reaffirmed  his  old  positions.  He 
tried  to  do  something  in  the  way  of  a  development  of  the 
doctrine,  bringing  out  with  more  distinctness  the  fact  that 
Christ^s  sufferings  were  not  substitutionary,  since  they  do 
not  fulfil  the  covenant  made  with  Adam,  but  a  new  one 
''made  by  the  persons  of  the  Trinity  from  eternity."  And 
he  finally  expresses  his  own  theory  somewhat  more  fully 
in  the  following  language.  Referring  to  his  former  trea- 
tise, he  says: 

The  dialogue  doth  ....  oppose  the  way  of  vindicative  justice; 
but  yet  it  makes  all  Christ's  sufferings  to  be  performed  in  a  way  of 
justice  according  to  the  order  of  justice  in  the  voluntary  cause  and 

covenant  The  dialogue  ....  shows  from  God's  declaration  in 

Gen.  3:15,  that  the  devil  must  combat  against  the  seed  of  the  de- 
ceived woman,  and  that  Christ  in  his  human  nature  must  combat 
against  him  and  break  his  head  plot  by  continuing  obedient  to  the 
death,  and  that,  therefore,  his  sufferings  and  death  were  meritorious 
because  it  was  all  performed  in  a  way  of  justice,  namely,  in  exact 
obedience  to  all  the  articles  of  the  voluntary  covenant.^o 

Thus  Pynchon's  work  was  one-sided,  incomplete,  and 

1®  Massachusetts  Records,  Vol.  IV,  Part  I,  p.  48. 
Further  Discussion,   p.  176. 


20 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


immature.  It  was  essentially  a  protest,  not  in  any  way  a 
constructive  effort.  It  had  no-  immediate  effect  in  producing 
modification  of  theory  in  New  England,  for  most  of  the 
following  writers  pass  over  all  he  said  as  if  they  had  never 
heard  of  him,  or  at  least  never  read  him;^^  and  doubtless 
few  had.  No  trace  of  positive  influence  exerted  upon  the 
later  New  England  writers  has  yet  been  discovered.  The 
book  seems  to  have  exhaled  its  life  in  the  flames  in  which 
it  was  burned  upon  Boston  market  place.  But  the  same 
sturdy  protest  against  scholastic  deformations  of  Christian 
doctrine  was  at  a  later  day  to  receive  a  more  cordial  hear- 
ing. 

If  Pynchon  thus  exerted  little  positive  influence,  it 
seems  to  have  been  due  to  the  stimulus  afforded  by  such  a 
phenomenon  as  heresy  in  New  England  that  there  soon 
began  to  be  a  series  of  systematic  treatises  upon  divinity, 
John  Norton,^^  who  had  refuted  Pynchon  in  1653,  appear- 
ing with  his  Orthodox  Evangelist  in  1654.  This  book, 
though  small — for  it  comprises  but  355  quarto  pages — pos- 
sesses a  high  degree  of  minuteness,  accuracy,  and  techni- 
cality. Its  epistle  dedicatory  expresses  confidence  in  the 
progress  of  the  truth.  "Even  fundamental  truths  .... 
have  been  and  shall  be  transmitted  more  clear  from  age  to 
age  in  the  times  of  reformation."  The  body  of  the  work 
begins  with  chapters  upon  the  divine  essence  and  the  Trin- 

*i  Charles  Chauncy,  in  a  volume  of  sermons  (1659)  entitled  in  Hebrew 
The  Lord  Our  Righteousness,  says  (pp.  52,  53) :  "Christ  by  way  of  satisfaction 
for  sinners  suffered  the  full  and  utmost  punishment  due  to  the  sins  of  the 
elect  ....  the  punishment  of  the  second  death."  John  Eliot,  in  The  Har- 
mony of  the  Gospels  in  the  Holy  History  of  the  Humiliation  and  Sufferings  of 
Jesus  Christ  (1678),  teaches  that  Christ  suffered  the  pains  of  hell,  using  the 
distinction  which  Norton  had  employed  between  a  "penal"  and  a  "local"  hell 
(p.  119). 

22  Born  in  Stortford,  England,  May  6,  1606;  educated  at  Cambridge;  came 
in  1635  to  Plymouth,  Mass.,  but  soon  became  the  minister  of  Ipswich;  in  1652 
became  associate  minister  in  Boston;  sent  to  England  after  the  restoration  to 
assure  the  king  of  the  loyalty  of  Massachusetts;  returning,  died  at  Boston, 
April  5,  1663. 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND  21 


ity,  and  closes  with  a  treatment  of  the  state  of  the  blessed ; 
but  it  is  chiefly  occupied  with  the  discussion  of  the  way  of 
salvation,  thus  foreshadowing  the  interest  in  anthropologi- 
cal themes  characteristic  of  New  England  divinity.  On  the 
order  of  the  decrees  it  is  predominantly  supralapsarian.  On 
the  will  it  teaches  that  "the  liberty  of  man,  though  subordi- 
nate to  God's  decree,  freely  willeth  the  very  same  thing  and 
no  other  than  that  which  it  would  have  willed  if  (upon  a 
supposition  of  impossibility)  there  had  been  no  decree."^^ 
Again:  ''Man  acts  as  freely  as  if  there  were  no  decree;  yet 
as  infallibly  as  if  there  were  noi  liberty."  There  is  no 
theory  of  the  will,  properly  speaking,  though  Norton  finds 
some  help  in  the  idea  that  the  will  is  a  second  cause.  He 
rejects  the  "indifferency  of  the  will  to  act  or  not  to  act  in- 
dependent of  the  decree,"  but  has  no  positive  theory  to 
offer,  and  upon  the  allied  subject  of  conversion  is  led  by  his 
desire  to  meet  the  Arminians  to  lay  so  much  stress  upon 
divine  sovereignty  as  to  emphasize  passivity  in  Conversion 
overmuch. 

Isaac  Chauncy  published  in  1694  The  Doctrine  Which 
is  according  to  Godliness,  etc.,  which  was  a  system  of  divin- 
ity in  the  form  of  question  and  answer,  upon  the  basis  of 
the  Westminster  Catechism.  It  was  a  vigorous  and  inde- 
pendent work,  in  complete  conformity  to  the  Westminster 
standards  in  every  important  point.  On  the  will  Chauncy 
says  that  God's  decree  "maintains  the  liberty  of  the 
creature's  will,  that  all  free  agents  act  as  freely  according 
to  the  decree  as  agents  by  necessity  do  act  necessarily." 
For  the  sake  of  maintaining  the  true  deity  of  Christ,  he 
even  ventured  to  contradict  the  Nicene  Creed.  "The  Father 
doth  not  communicate  Godhead  in  begetting,  but  Sonship 
only.    It  is  very  improper  to  say  Christ  is  God  of  God  [the 

Evangelist,  pp.  74-76. 
2*  Son  of  Charles,  president  of  Harvard  College. 


22  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Nicene  phrase],  but  every  person  is  essentially  absolutely 
first,  having  the  whole  Godhead  in  it." 

There  exists  in  manuscript  in  the  library  of  the  Massa- 
chusetts Historical  Society  A  Whole  Body  of  Divinity  in  a 
Catechetical  Way  by  Samuel  Stone,^^  of  Hartford,  copied 
by  Samuel  Willard,^^  marked  by  the  same  originality  of 
expression  and  the  same  agreement  with  Westminster.  It 
serves  to  continue  the  line  of  systematic  writers  to  Willard 
himself,  who  from  1688  to  1707  delivered  a  course  of  ex- 
pository lectures  upon  the  Shorter  Catechism  which  was 
published  in  1726  in  a  folio  of  914  pages,  under  the  title 
of  A  Complete  Body  of  Divinity.  It  is  a  big,  but  not  a 
great,  work.  In  the  treatment  of  the  Scriptures  he  re- 
verses the  order  of  the  proof  as  given  in  the  Confession, 
putting  the  character  of  the  Bible,  such  as  its  contents,  work 
in  the  soul,  majesty,  etc.,  first,  and  coming  to  the  testimony 
O'f  the  Spirit  last,  and  that  under  the  head  of  "Testimony," 
which  is  subdivided  into  two  heads,  the  human  and  the 
divine.  Under  the  subject  of  the  fall  he  has  the  remarkable 
statement  that  God  "gave  not  to  Adam  those  influences 
of  confirming  and  assisting  grace  that  were  needful  to  his 
standing;  and  yet  providence  is  not  to  blame,  because  Adam 
did  not  want  any  of  those  influences  till  he  was  willing  to 
want  them."  Thus  sin  comes  from  lack  of  grace,  and 
lack  of  grace  comes  from  sin !  There  is  a  blind  effort  here  to 
place  the  responsibility  of  the  existence  of  sin  upon  the  free 
will  of  man,  as  Willard  says  elsewhere:  "Adam  sinned 
voluntarily  or  by  consent,  in  that  he  abused  his  own  free 
will."       As  to  the  order  of  the  decrees,  Willard  was  a 

26  Born  in  Hertford,  England,  about  1602;  emigrated  to  Cambridge,  New 
England,  in  1633;  pastor  there;  removed  to  Hartford,  Conn.,  1636,  with  the 
founders  of  that  town;  pastor  there  till  his  death,  in  1663. 

Born   in   Concord,   Mass.,    1640;   graduated   at   Harvard,    1659;   pastor  of 
the  Old  South  Church,  Boston,  1676  (?)  to  his  death,  1707. 
^'  Op.  cit.,  pp.  178,  179. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  i8d- 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND  23 

supralapsarian.  The  means  of  grace,  preaching,  etc., 
"have  no  efficiency  in  the  production  of  this  habit  [of  faith] 
by  moral  suasion  i.  e.,  preaching  has  no  efficiency  in 
regeneration. 

Thus  to  all  appearance  the  ancient  Calvinism  had  fully 
maintained  itself  down  to  the  close  of  the  century.  There 
was  still  found  in  1707  a  minister  in  one  of  the  chief 
churches  of  Boston  who  was  regularly  lecturing  upon  di- 
vinity with  the  minuteness  only  tO'  be  expected  in  a  theo- 
logical school,  and  adhering  with  absolute  faithfulness  to 
the  Westminster  system.  And  yet  beneath  the  surface 
there  was  widespread  departure  and  alienation  from  that 
system.  Another  side  of  the  history  of  the  first  century 
needs  now  to  be  reviewed. 

There  is  an  analogy  between  ideas  and  material  bodies 
in  the  particular  of  their  gravity;  and  the  first  century  of 
New  England  history  was  toi  show  how  the  Puritan  divinity, 
in  the  proportion  and  with  the  emphasis  with  which 
it  was  held,  by  a  natural  gravitation  tended  downward. 

It  was  the  beginning  of  a  chapter  of  misfortunes  when 
Mrs.  Anne  Hutchinson  arrived  in  Boston  in  1635.  She 
was  a  woman  of  talent,  of  a  deeply  religious  nature,  very 
much  attached  to  her  pastor.  Rev.  John  Cotton,^^  who  had 
left  her  home,  Boston,  England,  to  become  the  minister  of 
the  New  England  Boston.  Much  prayer  had  brought  her 
to  the  conviction  that  she  had  been  "trusting  in  a  covenant 

Ibid.,  p.  434. 

The  best  general  view  of  this  episode  is  found  in  Punchard,  History  of 
Congregationalism,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  196  If.  Original  authorities  are:  Welde,  A 
Short  Story  of  the  Rise,  Reign,  and  Ruine  of  the  Antinomians,  etc.  (1644);  E. 
Johnson,  The  Wonderworking  Province  of  Sions  Saviour  (1654;  reprinted,  An- 
dover,  1867);  Cotton  Mather,  Magnolia  (1702;  Hartford  ed.,  1853,  always  cited 
in  the  following  pages,  Vol.  II,  p.  508),  gives  an  account  of  no  great  value;  C. 
Chauncy,  Seasonable  Thoughts  (1743),  reproduces  something  from  Welde. 

SI  Born  in  Derby,  England,  1585;  fellow  of  Emanuel  College,  Cambridge, 
subsequently  dean;  settled  at  Boston,  England,  in  1612;  emigrated  to  Boston, 
New  England,  in  1632,  and  died  there  in  1652. 


24 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


of  works,"  and  in  connection  with  the  higher  spiritual  ex- 
periences which  she  had  gained  in  her  effort  to  throw  her- 
self more  fully  upon  the  mercy  of  God,  she  had  become 
visionary  and  fanatical.  So  she  conceived  that  it  was  "re- 
vealed" to  her  that  she  must  go  to  New  England  and  "be 
persecuted  and  suffer  much  trouble."  Arrived  here,  she 
began  soon  to  assemble  the  women  in  her  house  for  reli- 
gious meetings,  repeating  the  sermons  of  Mr.  Cotton  with 
comments  of  her  own,  and  before  long  had  become  the 
head  of  a  considerable  party,  who  were  charged  with  An- 
tinomian  errors,  and  thus  stirred  up  a  controversy  which 
divided  the  church  and  town,  and  excited  so  much  feeling 
as  to  become  the  cause  of  a  serious  crisis  in  the  life  of  the 
young  community.  A  synod  was  called  against  her  errors 
in  1637,  and  they  were  condemned.  Subsequently  she  was 
banished,  and  died  at  the  hands  of  the  Indians  upon  Long 
Island. 

It  is  exceedingly  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  arrive  at 
this  late  day  at  an  exact  and  reliable  estimate  of  the  nature 
and  tendency  of  Mrs.  Hutchinson's  views.  No  one  can 
read  the  various  contemporary  accounts  without  the  feel- 
ing that  misunderstanding  played  a  great  part  in  creating 
the  conviction  that  she  had  seriously  departed  from  the 
orthodoxy  of  the  day.  The  most  valuable  source  of  in- 
formation, Welde's  Short  Story,  is  of  no  great  historical 
worth.  It  is  marred  by  superstition,^^  its  common  honesty 
is  somewhat  doubtful, and  it  must  hence  be  employed 
with  the  greatest  caution.  As  commonly  understood,  her 
peculiar  views  gathered  about  two  points:  the  doctrine  of 
the  indwelling  of  the  Spirit  and  the  assurance  of  justifica- 

82  It  contains  a  most  incredible  account  of  the  birth  of  a  monster  to  the 
wife  of  a  certain  William  Dyer. 

S3  See  references  under  Dexter,  Congregationalism  as  Seen  in  Its  Literature 
(New  York,  1880),  bibliography,  title  No.  972.  This  invaluable  work  has  been  a 
constant  dependence. 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


tion.  The  Holy  Spirit  dwelt  in  a  justified  person  person- 
ally. "Gifts  and  graces"  were  of  no  value  in  evidencing 
Christian  character,  but  the  witness  of  the  Spirit  was  the 
only  evidence.  Hence  the  assurance  of  justification  was 
immediately  given  to  the  soul  by  the  Spirit.  It  was  not 
evidenced  by  the  sanctification  of  the  believer,  but  was 
totally  independent  of  this.  Hence  works  were  of  no  value, 
and  hence  the  Christian  might  live  in  sin.  Justification  was 
entirely  separated  from  faith.  A  man  was  justified  before 
he  believed.  A  further  distinction  was  drawn  between  the 
covenant  of  works  and  that  of  grace.  All  who  rested  their 
evidence  upon  the  fruits  of  the  Spirit  were  said  to  be  trust- 
ing in  a  covenant  of  works.  The  covenant  of  grace  was 
restricted  to  those  who  experienced  the  inward  witness  of 
the  Spirit. 

It  is  at  least  probable  that  these  expressions  were  only 
individual  methods  of  emphasizing  the  dominant  ideas  of 
the  Calvinistic  system  as  then  commonly  preached,  and 
especially  as  presented  in  the  ordinary  ministrations  of  Mr. 
Cotton,  Mrs.  Hutchinson's  favorite  minister.  The  second 
error  which  Welde  mentions,  "that  a  man  is  united  to 
Christ  and  justified  without  faith;  yea,  from  all  eternity," 
seems  nothing  but  an  extreme  formulation  of  the  doctrine 
of  election.  In  fact.  Rev.  John  Wheelwright,  in  defending 
himself  against  Welde's  charges,  says  of  this  very 
charge :  The  writer  holds  it  to  be  true  "if  it  be  meant 
respecting  God's  decree,"  but  in  no  other  sense.  Many  of 
the  expressions  quoted  seem  also  to  be  of  the  same  nature 
as  that  extreme  application  of  the  doctrine  of  union  with 
Christ  which  was  to  appear  subsequently  in  Rellyanism, 
itself  only  an  exaggerated  Calvinism.  Such,  for  example 
are  these:  "Christ  is  the  new  creature;"  "All  graces  are 
in  Christ  as  the  subject  and  none  in  us,  so  that  Christ 

Mercurius  Atnericanus  (1645;  reprinted  by  the  Prince  Society,  1876),  p.  9. 


26  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


believes,  Christ  loves,"  etc.^^  And  Mr.  Wheelwright's 
denials  that  he  held  that  sanctification  was  no  evidence  of 
justification  are  repeated  and  explicit. 

The  mere  unraveling  of  a  snarl  of  insignificant  tempo- 
rary aberrations  from  truth  is  of  nO'  interest  or  impor- 
tance in  the  present  history.  But  besides  the  evident  tend- 
ency tO'  overemphasize  the  divine  sovereignty  and  allied 
truths  which  already  appears,  there  is  one  further  phe- 
nomenon, exhibited  in  connection  with  the  synod,  which  is 
of  the  greatest  significance.  This  is  the  substantial  igno- 
rance of  the  nature  of  saving  faith  brought  to  light  by  the 
discussions  upon  justification.  Mr.  Cotton  seems,  at  first 
sight,  to  have  been  farther  from  the  truth  than  his  col- 
leagues, and  was  brought  with  some  difficulty  to  a  partial 
agreement  with  them.  He  held  that  our  "union  with 
Christ"  is  complete  before  and  without  the  work  or  act 
of  faith  though  not  before  or  without  the  "habit"  or 
gift  of  faith.  It  is  evident  from  his  own  subsequent  ex- 
pressions that  he  was  after  all  in  substantial  agreement 
with  the  rest,  for  he  says,  'T  looked  at  union  with  Christ 
as  equivalent  to  regeneration."  This  as  the  divine  part 
in  conversion  does  at  least  logically  precede  the  act  of 
faith.  But,  however  they  might  be  divided  upon  this 
point,  Mr.  Cotton  and  all  the  rest  were  united  in  view- 
ing man  as  passive  in  faith.  For  the  sake  of  securing  the 
honor  of  God  as  the  author  of  regeneration,  they 
held  views  of  divine  sovereignty,  inability,  and  regeneration 
which  in  effect  rendered  man  totally  passive  till  the  indis- 
pensable condition  was  fulfilled,  upon  which  faith  fol- 
lowed, as  a  spontaneous  act,  it  is  true,  but  still  as  necessary. 

In  this  confusion  the  New  England  fathers  were  not 
alone.    It  was  generally  true  that  but  little  light  was  to  be 

Short  Story,  errors  17,  16. 

The  Way  of  Congregational  Churches  Cleared,  etc.  (1648),  pp.  41  ff. 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


27 


found  upon  the  nature  of  the  action  of  the  human  mind  in 
religious  matters  in  any  of  the  standard  writers  of  the  day. 
The  will  was  still  linked  inseparably  with  the  emotions  in 
the  common  psychology,  and  its  office  and  operation  hence 
much  obscured.  The  Westminster  Confession  confounds 
saving  faith  with  historical  faith  in  the  expression:  ''By 
this  faith  a  Christian  believeth  to  be  true  whatsoever  is  re- 
vealed in  the  Word."  ^'^  Even  Calvin  had  said :  "Faith 
.  ...  is  a  certain  and  steady  knowledge  of  the  divine  be- 
nevolence towards  us."  And  though  in  case  of  both  of 
these  authorities  there  can  be  found  other  expressions  cal- 
culated to  give  a  good  practical  impression  to  the  popular 
mind,  yet  when  the  emphasis  was  laid  upon  man's  inability 
to  repent  which  was  laid  in  those  days,  the  activity  of  man 
was  brought  into  so  great  darkness  and  doubt  that  pa- 
ralysis of  the  spiritual  forces  of  the  soul  often  followed, 
and  the  work  of  repentance  which  man  "could  not  do"  re- 
mained largely  undone. 

The  consequences  of  this  confused  and  paralyzing  the- 
ology soon  became  apparent.  Cotton  Mather  may  tell  the 
piteous  story: 

When  our  churches  were  come  to  between  twenty  and  thirty  years 
of  age,  a  numerous  posterity  was  advanced  so  far  into  the  world,  that 
the  first  planters  began  apace  in  their  several  families  to  be  distin- 
guished by  the  name  of  grandfathers;  but  among  the  immediate  par- 
ents of  the  grandchildren,  there  were  multitudes  of  well-disposed 
persons,  who,  partly  through  their  own  doubts  and  fears,  and  partly 
through  other  culpable  neglects,  had  not  actually  come  up  to  the  cov- 
enanting state  of  communicants  at  the  table  of  the  Lord.  The  good 
old  generation  could  not,  without  many  uncomfortable  apprehensions, 
behold  their  ofifspring  excluded  from  the  baptism  of  Christianity,  and 
from  the  ecclesiastical  inspection  which  is  to  accompany  that  baptism; 
indeed,  it  was  to  leave  their  offspring  under  the  shepherdly  govern- 
ment of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  in  his  ordinances,  that  they  had  brought 
their  lambs  into  this  wilderness.    When  the  apostle  bids  churches  to 

Chap.  xiv. 
•«  Institutes,   III,  ii,  7. 


28 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


"look  diligently,  lest  any  man  fail  of  the  grace  of  God,"  there  is  an 
ecclesiastical  word  used  for  that  ''looking  diligently;"  intimating  that 
God  will  ordinarily  bless  a  regular  church-watch,  to  maintain  the 
interests  of  grace  among  his  people;  and  it  was  therefore  the  study 
of  those  prudent  men,  who  might  be  called  our  seers,  that  the  chil- 
dren of  the  faithful  may  be  kept,  as  far  as  may  be,  under  a  church- 
watch,  in  expectation  that  they  might  be  in  the  fairer  way  to  receive 
the  grace  of  God;  thus  they  were  "looking  diligently,"  that  the  pros- 
perous and  prevailing  condition  of  religion  in  our  churches  might 
not  be  res  unius  aetatis — "a  matter  of  one  age  alone."  Moreover, 
among  the  next  sons  or  daughters  descending  from  that  generation, 
there  was  a  numerous  appearance  of  sober  persons,  who  professed 
themselves  desirous  to  renew  their  baptismal-covenant  and  submit 
unto  the  church-discipline,  and  so  have  their  houses  also  marked  for 
the  Lord's;  but  yet  they  could  not  come  to  that  experimental  account 
of  their  own  regeneration,  which  would  sufficiently  embolden  their 
access  to  the  other  sacrament.  Wherefore,  for  our  churches  now 
to  make  no  ecclesiastical  difference  between  these  hopeful  candidates 
and  competents  for  those  our  further  mysteries;  and  pagans,  who 
might  happen  to  hear  the  word  of  God  in  our  assemblies,  was  judged 
a  most  unwarrantable  strictness,  which  would  quickly  abandon  the 
biggest  part  of  our  country  unto  heathenism.  And,  on  the  other  side, 
it  was  feared  that,  if  all  such  as  had  not  yet  exposed  themselves  by 
censurable  scandals  found  upon  them  should  be  admitted  unto  all  the 
privileges  in  our  churches,  a  worldly  part  of  mankind  might,  before 
we  are  aware,  carry  all  things  into  such  a  course  of  proceeding,  as 
would  be  very  disagreeable  unto  the  kingdom  of  heaven. 

No  one  can  fail  to  perceive  the  surprise  with  which 
Mather,  and  doubtless  all  the  rest  of  the  New  England 
leaders,  looked  upon  this  state  oi  things.  There  were,  no 
doubt,  many  elements  entering  into  the  production  of  the 
result,^^  some  of  which  cannot  now  be  fully  understood. 
The  early  plan  of  requiring  of  candidates  for  church  mem- 
bership a  long  and  detailed  account  of  gracious  exercises, 
however  appropriate  when  the  first  little  companies  had 

3^  Magnolia,  Vol.  II,  pp.  277  ff. 

*^  It  has  been  common  to  ascribe  the  movement  for  the  "Half- Way  Cove- 
nant" to  the  desire  to  enlarge  the  franchise,  which  v/as  at  first  restricted  in 
Massachusetts  to  church  members.  But  there  is  no  evidence  that  this  considera- 
tion had  any  influence.  See  Dexter,  Congregationalism  as  Seen  in  Its  Litera- 
ture, p.  468;  also  New  England  and  Yale  Review,  February,  1892,  article  by 
Professor  W.  Walker. 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


29 


gathered  together  under  the  stress  of  persecution  in  Eng- 
land, and  when  all  their  religious  exercises  must  of  neces- 
sity have  been  marked,  could  only  serve  as  an  unfortunate 
and  embarrassing  condition  among  a  later  generation,  born 
and  brought  up  in  the  perfect  freedom  of  the  New  World, 
and  without  the  thrilling  experiences  of  their  fathers  to 
give  point  to  their  views  and  depth  to  their  experience. 
But  with  all  the  rest,  there  was  a  theological  root  to  the 
trouble,  and  this  was  that  doctrine  of  inability,  one  applica- 
tion of  which  we  have  already  seen.  The  doctrine  of  the 
sovereignty  of  God  is  one  which  affects  the  church  differ- 
ently at  dififerent  times.  The  first  Puritans,  sure  in  their 
own  hearts  that  they  were  the  elect  of  God,  found  the 
doctrine  necessary  to  sustain  them  in  the  tremendous  strug- 
gles through  which  they  passed.  As  the  waves  of  the 
storm  rose  higher  about  them,  they  looked  more  and  more 
to  God,  who  was  yet  ruler  above  all  the  commotion  of  the 
elements,  and  would  save  his  people.  Hence  the  doctrine 
nerved  to  greater  activity;  and  it  produced  a  similar  effect, 
during  the  first  period  of  the  promulgation  of  Calvinism, 
among  every  nation  which  accepted  the  system.  The  Cal- 
vinists  were  the  great  active  forces  of  an  advancing  Prot- 
estantism. But  when  such  mighty  stimulus  was  removed, 
when  inability  was  preached  to  men  who  were  not  con- 
scious that  they  were  the  elect,  when  passive  waiting  for 
the  gracious  deliverance  of  God  was  inculcated  upon  men 
whom  the  tide  of  events  no  longer  forced  to  activity  in 
spite  of  themselves  and  of  their  theories,  it  produced  slug- 
gishness, apathy,  self-distrust,  despair.  It  has  never  been 
a  good  way  to  induce  men  to  repent  to  tell  them  that  they 
cannot.  Thus,  in  part,  it  was  the  theology  of  the  period 
which  wrought  the  paralysis  which  Mather  sketches,  and 
which  continued  in  spite  of  all  the  ecclesiastical  nostrums 


30 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


of  the  Half-Way  Covenant,  and  sunk  the  churches  lower 
and  lower. 

An  inspection  of  the  preaching  of  the  early  ministers  of 
New  England  would  show  how  predominantly  depressing 
and  discouraging  their  ministrations  were.  There  were 
not  lacking  many  appeals  which  were  adapted  to  stir  the 
conscience,  produce  repentance,  and  call  out  faith;  for, 
when  men  are  moved  by  the  great  forces  of  the  soul,  and 
the  truths  of  the  gospel  are  presented  to  them,  they  will 
respond  in  the  natural  manner,  regardless  of  the  theories 
which  they  may  be  taught  and  which  at  other  times  may 
paralyze  their  action.  But  when  every  allowance  has  been 
made  for  the  brighter  and  better  side  of  the  early  preach- 
ing, it  still  remains  that  the  general  impression  of  the 
pulpit  was  that  the  sinner  is  "dead,"  helpless,  cannot  be 
interested  in  divine  things,  and  has  nothing  to  do  but  to 
wait  for  God.  Innumerable  quotations  might  be  made  to 
illustrate  this  statement ;     but  unless  counterbalanced  by 

*^  For  example:  John  Higginson,  minister  of  Salem,  1659-1708  (Our  Dying 
Saviour's  Legacy  of  Peace,  186S),  was  a  rather  cheerful  preacher,  bringing  out 
man's  activity  in  faith.  Jonathan  Mitchell,  minister  of  Cambridge,  1650-68 
(A  Discourse  of  the  Glory  to  Which  God  Hath  Called  Believers  by  Jesus 
Christ,  1721),  is  like  the  average.  Thomas  Cobbett,  minister  in  Lynn  from 
1637  to  (?)  1657  {A  Practical  Discourse  of  Prayer,  1654),  cannot  deny  the 
duty  of  the  unregenerate  to  pray,  and  yet  spends  his  time  in  finding  reasons 
for  their  prayer  though  they  are  entirely  wicked  in  praying;  Solomon  Stoddard, 
minister  of  Northampton,  1 669-1 729,  takes  up  so  much  time,  even  by  his  Guide 
to  Christ  (17 14),  in  getting  around  the  difficulties  of  inability,  that  he  has 
no  time  left  for  directions  actually  to  exercise  faith  (compare  also  his  The 
Safety  of  Appearing  at  the  Day  of  Judgment  in  the  Righteousness  of  Christ, 
etc.,  1687,  and  his  The  Nature  of  Saving  Conversion,  1719).  To  the  same 
effect  are:  Charles  Chauncy,  The  Lord  Our  Righteousness  (1659);  John  Cotton, 
The  Church's  Resurrection  (1642),  The  Way  of  Life  (1641;  rather  helpful, 
but  upon  p.  187  hopelessly  lost  in  leconciling  election  with  the  heinousness  of  sin 
upon  the  basis  of  inability),  The  Covenant  of  God's  Free  Grace  (1645),  Christ  ihe 
Fountain  of  Life  (1651;  see  p.  173;  the  grace  of  Christ  "conveys  such  a  spirit 
of  grace  into  us  as  gives  us  power  to  receive  Christ") ;  Thomas  Hooker,  min- 
ister in  Hartford,  1636-47,  The  Soul's  Humiliation  (1638),  The  Unbeliever's 
Preparing  for  Christ  (1638),  The  Soul's  Vocation  (1638),  and  The  Poor  Dying 
Christian  Drawn  to  Christ  (1643) — all  very  gloomy;  John  Davenport  minister 
in  New  Haven,  1638-68,  then  in  Boston  till  he  died  in  1670  (see  quotations  in 
Cotton's  Covenant  of  Free  Grace,  pp.  34-40).  Of  Mather  it  is  enough  to  quote 
the  titles  of  two  collections  of  sermons,  The  Greatest  Sinners  Exhorted  and  En- 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


3^ 


others  which  space  forbids,  the  impression  they  would  give 
would  be  even  too  gloomy  and  hopeless.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that  to  the  time  of  Increase  Mather  there  was  scarcely  a 
single  preacher  who  seemed  to  possess  the  evangelistic  in- 
stinct and  who  could  wield  the  evangelistic  methods.  In 
Mather's  case  hard  common-sense  and  practical  tact  out- 
weighed theory.  He  flung  the  doctrine  of  inability  into  the 
depths  and  preached  sermons  which  live  and  breathe  today. 
But  he  only  serves  to  show  by  contrast  how  unfavorable 
the  general  style  was  in  its  effect  upon  the  majority  of 
hearers. 

Thus  out  of  the  undue  and  unseasonable  emphasis  which 
the  Puritan  theology  laid  upon  the  divine  sovereignty  and 
man's  inability  there  had  sprung  a  blighting  influence  which 
had  reduced  the  number  of  conversions  greatly,  and  was 
beginning  to  deplete  the  churches  of  members.  The  Half- 
Way  Covenant  was  the  method  hit  upon  to  remedy  the 
difficulty.  It  allowed  parents,  themselves  baptized,  of  cor- 
rect life,  who  would  ''own  the  covenant" — that  is,  would 
acknowledge  the  rightfulness  of  God's  claims  upon  them, 
and  promise  to  submit  to  the  discipline  of  the  church, 
though  not  professing  conversion — to  have  their  children 
baptized.  The  arguments  for  this  arrangement  were 
strange.  Though  much  drawn  out,  in  substance  they  were 
all  one.  The  infants  in  question  were  first  proved  mem- 
bers of  the  church  (the  position  of  the  Episcopal  church 
in  England,  but  repudiated  hitherto  in  New  England),  and 
from  this  their  right  to  baptism  was  inferred.  Thus,  in 
effect,  the  character  of  the  church  was  changed.  The  old 
Congregational  idea  had  been  that  the  church  was  the  fel- 
lowship of  believers,  and  that  only  they  had  a  right  to  its 
privileges,  including  the  baptism  of  their  children.  Thus, 


couraged  to  Come  to  Christ  and  that  Nozv,  without  Delaying  (1686),  and  Now 
or  Never  (1713). 


32 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


while  the  church  had  an  educational  function  and  was  to 
train  up  men  to  be  Christians,  it  was  viewed,  in  its  strictly 
ecclesiastical  character,  not  as  a  school,  but  as  a  fellowship 
of  persons  already  thus  trained  and  already  converted. 
Now  it  was  to  perform  the  function  of  a  school,  and  within 
its  fold  train  up  men  to  religion.  The  full  scope  of  the 
change  was  not  at  first  seen,  but  it  was  consummated 
when  in  1707  Solomon  Stoddard,  of  Northampton,  pro- 
posed to  admit  the  unregenerate  to  the  Lord's  Supper  as  a 
means  of  grace — that  is,  of  conversion.  Thus  ultimately 
the  doctrine  of  inability  broke  down  the  theory  of  the  new 
birth  in  its  relation  to  the  church,  as  it  early  discouraged 
the  actual  exercise  of  repentance. 

The  precise  causes  leading  to  this  remarkable  result  are 
somewhat  difficult  to  trace.  There  was  much  dispute  upon 
the  subject,  and  the  churches  were  brought  to  adopt  the 
new  method  only  with  great  reluctance.  Increase  Mather 
wrote  in  connection  with  John  Davenport,  of  New  Haven, 
strongly  against  it,  but  years  afterward  took  the  other 
side.^^  His  treatises  upon  the  side  of  the  new  scheme 
throw  some  light  upon  the  previous  history  of  the  idea. 
He  naturally  attempts  to  gain  some  support  for  the  plan 
from  the  earlier  writers,  and  entitles  his  first  book  (of  the 
year  1675)  :  The  First  Principles  of  New  England  con- 
cerning the  Subject  of  Baptism.  In  this  he  quotes  John 
Cotton  as  being  in  favor  of  the  plan.  The  passages  quoted 
pronounce,  indeed,  in  favor  of  the  baptism  of  the  children 
of  the  unregenerate  "children,"  but  only  upon  condition 

^2  Against  the  synod,  An  Apologetical  Preface  to  John  Davenport's  Another 
Essay;  for  it,  besides  the  book  above  mentioned,  A  Discourse  concerning  the 
Subject  of  Baptism,  etc.  (1675). 

*3  See  pp.  2  f{.  He  quotes  Cotton's  Book  of  t)ue  Way  of  the  Churches,  pp. 
87,  88,  106,  115,  and  his  Keyes.  The  former  quotations  contain  nothing 
decisive  and  in  the  Keyes  of  1644  (reprinted,  Boston  1843),  and  the  Vindiciae 
clavium  (1645),  there  is  nothing  to  the  point.  He  quotes  also  Hooker,  Survey 
of  Church  Discipline,  pp.  8,  48;  but  he  is  discussing  another  point  there. 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND  33 


that  their  "grandparents"  assume  the  training  of  them. 
This  was  Cotton's  position  in  public  utterances  of  the  year 
1645.  ^^^t  the  increasing  pressure  of  the  condition  of 
things  seems  to  have  led  him  to  waver,  and  at  last,  in  a 
letter  dated  November  8,  1648,  and  quoted  by  Mather,^^ 
we  have  the  following  passage,  which  looks  somewhat 
doubtfully  in  the  direction  of  the  Half-Way  Covenant: 

It  is  not  necessary  that  they  [upon  a  reformation  of  the  church] 
should  take  carnal  members  of  the  parish  into  the  fellowship  of  this 
renewed  election  of  their  ministers,  and  yet  it  is  not  improper  but 
the  ministers  may  perform  some  ministerial  acts  to  them,  as  not  only 
to  preach  the  word  to  them,  but  happily  [i.  e.,  haply]  also  to  baptize 
their  children.  For  such  members  are  like  the  church  members  with 
us  baptized  in  their  infancy  yet  not  received  to  the  Lord's  Supper 
when  they  come  to  age,  nor  admitted  to  fellowship  of  voting  in  ad- 
missions, elections,  censures,  till  they  come  to  profess  their  faith  and 
repentance,  and  lay  hold  of  the  covenant  of  their  parents  before  the 
church.  And  yet,  they  being  not  cast  out  of  the  church  nor  the  cove- 
nant thereof,  their  children  may  be  capable  of  the  first  seal  of  the 
covenant,  so  in  this  case  till  the  parents  themselves  grow  scandalous 
and  thereby  cast  out  of  the  covenant  of  the  church. 

Other  evidences  of  a  tendency  to  change  the  early  prac- 
tice before  the  synod  had  actually  recommended  it  are  ad- 
duced by  Mather,  but  most  of  them  are  derived  from  un- 
published manuscripts.  His  father,  Richard  Mather,  who 
had  published  a  catechism  in  1650  which  was  supposed  to 
bear  against  the  Half-Way  Covenant,  left  a  manuscript  in 
which  he  said  that  he  was  in  favor  of  the  Covenant,  and 
that  the  catechism  was  to  be  interpreted  in  consistency  with 
this.  Other  less  famous  men  are  quoted  by  Mather,  and 
among  them  is  the  utterance  of  John  Norton  upon  his 
dying-bed  (1663),  who,  when  asked  what  the  sins  of  New 
England  were  for  which  God  was  displeased  with  the 
country,  said,  among  other  things,  "and  for  the  neglect  of 
baptizing  the  children  of  the  church,  those  that  some  call 
grandchildren,  I  think  God  is  provoked  by  it." 

**  First  Principles,  p.  5. 


34  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Thus  it  is  evident  that  it  was  the  pressure  of  an  unex- 
pected state  of  things  which  led  these  fathers  reluctantly 
to  a  change  in  their  methods.  But  the  particular  change 
made  was  determined  by  a  peculiarity  of  their  view  of 
the  Scriptures,  by  which  the  Old  and  New  Testaments 
were  brought  upon  pretty  much  the  same  level  as  doc- 
trinal authorities,  and  the  distinction  between  the  systems  and 
the  dispensations  of  the  two  almost  obliterated.  A  very 
prominent  idea  with  them  was  that  of  the  "covenant,"  de- 
rived, no  doubt,  from  the  Federal  School  of  Holland.  God 
stands  in  a  covenant  with  believers  and  their  households. 
Now,  as  he  stood  in  a  covenant  with  Israel  also,  the  style 
of  interpretation  common  in  New  England  led  to  an  iden- 
tification of  these  covenants  in  all  possible  respects;  and  as 
an  uncircumcised  person  was  outside  of  the  ancient  cove- 
nant, and  excluded  from  all  share  in  the  privileges  of  the 
people  of  God,  and  in  the  condition  of  a  pagan;  so  it  was 
thought  that  a  child  brought  up  in  the  Christian  com- 
munity and  remaining  unbaptized  would  also  be  outside  of 
the  covenant,  the  recipient  of  none  of  the  special  blessings 
of  grace,  and  to  a  considerable  degree  in  a  hopeless  state. 
If  unbaptized  children  were  indeed  outside  of  the  covenant, 
and  thus  in  a  condition  but  little  better  than  "pagans,"  as  the 
piteous  phrase  ran,  the  thing  to  be  done  was  to  get  them 
into  covenant  relations  that  they  might  be  saved.  The  fact 
that  their  parents  did  not  seem  to  be  saved,  though  in  the 
covenant,  escaped  the  fathers.^^ 

It  was  therefore  no  superstitious  regard  for  sacraments, 
no  thought  of  baptismal  regeneration,  and  no  conscious 
lapse  from  the  doctrine  of  the  regenerate  church  to  the 
view  that  the  church  is  a  school  for  the  gradual  training 
of  Christians  by  the  sacraments  and  Christian  teaching, 

The  full  arguments  of  the  synod  are  given  in  Mather's  Magnalia,  Vol.  II, 
pp.  276  ff. 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


35 


which  created  the  Half- Way  Covenant,  but  simply  the  pas- 
sive theology  of  the  times,  which  waited  for  God  in  the 
matter  of  conversion  as  for  a  sovereign  whose  gifts  of 
grace  were  in  his  own  inscrutable  disposal,  and  without 
whom  man  was  absolutely  unable  to  do  anything.  To  be 
sure,  to  baptize  children  was  in  the  power  of  man,  and  this 
must  be  done.  But  repentance  was  the  gift  of  God,  and 
therefore  not  the  act  of  man.^^ 

But  the  remedy  had  no  curative  effect.  The  Half- Way 
Covenant  was  introduced  very  largely  into  the  churches 
and  remained  sometimes  till  into  the  last  century but 
the  course  of  things  was  downward.  The  Indian  war 
broke  out  (1675-76),  agriculture  suffered  from  drought 
and  blight,  commerce  suffered  at  sea,  pestilences  and  epi- 
demics arose,  and  the  consciences  of  the  people,  educated 
under  the  Jewish  ideas  of  which  we  have  already  seen  an 

The  following  extract  is  from  Mitchell  and  Mather's  Defense  of  the 
Answer  and  Arguments  of  the  Synod  (1664)  p.  45:  "It  is  the  Lord's  cwn 
way  and  his  institutions  only,  which  he  will  bless,  not  man's  invention,  though 
never  so  plausible.  Neither  hath  God  in  his  wisdom  so  instituted  the  frame  of 
his  covenant,  and  the  constitution  of  the  church  thereby,  as  to  make  a  perfect 
separation  between  good  and  bad,  or  to  make  the  work  of  conversion  and 
initial  instruction  needless  in  the  churches.  Conversion  is  to  the  children  of 
the  covenant  a  fruit  of  the  covenant,  saith  Mr.  Cotton.  If  we  do  not  keep  in 
the  way  of  a  converting,  grace-giving  covenant,  and  keep  persons  under  those 
church  dispensations  wherein  grace  is  given,  the  church  will  die  of  a  lingering 
though  not  of  a  violent  death.  The  Lord  hath  not  set  up  churches  only  that  a 
few  old  Christians  may  keep  one  another  warm  while  they  live,  and  then 
carry  away  the  church  into  the  cold  grave  with  them  when  they  die:  No, 
but  that  they  might  with  all  the  care  and  with  all  the  obligations  and  ad- 
vantages to  that  care  that  may  be,  nurse  up  still  successively  another  genera- 
tion of  subjects  to  Christ,  that  may  stand  up  in  his  kingdom  when  they  are 
gone,  that  so  he  might  have  a  people  and  kingdom  successively  continued  to 
him  from  one  generation  to  another." 

Increase  Mather,  in  his  Discourse  Concerning  the  Subject  of  Baptism  (1675), 
pp.  7  and  8,  says:  "The  persons  in  question  are  either  belonging  to  the  visible 
church,  or  of  the  world  only.  The  Scripture  speaketh  of  those  two  terms, 
church  and  the  world,  etc.  But  to  say  that  the  persons  in  question  and  their 
children  are  of  the  world  only,  is  in  effect  to  say  that  they  are  visibly  the 
devil's  and  none  of  the  Lord's  children." 

For  example,  in  the  First  Church  in  Cambridge  (Mitchell's  church)  till 
1828.  See  Manual,  1S72.  Still  the  lists  of  those  received  in  this  particular 
church  under  the  scheme  show  that  it  could  have  had  little  influence  on.  the 
vital   religion   of  the  church. 


36 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


example  in  the  discussions  upon  the  covenant,  saw  in  these 
calamities  the  visitations  of  God  for  their  sins.  A  "reform- 
ing synod"  was  accordingly  called,  and  met  in  Boston  in 
1679.  The  document  put  forth  by  the  synod  mentions  a 
great  many  particulars  in  which  the  churches  had  fallen 
away  from  their  duty  and  stood  in  need  of  a  reformation. 
The  reader  must  make  considerable  allowance  for  the 
phraseology  of  the  day,  and  for  the  over-strict  views  upon 
many  topics  which  prevailed  in  New  England  at  the  time. 
Cotton  Mather  in  his  account  of  the  matter  seems  to  have 
an  inkling  that  the  terms  of  the  document  would  be  likely 
to  give  posterity  an  unduly  unfavorable  view  of  the  con- 
dition of  things,  for  he  says : 

Indeed,  the  people  of  God  in  this  land  were  not  gone  so  far  in 
degeneracy  but  that  there  were  further  degrees  of  disorder  and  cor- 
ruption to  be  found,  I  must  freely  speak  it,  in  other,  yea  in  all  other 
places  where  the  protestant  religion  is  professed:  and  the  most  impar- 
tial observers  must  have  acknowledged  that  there  was  proportion- 
ably  still  more  of  true  religion,  and  a  larger  number  of  the  stricter 
saints  in  this  country,  than  in  any  other  on  the  face  of  the  earth.^^ 

Still,  with  all  allowances,  it  is  evident  that  there  was 
decline  in  the  community.  The  positive  sins  mentioned — 
the  increase  of  profanity,  intemperance,  and  licentiousness 
— show  that  there  was  rising  a  community  about  the 
church  which  deserved  the  name  of  "the  world,"  and  that 
the  church  was  not  subduing  it.  Though  the  synod  recom- 
mended vigorous  measures,  and  though  many  churches  held 
special  meetings  of  reconsecration,  the  evil  was  not  stayed. 
The  Half- Way  Covenant  had  a  strong  influence  in  this 
direction.  Those  who  had  come  forward  and  owned  the 
covenant  and  had  their  children  baptized  seemed  satisfied 
with  this,  and,  as  Mr.  Stoddard  said,  there  was  a  "general 
neglect"  of  the  Lord's  Supper.  "About  forty  years  past," 
he  says  in  his  sermon  of  the  year  1707,  "there  were  multi- 

*^  Magnolia,  Vol.  II,  p.  317. 


FIRST|CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


37 


tudes  in  the  country  unbaptized :  but  that  neglect  was  taken 
into  examination,  and  now  there  is  an  alteration  in  that 
particular.  But  to  this  day  there  are  four  to  one  that  do 
neglect  the  Lord's  Supper,  as  if  it  did  not  belong  to  them  to 
magnify  God  on  account  of  the  work  of  redemption."  The 
organized  churches  were,  therefore,  in  danger  of  extinction, 
since  the  body  of  communicants,  who  were  the  members  in 
full  standing,  and  could  alone  perpetuate  the  organizations, 
was  decreasing.^^  The  evil  began  probably  in  connection 
with  the  difficulties  which  had  led  to  the'Half-Way  Cove- 
nant; and  we  find  that  to  meet  it  there  had  already  been 
practiced  some  laxness  in  admitting  members  to  the  com- 
munion without  a  personal  confession  of  faith.  One  of 
the  remedies  for  the  prevailing  evils  proposed  by  the  "re- 
forming synod"  gives  more  than  a  hint  of  this.  The  synod 
said: 

It  is  requisite  that  persons  be  not  admitted  unto  communion  in  the 
Lord's  Supper  without  making  a  personal  and  public  profession 
of  their  faith  and  repentance,  either  orally  or  in  some  other  way,  so 
as  shall  be  to  the  just  satisfaction  of  the  church;  and  that,  therefore, 
both  elders  and  churches  be  duly  watchful  and  circumspect  in  this 
matter.5<> 

The  careful  phraseology  shows  that  in  some  instances,  at 
least,  all  proper  confession  of  personal  faith  had  been 
omitted. 

But  it  was  left  to  Rev.  Solomon  Stoddard,  of  North- 
ampton, Mass.,*^^  to  make  an  open  proposal  to  adopt  this 
lax  practice  as  the  regular  method  of  the  churches.  In  1707 
he  preached  the  sermon  from  which  a  quotation  has  already 

*^  Trumbull,  in  his  History  of  Connecticut,  Vol.  I,  p.  472,  says  that  in  the 
year  1696  "the  practice  of  making  a  relation  of  Christian  experiences,  and  of 
admitting  none  to  full  communion  but  such  as  appeared  to  be  Christians  indeed, 
yet  prevailed;  and  the  number  of  church  members,  in  full  communion,  was 
generally  small.  In  those  churches  where  the  owning  of  the  covenant  was  not 
practiced,    great   numbers   of   children   were  unbaptized." 

^°  Magnolia,  Vol.  II,  p.  326. 

^1  Born  1643;  died  1729;  pastor  at  Northampton,  1669-1729. 


38 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


been  made,  and  which  bore  this  title:  "The  Inexcusable- 
ness  of  Neglecting  the  Worship  of  God  under  a  Pretence 
of  Being  in  an  Unconverted  Condition."  The  occasion  was 
a  somewhat  public  one,  as  the  "Inferior  Court"  was  then 
sitting.  It  was  thus,  no  doubt,  intended  to  have  a  general 
application,  and  to  introduce  a  practice  at  least  in  some 
respects  new.  Yet  it  seems  to  have  grown  out  of  Mr.  Stod- 
dard's own  experiences  as  a  parish  minister.  In  seeking  to 
restore  the  Lord's  Supper  to  its  proper  place  in  the  public 
observance,  he  had  apparently  tried  to  persuade  certain 
persons  to  come  to  the  Lord's  table,  who  had  met  him  with 
the  excuse  that  they  were  unregenerate,  and  so  had  no 
right  to  the  privilege  he  urged  upon  them.  So  he  explains 
the  object  of  his  sermon,  when  it  had  been  attacked  by  In- 
crease Mather,^  2  as  being  "to  answer  a  case  of  conscience 
and  direct  those  that  might  have  scruples  about  participat- 
ing in  the  Lord's  Supper  because  they  have  not  a  work  of 
saving  conversion,  and  not  at  all  to  direct  the  churches  to 
admit  any  that  were  not  to  rational  charity  true  believ- 
ers." The  doctrine  he  propounded  to  this  end  he  ex- 
presses thus:  "That  sanctifying  grace  is  not  necessary 
unto  the  lawful  attending  of  any  duty  of  worship."  The 
general  argument  is  characteristic  of  New  England,  though 
now  applied  in  a  new  way.  It  acquires  all  its  strength  from 
the  identification  of  the  Jewish  system  with  the  Christian  at 
a  multitude  of  points  in  which  they  are  in  fact  widely  sep- 
arated. The  Lord's  Supper  ought  as  much  to  be  observed 
as  any  other  act  of  worship,  and  unconverted  persons  are 
just  as  inexcusable  for  not  attending  it  as  any  others;  and 
this  all  the  more,  since  the  Passover  in  the  Old  Testament 
was  kept  by  all  the  people  without  regard  to  their  holy 
estate. 

52  In   A    Dissertation,   etc,    (Boston,  1708). 
Appeal  to  the  Learned  (1799),  pp.  2,  3. 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


39 


The  most  startling  view  proposed  in  the  sermon  was 
that  the  unconverted  should  be  urged  to  come  to  the  sacra- 
ment as  a  converting  ordinance.  At  first  sight  this  looks 
like  a  return  to  the  sacramentarianism  of  the  Roman 
church,  but  it  was  not  such  in  fact.  On  the  contrary,  Stod- 
dard seems  to  have  held  a  view  of  the  Lord's  Supper  too 
low  rather  than  too  high.  Among  the  reasons  he  gives 
for  his  doctrine  are  that  "it  is  needful  that  others  [than 
the  regenerate]  should  attend  duties  of  worship  that  the 
worship  of  God  may  he  carried  on.''    And  again,  ''This  is 

very  useful  that  men  may  obtain  sanctifying  grace  

God  in  the  Lord's  Supper  invites  us  to  come  to  Christ, 
makes  an  affecting  representation  of  his  sufferings  for  our 
sins,"  etc.^^  He  styles  it  a  "seal  of  the  covenant,"  but  he 
says  in  his  later  treatise  "that  the  sacraments  do  not  seal  up 
pardon  and  salvation  to  all  that  receive  them,  but  they  are 
seals  to  the  truth  of  the  covenant."  Now,  if  Stoddard 
meant  by  the  first  clause  of  this  last  sentence  that  the  seals 
did  not  seal  simply  as  outward  elements,  no  one  in  New 
England  would  have  disagreed  with  him;  but  he  probably 
intended  to  deny  that  the  sacraments  had  any  personal  ap- 
plication as  seals  of  forgiveness  to  the  believing  recipient, 
and  to  limit  their  sealing  efficacy  to  the  covenant  in  gen- 
eral, that  is,  to  make  them  mere  monuments — a  view  far 
from  the  Scriptures,  the  Confessions,  and  the  consensus  of 
teaching  in  New  England  at  the  time.  Thus  the  main 
thing  about  them  was  the  affecting  representation  they 
made;  their  efficiency  was  that  of  a  sermon,  or  a  prayer, 
and  hence  they  should  be  attended  by  the  unregenerate,  as 
these  should  be.^^ 

^*  Sermon  of  the  year  1707,  pp.  15,  16. 
^'^  App-ealj   pp.   22,  23. 

'^^  Stoddard  was,  however,  not  a  man  to  use  theological  terms  with  accuracy, 
and  there  are  many  contradictions  in  his  forms  of  presenting  his  ideas  which 
cannot  be  fully  cleared  up.    He  said,  for  example,  that  "those  that  are  saints  by 


40  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


This  sermon  was,  however,  not  only  a  factor  in  the  de- 
cline of  the  New  England  churches,  but  also  incidentally  a 
witness  that  the  decline  had  already  proceeded  to  quite  an 
alarming  point.  Upon  nothing  had  the  earliest  Congrega- 
tionalists  insisted  with  greater  or  juster  emphasis  than  upon 
the  necessity  of  a  godly  ministry.  The  Cambridge  Plat- 
form made  the  divine  calling  an  indispensable  prerequisite 
of  the  office.^'^  The  minute  pains  taken  to  secure  a  regen- 
erate church  membership  would  have  had  no  significance, 
had  not  even  greater  been  taken  to  secure  a  ministry  who 
could  impress  the  truths  of  the  gospel  with  power  because 
they  had  a  deep  experience  of  the  divine  word  themselves. 
But  a  declining  church  had  now  produced  a  declining  min- 
istry, and  we  find  Mr.  Stoddard  gravely  arguing  for  his 
new  position  that  sanctifying  grace  was  not  necessary  unto 
attending  any  duty  of  worship,  from  the  further  position, 
Vv^iicli  is  stated  as  an  acknowledged  principle,  that  "sanc- 
tifying grace  is  not  necessary  untoi  ....  preaching  of 
the  word      He  says : 

It  is  upon  all  accounts  most  desirable  that  preachers  should  be 
godly  men,  and,  ceteris  paribus,  they  that  are  converted  themselves 
are  most  likely  to  be  instruments  of  the  conversion  of  sinners  and 
the  edification  of  saints.  Yet  it  is  lawful  for  men  in  a  natural  con- 
dition to  preach  the  word.  Jesus  Christ  sent  out  Judas  to  preach 
the  gospel  as  well  as  the  other  disciples. 

And  later  he  says  again: 

If  a  man  do  know  himself  to  be  unregenerate,  yet  it  is  lawful  for 
him  to  administer  baptism  and  the  Lord's  Supper.     The  blessing 

calling  are  to  be  accepted  by  the  church,  whether  they  be  converted  or  not" 
(Sermon,  p.  23).  But  "called  saints"  are  converted,  calling  being  the  divine 
side,  and  conversion  the  human  side  of  the  same  thing.  Again,  the  whole 
contention  of  his  sermon  was  that  persons  that  knew  themselves  to  be  uncon- 
verted should  come  to  the  Lord's  table,  and  yet  he  said  that  it  was  not  his 
object,  to  "direct  the  churches  to  admit  any  that  were  not  to  rational  charity 
true  believers."  But  how  could  "rational  charity"  call  a  man  a  true  believer 
wno  knew  and  said  himself  that  he  was  not?  That  would  seem  to  be  very 
irrational  charity. 

^"^  Chap,  viii,  §  i. 
Sermon,  p.  6. 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


41 


of  this  ordinance  doth  not  depend  upon  the  piety  of  him  that  doth 
administer  it  Men  that  are  destitute  of  grace  are  not  pro- 
hibited in  the  word  of  God  to  administer  the  ordinances  of  God.'^^ 

Now  this,  we  are  to  note,  is  by  no  means  the  position  that 
the  unworthiness  of  the  ministrant  does  not  affect  the 
validity  of  the  sacrament  administered,  to  him  who  re- 
ceives it,  though  this  acknowledged  principle  is  used  as  an 
argument  in  its  favor;  but  it  is  the  position  that  an  uncon- 
verted man  may,  so  far  as  he  is  himself  concerned,  go  on 
lawfully  to  administer  the  ordinances,  or,  in  other  words, 
that  a  man  who  knows  himself  to  be  in  God's  eye  out  of 
the  church  may  do  those  things  which  belong  alone  to  the 
members  of  the  church  to  do! 

How,  now,  could  such  a  position  be  for  an  instant  main- 
tained, had  there  not  already  been  discussion  among  the 
churches  upon  this  topic,  which  was  called  out  by  some 
patent  and  strange  fact?  How,  unless  there  were  already 
ministers  who  could  not  in  honesty  claim  to  be  converted, 
and  for  whom  some  way  of  justification  had  been  anxiously 
sought?  The  later  complaint  of  Whitefield  about  *'uncon~ 
verted  ministers,"  whom,  to  his  own  mind,  he  found  in 
many  places  in  New  England,  points  in  the  same  direction, 
and  gives  too  much  reason  to  fear  that  the  decay  in  the 
churches  had  now  confessedly  reached  even  the  ministers 
themselves.^^ 

''^  Ibid.,  p.  14. 

'^^  Mr.  Stoddard  claimed  that  the  direction  of  the  synod  of  1679,  cited  above, 
was  not  contrary  to  his  position  in  the  Sermon  of  1707,  for  the  words,  as  they 
ran  in  the  synod's  result  ("that  persons  be  not  admitted  unto  communion  in  the 
Lord's  Supper  without  making  a  personal  and  public  profession  of  their  faith 
and  repentance'  were  substituted  at  his  request  for  the  more  precise  and 
searching  formula  at  first  reported,  in  which  the  phrase  was  found,  "without 
making  a  relation  of  the  work  of  God's  Spirit"  (Appeal,  p.  94).  But  this  was 
scarcely  so.  That  he  made  the  proposal  to  change  the  wording,  and  that  it  was 
done  upon  his  request,  we  must  accept  tipon  his  assertion;  but  that  the  change 
had,  in  the  mind  of  the  synod  at  large,  any  such  significance  is  impossible. 
Indeed,  an  anonymous  writer,  in  reply  to  Mr.  Stoddard  (An  Appeal  of  Some 
of  the  Unlearned,  1709),  said  (p.  17):  "The  story  told  as  to  the  blotting  of  a 
passage  in  the  result  of  the  synod,  we  are  upon  good  information  from  the 


42 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


The  main  object  of  Mr.  Stoddard,  in  his  sermon,  was 
accompHshed,  and  though  Increase  Mather  opposed  him 
with  strong  logic  of  the  reason,  that  stronger  logic  of 
events  was  with  the  innovator,  and  the  practice  became 
general  in  the  valley  of  the  Connecticut  at  least  to  admit 
persons  to  the  communion  who  did  not  profess  to  be  con- 
verted.^^ Rev.  Benjamin  Colman,  of  Boston,  also  favored 
the  idea,^^  and  doubtless  many  others,  though  there  was 
also  always  a  large  number  who  repudiated  both  the  Half- 
Way  Covenant  and  its  daughter,  lax  communion.  The 
spiritual  dearth  increased,  revivals  were  uncommon,  immo- 
rality grew  apace,  and  the  state  of  religion  went  lower  and 
lower.^^  Theological  modifications  naturally  entered  with 
lax  practice,  and  the  Arminian  writings  of  Tillotson, 
Whitby,  Taylor,  and  Clarke,  and  subsequently  the  Socinian 
treatises  of  Emlyn  (reprinted  in  America  in  1756,  and  no 
doubt  read  long  before  that)  and  others  were  read  and 
had  a  large  influence.  How  far  the  Congregational  clergy 
became  Arminian  at  this  time  (about  1720)  it  is  impossible 
to  say.  The  impression  was  abroad  that  many,  both  in 
the  ministry  and  the  churches,  were  in  greater  or  less  sym- 
pathy with  this  style  of  thought.  Proofs  and  traces  of  it 
will  be  found  at  a  later  point  in  this  history;  but  it  is  now 
enough  to  note  that  so  keen  an  observer  as  Jonathan  Ed- 
wards thought  Arminianism  "prevailing"  and  was  led  to 
devote  his  principal  writing  to  opposing  it,  and,  indeed, 
began  the  great  revival  work  of  his  life  with  a  repreaching 

moderator  himself,  who  drew  that  result,  assured  it  is  a  mistake,  and  a 
gross  one." 

Trumbull,  History,  Vol.  II,  p.  146:  "A  great  proportion  of  the  clergy 
at  that  time  were  of  opinion  that  unregenerate  men,  if  externally  moral,  ought 
to  be  admitted  to  all  the  ordinances."   Cf.  ihid.,  p.  178. 

Sermon,  1727,  title:  "Parents  and  Grown  Children  should  be  together  at 
the   Lord's  Table." 

♦"8  Cf.  Trumbull,  History,  Vol.  II,  p.  137,  with  Edwards'  Works,  edition  of 
1830,  Vol.  IV,  p.  19. 


FIRST  CENTURY  IN  NEW  ENGLAND 


43 


of  the  fundamental  doctrines  of  Calvinism,  the  effects  of 
which  went  far  to  show  that  his  diagnosis  of  the  disease 
was  correct. 

The  course  of  this  review  has  brought  the  reader  to  the 
lowest  point  of  religious  decline  reached  in  New  England, 
whether  it  be  considered  from  a  practical  or  a  doctrinal 
point  of  view.  Before  he  begins  to  trace  the  upward  course 
of  things,  and  to  view  the  influences  under  which  that  took 
place,  he  should  pause  long  enough  to  perceive  that  the 
progress  downward  has  its  fruitful  cause  in  the  one  fact 
of  an  alarming  absence  of  vital  piety  in  the  New  England 
communities.  There  was  not  regenerate  material  for  the 
regenerate  church.  It  was  sought  to  remedy  the  difficulty 
in  various  ways,  but  they  did  not  touch  this  underlying 
cause.  The  children  of  the  unregenerate  were  baptized, 
but  that  did  not  secure  their  conversion,  and  the  church 
continued  to  grow  fewer  and  fewer  in  number.  Then  the 
unregenerate  were  invited  to  the  Lord's  table,  but  though  a 
greater  number  of  communicants  was  thus  secured,  the 
general  condition  of  the  community  did  not  improve,  and 
all  that  New  England  was  founded  for,  or  her  pious  sons 
still  cared  for,  went  slowly  to  ruin.  And,  doctrinally  con- 
sidered, the  cause  of  all  was  the  doctrine  of  inability,  so 
preached  as  to  deplete  the  churches,  by  discouraging  re- 
pentance and  faith. 

The  influence  of  the  style  of  thought  becoming  largely 
prevalent  in  England  has  been  hinted  at.  The  complete  un- 
derstanding of  this  thought,  of  importance  not  only  for  its 
direct,  but  for  many  indirect,  influences  upon  subsequent 
New  England  thinking,  demands  that  a  still  fuller  con- 
sideration be  given  to  it  in  the  following  pages. 


JONATHAN  EDWARDS 


CHAPTER  II 


EDWARDS'  EARLIER  LABORS 

The  New  England  churches  have  now  evidently  come 
to  a  crisis.  They  have  been  established  in  America  for  a 
full  century.  The  forces  embraced  in  the  perfected  system 
of  Calvinism,  both  good  and  evil,  have  been  at  work  a 
hundred  years  upon  a  field  singularly  favorable  to  their 
normal  development,  protected  by  its  isolation  from  the 
most  demoralizing  tendencies,  but  not  wholly  excluded 
from  the  general  influences,  of  the  age.  The  course  of 
events  has  been  against  the  better  of  them  and  has  tended 
to  emphasize  the  worse.  Political  and  social  degeneration 
resulting  from  the  trials  of  the  frontier  has  operated  to 
assist.  And,  at  the  end,  it  seems  that  the  whole  theologi- 
cal system  is  about  tO'  give  way  tO'  another,  and  with  this 
change  the  great  principles  of  the  Protestant  Reformation 
seem  about  to  fall.  But  much  of  the  old  was  evidently 
good,  and  cannot  be  surrendered,  and  much  of  the  new  is 
bad,  and  must  be  resisted.  Evidently  a  great  work  is  wait- 
ing to  be  done,  and  one  demanding  a  man.  What  man  is 
there  who'  can  do  it? 

The  answer  was  providentially  given  in  the  birth  and 
career  of  Jonathan  Edwards.^    Born  and  trained  in  a  par- 

^  Born  at  East  Windsor,  Conn.,  October  s,  1703,  the  son  of  Rev.  Timothy 
Edwards,  who  was  of  Welsh  descent;  died  at  Princeton,  N.  J.,  March  22,  1758. 
Very  precocious;  his  notes  made  in  childhood  upon  the  habits  of  the  spider  show 
great  talent  in  the  study  of  nature.  He  graduated  from  Yale  at  the  age  of 
seventeen  (1720),  and  was  installed  at  Northampton,  after  having  served  his 
college  as  tutor,  in  1727.     The  revival  began  in  1734,  and  broke  out  again  in 

1740.  The  Distinguishing  Marks  of  a  Work  of  the  Spirit  of  God  appeared  in 

1 74 1,  Thoughts  on  the  Revival  in  1742,  the  Religious  Affections  in  1746,  and 
Qualifications  for  Full  Communion  in  1749.  In  1750  he  was  dismissed,  went  as 
a  missionary  to  the  Indians  to  Stockbridge,  where  he  wrote  his  Freedom  of 
the  Will  (1754).  Nature  of  Virtue  (i755)>  and  Original  Sin  (1758).  He  be- 
came president  of  Princeton  college  in  1758.  Life  by  Dwight  in  his  edition  of 
Edwards'  Works;  another  by  Professor  A.  V.  G.  Allen  (Boston,  1889) ;  another 
still  expected,  of  a  very  elaborate  character,  by  the  late  Professor  E.  A.  Park. 


47 


48  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


sonage,  it  was  but  natural  that  his  early  religious  experi- 
ences should  be  marked.  For  a  time  they  were  over- 
shadowed by  the  intellectual  interests  which  engaged  his 
opening  mind.  At  ten  years  of  age  he  was  able  to  refute 
with  cogency  and  wit  the  doctrine  that  the  soul  is  material 
and  sleeps  with  the  body  till  the  resurrection.  At  thirteen 
he  was  ready  for  college,  and  at  fourteen  he  was  reading 
Locke's  Essay  upon  Human  Understanding  and  enjoying 
a  far  higher  pleasure  in  the  perusal  of  its  pages  "than  the 
most  greedy  miser  finds  when  gathering  up  handfuls  of 
silver  and  gold  from  some  newly  discovered  treasure." 
With  the  sensational  philosophy  of  this  great  thinker  he 
became  entirely  familiar,  but  the  spiritual  and  mystical  tend- 
ences  of  his  own  mind,  combined  no  doubt  with  the  in- 
fluence of  that  strain  of  thought  which,  first  put  by  Aug- 
ustine intoi  the  words,  Omne  honiim  aut  Deus  aiit  ex  Deo, 
had  become  the  determining  element  in  Calvinism,  led  him 
to  conclusions  substantially  identical  with  those  of  Bishop 
Berkeley,  with  whose  writings  he  may  have  been  familiar.^ 
The  great  thoughts  of  Leibnitz  and  of  Malebranche,  of 
Cumberland  and  of  Hutcheson,  became  familiar  to  him, 
probably  through  the  personal  reading  of  their  works. 
And  by  his  own  independent  study  he  had  already  arrived, 
while  a  mere  boy,  at  those  great  leading  principles  which 
formed  the  staple  of  his  later  thinking  and  constitute  his 
chief  contribution  to  the  thought  of  his  age.^ 

2  See  Allen's  Edwards,  pp.  14-17,  309.  Both  Professor  G.  P.  Fisher,  and 
Professor  Fraser,  the  editor  of  Berkeley,  doubt  whether  he  read  Berkeley  (Fisher, 
Unpublished  Essay  of  Edwards,  p.  18). 

3  There  is  a  tendency  among  writers  to  assume  that  the  New  England 
divines  cannot  have  been  acquainted  very  largely  with  the  literature  of  their 
times.  But  this  is  a  great  mistake.  Professor  Park  has  given  lists  of  the  books 
known  to  have  been  read  by  Hopkins  {Memoir,  p.  53)  and  Emmons  {Memoir, 
pp.  68  ff.).  Yale  College  library  was  well  supplied  with  books.  Cumberland's 
De  Legibus  Naturae,  3d  ed.,  1694,  was  early  put  there,  the  English  translation 
of  1727  shortly  after  publication,  and  both  editions  appear  in  the  first  catalogue 
of   1743.     Leibnitz*  correspondence  with  Clarke  was  a  common  book. 


EDWARDS'  EARLIER  LABORS 


49 


Thus  Edwards  became  intellectually  equipped  for  the 
task  of  a  theologian  above  any  of  his  contemporaries.  He 
brought  from  his  studies  competent  learning,  the  matured 
fruits  of  original  thinking,  marked  independence  and  entire 
candor  of  mind,  exceptional  acuteness  and  thoroughness, 
and  chief  of  all  the  unquenched  fire  of  native  genius  of  a 
high  order.  But  he  possessed  higher  qualifications  for 
the  work  that  was  to  fall  to  him  than  even  these.  That 
early  spiritual  experience  of  divine  truth,  which  had  suf- 
fered a  partial  eclipse  in  later  childhood,  had  been  renewed 
and  deepened  with  his  increasing  maturity  of  mind.  It  is 
significant,  and  to  a  large  degree  determinative  of  the 
whole  development  of  New  England  theology,  that  it  was 
about  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  sovereignty  that  his 
thoughts  principally  centered,  and  that  this  doctrine,  the 
central  idea  of  Calvinism  as  distinguished  from  the  Ar- 
minianism  which  was  just  then  entering  New  England  and 
creating  the  problem  which  Edwards  was  providentially 
set  to  solve,  though  it  once  "used  to  appear  like  a  horrible 
doctrine"  to  him,  became  "not  only  a  conviction,  but  a  de- 
lightful conviction."  ^  His  mind  possessed  the  power  of 
spiritual  intuition,  characteristic  of  his  Welsh  ancestry,  in 
a  large  degree.  He  seemed  to  behold  spiritual  truths  by 
direct  vision.  And  he  was  eminently  a  man  of  prayer,  of 
intimate  communion  with  God  as  his  Father  and  Friend. 

It  is  comparatively  easy  for  us  who  live  at  this  later  day 
to  formulate  the  problem  which  lay  before  Edwards.  It 
was  not  to  make  all  things  new.  The  fruits  of  a  historical 
development  w^ere  not  to  be  rashly  or  carelessly  relin- 
quished. What  was  good  in  the  old  formulations  of  doc- 
trine was  to  be  preserved.  But  at  the  same  time  the  old 
could  not  be  reintroduced  without  modification.  Theologi- 
cal opposition  and  innovation  is  never  properly  met  by 

*  Dwight's  Life,  p.  60. 


50  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

simple  reaffirmation  of  old  positions  in  the  old  language. 
The  reason  for  the  objection  must  be  perceived  and  appre- 
ciated by  him  who  would  give  it  a  due  and  conclusive 
answer.  What  is  true  in  it  must  be  acknowledged  and 
given  proper  weight.  He  who  will  teach  must  himself 
learn.  Hence  what  has  justly  offended  the  newly  awak- 
ened mind  of  an  inquiring  age  must  be  set  aside,  and  out 
of  all  the  materials  afforded  by  the  times,  new  and  old,  the 
theologian  must  go  on  to  introduce,  with  his  better  formu- 
lations of  the  old  principles,  other  principles  which  may 
be  absolutely  new. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  Edwards  placed  the  problem  be- 
fore himself  in  any  such  form.  He  was  profoundly  at- 
tached to  the  Calvinistic  system,  and  his  first  instinct  was 
to  restore  it  to  its  high  place  of  influence.  This  was  so 
far  well,  and  he  was  hereby  preserved  from  the  first  great 
danger  of  a  leader  at  such  a  time,  that  of  disloyalty  to  the 
past.  But,  though  he  may  have  had  no  thought  of  doctrinal 
change,  his  mind  was  too  original  and  his  studies  too 
exact  to  permit  him  to  remain  where  his  fathers  had  been. 
He  was,  possibly,  somewhat  deficient  at  first  in  respect  for 
the  positions  of  his  adversaries,  though  not  for  the  in- 
fluence which  they  were  exerting.  But  his  perfect  candor, 
his  clear  perception  of  truth,  and  his  personal  humility 
combined  to  open  to  him  many  new  vistas  as  he  studied, 
and  what  truth  he  saw  he  acknowledged  and  made  his 
own.  Thus  he  made  a  reply  to  the  departures  of  the  day 
which  was  capable  of  meeting  the  situation  and  of  advan- 
cing the  interests  of  theology.  If  his  natural  intensity  of 
conviction  and  expression  as  to  what  he  was  led  to  adopt, 
which  seems  to  make  all  his  writings  pulsate  with  life,  be 
added,  the  fitness  of  Edwards  to  solve  the  theological  prob- 
lem of  his  day,  largely  unconscious  as  it  was,  will  have 
been  made  clear. 


EDWARDS'  EARLIER  LABORS 


51 


Edwards'  ministry  began  in  a  place  where  the  full  force 
of  the  theological  situation  could  be  felt,  in  Northampton, 
as  the  colleague  of  Solomon  Stoddard,  to  whom  he  sus- 
tained the  relation  of  grandson.  In  that  parish,  where  the 
most  extreme  application  of  the  Half- Way  Covenant  had 
been  made,  the  subtle  influences  of  Arminianism  were  most 
likely  to  attract  the  attention  and  excite  the  opposition  of 
such  a  man  as  Edwards.  For  a  time  no  sign  of  this  ap- 
pears. His  grandfather  survived  his  ordination  two  years, 
and  for  two  more  nothing  occurs  to  mark  his  work  as  in 
any  sense  peculiar.  But  in  the  year  1731  he  was  invited 
to  preach  the  "public  lecture"  in  Boston,  and  selected  as 
his  theme  ''God  Glorified  in  Man's  Dependence."  ^  He  set 
forth  the  absolute  and  universal  dependence  of  the  re- 
deemed upon  God  as  the  cause,  and  only  proper  cause,  of 
all  their  good.  The  grace,  the  power,  the  direct  agency 
of  God  are  emphasized,  and  he  is  presented  as  the  "objec- 
tive" and  "inherent"  good  of  his  saints.  The  doctrine  of  the 
sermon  was  in  no  respect  remarkable,  but  something  in 
its  tone  attracted  great  attention.  Its  secret  is  revealed  in 
the  following  passage  from  the  "use."    Says  Edwards: 

Hence  those  doctrines  and  schemes  of  divinity  that  are  in  any 
respect  opposite  to  such  an  absolute  and  universal  dependence  on 
God,  derogate  from  his  glory  and  thwart  the  design  of  our  redemp- 
tion. And  such  are  those  schemes  that  ....  own  an  entire  depend- 
ence upon  God  for  some  things,  but  not  for  others;  they  own  that 
we  depend  on  God  for  the  gift  and  acceptance  of  a  Redeemer,  but 
deny  so  absolute  a  dependence  on  him  for  the  obtaining  of  an  interest 
in  the  Redeemer.  They  own  an  absolute  dependence  on  the  Father 
for  giving  his  Son,  and  on  the  Son  for  working  out  redemption,  but 
not  so  entire  a  dependence  upon  the  Holy  Ghost  for  conversion,  and 
a  being  in  Christ,  and  so  coming  to  a  title  to  his  benefits.  They  own 
a  dependence  on  God  for  means  of  grace,  but  not  absolutely  for  the 
benefit  and  success  of  those  means,  etc. 

It  is  unquestionable  that  the  preacher,  in  this  reference 

"5  Works,  Dwight's  edition  in  ten  volumes  (hereafter  always  quoted,  unless 
otherwise  specified),  Vol.  VII,  p.  149. 


52 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


to  undue  emphasis  upon  human  independence  and  initiative, 
had  in  mind  that  "prevaihng"  Arminianism  against  which 
the  principal  contests  of  his  life  were  to  be  waged. 

Three  years  later  the  silence  was  again  broken  by  a 
sermon,^  preached  in  his  own  church,  upon  the  doctrine 
of  a  "Divine  and  Supernatural  Light  Immediately  Im- 
parted to  the  Soul  by  the  Spirit  of  God,"  which  was  defined 
as  consisting  not  in  our  natural  convictions  of  sin  and 
misery,  nor  in  any  impression  made  upon  the  imagi- 
nation, nor  in  any  new  truths  not  contained  in  the  word 
of  God,  but  in  a  ''sense  of  the  divine  and  superlative  excel- 
lency of  the  things  of  religion,"  and  "a  conviction  of  the 
truth  and  reality  of  them."  If  in  the  former  sermon  the 
logical  and  doctrinal  theologian  was  foreshadowed,  here 
we  find  the  spiritual  seer. 

These  sermons  were  like  the  first  booming  of  a  solitary 
gun  upon  the  opening  of  a  great  battle.  The  more  special 
work  of  Edwards  began  when  in  1734  he  preached  a  ser- 
mon, afterwards  expanded  into  a  treatise  and  published, 
which  initiated  his  first  revival,  and  began  a  new  epoch  in 
American  religious  life.  It  was  entitled  Justification  by 
Faith^  and  was  a  direct  attack  upon  Arminianism."^  It  is  a 
strong  and  original  presentation  of  the  common  doctrine 
of  the  Reformed  churches  upon  this  subject.  Positions  are 
maintained  which  Edwards'  successors,  following  out  prin- 
ciples which  he  had  given  them,  were  led  to  reject,  although 
we  easily  trace  at  such  points  a  certain  conventionality  of 
treatment,^  which  indicates  the  controlling  influence  of  the- 
ological tradition.  But  at  other  points  the  investigating 
mind  which  was  always  asking  the  reason  for  every  ac- 
cepted doctrine,  and  the  spiritual  trend  of  the  writer's 


^  Works,   Vol.   VI,   p.  171. 
T  Ibid.,  Vol.  V,  p.  345. 
s  Cf.  ibid.,  pp.  400,  402. 


EDWARDS'  EARLIER  LABORS 


53 


thought,  come  prominently  to  view.  Justification  is  de- 
fined as  consisting,  not  merely  in  the  forgiveness  of  our 
sins,  but  in  the  imputation  of  Christ's  righteousness  to  us 
whereby  we  have  that  which  is  the  ground  of  our  being 
rewarded  with  eternal  life.  The  defense  of  imputation  is 
conventional.^  But  the  definition  of  faith  and  of  repent- 
ance marks  a  distinct  advance  upon  the  tone  of  the  previous 
century,^ ^  and  the  explanation  of  the  reason  why  faith 
should  be  made  the  condition  of  justification  departs  widely 
from  the  mechanical  methods  of  Calvinistic  scholasticism 
and  reproduces  the  true  spiritual  atmosphere  of  the  bet- 
ter days.  Every  idea  of  merit  in  faith  is  excluded — here  is 
the  evangelical  element;  but  faith  is  said  to  be  the  condi- 
tion of  forgiveness,  because  it  unites  the  soul  to  Christ  so 
that  there  is  a  fitness  in  bestowing  such  a  favor  in  conse- 
quence of  it.  Justification  is  thus  a  "manifestation  of  God's 
regard  to  the  beauty  of  that  order  that  there  is  in  uniting 
those  things  that  have  a  natural  agreement  and  congruity 
and  unition  of  the  one  with  the  other." 

One  can  scarcely  refrain,  as  he  thus  passes  over  the  first 
great  influential  work  of  the  originator  of  a  new  school 
in  theology,  from  asking  how  far  the  future  master  was 
seen  in  his  first  attempt;  nor  from  considering  more  ser- 
iously whether  Edwards  really  showed  himself  the  man 
fully  to  cope  with  the  New  England  situation.  We  have 
already  traced  the  condition  of  the  churches  at  this  time 
to  the  lack  of  conversions,  and  this  lack  to  the  constant 
preaching  of  the  divine  sovereignty  in  the  form  of  the  in- 
ability of  man.  The  mind  of  the  age,  as  well  as  the  ex- 
perience of  the  churches,  had  come  to  the  point  where  the 
old  doctrine  of  sovereignty  needed  modification.  More 

®  See  particularly  p.  395. 
1°  Ibid.,  p.  430, 
Ibid.,  p.  369. 


54 


HISTORY  OF  NEW,  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


room  was  demanded  for  the  activity  of  man.  It  was  at 
this  point  that  the  new  leader  was  to  be  tested.  Could  he 
perceive  the  real  difficulty?  Had  he  any  sufficient  remedy 
to  offer? 

In  reply  to  these  questions,  a  somewhat  ambiguous  an- 
swer must  be  made.  Edwards  saw  what  all  saw — Armin- 
ians,  Half-Way  men  like  Stoddard,  and  Calvinists  alike — 
that  the  great  necessity  of  the  times  was  conversions.  He 
saw,  what  many  did  not  see,  that  the  conversion  required 
was  a  deep  and  pervading,  a  divinely  wrought  work  in  the 
soul.  He  saw  also  that  the  tendency  among  the  Armin- 
ians  to  confuse  a  "good,  moral  life"  with  the  Christian 
life,  and  to  depend  for  salvation  upon  the  striking  at  the 
day  of  judgment  of  a  kind  of  moral  balance-sheet  between 
good  and  bad  deeds,  was  a  fundamental  abandonment  of 
the  gospel.  The  new  emphasis  upon  the  worth  and  place 
of  man  in  the  scheme  of  things  had  forgotten  for  the  time 
that  he  had  misused  his  freedom  radically,  and  was  guilty 
and  ruined.  What  was  wanted,  therefore,  was  just  the 
old  doctrine  of  salvation  by  faith,  by  spiritual  union  with 
God,  and  by  justification,  by  the  free  forgiveness  of  the 
sinner  in  the  infinite  grace  of  God  in  Jesus  Christ  and 
this  Edwards  enforced  with  great  power.  The  result  was 
the  renewal  of  what  had  almost  ceased,  of  conversions, 
and  the  revival  by  the  logic  of  facts  in  the  thinking  of  the 
churches  of  the  doctrine  of  the  new  birth.^^  There  was  no 
new  truth  brought  forward  at  this  point,  but  a  new  im- 
pression of  the  truth  was  made  which  was  almost  equiv- 
alent to  the  impression  which  a  new  truth  is  adapted  to 
make.  The  doctrine  of  regeneration  acquired  practical 
effectiveness,  for  men  were  actually  born  again  in  great 
numbers  in  the  revivals  of  the  years  1735  and  1740,  and 
thus  the  old  paralysis  of  New  England  was  broken  up. 

12  See  Edwards'  own  testimony,  Works,  Vol.  IV,  p.  37. 

13  Cf.  Tracy,  Great  Awakening,  pp.  ix  ff. 


EDWARDS'  EARLIER  LABORS 


55 


But  Edwards  did  not  at  this  time  see  the  source  of  that 
old  paralysis  in  the  doctrine  of  inability.  His  influence  was 
that  of  a  great  preacher,  not  yet  that  of  a  great  thinker. 
He  was  not  yet  at  the  point  where  the  arguments  of  his  op- 
ponents could  begin  to  have  a  large  effect  upon  his  own 
convictions.  He  held  too  strong  views  as  to  the  divine 
sovereignty,  and  had  found  the  doctrine  too  ''delightful" 
to  be  much  inclined  to  learn  where  it  had  gradually  ob- 
scured other  truths  by  its  too  rank  development.  Hence 
the  doctrine  of  inability,  the  source  of  the  whole  difficulty 
which  he  so  clearly  saw,  did  not  appear  to  him  in  its  un- 
favorable aspects.  Indeed,  it  somewhat  obscured  his  own 
view  of  the  freeness  of  God's  grace  and  of  the  divine 
readiness  to  forgive.  His  preaching  was  still  too  much 
as  if  men  were  to  give  themselves  completely  to  God,  to 
surrender  themselves  wholly,  to  fulfil  every  condition  pre- 
scribed by  the  gospel,  and  then  to  remain  in  entire  uncer- 
tainty whether,  after  all,  God  would  bless  them  or  not.  He 
even  says,  quite  in  the  line  of  the  earlier  thought,  that  fixed- 
ness of  resolution  sufficient  to  obtain  salvation  is  ''not  in 
our  power."  Certainly,  such  a  strain  of  remark  as  the 
following  was  not  eminently  calculated  to  encourage  the 
hearer  to  action: 

You  must  not  think  much  of  your  pains,  and  of  the  length  of 
time;  you  must  press  towards  the  kingdom  of  God,  and  do  your 
utmost,  and  hold  out  to  the  end,  and  learn  to  make  no  account  of  it 
when  you  have  done.  You  must  undertake  the  business  of  seeking 
salvation  upon  these  terms,  and  with  no  other  expectation  than  this, 
that  if  ever  God  bestows  mercy,  it  will  be  in  his  own  time;  and  not 
only  so,  but  also  that  when  you  have  done  all,  God  will  not  hold  hitn- 
self  obliged  to  show  you  mercy  at  last>^ 

Not  encouraging,  certainly,  in  its  outcome  is  this  pas- 
sage; and  yet  there  is  an  appeal  to  "press"  and  "do"  and 
"hold  out,"  which  has  a  ring  anticipatory  of  later  and  bet- 

1*  Works,  p.  462, 
"  Ibid.,  p.  467. 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


ter  preaching ;  and  this  tone  of  exhortation  to  action  which 
sounded  through  all  Edward's  preaching — the  thrilling,  in- 
tense activity  of  his  ardent  soul — this  it  was  which  moved 
men  to  repentance  and  conversion,  and  this  first  actually 
broke  down  the  doctrine  of  inability.  That  doctrine  has 
never  played  any  actual  part  in  the  thinking  of  men  in 
times  of  real  revival. 

Evidently,  then,  the  thinker  and  reformer  has  not  yet 
come  to  his  full  strength.  There  is  a  promise,  but  still  lit- 
tle present  exercise,  of  the  powers  of  a  great  intellectual 
leader.  It  is  the  instinctive  working  of  a  great  mind  which 
we  see  here,  rather  than  the  well-planned  efforts  of  one  who 
had  surveyed  the  field  and  fully  comprehended  his  task. 

The  external  history  of  the  revival  does  not  concern  us 
here.  Its  vicissitudes,  the  interruption  which  it  suffered 
until  renewed  under  the  agency  of  Whitefield,  the  abun- 
dant labors  of  Edwards  at  home  and  abroad,  the  abnormal 
phenomena  attending  it,  however  interesting,  are  all  mat- 
ters aside  from  our  present  purpose.  It  called  out  intense 
opposition  from  many  moderate  men  among  the  New  Eng- 
land clergy,  of  whom  the  most  prominent  was  Charles 
Chauncy,  minister  of  the  First  Church  in  Boston,  who 
wrote  several  tracts  against  it,  among  them  his  Seasonable 
Thoughts  on  the  State  of  Religion  in  New  England 
(1743).^^  The  divine  character  and  the  religious  worth 
of  the  revival  were  denied,  and  hence  Edwards  felt  called 
upon  to  come  to  its  defense.  In  a  large  measure  he  became 
the  historian  of  the  great  spiritual  upheaval.  He  was  also 
led  to  the  production  of  a  work  which  was  designed  to  lay 
the  foundation  for  more  solid  and  successful  labor  in  the 
field  of  practical  religion  by  removing  the  obscurity  which 
overhung  the  nature  of  true  religion,  and  by  setting  forth 


1'  See  Dexter's  bibliography  for  1740  and  following  years,  in  his  Congre- 
gationalism as  Seen  in  Its  Literature. 


EDWARDS'  EARLIER  LABORS 


57 


the  distinguishing  notes  of  that  virtue  which  is  acceptable 
in  the  sight  of  God.  It  was  entitled  A  Treatise  Concerning 
Religions  Aifections,^'^  and  was  an  exceedingly  thorough 
affair.  In  a  sense  it  may  be  regarded  as  the  full  presenta- 
tion of  the  ideas  which  had  formed  the  substance  of  the 
sermon  upon  illumination  of  1734.  It  rests  upon  the  con- 
ception of  the  nature  of  virtue  which  was  elaborated  in  the 
treatise  of  1755,  and  it  is  involved  in  some  of  the  con- 
fusion which  marked  the  first  principles  of  the  treatise 
upon  the  will.  It  will  therefore  require  some  attention  at 
a  later  point  in  the  study  of  the  history  of  Edwards'  ideas, 
but  is  of  the  first  importance  in  immediate  connection  with 
the  review  of  his  services  in  the  period  now  under  consid- 
eration, since  it  is  the  chief  illustration  of  his  entire  accord 
with  the  spiritual  side  of  the  Westminster  theology  to 
which  notice  has  already  been  drawn. 

"True  religion,  in  great  part,"  says  Edwards,  "consists 
in  holy  affections."  What  the  affections  are  he  does  not 
clearly  define,  for  though  distinguishing  between  what  are 
called  in  the  better  phraseology  of  modern  days,  volitions, 
and  the  emotions  proper,  he  blurs  the  distinction  and  re- 
fuses to  acknowledge  that  there  are  two  distinct  faculties  of 
the  mind  here  concerned.  His  thought,  stated  in  modern 
language,  is,  however,  clearly  this,  that  religion  consists 
in  the  holy  choice  of  the  will  accompanied  by  the  lively 
play  of  the  appropriate  emotions.  Having  established  this 
point,  he  goes  on  to  discuss  most  searchingly  some  sup- 
posed signs  of  true  religion  which  are  no  certain  evidences 
of  its  existence.  It  is,  for  example,  no  sign  that  religious 
affections  are  "truly  gracious"  that  they  are  "very  great," 
or  that  they  have  "great  effects  upon  the  body,"  or  that 
they  cause  fluency  or  fervor,  or  that  they  are  "not  excited 
by  us,"  or  "come  with  texts  of  Scripture,"  or  that  their  sub- 

17  Works,  Vol.  V,  pp.  1-344. 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


jects  have  great  confidence;  etc.,  etc.  And  then  he 
passes  to  the  positive  treatment  of  the  theme,  in  which  he 
follows  the  lines  of  his  former  sermon.  Truly  spiritual 
affections  arise  from  supernatural  operations  on  the  heart; 
their  object  is  the  excellency  of  divine  things  "as  they  are 
in  themselves;"  they  are  founded  on  the  moral  excellency 
of  divine  things;  they  arise  from  divine  illumination;  they 
are  attended  with  a  conviction  of  the  reality  and  certainty 
of  divine  things;  and  their  fruit  are  tempers  of  heart  and 
courses  of  life  that  are  manifestly  truly  Christian. 

In  the  course  of  the  treatise  many  incidental  definitions 
are  thrown  out  which  add  much  to  the  clearness  of  the  gen- 
eral thought  above  that  of  the  former  discussion.  The 
sense  of  divine  things  which  the  true  Christian  has,  is  un- 
folded at  some  length,  and  is  condensed  in  the  following 
definition:  "A  new  foundation  laid  in  the  nature  of  the 
soul  for  a  new  kind  of  exercises  of  the  same  [i.  e.,  the 
original]  faculty  of  the  understanding."  But  when  Ed- 
wards comes  to  the  peculiar  certainty  which  the  Christian 
has  of  the  truth  of  divine  things,  he  is  particularly  clear 
and  valuable.    He  says : 

It  is  evident  that  there  is  a  spiritual  conviction  of  the  truth,  or 
a  belief  peculiar  to  those  who  are  spiritual,  who  are  regenerated,  and 
who  have  the  Spirit  of  God,  in  his  holy  communications,  dwelling  in 

them  as  a  vital  principle  A  view  of  the  divine  glory  directly 

convinces  the  mind  of  the  divinity  of  these  things.  ....  They  there- 
fore that  see  the  stamp  of  this  glory  in  divine  things,  they  see  divinity 
in  them,  they  see  God  in  them,  and  so  see  them  to  be  divine;  because 
they  see  that  in  them  wherein  the  truest  idea  of  divinity  consists. 
Thus  a  soul  may  have  a  kind  of  intuitive  knowledge  of  the  divinity 
of  the  things  exhibited  in  the  gospel;  not  that  he  judges  the  doctrines 
of  the  gospel  to  be  from  God  without  any  argument  or  deduction  at 
all;  but  it  is  without  any  long  chain  of  arguments;  the  argument 
is  but  one  and  the  evidence  direct;  the  mind  ascends  to  the  truth  of 

the  gospel  but  one  step,  and  that  is  its  divine  glory  The  gospel 

of  the  blessed  God  does  not  go  abroad  a  begging  for  its  evidence  so 
much  as  some  think:  it  has  its  highest  and  most  proper  evidence  in 
itself.18 

18  Loc.  cif.,  pp.  176  ff. 


EDWARDS'  EARLIER  LABORS 


59 


And  he  further  adds,  with  reference  to  the  importance 
of  this  argument: 

Unless  men  may  come  to  ai  reasonable  solid  persuasion  and  con- 
viction of  the  truth  of  the  gospel  by  internal  evidences  in  the  way 
that  has  been  spoken,  viz.,  by  a  sight  of  its  glory,  it  is  impossible  that 
those  who  are  illiterate  and  unacquainted  with  history  should  have 

any  thorough  and  effectual  conviction  of  it  at  all  After  all 

that  learned  men  have  said  to  them,  there  will  remain  innumerable 
doubts  on  their  minds;  they  will  be  ready,  when  pinched  with  some 
great  trial  of  their  faith,  to  say,  "How  do  I  know  this  or  that?  How 
do  I  know  when  these  histories  were  written?  Learned  men  tell 
me  these  histories  were  so  and  so  attested  in  their  day;  but  how  do 
I  know  that  there  were  such  attestations  then?"  ....  But  the  gos- 
pel was  not  given  only  for  learned  men  It  is  unreasonable  to 

suppose  that  God  has  provided  for  his  people  no  more  than  prob- 
able evidences  of  the  truth  of  the  gospel  And  if  we  come  to 

fact  and  experience,  there  is  not  the  least  reason  to  suppose  that  one 
in  a  hundred  of  those  who  have  been  sincere  Christians  and  have  had 
a  heart  to  sell  all  for  Christ,  have  come  by  their  conviction  of  the 

truth  of  the  gospel  this  way  [viz.  by  external  arguments]  And 

indeed,  it  is  but  very  lately  that  these  arguments  have  been  set  in  a 
clear  and  convincing  light  even  by  learned  men  themselves :  and 
since  it  has  been  done,  there  never  were  fewer  thorough  believers 
among  those  who  have  been  educated  in  the  true  religion.  Infidelity 
never  prevailed  so  much  in  any  age  as  in  this  wherein  these  argu- 
ments are  handled  to  the  greatest  advantage.^^ 

Edwards  did  not  neglect  the  external  arguments,^^  as 
Calvin  had  not;  but  we  see  here  clearly  that  he  placed  the 
weight  of  argument  where  it  should  be,  in  the  inner  cer- 
tainty of  the  specific  Christian  experience.  This  was  the 
trend  of  the  Westminster  confession;  and  under  Edwards' 
influence  it  maintained  itself  for  a  generation  longer  in 
New  England.  Under  what  influences  it  gave  place  to  the 
purely  external  treatment  of  the  subject  which  was  char- 
acteristic of  the  middle  of  the  present  century,  the  his- 
tory of  the  Unitarian  controversy  will  clearly  reveal. 

Ibid.,  pp.  182  ff. 

20  He  says:  "They  may  be  in  some  respects  subservient  to  the  begetting 
of  a  saving  faith  in  men"  (Vol.  V,  p.  186),  and  he  pays  attention  to  them  in 
his  "Observations,"  Vol.  VII,  pp.  244  ff. 


6o  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

The  last  important  work  owing  its  origin  immediately 
to  the  results  of  the  revival  was  the  Qualifications  for  Com- 
munion. Edwards  had  at  first  followed  unquestionably  in 
the  path  marked  out  by  his  grandfather  Stoddard,  and  ad- 
mitted to  the  communion  without  special  examination  as 
to  evidences  of  conversion  upon  the  part  of  the  communi- 
cant. But  he  discovered  a  bad  moral  condition  in  the  com- 
munity affecting  its  younger  members,  some  of  whom 
were  communicants;  and  the  resistance  which  was  made 
by  prominent  families  to  necessary  discipline  led  him  to 
examine  the  subject  with  care,  and  he  soon  adopted  the 
original  position  of  the  New  England  churches  and  deter- 
mined to  admit  none  to  communion  who  were  not  "osten- 
sible" Christians.  His  attempts  to  carry  out  his  new  views 
in  practice  led  to  his  dismissal  from  his  pastorate,  and  to  the 
preparation  of  this  treatise  in  defense  of  himself  before  his 
people.  He  thereby  laid  the  foundation  for  the  general 
practice  of  Congregationalists  for  more  than  a  century. 

His  proposition,  carefully  guarded,  is  that  none  should 
be  admitted  to  the  Lord's  Supper  but  ''such  as  are  in  pro- 
fession and  in  the  eye  of  the  church's  Christian  judgment 
godly  or  gracious  persons."  He  does  not  seek  to  secure  in- 
fallibly the  actual  possession  of  saving  grace  in  every  com- 
municant, for  that  would  involve  on  the  part  of  the  church 
the  power  of  reading  men's  hearts;  but  there  should  be 
what  is  now  phrased  a  "credible  profession."  The  argu- 
ments he  employed  are  these : 

None  ought  to  be  admitted  as  members  of  the  visible  church  of 

Christ  but  visible  and  professing  saints  All  who  are  capable 

of  it  are  bound  to  make  an  exphcit  and  open  profession  of  the  true 

religion  The  profession  should  be  of  real  piety  [against  the 

idea  of  professing  a  belief  in  Christianity  in  general  without  a  pro- 
fession of  personal  faith  in  Christ]  There  is  no  good  reason 

why  the  people  of  God  should  not  profess  a  proper  respect  to  Christ 
in  their  hearts  as  well  as  a  true  notion  of  him  in  their  heads  


EDWARDS'  EARLIER  LABORS 


6i 


The  teachings  of  Christ,  the  practice  of  the  primitive  church,  and  the 
Scriptures  in  general,  require  it. 

He  modestly  but  strongly  refutes  the  position  of  Mr. 
Stoddard,  saying"  that  the  natural  tendency  of  the  Lord's 
Supper  to  move  the  heart  and  lead  to  conversion  is  no  proof 
that  this  was  its  designed  object,  and  finally  strikes  at  the 
root  of  the  whole  Half-Way  system  by  saying,  in  effect, 
that  the  things  which  baptism  and  the  Lord's  Supper  sig- 
nify do  not  exist  in  the  case  of  the  unregenerate,  and  hence 
to  bestow  the  badges  of  repentance  and  forgiveness  upon 
such  persons  is  an  empty  and  dishonoring  honor. 

The  importance  of  the  practical  service  rendered  by  the 
Qiialiiications  for  Communion  can  scarcely  be  overesti- 
mated. It  is  too  evident  to  need  long  discussion  here.  Its 
influence  in  the  doctrinal  sphere,  though  indirect,  was  per- 
manent and  broad.  Wherever  there  were  ^'Edwardeans," 
after  there  came  to  be  a  distinctively  Edwardean  school, 
evidences  of  regeneration  were  scrutinized  with  care,  and  a 
consequent  emphasis  was  laid  upon  the  doctrine  of  regen- 
eration, and  upon  the  allied  doctrines  of  the  will,  and  of  vir- 
tue, and  of  sin,  which  form  the  great  staple  of  New  Eng- 
land discussion.  It  is  probable  that  Edwards'  practical 
work  as  a  revivalist  and  a  faithful  and  scrupulous  pastor 
had  as  great  an  influence  upon  the  future  of  his  native  pro- 
vince as  that  which  he  did  in  his  study  by  the  methods  of  the 
philosophic  divine.  Yet  in  the  providence  of  God  he  was  to 
do  both  works;  and  the  separation  from  Northampton, 
which  was  so  unjust,  and  which  cost  him  so  much  anguish, 
was  the  divine  means  of  transplanting  him  to  the  desolate 
and  distant  Stockbridge,  where  his  mind,  released  from 
most  of  the  interruptions  of  active  life,  was  at  leisure  to 
bring  forth  out  of  its  treasure-house  things  new  and  old. 
To  this  period,  the  loftier  and  greater  in  its  results  for 
American  religious  thought,  the  history  now  turns. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  TREATISE  ON  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL 

If  the  great  characteristic  of  Edward's  mind  was  acute- 
ness,  next,  if  not  upon  an  equaHty  with  this,  are  to  be  placed 
his  depth  and  thoroughness.  He  had  met  Arminianism 
upon  the  side  of  its  practical  opposition  to  evangelical  re- 
ligion, of  its  coldness,  its  self-righteousness,  its  antagonism 
to  the  practical  measures  by  which  a  pure  Christian  church 
could  alone  be  sustained.  But  he  was  content  with  no  super- 
ficial consideration  of  what  were  mere  symptoms.  These 
outward  phenomena  were  traceable  to  some  definite  cause, 
and  that  some  particular  idea.  Edwards  conceived  this  to 
be  the  philosophy  of  the  will  which  had  become  prevalent, 
and  as  early  as  1747  he  had  sketched  the  plan  of  a  work 
upon  this  theme,  which  the  disturbances  leading  up  to  his 
dismissal  had  rendered  it  impossible  for  him  to  carry  out.^ 
In  Stockbridge  he  took  up  the  thread,  and  in  1754  printed 
his  Careful  and  Strict  Inquiry  into  the  Modern  Prevailing 
Notions  of  That  Freedom  of  the  Will  Which  is  Supposed  to 
be  Essential  to  Moral  Agency,  etc.^  Its  importance  is 
evident  not  only  from  the  universal  plaudits  with  which  it 
was  received,  and  from  the  position  among  the  great  men 
of  the  world  which  it  secured  to  its  author,  but  by  the  per- 
manence of  its  influence  as  a  classic  of  the  New  England 
theology.  In  actual  fact,  it  was  but  the  first  of  a  consider- 
able series  of  treatises  in  New  England  in  which  the  theory 
of  the  will  was  discussed,  and  by  which  it  was  essentially 
modified  and  improved;  but  in  the  imagination  of  the  dif- 
ferent leaders  of  the  school,  down  to  the  latest,  it  was  the 
unsurpassed  ideal  with  which  they  all  sought  to  prove  their 
entire  agreement. 

1  D wight's  Life,  p.   250.  ^  Works,  Vol.  II,  pp.  1-300. 

62 


TREATISE  ON  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL  63 


The  Freedom  of  the  Will  cannot  be  correctly  understood 
without  a  clear  view  of  Edwards'  starting-point.  Two  par- 
ticulars are  to  be  carefully  observed,  of  which  the  first  is  his 
conception  of  the  idea  of  cause.  There  are  evidences  in 
those  remarkable  Notes  on  the  Mind,  written  while  he  was 
a  youth  in  college,  that  Edwards  early  busied  himself  with 
this  problem;  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  treatise  written 
in  mature  manhood  went  no  farther  than  the  notes  of  the 
youth.  The  Notes  say  succinctly:  "Cause  is  that  after  or 
upon  the  existence  of  which,  or  the  existence  of  it  after 
such  a  manner,  the  existence  of  another  thing  follows ^ 
And  in  the  treatise  the  definition  runs: 

Therefore  I  sometimes  use  the  word  cause,  in  this  enquiry,  to 
signify  any  antecedent,  either  natural  or  moral,  positive  or  negative, 
on  which  an  event,  either  a  thing,  or  the  manner  and  circumstance 
of  a  thing,  so  depends,  that  it  is  the  ground  and  reason,  either  in 
whole  or  in  part,  why  it  is,  rather  than  not;  or  why  it  is  as  it  is, 
rather  than  otherwise;  or,  in  other  words,  any  antecedent  with  which 
a  consequent  event  is  so  connected  that  it  truly  belongs  to  the  reason 
why  the  proposition  which  affirms  that  event,  is  true;  whether  it 
has  any  positive  influence,  or  not.  And  agreeably  to  this,  I  some- 
times use  the  word  eifect  for  the  consequence  of  another  thing  which 
is  perhaps  rather  an  occasion  than  a  cause,  most  properly  speaking.* 

Upon  the  idea  of  cause  as  thus  defined  the  whole  treatise 
rests,  for  an  event  in  the  realm  of  mind  without  a  cause 
is  as  inconceivable  to  Edwards  as  such  a  one  in  the  realm 
of  matter.  This  is  the  great  positive  argument  of  the  dis- 
cussion, though  rather  an  assumed  axiom  than  the  subject 
of  prolonged  elaboration.  And  thus  it  comes  to  pass  that 
into  the  very  foundation  of  the  whole  argument  there  is  in- 
serted an  ambiguity  which  doubtless  deceived  Edwards  him- 
self, and  has  given  rise  to  two  distinct  interpretations  of  the 

^Ihid.,   Vol.   I,  p.  668. 

*  Ihid.,  p.  50.  Cf.  the  language  of  J.  S.  Mill,  Logic  (Harper's  ed.,  p.  236) : 
"To  certain  facts^  certain  facts  always  do,  and,  as  we  believe,  will  continue  to, 
succeed.  The  invariable  antecedent  is  termed  the  cause;  the  invariable  conse- 
quent, the  effect," 


64 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


work.  Motives  are  "causes"  determining  the  will.  Is  the 
motive  an  occasion  upon  which  the  efficient  will  acts,  or  it- 
self an  efficient  cause  operating  upon  the  will?  Edwards' 
definition  gives  no  answer  to  this  question,  for  he  has 
wrapped  up  in  one  term  both  efficient  and  occasional  causes. 
It  was  doubtless  true  that  his  idealism  had  much  to  do  with 
this.  If  God  was  the  only  agent,  if,  according  to  the  occa- 
sionalism of  Malebranche,  God  does  everything  upon  occa- 
sion of  certain  events  in  the  mundane  sphere,  then  there  is 
no  essential  difference  between  the  occasional,  and  what 
seems  to  us  to  be  the  efficient  cause.  But,  however  the  am- 
biguity was  introduced  into  his  thinking,  there  it  was,  at  the 
very  foundation  of  the  edifice  he  was  about  to  rear,  and 
destined  to  make  its  whole  structure  insecure  to  the  highest 
pinnacle.^ 

The  second  particular  calling  for  attention  is  the  divi- 
sion of  the  mind  into  faculties,  understanding,  and  will, 
which  Edwards,,  following  Calvin,^  and  deserting  at  this 
redeeming  point  his  master,  Locke,"^  unfortunately  adopted. 
Thus  he  confounded  the  emotions,  the  action  of  which  is 
necessary,  with  the  will,  the  action  of  which  is  free,  and  at- 
tributed to  the  latter,  as  a  matter  of  self-evidence,  all  the 
necessity  of  the  former.  The  confusion  resulted  in  the  en- 
tire ambiguity  of  the  wo-rd  ''inclination,"  ^  which  is  some- 
times used  to  denote  an  emotion  and  often  in  the  same  sen- 
tence, and  in  the  process  of  a  vital  argument,  used  immedi- 
ately thereafter,  and  as  if  no  change  of  meaning  had  been 
made,  to  denote  a  volition.^  Hence  as  an  argument  the 
whole  treatise  splits  upon  the  rock  O'f  this  ambiguous  mid- 

5  The  whole  reply  to  Chubb  (p.  96,  i)  is  vitiated  by  this  confusion.  The  idea  of  power 
was,  in  like  manner,  eviscerated  (Vol.  I,  p.  681). 

^  Institute,  Book  I,  chap,  xv,  §§  6-8;  cf.  Book  II,  chap,  ii,  §  2. 

■7  Works,  Vol.  II,  p.  17;  cf.  Vol.  V,  p.  10;  Vol.  I,  p.  693. 

^  And  similar  words,  such  as  "preferring"   (pp.   22,  24,  etc.). 

^  For  example,  pp.  20,  35,  70,  166.  P.  24,  bottom,  verges  perilously  near  it. 
Examples,  more  or  less  forcible,  can,  however,  be  found  on  nearly  every  page. 


TREATISE  ON  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL 


6S 


die.  It  is  one  of  the  curiosities  of  literature  that  in  our  own 
day  there  should  be  found  some,  who  accept  the  threefold 
division  of  the  mind  and  the  true  efficiency  of  second  causes, 
to  declare  that  they  agree  with  Edwards  on  the  doctrine  of 
the  will ! 

With  such  fundamental  conceptions  long  since  incor- 
porated in  his  whole  style  of  thinking,  Edwards  came  into 
contact  with  the  Arminian  writers  of  his  day.  Among  these 
the  chief  w^as  Daniel  Whitby,^ ^  who'  in  his  work  entitled 
Six  Discourses'^  discussed,  not  only  the  will,  but  also  all  the 
so-called  "Five  Points"  of  controversy  between  the  Calvin- 
ists  and  the  Arminians.  Thus  he  taught  a  "conditional  elec- 
tion to  be  made  sure  by  good  works/'  as  well  as  the  doctrine 
of  general  atonement,  and  combated  the  Calvinistic  views 
upon  irresistible  grace,  bondage  of  the  will,  and  the  per- 
severance of  the  saints. 

Such  a  setting  to  the  doctrine  of  free  will  did  not  help 
it  with  Edwards.  But  in  its  details  this  doctrine  impinged 
upon  his  established  methods  of  thought.  The  will,  accord- 
ing to  Whitby,  is  free  not  only  in  the  sense  of  being  the 
faculty  of  choice,  but  as  having  no  determination  either  to 
evil  or  good.  Its  liberty  he  thus  defines :  "a  power  of  acting 
from  ourselves,  or  doing  what  we  will."^^  Thus  it  is  free, 
not  only  from  "co-action,"  but  from  what,  in  distinction 
from  that,  was  called  "necessity."  In  a  quotation  from  a 
certain  Mr.  Thorndike  the  word  "indifference"  is  used  to 
describe  this  freedom.^  ^ 

Upon  this  free  will  motives,  such  as  promises  and  threats, 
operate  and  exercise  influence;  but  when  the  motives  are 
presented,  the  decision  still  lies  with  the  will.  It  may  choose 
in  the  one  way  equally  with  the  other;  and  it  chooses  as  it 

Church  of  England,  rector  of  St.   Edmund's,   Salisbury;  born   1638,  died 

1726. 

11  ?2dition  at  hand  is  the  American  reprint  (Worcester,  1801). 
3  2  Of.  cit.,  p.  249.  Ibid.,  p.  231. 


66  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


does  by  "self-determination."  True,  Whitby  does  not,  so 
far  as  noted,  employ  this  precise  word,  upon  which  Ed- 
wards rings  so  many  changes ;  but  the  thought  is  his,  and  he 
does  once  at  least  say  that  the  will  ''determines  itself."^* 
If,  now,  it  determines  itself,  says  Whitby,  there  is  evidently 
no  rational  ground  for  knowing  beforehand  what  the  action 
of  the  will  in  a  given  case  may  be,  even  when  all  the  operat- 
ing motives  are  supposed  to  be  known.  The  omniscience  of 
God,  which  embraces  his  foreknowledge,  is  therefore  an 
attribute  entirely  mysterious.  It  also  follows  that  man  in 
conversion  is  not  passive  and  that  the  grace  of  God  is  not 
irresistible. 

The  arguments  by  which  Whitby  sustained  his  positions 
were  not  novel,  and  moved  in  the  plain  sphere  of  common- 
sense.  He  first  soaght  to  show  that  it  was  as  essential  that 
the  will  should  be  free  from  "necessity"  as  from  "co-action," 
and  then  directed  his  easy  task  toward  showing  that  there 
could  be,  in  consistence  with  the  condition  in  which  man  is 
(a  state  of  probation),  and  with  the  treatment  which  he  re- 
ceives as  an  object  of  praise  or  blame,  of  commands,  and  of 
promises,  no  "co-action"  of  the  will. 

To  this  treatise,  and  to  others  like  it,  as,  for  example, 
that  of  Mr.  Chubb,^^  Edwards  gave  minute  attention.  It 
doubtless  seemed  to  him  that  the  answer  was  easy.  The 
philosophical  world  had  before  it  in  the  work  of  Locke  the 
complete  materials  for  the  refutation.  He  had  only  to  sit 
down,  as  he  thought,  and  with  sufficient  thoroughness  ex- 
plain and  enforce  what  Locke  had  already  said  in  brief,  and 
then  show  at  length  how  inconsequent  and  illogical  in  the 
comparison  each  several  position  of  the  antagonists  was, 

^■^  Loc.  cit.,  240. 

Edwards  quotes  in  this  treatise:  Whitby,  Discourses;  Hobbes;  Samuel 
Clarke,  Demonstration;  Turnbull,  Christian  Philosophy ;  Chubb,  Collection  of 
Tracts;  Stebbing,  Treatise  on  the  Operations  of  the  Spirit;  Taylor,  Original  Sin; 
Lord  Karnes,  Essays;  and  others. 


TREATISE  ON  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL 


67 


and  the  work  would  be  done.  It  is  therefore  necessary 
briefly  to  review  Locke's  theory  of  the  will  in  preparation 
for  the  consideration  of  Edwards  himself. 

It  has  already  been  noted  that  Edwards  early  read 
Locke's  Essay  on  Human  Understanding,  That  early  read- 
ing seems  to  have  made  the  strongest  impression  upon  his 
mind,  and,  as  we  shall  see,  the  improvements  which  Locke 
introduced  in  his  second  edition  were  generally  rejected  by 
Edwards  in  the  preparation  of  his  great  treatise. 

Locke  begins  his  treatment  of  the  wilP^  by  defining  the 
idea  of  liberty  as  "the  idea  of  a  power  in  any  agent  to  do  or 
forbear  any  particular  action  according  to  the  determination 
or  thought  of  the  mind  whereby  either  of  them  is  preferred 
to  the  other."  It  will  be  seen  that  some  stress  was  laid  by 
him  in  the  development  of  his  thought  upon  the  word  "for- 
bear" in  this  definition;  but  apart  from  this  modification, 
liberty  is  always  external  liberty,  the  power  to  do  as  one 
wills.  He  even  says  that  it  is  an  "unreasonable  because 
unintelligible  question  whether  man's  will  be  free  or  no." 

Liberty,  which  is  but  a  power,  belongs  only  to  agents,  and  can- 
not be  an  attribute  or  modification  of  the  will  which  is  also  but  a 

power  To  ask  whether  the  will  has  freedom  is  to  ask  whether 

one  power  has  another  power,  one  ability  another  ability  We 

can  scarce  tell  how  to  imagine  any  being  freer  than  to  be  able  to  do  what 
he  wills. 

In  developing  this  thought,  he  touches  the  question 
"whether  a  man  be  at  liberty  to  will  which  of  the  two  he 
pleases,  motion  or  rest?"    Which  he  answers  thus: 

This  question  carries  the  absurdity  of  it  so  manifestly  in  itself 
that  one  might  thereby  sufficiently  be  convinced  that  liberty  concerns 
not  the  will.  For  to  ask,  whether  a  man  be  at  liberty  to  will  either 
motion  or  rest,  speaking  or  silence,  which  he  please,  is  to  ask  whether 
a  man  can  will  what  he  wills,  or  be  pleased  with  what  he  is  pleased 

i«  Human  Understanding,  Book  II,  chap,  xxi,  "Of  Power."  The  edition 
used  is  the  "ninth"  (really  the  second),  (London:  Churchill,  1726).  Edwards 
quotes  the  "seventh,"  which  was  also  properly  the  second.  A  thorough  critical 
edition  of  Locke  is  still  lacking,  and  would  clear  up  many  obscure  points. 


68 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


with.  A  question  which  I  think  needs  no  answer;  and  they  who  can 
make  a  question  of  it  must  suppose  one  will  to  determine  the  acts  of 
another,  and  another  to  determine  that;  and  so  on  in  infinitum. 

This  argument,  it  should  be  noted,  is  the  famous  re- 
ductio  ad  absurdum  which  formed  the  staple  of  Edwards' 
reply  to  his  adversaries. 

Locke  now  takes  up  the  central  topic  of  the  theme,  and 
asks  the  question:  "What  determines  the  will?"  At  this 
point  the  important  difference  between  the  first  and  second 
editions  of  the  Human  Understanding  comes  into  view. 
Locke  says : 

It  seems  so  established  and  settled  a  maxim  by  the  general  con- 
sent of  all  mankind  that  good,  the  greater  good,  determines  the  will, 
that  I  do  not  at  all  wonder  that,  when  I  first  published  my  thoughts 
on  this  subject,  I  took  it  for  granted;  and  I  imagine  that  by  a  great 
many  I  shall  be  thought  more  excusable  for  having  then  done  so 
than  that  now  I  have  ventured  to  recede  from  so  received  an  opinion. 
But  yet  upon  a  stricter  enquiry  I  am  forced  to  conclude  that  good, 
the  greater  good,  though  apprehended  and  acknowledged  to  be  so, 
does  not  determine  the  will  until  our  desire,  raised  proportionably  to 
it,  makes  us  uneasy  in  the  want  of  it. 

The  answer  to  the  question  propounded — "What  deter- 
mines the  v/ill?" — is,  then,  in  both  editions:  "The  motive 
before  it;"  but  in  the  first  edition,  where  the  will  had  not 
been  sharply  distinguished  from  the  desire,  it  was  the  ob- 
jective motive,  the  good,  whereas  now  it  is  the  subjective 
motive,  or  the  desire  excited  by  the  good  presented  to  the 
mind.  This  distinction  depended  upon  the  new  conception 
Locke  had  gained  of  the  "perfect  distinction"  of  the  will 
from  the  desire,  which,  he  says,  "must  not  be  confounded." 

But,  now,  what  moves  desire?  Locke  replies,  "Happi- 
ness." "What  has  an  aptness  to  produce  pleasure  in  us, 
is  that  we  call  good."  But  a  good  must  be  so  situated  as 
to  stir  desire,  or  it  will  never  influence  action.  An  absent 
good,  for  example,  is  less  effective  than  some  present  un- 
easiness. 


TREATISE  ON  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL  69 

The  drift  of  all  this  discussion  has  evidently  been  to  place 
the  will  completely  under  the  causative  control  of  the  de- 
sires. But  at  just  this  point  Locke  introduces  the  saving 
element  for  which  he  has  previously  opened  the  way.  It  is 
natural,  he  says,  that  the  greatest  and  most  pressing  uneasi- 
ness— 

should  determine  the  will  to  the  next  action;  and  so  it  does  for  the 
most  part,  but  not  always.  For  the  mind  having  in  most  cases,  as  is 
evident  in  experience,  a  power  to  suspend  the  execution  and  satisfac- 
tion of  any  of  its  desires,  and  so  all,  one  after  another,  is  at  liberty 
to  consider  the  objects  of  them,  examine  them  on  all  sides,  and  weigh 
them  with  others.  In  this  lies  the  liberty  man  has,  and  from  the  not 
using  of  it  right,  comes  all  that  variety  of  mistakes,  errors,  and  faults 
which  we  run  into  in  the  conduct  of  our  lives,  and  our  endeavors 
after  happiness,  whilst  we  precipitate  the  determination  of  our  wills 
and  engage  too  soon  before  due  examination. 

But  when  deliberation  has  taken  place,  the  action  not 
only  follows  according  to  the  "most  pressing  uneasiness," 
but  it  should  do  this,  for  '"tis  not  a  fault  but  a  perfection  of 
our  nature  to  desire,  will,  and  act  according  to  the  last  result 
of  a  fair  examination." 

Upon  this  basis,  as  already  said,  the  reply  of  Edwards 
to  Whitby  and  his  associates  was  prepared.  In  substance, 
it  was  as  follows : 

Every  act  of  the  will  is  an  act  of  choice  and  involves 
alternatives.  Placed  between  two  eligible  things,  the  ques- 
tion in  discussion  is :  "What  determines  the  will  to  choose 
the  one  rather  than  the  other?"  The  Arminians  said  that 
the  will  determined  itself.  Edwards  says  that  the  will  is 
determined  by  the  motive  which  it  actually  follows. 

To  motives  are  therefore  ascribed  a  positive  power. 
They  are  causes,  and,  so  far  as  a  tendency  to  the  occasional- 
ism of  Malebranche  which  is  evident  in  his  writings  allowed, 
Edwards  ascribed  to  them  efficient  causation.  They  could 
be  calculated,  and  upon  a  perfect  knowledge  of  their  nature 
and  potency  the  future  action  of  a  being  influenced  by  them 


70 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


could  be  predicted.  In  this  the  subjective  conditions  which 
determine  the  influence  of  motives  were  not  neglected,  but 
still  positive  power  was  left  to  the  objective  motive. 

Thus  the  prevailing  motive  both  determines  that  the 
action  of  the  will  shall  take  place  and  also  how  it  shall  take 
place.  It  does  this  because  it  possesses  a  certain  attractive 
power,  or  because  it  is  an  apparent  good.  And,  inasmuch  as 
it  acts  as  a  cause,  it  is  evident  that  the  greatest  apparent 
good  in  any  group  of  conflicting  apparent  goods  will  deter- 
mine the  will.  Hence  the  maxim :  "The  will  is  as  the  great- 
est apparent  good." 

Hence  the  choices  of  the  will  are  as  necessary  as  the 
events  of  the  physical  world.  They  are  caused  by  motives 
in  the  same  sense  as  these  are  caused  by  the  forces  of  ob- 
jects and  events  in  nature.  Yet  this  does  not  infringe  upon 
the  liberty  of  man,  because  it  leaves  him  so  far  entirely  able 
to  do  what  he  wills;  and  this  is  the  meaning  of  liberty  and 
the  only  meaning  it  can  have.  To  suppose  that  freedom 
means  that  a  man  can  will  as  he  wills,  is  to  involve  oneself 
in  self-contradict?on.  The  only  conceivable  liberty  is  exter- 
nal liberty. 

Virtue  or  vice  consists  in  the  nature  of  the  choice  made 
in  any  case  irrespective  of  its  origin.  Commands  and 
threats  are  motives  which  may  be  employed,  but  whatever 
the  motives,  as  a  man  chooses,  so  is  he. 

Such  is  a  summary  view  of  the  theory  brought  forward 
in  answer  to  Whitby.^ ^  Its  importance  demands  that  it  be 
presented  in  the  very  words  of  its  author.   After  some  pre- 

1'^  There  is  another  and  quite  different  interpretation  of  Edwards.  It  is 
founded  upon  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  "cause"  in  his  philosophy.  It  makes 
motives  merely  the  occasion  of  the  action  of  the  will,  which  here  follows,  not  a 
"law,"  but  a  "usage" — to  employ  the  favorite  phrase  of  Professor  Park.  But, 
when  every  allowance  has  been  made,  this  cannot  be  said  to  be  an  objective  in- 
terpretation of  Edwards.  It  was  first  brought  forward  by  the  younger  Edwards 
as  an  expedient  to  meet  the  objections  of  Samuel  West,  and  is  essentially,  how- 
ever excusably  or  unconsciously,  a  partisan  interpretation.  A  full  discussion  will 
be  found  in  the  appropriate  place  below. 


TREATISE  ON  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL 


71 


liminary  definitions,  which  have  been  already  noted,  Ed- 
wards begins  the  development  of  his  theme  by  defining  the 
determination  of  the  will.  He  says :  "By  determining  the 
will,  if  the  phrase  be  used  with  any  meaning,  must  be  in- 
tended causing  that  the  act  of  the  will  should  be  thus  and 
not  otherwise,"  etc.^^ 

Now,  evidently  Edwards'  meaning  in  the  further  devel- 
opment of  his  theme  will  be  dependent  upon  the  meaning 
attached  by  him  to  the  word  "causing."  This  he  elsewhere 
explains  in  the  following  words: 

Sometimes  by  moral  necessity  is  meant  that  necessity  of  connec- 
tion and  consequence  which  arises  from  such  moral  causes  as  the 
strength  of  inclination  or  motives,  ard  the  connection  which  there 
is  in  many  cases  between  these  and  such  certain  volitions  and  actions. 
.  ...  By  natural  necessity  as  applied  to  men  I  mean  such  necessity 
as  men  are  under  through  the  force  of  natural  causes  as  distinguished 

from  what  are  called  moral  causes  This  difference,  however, 

does  not  lie  so  much  in  the  nature  of  the  connection  as  in  the  two 
terms  connected^ 

The  causes  are  motives,  which  are  thus  defined : 

By  motive  I  mean  the  whole  of  that  which  moves,  excites,  or  in- 
vites the  mind  to  volition,  whether  that  be  one  thing  singly,  or  many 
things  conjunctly.  Many  particular  things  may  concur  and  unite  their 
strength  to  induce  the  mind;  and  when  it  is  so,  all  together  are  as 
one  complex  motive.  And  when  I  speak  of  the  strongest  motive,  I 
have  respect  to  the  strength  of  the  whole  that  operates  to  induce  a 
particular  act  of  volition  whether  that  be  the  strength  of  one  thing 
alone  or  many  together.^^ 

The  law  of  the  action  of  motives  is  thus  expressed : 

Things  that  exist  in  the  view  of  the  mind  have  their  strength, 
tendency,  or  advantage  to  move,  or  excite  its  will,  from  many 
things  appertaining  to  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  the  thing 
viewed,  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  the  mind  that  views,  and  the 
degree  and  manner  of  its  view;  of  which  it  would  perhaps  be  hard 
to  make  a  perfect  enumeration.  But  so  much  I  think  may  be  deter- 
mined in  general,  without  room  for  controversy,  that  whatever  is 

18  "Freedom  of  the  Will,"  Works,  Vol.  II,  p.  18. 
1®  Ibid.,  pp.  32  f. 
^'^  Ibid.,  p.  19. 


72 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


perceived  or  apprehended  by  an  intelligent  and  voluntary  agent,  which 
has  the  nature  and  influence  of  a  motive  to  volition  or  choice,  is  con- 
sidered or  viewed  as  good;  nor  has  it  any  tendency  to  engage  the 
election  of  the  soul  in  any  further  degree  than  it  appears  such.  For  to 
say  otherwise,  would  be  to  say,  that  things  that  appear  good  have  a 
tendency,  by  the  appearance  they  make,  to  engage  the  mind  to  elect 
them,  some  other  way  than  by  their  appearing  eligible  to  it;  which  is 
absurd.  And  therefore  it  must  be  true,  in  some  sense,  that  the  will 
always  is,  as  the  greatest  apparent  good  is}^ 

Edwards'  system  is  thus  a  system  of  necessity,  and 
avowedly  so.  But  it  is  not  a  system  of  physical  necessity, 
and  he  is  at  considerable  pains  to  make  this  plain,  futile  as 
the  distinction  will  prove  to  be  under  his  management  of  the 
theory.  He  expresses  himself  variously.  At  one  time  he 
says : 

Metaphysical  or  philosophical  necessity  is  nothing  different  from 
.  .  .  .  certainty.  I  speak  not  now  of  the  certainty  of  knowledge,  but 
the  certainty  that  is  in  things  themselves,  which  is  the  foundation 
of  the  certainty  of  the  knowledge.  22 

At  another  time: 

Philosophical  necessity  is  really  nothing  else  than  the  full  and 
fixed  connection  between  the  things  signified  by  the  subject  and  pred- 
icate of  the  proposition  which  affirms  something  to  be  true  .... 
And  in  this  sense  I  use  the  word  necessity  in  the  following  discourse 
when  I  endeavor  to  prove  that  necessity  is  not  inconsistent  with 
liberty.  23 

Broad  and  free  as  this  may  sound,  it  is  to  be  read  in  con- 
nection with  what  appears  upon  the  next  following  page : 

The  only  way  that  anything  that  is  to  come  to  pass  hereafter  is  or 
can  be  necessary,  is  by  a  connection  with  something  that  is  neces- 
sary in  its  own  nature,  or  something  that  already  is  or  has  been;  so 
that,  the  one  being  supposed,  the  other  certainly  follows. 

21  Loc.  cit.,  p.  20.  At  another  place  Edwards  says:  "An  appearing  most  agree- 
able to  the  mind  or  pleasing  to  the  mind  and  the  mind's  preferring  and  choosing 
seem  hardly  to  be  distinct."  Of  this  passage  Henry  B,  Smith  observes  {System 
of  Christian  Theology,  p.  246)  :  "In  our  view  this  is  the  least  satisfactory  passage 
in  Edwards'  treatise  on  the  Will.  In  this  view  the  motive  would  be  the  efficient 
and  not  merely  the  occasional  cause  of  volition." 

22/&id.,  p.  28. 

p.  29. 


TREATISE  ON  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL 


73 


Now,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  this  "connection"  is  by 
causation. 

Equally  careful  is  Edwards  to  define  the  phrase  "moral 
inability."   He  says : 

Moral  inability  consists  ....  either  in  the  want  of  inclination; 
or  the  strength  of  a  contrary  inclination  [meaning  here,  probably,  an 
affection  of  the  sensibility]  ;  or  the  want  of  sufficient  motives  in  view, 
to  induce  and  excite  the  act  of  the  will,  or  the  strength  of  apparent 
motives  to  the  contrary.  Or  both  these  may  be  resolved  into  one; 
and  it  may  be  said  in  one  word,  that  moral  inability  consists  in  the 
opposition  or  want  of  inclination  [meaning  here,  probably,  a  choice 
of  the  will]. 24 

The  decisive  passage  upon  the  meaning"  of  the  word 
"liberty"  in  Edwards'  scheme  is  the  following: 

The  plain  and  obvious  meaning  of  the  words  freedom  and  liberty 
in  common  speech  is  the  power,  opportunity,  or  advantage  that  any 
one  has,  to  do  as  he  pleises.  Or  in  other  words,  his  being  free  from 
hindrance  or  impediment  in  the  way  of  doing  or  conducting  in  any 
respect  as  he  wills.^^ 

In  this  he  confessedly  follows  Locke,  and  refers  to  him  for 
further  amplification  of  the  point.^^  And,  quite  in  Locke's 
vein,  he  goes  on  to  say,  a  little  farther  down:  "To  talk  of 
liberty  or  the  contrary  as  belonging  to  the  very  will  itself, 
is  not  to  speak  good  sense/' 

These  may  suffice  for  quotations  from  the  first  part  of 
the  work,  which  is  taken  up  with  definitions.  The  second 
part  considers  "whether  there  is  or  can  be  any  such  sort  of 
freedom  of  the  will  as  that  wherein  Arminians  place  the  es- 
sence of  the  liberty  of  all  moral  agents;  and  zvhether  any 
such  thing  ever  was  or  can  he  conceived  of!"  The  answer 
is,  of  course,  "No,"  and  is  arrived  at  by  the  most  acute, 
minute,  and  elaborate  reasoning,  discussion,  refutation,  and 
(supposed)  annihilation  of  the  enemies'  position;  for  Ed- 

2* /bid.,  p.  35. 

2S  Ihid.,  p.  38. 

28  Ihid.,  p.  39. 


74 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


wards  did  not  intend  to  leave  the  least  possibility  of  an 
answer. 

Discussing  the  **self-determining  power  of  the  will,"  he 
says : 

Therefore,  if  the  will  determines  all  its  own  free  acts,  the  soul 
determines  them  in  the  exercise  of  a  power  of  willing  and  choosing; 
or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  it  determines  them  of  choice;  it  deter- 
mines its  own  acts  by  choosing  its  own  acts.  If  the  will  determines 
the  will,  then  choice  orders  and  determines  the  choice;  and  acts  of 
choice  are  subject  to  the  decision  and  follow  the  conduct  of  other 
acts  of  choice.  And,  therefore,  if  the  will  determines  all  its  own  free 
acts,  then  every  free  act  of  choice  is  determined  by  a  preceding  act 
of  choice,  choosing  that  act.  And  if  that  preceding  act  of  the  will 
be  also  a  free  act,  then,  by  these  principles,  in  this  act,  too,  the  will 
is  self-determined :  that  is,  this,  in  like  manner,  is  an  act  that  the  soul 
voluntarily  chooses;  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  it  is  an  act  deter- 
mined still  by  a  preceding  act  of  the  will  choosing  that.  Which 
brings  us  directly  to  a  contradiction :  for  it  supposes  an  act  of  the 
will  preceding  the  first  act  in  the  whole  train,  directing  and  deter- 
mining the  rest;  or  a  free  act  of  the  will  before  the  first  free  act 
of  the  will.  Or  else  we  must  come  at  last  to  an  act  of  the  will  deter- 
mining the  consequent  acts,  wherein  the  will  is  not  self-determined 
and  so  is  not  a  free  act,  in  this  notion  of  freedom:  but  if  the  first 
act  in  the  train,  determining  and  fixing  the  rest,  be  not  free,  none 
of  them  all  can  be  free,  as  is  manifest  at  first  view,  but  [a  "first  view" 
not  being  enough  for  a  man  like  Edwards]  shall  be  demonstrated  pres- 
ently.27 

The  following  page  and  a  half  are  an  elaborate  restate- 
ment of  this  argument,  and  it  is  substantially  repeated,  in 
varying  forms,  on  a  moderate  estimate,  a  hundred  times  in 
this  treatise.    At  one  time  it  appears  thus : 

Still  the  questi  on  returns,  wherein  lies  man's  liberty  in  that  anti- 
cedent  act  of  will  which  chose  the  consequent  act.  The  answer  ac- 
cording to  the  same  principles  must  be,  that  his  liberty  in  this  also 
lies  in  his  willing  as  he  would,  or  as  he  chose,  or  agreeable  to  an- 
other act  of  choice  preceding  that.  And  so  the  question  returns  in 
infinitum,  and  the  like  answer  must  be  made  in  infinitum.  In  order 
to  support  their  opinion,  there  must  be  no  beginning,  but  free  acts 
of  will  must  have  been  chosen  by  foregoing  free  acts  of  will  in  the 
soul  of  every  man,  without  beginning, 

27  LOC.  Cit.,  p.  43.  28  IJjid,^  p.  62. 


TREATISE  ON  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL  75 


This  argument,  with  the  other  argument  that  there  is 
no  event  without  a  cause,  form  the  only  positive  arguments 
of  this  part  of  the  work,  which  goes  on  to  consider  the  pos- 
sibility of  choosing  things  absolutely  indifferent,  to  explore 
still  further  the  idea  of  liberty,  and  to  discuss  the  connection 
of  volition  with  motives.  The  foreknowledge  of  God  comes 
into  the  sweep  of  the  theme,  and  an  elaborate  biblical  argu- 
ment exhibits  the  minuteness  of  the  divine  foreknowledge 
of  men's  volitions,  and  then  Edwards  infers  necessity, 
which,  as  inferred,  is  "certainty"  and,  as  used,  is  a  causative 
connection.  The  third  part  of  the  treatise  discusses  the 
supposed  necessity  of  the  Arminian  idea  of  liberty  to  moral 
agency,  etc.;  and  the  last  part,  the  chief  grounds  of  the 
reasoning  of  the  Arminians,  without,  however,  introducing 
anything  essentially  new,  and  with  innumerable  repeti- 
tions of  what  had  already  been  exhaustively  said. 

The  impression  produced  by  the  work  was  enormous. 
The  new  doctrine  of  a  free  will  had  so  much  to  commend 
itself  to  the  ordinary  reason  of  man  that,  when  a  champion 
of  necessarianism  again  ventured  to  come  forth,  and  when 
he  succeeded  in  defending  the  old  positions  with  such  acute- 
ness,  and  with  such  an  air  of  invincibleness,  the  whole  world 
wondered,  and  the  defenders  of  the  old  doctrines  went  back 
to  the  old  theories  with  the  feeling  that  now  they  were  for- 
ever safe.  And  yet  the  work,  judged  simply  upon  its  merits 
as  an  intellectual  creation,  must  be  styled  a  logical  failure 
on  a  great  scale.  The  ambiguities  involved  in  its  funda- 
mental positions  have  been  already  pointed  out.  The  appli- 
cation of  the  law  of  causality  to  the  operations  of  the  mind 
is  in  contravention  of  the  simplest  facts  of  consciousness. 
The  fallacy  of  the  infinite  series  may  be  forced  upon  every 
argument  touching  the  domain  where  God  and  man  unite 
and  the  spheres  of  the  finite  and  infinite  intersect.  If  Ed- 
wards overthrew  freedom  by  his  argument,  he  also  virtually 


76  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND|THEOLOGY 

overthrew  the  existence  of  God;  for  if  God  is  required  as  a 
cause  of  the  world,  then  a  cause  is  required  for  God,  and  a 
cause  for  this  cause,  and  so  on  ad  iniinihim.  Nor  was  the 
work  original  except  in  the  fulness  of  its  treatment  of  its 
theme,  and  in  its  minuteness  and  acuteness.  Substantially, 
as  has  now  been  made  fully  evident,  it  is  a  reproduction 
of  Locke's  theory.  The  idea  of  liberty  is  the  same;  of  de- 
termination by  motive;  of  the  different  weight  of  different 
motives;  of  the  causative  relation  between  motive  and 
action.  The  argument  from  causation  is  in  Locke,  though 
obscured  by  his  sensational  philosophy;  the  general  concep- 
tion of  the  inconceivability  of  the  Arminian  position  is 
Locke's;  and  even  the  argument  of  the  reductio  ad  absur- 
dum. 

But  these  defects  did  not  essentially  interfere  with  the 
service  which  the  treatise  was  capable  of  rendering  to  the 
progress  of  New  England  theology.  As  a  permanent 
answer  to  the  Arminians,  it  was  a  philosophical  failure; 
but,  as  the  case  against  the  Arminians  was  not  purely  philo- 
sophical, it  was  capable  of  meeting  them  successfully  in  the 
more  purely  theological  sphere,  and  this  it  did.  In  main- 
taining freedom,  some  of  them  maintained  a  "liberty  of 
indifference,"  or  that  "equilibrium  whereby  the  will  is 
without  antecedent  bias."  This  was  not  true  of  Whitby, 
though  he  might  at  times  be  construed  so;  but  it  was  true 
of  others.  Thus  they  would  destroy,  not  only  the  control- 
ling power,  but  the  real  influence  of  motives,  and  fall  back 
into  the  old  Pelagian  view  which  destroyed  the  universal 
depravity  of  man,  and  the  certainty  that  without  grace  he 
will  never  repent  and  turn  to  God.  Now,  the  real  answer 
to  this  theory  upon  its  philosophical  side  is  man's  con- 
sciousness of  the  influence  of  motives,  and  if  Edwards 
proved  too  much  by  ascribing  to  motives  causative  power, 
the  sound  residuum  of  his  argument,  when  his  extrava- 


TREATISE  ON  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL  77 


gances  were  corrected,  was  effective  in  giving  a  basis  for 
the  theological  doctrines,  which  were  too  evidently  scrip- 
tural to  be  denied  by  any  who  would  listen  tO'  a  biblical 
argument. 

Edwards'  discussion  of  foreknowledge  is  also  note- 
worthy. His  two  propositions  are:  first,  God  foreknows 
our  volitions;  second,  foreknowledge  infers  necessity.  His 
proof  of  the  first  proposition  is  derived  from  prophecy 
which  has  foretold  events,  even  minute  ones,  depending 
upon  the  volitions  of  men.  The  argument  for  the  second 
point  is  concisely  that  nothing  can  be  known  or  foreknown 
without  evidence,  and  that  the  only  evidence  establishing 
the  certainty  of  future  events  is  the  will  of  God.  From 
this  argument  he  draws  the  corollary  that  the  decrees  of 
God  are  no  more  inconsistent  with  human  liberty  than  the 
foreknowledge  of  God,  thus  connecting  his  theme  Immedi- 
ately with  the  subject  of  election.  This  was  clearly  su- 
perior to'  the  Arminian  reference  of  the  whole  subject  to 
the  realm  of  mystery,  however  unsatisfactory  as  a  rationale 
of  the  theme. 

However  defective,  then,  the  treatise  on  the  will  was, 
its  effect  was  to  bring  the  theology  of  New  England  back 
to  Calvinism,  and  this  was  a  great  service.  The  Armin- 
ianism  which  threatened  It  was  not  an  Arminlanlsm  de- 
pending upon  better  views  of  the  will,  though  at  some 
points  it  had  them.  It  was  a  Pelagianizing  Arminlanism 
which  denied  the  essential  doctrines  of  grace.  It  needed 
rebuttal.  It  emphasized  the  manward  side  of  theology  too 
much,  just  as  the  extreme  Calvinism  of  the  early  day  had 
emphasized  the  godward  side  too  much.  The  future  lay 
with  neither  extreme.  New  England  theology  was  finally 
to  attempt  a  better  adjustment  of  these  two  elements  to  one 
another;  but  it  was  indispensable  that  it  should  not  first 


78  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


forget  the  divine  side.  This  Edwards  prevented,  and  thus 
made  all  the  following  sound  development  possible. 

But  Edwards'  service  was  not  exhausted  in  the  conser- 
vative force  of  his  treatise,  or  in  its  negative  results.  He 
had  propounded  a  distinction  which  was  not  correct  or  suc- 
cessful as  he  presented  it,  but  which  proved,  with  a  better 
understanding,  of  great  use  to  his  successors — that  between 
natural  and  moral  ability  and  inability.  In  a  word,  natural 
ability  and  inability  arise  from  natural  or  physical  causes; 
moral  ability  and  inability,  from  motives,  or  states  of  the 
will  which  are  resolvable,  in  the  last  analysis,  into  motives. 

Now,  inasmuch  as  Edwards'  "motives"  are  true  causes, 
moral  inability  does  not  really  differ  in  essence  from 
natural;  for  both  are  effects.  Hence  the  distinction  is 
sophistical  as  presented  in  Edwards.  But  in  Edwards' 
followers  it  became  correct  and  valuable,  and  was  of  use  in 
distinguishing  between  what  were  described  as  the  "can't" 
of  lack  of  power,  and  the  "can't"  which  is  really  "won't." 
Thus  much  light  was  shed  at  several  points  upon  difficult 
doctrines.  The  old  Calvinism  had  had  no  place  for  any 
ability  to  good,  and  this  had  been  the  paralyzing  influence 
of  the  early  days.  Edwards  introduced  an  ability,  which 
in  process  of  time  became  a  true  ability,  under  which  re- 
vival preaching  arose;  and  good  practice  in  converting 
men  and  good  theology  went  together. 

Another  distinct  service  rendered  by  this  treatise  was 
the  introduction  into  New  England  thought  of  a  topic  upon 
which  subsequent  writers  were  largely  to  busy  themselves 
with  advantage  to  the  prevailing  methods  of  defending 
the  Christian  faith.  This  topic  was  the  origin  of  evil.  It 
arose  in  consequence  of  the  argument  urged  by  the  Ar- 
minians  that  necessity  made  God  the  author  of  sin.  In  at- 
tempring  to  meet  them,  Edwards  simply  carried  out  the 
system  which  he  had  already  laid  down  in  the  earlier  por- 


TREATISE  ON  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL  79 


tions  of  the  treatise.  It  is  another  example  of  his  thor- 
of  o^hness  that  he  did  not  adopt  the  scheme  of  the  West- 
minster Confession,  by  which  the  fall  of  Adam;  was  re- 
ferred to  his  own  free  will,  which  acted  "contingently." 
Edwards  believed  in  no  contingency  The  fall  was  like 
every  other  event  in  the  world  proceeding  from  the  will — 
a  volition  caused  by  motives.  These  motives  were  in  the 
last  analysis  presented  by  God,  and  in  this  sense  God  willed 
the  fall.  This  is  High  Calvinism,  and  substantially  supra- 
lapsarianism — a  theory  tO'  which  Edwards  was  in  an- 
other place  to  give  a  death-blow.  But  Edwards  does  not 
prefer  the  phrase,  ''God  willed  the  fall;"  he  rather  teaches 
that  God  ordered  the  system  in  which  sin  would  infallibly 
come  to  pass.  He  draws  the  line  of  agency,  and  so  of  the 
authorship  of  sin,  at  the  action — that  is,  at  the  sin- — mak- 
ing this  man's,  upon  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  to  use 
a  modern  equivalent  for  his  expressions.  For  his  doctrine 
as  to  the  divine  government  he  depended  upon  the  Scrip- 
ture.  Thus  God  is  the  author  of  the  system,  man  of  the  sin. 

The  immediate  outcome  of  the  treatise  on  the  will,  in 
spite  of  all  the  drawbacks  which  we  have  noted,  is  to  be 
estimated  as  an  essential  service  to  both  theology  and  re- 
ligion. It  determined  that  the  new  school  of  thought  whose 
foundations  Edwards  was  unconsciously  laying  should  be 
evangelical,  effective,  and  thorough.  But  there  are  larger 
questions  which  remain  still  unanswered.  Was  the  work, 
ideally  considered,  such  a  work  as  a  theologian,  bent  on 
really  forwarding  the  cause  of  theology,  ought  to  write? 
Was  it,  in  particular,  characterized  by  the  disposition  to 
learn  from  the  adversary?  Such  a  question  can  only  be 
answered  in  the  negative.  It  was  absolute  reaction.  To 
Edwards  Arminianism  and  all  its  works  were  evil  and 
nothing  but  evil.  Calvinism  is  essentially  determinism. 
Without  a  theory  of  determinism  it  cannot  stand;  given  a 


8o  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

theory  of  determinism,  and  the  resulting  theology  must  be 
Calvinistic.  Therefore  Edwards  simply  reaffirmed  Calvin- 
ism, and  did  it  by  reaffirming  determinism. 

In  this  reply  the  answer  to  another  question  which  we 
must  ask  is  not  obscurely  hinted.  Given  such  an  answer  to 
the  spirit  of  the  day,  what  was  likely  to  be  the  effect  upon 
the  future  development  of  the  school,  since  the  labors  of 
Edwards  did  actually  result  in  a  school?  Calvinism  was 
essentially  a  system  of  abstract  logic,  deriving  the  whole 
framework  of  the  system  from  the  sole  causality  of  God 
by  logical  deductions,  without  much,  if  any,  appeal  to  con- 
sciousness. Considered  as  a  new  philosophical  proposal, 
the  Arminianism  of  Whitby  was  an  appeal  to  conscious- 
ness. Had  Edwards  been  disposed  to  learn  from  Whitby, 
he  would  have  asked  what  the  true  meaning  and  value  of 
this  proposal  was.  When,  now,  this  question  had  been 
brushed  aside  without  consideration,  and  determinism 
strenuously  reaffirmed,  and  especially  when  this  had  been 
done  in  a  treatise  of  such  power  as  was  the  Freedom  of  the 
Will,  what  would  be  the  effect  upon  the  future?  Could 
this  appeal  be  permanently  ignored?  If  it  could  be  for  a 
time  at  least,  what  would  be  the  tendency  of  thought  under 
its  suppression?  Would  it  be  to  an  ever  more  reckless  dis- 
regard of  consciousness?  Would  the  divine  sovereignty 
be  ever  more  emphasized  with  increasing  disregard  of 
human  agency?  Or  would  the  tendency  be  to  recoil  from 
the  Edwardean  position  toward  a  real  freedom?  If  such 
a  recoil  took  place,  would  it  be  successful?  Would  men 
be  able  to  get  away  from  the  influence  of  Edwards  to 
whom  they  were  so-  deeply  indebted;  or  vv^ould  their  alle- 
giance to  him  substantially  block  the  way  oi  their  progress  ? 
Would  they  recognize  the  fact  when  they  had  fundamen- 
tally abandoned  him;  or  would  they  fail  to  bring  their 
views  into  a  consistent  form  because  of  their  allegiance 


TREATISE  ON  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL  8i 


to  their  great  founder?  Would  the  school  come  at  l.».st  to 
a  satisfactory  position  upon  this  great  theme,  and  form- 
ulate a  system  comprehensive,  consistent,  and  successful ; 
or  would  it  be  foredoomed  by  the  very  greatness  of  the 
treatise  which  laid  its  foundation,  to  an  inextricable  con- 
fusion which,  when  at  last  discovered,  should  lead  tv">  a 
speedy  and  lamentable  downfall? 

Such  questions  a  historian,  thoroughly  penetrated  with 
the  historical  spirit,  would  be  constrained  to  ask,  as  he 
paused  over  this  remarkable  work.  Their  answer  could 
be  gained  only  by  continued  studies  in  the  history  of  the 
Edwardean  school. 


CHAPTER  IV 


EDWARDS'  REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES 

The  conflict  with  the  Arminians  could  not  remain  in 
the  more  exchjsively  metaphysical  sphere  in  which  it  had 
hitherto  been  waged  since  Edwards  retired  to  Stockbridge. 
A  work  was  soon  put  into  his  hands  which  attacked  the 
doctrine  of  original  sin  and  which  seemed  to  call  for  his 
careful  attention.  This  was  the  book  entitled  The  Scrip- 
tural Doctrine  of  Original  Sin  Proposed  to  Free  and  Can- 
did Examination,  by  Dr.  John  Taylor,  of  Norwich,  Eng- 
land, a  Unitarian,  which  appeared  in  the  year  1740. 
With  it  he  received  two  other  works  by  the  same  author, 
his  Key  to  the  Apostolical  Writings  and  his  Paraphrase  to 
the  Epistle  to  the  Romans. 

These  works  were  characterized  by  some  excellent  fea- 
tures. The  same  recoil  from  artificial  and  false  modes  of 
statement  which  was  to  lead  to  some  of  the  most  impor- 
tant modifications  o-f  the  current  Calvinism  by  the  New 
England  school  had  led  Taylor  to  take  positions  and  make 
definitions  which  must  command  the  assent  of  the  candid 
mind.  Sin  is  with  him  a  strictly  personal  matter.  Pun- 
ishment must  be  as  personal  as  guilt.  He  rejects  the  doc- 
trine of  the  imputation  of  sin,  and  even  enunciates  the 
great  principle  that  ability  and  obligation  are  commen- 
surate. This  better  side  of  Taylor  is  evident  in  the  fol- 
lowing extract  from  his  Original  Sin: 

A  representative  of  moral  action  is  what  I  can  by  no  means  digest. 
A  representative,  the  guilt  of  whose  conduct  shall  be  imputed  to  us,  and 
whose  sins  shall  corrupt  and  debauch  our  nature,  is  one  of  the  greatest 
absurdities  in  all  the  system  of  corrupt  religion.  That  the  conduct  of 
ancestors  should  effect  the  external  circumstances  of  posterity,  is  a  consti- 
tution just  and  wise,  and  may  answer  good  purposes;  and  that  repre- 

8a 


REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES 


83 


sentatives  of  civil  societies,  or  any  other  persons  intrusted  with  the 
management  of  afYairs,  may  injure  those  who  employ  them,  is  agree- 
able to  a  state  of  trial  and  imperfection;  but  that  any  man  without 
my  knowledge  and  consent,  should  so  represent  me,  that  when  he  is 
guilty  I  am  to  be  reputed  guilty,  and  when  he  transgresses  I  shall  be 
accountable  and  punishable  for  his  transgression,  and  thereby  sub- 
jected to  the  wrath  and  curse  of  God,  nay,  further,  that  his  wicked- 
ness shall  give  me  a  sinful  nature,  and  all  this  before  I  am  born,  and 
consequently  while  I  am  in  no  capacity  of  knowing,  helping  or  hin- 
dering what  he  doth;  surely  anyone  who  dares  use  his  understand- 
ing, must  clearly  see  this  is  unreasonable,  and  altogether  inconsistent 
with  the  truth,  and  goodness  of  God.^ 

But  these  merits  of  the  work  did  not  help  it  with  Ed- 
wards, though  they  drove  him  to  some  modifications  of 
old  theories,  as  will  be  seen.  They  were  too  intimately 
associated  with  another  side  of  Taylor's  theology — with 
his  superficial  view  of  sin  and  his  feeble  religious  experi- 
ence. He  holds  that  Adam's  sin  resulted  subjectively  in 
guilt,  shame,  and  fear  and  that  he  fell  thereby  under  sub- 
jection to  sorrow,  labor,  and  death.  This  death,  however, 
is  to  be  understood  simply  of  physical  death.  The  ruin 
of  man  did  not  seem  to  him  to  be  very  great,  as  will  be 
evident  from  the  following  extract: 

We  are  born  as  void  of  actual  knowledge  as  the  brutes  them- 
selves. We  are  born  with  many  sensual  appetites,  and  consequently 
liable  to  temptation  and  sin.  But  this  is  not  the  fault  of  our  nature, 
but  the  will  of  God,  wise  and  good.  For  every  one  of  our  natural 
passions  and  appetites  are  in  themselves  good;  of  great  use  and  ad- 
vantage in  our  present  circumstances;  and  our  nature  would  be  de- 
fective, sluggish  or  unarmed  without  them.  Nor  is  there  any  one 
of  them  we  can  at  present  spare.  Our  passions  and  appetites  are  in 
themselves,  wisely,  and  kindly  implanted  in  our  nature.  They  are 
good,  and  become  evil  only  by  unnatural  excess,  or  wicked  abuse. 
The  possibility  of  which  excess  and  abuse  is  also  well  and  wisely  per- 
mitted for  our  trial.  For  without  some  such  appetite,  our  reason 
would  have  nothing  to  struggle  with,  and  consequently  our  virtue 
could  not  be  duly  exercised  and  proved  in  order  to  its  being  rewarded. 
And  the  appetites  we  have,  God  hath  judged  most  proper,  both  for 
our  use  and  trial  

1  Edition  employed,  the  reprint  of  the  fourth  edition  (London,  1845),  pp. 
177.  178. 


84 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


This  idea  then  we  ought  to  have  of  our  being;  that  everything  in 
it  is  formed  and  appointed  just  as  it  should  be;  that  it  is  a  noble  and 
invaluable  gift  bestowed  upon  us  by  the  bounty  of  God,  with  which 
we  should  be  greatly  pleased,  and  for  which  we  should  be  continually 
and  heartily  thankful;  that  it  is  a  perishable  thing,  which  needeth  to 
be  diligently  guarded  and  cultivated;  that  our  sensual  inclinations  are 
to  be  duly  restrained  and  disciplined,  and  our  rational  powers  faith- 
fully applied  to  their  proper  uses;  that  God  hath  given  us  those  ra- 
tional powers  attended  with  those  sensual  inclinations,  as  for  other 
good  purposes,  so  in  particular  to  try  us,  whether  we  will  carefully 
guard  and  look  after  this  most  invaluable  gift  of  his  goodness;  and 
that  if  we  do  not,  he  will  in  justice  punish  our  wicked  contempt  of 
his  love;  but  if  we  do,  he  will  graciously  reward  our  wisdom  and 
virtue.  And  all,  and  every  one  of  these  considerations  should  be  a 
spur  to  our  diligence,  and  animate  our  endeavors  to  answer  these 
most  high  and  most  excellent  purposes  of  his  wisdom  and  goodness. ^ 

Thus  it  is  true  that  Taylor  perceived,  long  before  the 
school  of  Edwards,  the  excrescences  of  the  doctrine  of 
original  sin,  but  it  is  also  true  that  he  let  fall  at  the  same 
time  the  invaluable  truth  contained  in  that  doctrine.  It 
was  the  perception  of  this,  and  the  consciousness  of  an 
undercurrent  of  unevangelical  thought  and  feeling,  which 
principally  moved  Edwards  to  write  against  the  book.^ 
It  led  Wesley  to  do  the  same  thing,  though  he  had  no 
objection  to  Arminianism  as  such.  No  doubt,  Taylor's 
views  upon  the  atonement  increased  the  suspicion  against 
him.  He  taught  that  the  whole  work  of  Christ  was  com- 
prised in  his  obedience;  his  example  powerfully  attracted 
men;  and  he  was  thereby  rendered  worthy  that  for  his 
sake  the  great  good  of  forgiveness  should  be  bestowed 
upon  men.  The  doctrine  of  satisfaction  to  justice  in  every 
form,  whether  the  justice  be  taken  as  distributive  or  pub- 
lic, is  entirely  left  out.^ 

The  reply  of  Edwards  fills  a  large  volume,  but  must 

2  Op.  Cit.,  pp.  103,  104. 

s  Edwards  was  anticipated  one  year  by  Samuel  Niles,  of  Braintree,  in  Th€ 
True  Scripture  Doctrine  of  Original  Sin  Stated  and  Defended,  etc.  (318  pages; 
Boston,  1757).    Chiefly  exegetical,  it  discusses  Taylor  very  thoroughly. 

*  Key,  etc.,  pp.  44  fF. 


REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES  85 


be  dismissed  in  the  briefest  possible  space.^  There  are 
two  elements  of  the  doctrine,  he  says,  which  are  so  united 
in  thought  that  they  are  either  both  accepted  or  both  re- 
jected. These  are  the  depravity  of  our  nature  and  the  im- 
putation of  Adam's  sin.  The  proof  of  the  first  involving 
that  of  the  other,  Edwards'  attention  is  chiefly  directed 
to  the  question  of  depravity.  The  argument  is  strong  and 
is  marked  by  the  characteristic  effort  to  reduce  doctrines 
to  their  elements  and  to  urge  the  most  fundamental  proofs 
which  can  be  given.  Universal  sinfulness  is  first  proved. 
This,  as  "universal,  constant,  infallible,"  is  employed  as  a 
proof  of  a  ''tendency  or  propensity."  Should  it  be  said 
that  the  evil  proved  is  not  a  "tendency"  in  man,  but  has 
its  location  rather  in  external  nature,  in  the  circumstances 
by  which  man  is  surrounded,  still  the  difficulty  is  not  re- 
moved. Man  is  then  born  into  the  world,  as  it  is,  in  such 
a  condition  as  to  lead  universally  to  sin;  and  such  a  con- 
dition is  itself  a  nature  unfitted,  as  things  are,  to  lead  to 
holiness,  and  hence  it  is  essentially  a  depraved  nature. 

Advancing  to  the  positive  argument,  Edwards  derives 
this  principally  from  the  Scriptures.  But  he  also  revives 
an  argument  at  least  as  old  as  Anselm,^  drav/n  from  the 
infinity  of  sin,  which  is  to  forestall  the  reply  that  the  tend- 
encies of  man  toward  good  are  greater  than  those  toward 
evil  Sin  is  infinite,  since  it  is  the  rupture  of  an  obliga- 
tion which  is  infinite  in  being  an  obligation  toward  an 
infinite  being.  Other  arguments  axe  brought  to  prove 
the  greatness  of  man's  sin,  such  as  his  propensity  to  sin 
as  soon  as  he  is  capable  of  it,  to  sin  continually  and  pro- 
gressively, and  also  the  remains  of  sin  in  the  best  men. 

"  "The  Great  Christian  Doctrine  of  Original  Sin  Defended,"  etc.,  Works 
Vol.  II,  pp.  501-583  (1758).  The  same  year  came  out  Peter  Clark's  The  Scrip- 
ture-Doctrine  of  Original  Sin,  which  formed  the  orthodox  part  of  quite  a  little 
controversy.     See  Dexter's  bibliography  nos.  3354,  3365,  3366,  3367,  3368,  3371. 

«  Cur  D.eus  homo,  Book  I.,  chap.  xxi. 


86  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


And  then  objections  are  answered:  that  Adam  was  not 
depraved  and  yet  sinned,  and  so  may  we;  that  free  will 
is  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  existence  of  sin;  that  the  cor- 
ruption of  man  may  be  owing  to  bad  example,  which, 
Edwards  says,  is  explaining  the  thing  by  itself;  that  the 
senses  grow  up  first,  and  thus  the  animal  passions  get 
the  start  of  the  reason,  which  is  in  substance  original  sin; 
and  the  propriety  that  virtue  should  meet  with  trials. 
Thus  thorough  was  the  discussion. 

Up  to  this  point  Edwards  has  contributed  nothing  spe- 
cially original  tO'  the  defense  or  explanation  of  the  doctrine. 
But  he  never  handled  a  subject  without  impressing  upon 
it  at  some  point  the  force  of  his  own  independent  thought, 
and  he  soon  began  to  let  fall  hints  and  advance  positions 
which  were  to  be  fruitful  in  later  days.  The  theory  of 
the  current  Calvinism  required  the  supposition  that 
there  rested  upon  the  descendants  of  Adam  a  double  guilt 
— that  of  Adam's  first  sin,  imputed  to  them,  and  that  of 
a  corrupted  nature  which  was  truly  and  properly  sin.  The 
order  of  thought  is:  first,  Adam  made  a  federal  head; 
second,  his  sin  imputed;  third,  corruption  of  nature  vis- 
ited upon  mankind ;  finally,  actual  sin  in  consequence.  This 
is  the  so-called  "immediate  imputation."  Upon  this  theory 
there  are  two  kinds  of  sin,  voluntary  and  involuntary. 

Edwards  had  already  taught  that  sin  was  voluntary. 
It  remained  to  decide  whether  he  would  teach  that  such  sin 
was  the  only  sin,  or  that  all  sin  was  voluntary.  The  pres- 
ent discussion  led  him  to  contemplate  this  problem,  and  to 
adopt  this  further  position.  He  had  already  avoided  any 
expression  which  should  make  him  teach  that  depravity 
was  properly  sin.  He  accepted  the  federal  headship  of 
Adam,  and,  as  he  viewed  death  as  the  penalty  of  the  sin 
of  Adam,  he  was  obliged  to  suppose  that  all  who  die  are 


REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES  87 


guilty  of  that  sin,  or  that  its  guilt  lies  upon  all  menJ  Yet 
he  cannot  accept  the  common  view  that  men  are  charged 
with  something  which  they  have  not  done,  any  more  than 
Taylor.  Sin  is  imputed,  he  therefore  says,  but  not  in  order 
to  make  it  the  sin  of  all  men.  It  is  imputed  because  it  is 
the  sin  of  all  men,  for  they  have  committed  it  in  Adam. 
Thus  he  extends  his  doctrine,  excludes  every  sin  but  vol- 
untary sin,  and  so  gives  fully  to  New  England  theology 
its  first  great  distinguishing  doctrine,  that  all  sin  consists 
in  choice.  Thus  he  completes  at  this  point  the  work  begun 
in  the  treatise  on  the  will.^ 

To  maintain  this  connection  of  the  race  with  Adam, 
Edwards  proposes  a  theory  somewhat  new.  He  had 
already  rejected  the  idea  that  original  sin  consisted  in  a 
positive  taint,  which  had  been  the  view  of  original  sin 
opposed  by  Taylor.  He  says  simply  that  the  Holy  Spirit 
must  and  did  withdraw  from  man  after  his  sin.  The  im- 
mediate result  of  this  was  that  man  set  himself  up  as  his 
own  standard  and  fell  into  further  sin.  Hereupon,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  established  course  of  nature,  or  of  a  spe- 
cial divine  constitution,  the  descendants  of  Adam  were 
bom,  as  he  was,  after  his  sin,  destitute  of  holiness,  thus 
negatively  evil  or  depraved,  out  of  communion  with  God 
and  certain  tO'  pursue  the  course  of  their  fleshly  affections; 
that  is,  to  fall  into  sin.  So,  "all  are  looked  upon  as  sin- 
ning in  and  with  their  common  root;  and  God  right- 
eously withholds  special  influences  and  special  communica- 
tions from  all  for  this  sin."  In  consequence  of  this  act 
of  God's,  men  consent  to  Adam's  sin  as  soon  as  they  begin 
to  act.  Imputation  follows  this  consent,  Edwards  says: 
"The  first  depravity  of  heart,  and  that  imputation  of  that 
sin  are  both  the  consequences  of  that  established  union; 

This  is  the  fallacy  of  Augustine,  perpetuated  by  Calvin. 
8  Works,  Vol.  II,  pp.  542  flf. 


88 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


but  yet  in  such  order  that  the  evil  disposition  is  first  and 
the  charge  of  guilt  consequent,  as  it  was  in  the  case  of 
Adam  himself."  Edwards'  order  is,  then:  first,  the  "con- 
stitution;" second,  birth  of  men  without  the  Spirit;  third, 
positive  evil  disposition  or  sin,  which  is  consent  to  Adam's 
sin;  fourth,  the  charge  of  guilt. 

But  it  is  now  an  interesting  question:  How  did  Ed- 
wards justify  this  constitution  to  himself?  The  answer 
comes  out  in  his  reply  to  a  supposed  objection  that  things 
cannot  be  "viewed  and  treated  as  one  which  are  not  one 
but  totally  distinct."  The  objection,  he  says,  is  founded 
upon  a  false  idea  of  identity.  Some  things  entirely  dis- 
tinct and  very  diverse  are  yet  united  by  the  constitution 
of  the  creator  so  that  they  are  in  a  sense  one,  as  for  in- 
stance the  oak,  a  hundred  years  old,  and  the  acorn.  Even 
the  identity  of  created  intelligences  depends  upon  the  con- 
stitution of  God.  Continuance  of  the  same  consciousness, 
or  memory,  is  essential  to  continued  personal  identity; 
and  yet  this  continued  memory  is  the  constitution  of  God 
and  not  the  work  of  the  man  himself.  Indeed,  the  con- 
tinued existence  of  every  created  entity,  whether  person 
or  thing,  is  nothing  but  the  continued  creation  of  God.  It 
is  altogether  equivalent  to  an  immediate  production  out 
of  nothing  at  every  moment.  The  continued  identity  of 
anything  is  therefore  only  the  consistency  with  which  God 
produces  now  what  he  produced  a  moment  since;  or  it  is 
the  divine  constitution.  By  the  same  constitution,  Adam 
and  the  race  may  be  the  same  person,  and  so  the  loss  of 
Adam  be  the  loss  of  his  posterity. 

If,  now,  it  is  necessary  to  sum  up  in  one  glance  the 
features  of  progress  for  the  developing  thought  of  New 
England  contributed  by  this  treatise  passed  in  so  brief  re- 
view, they  may  be  summarized  (i)  in  the  extension  of 
the  proposition  that  sin  is  voluntary  action  to  the  explicit 


REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES  89 


principle  that  all  sin  is  voluntary  action;  (2)  in  the  re- 
moval from  the  theology  of  the  idea  that  man's  corruption 
consists  in  a  positive  taint  imparted  to  his  nature  (for  the 
whole  matter  is  explained  in  strict  conformity  with  the 
moral  instincts  when  it  is  taught  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is 
withdrawn  from  sinning  Adam,  and  corruption  is  traced 
to  this  root)  ;  and  (3)  in  an  idea  introduced- — one  which  re- 
appears upon  many  a  page  of  later  writers — the  mainte- 
nance of  the  doctrine  of  the  actuality  of  depravity  in  man 
by  the  supposition  of  an  established  order  of  nature,  or 
divine  constitution.  If  the  doctrine  of  natural  depravity 
be  accepted,  there  is  need  of  some  explanation  of  the  con- 
nection of  Adam  with  this  result.  Heredity  may  serve 
as  a  partial  explanation,  and  yet  only  a  partial  one.  The 
corruption  of  man  is  not  all  of  the  body.  Unless  we  be- 
lieve in  traducianism  (a  theory  now  coming  intO'  favor  in 
certain  quarters),  it  will  be  difficult  to  explain  the  dishar- 
mony of  soul,  as  it  is  in  psychology  to  explain  the  trans- 
mittance  of  traits  of  character  from  father  to  son.  But 
the  thought  of  a  continued  creation  with  the  added  idea  of 
a  divine  constitution  would  throw  light  upon  the  subject. 
In  the  case  of  every  new-born  person,  God  is  again  opera- 
tive, and  that  in  accordance  wnth  a  plan  of  his  own.  As 
the  nature  of  the  oak  is  determined  by  the  nature  of  the 
acorn,  and  that  by  its  parent  oak,  so  with  the  child.  And 
thus,  according  to  an  intelligible  method,  God  can  deter- 
mine to  treat  men  according  as  Adam,  their  constituted 
head,  shall  remain  holy,  or  fall. 

If  we  were  to  ask  at  this  point  again  those  questions 
which  we  have  previously  asked  as  to  Edwards'  adapta- 
tion to  further  the  cause  of  theology  in  a  time  of  contro- 
versy, we  should  have  to  reply  that  now  at  last  he  has 
come  to  perceive  more  accurately  his  proper  task.  This 
treatise  is  no  mere  piece  of  reaction.    He  learns  as  he 


90 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


reads.  He  innovates  as  he  writes.  There  is  movement, 
change,  life,  in  this  work  as  in  no  preceding  one.  It  is 
most  significant  that  some  things  he  says  nothing  about. 
There  is  no  refutation  of  such  a  sound  principle  as  that 
ability  and  obligation  are  commensurate.  What  he  op- 
poses are  the  real  errors  of  Taylor,  not  the  great  illuminat- 
ing suggestions  which  were  later  to  form  a  large  part  of 
the  working  materials  of  New  England  theology.  And 
there  is  here  already  that  emphasis  of  the  ethical  element 
of  theology  which  was  to  be  more  and  more  characteristic 
of  the  school  as  it  advanced  to  the  very  end.  Our  corrup- 
tion, even,  is  an  ethical  corruption,  since  it  consists  prin- 
cipally in  the  deprivation  of  the  Holy  Spirit  under  which 
we  suffer — nothing  physical,  nothing  merely  mysterious. 
Hence  Edwards  now  understands  how  to  conserve  the  old, 
how  to  learn  from  even  erroneous  proposals,  how  to  study 
the  spirit  of  his  age,  how  to  change  old  forms  as  new  light 
breaks  upon  him.  He  has  arrived  at  last  at  the  true  posi- 
tion of  a  leader.^ 

The  remaining  principal  treatise  of  Edwards  is  in  many 
respects  the  most  remarkable  of  the  series.  The  others  had 
been  prepared  with  immediate  reference  to  the  demands 
of  the  contest  against  the  Arminians,  and  all  suffered  from 
the  defects,  as  well  as  partook  of  the  vigor  and  interest, 
incidental  to  such  an  origin.  The  Dissertation  Concerning 
the  Nature  of  True  Virtue  was  more  largely  the  spon- 
taneous fruit  of  early  and  later  meditations.  The  Armin- 
ians are  not  mentioned  in  it.  It  breathes  the  calm  spirit 
of  quiet  studies.  In  these  respects  it  stands  comparatively 
isolated  among  Edwards'  writings;  and  it  is  isolated  in 

®  Dr.  Charles  Chauncy,  pastor  of  the  First  Church,  Boston,  wrote  a  series 
of  Five  Dissertations  on  the  Scripture  Account  of  the  Fall  and  its  Consequences 
in  1785,  in  which  he  controverted  Edwards  at  some  length.  Like  his  Salvction 
of  all  Men,  it  was  the  product  of  a  gradual  and  lifelong  departure  from  the  stand- 
ard Calvinism. 

10  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  91-157. 


REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES  91 


another  respect,  in  that  its  great  ideas,  though  early 
formed,  and  put  down  in  writing  with  great  clearness  in 
the  manly  notes  of  the  youthful  student  at  college,  seem 
never  tO'  have  influenced  the  general  course  of  his  specula- 
tions upon  other  themes,  fruitful  in  the  extreme  as  they 
were  to  be  under  the  hand  of  his  successors.  He  defines 
justice  as  virtuous  only  when  governed  by  benevolence, 
with  perfect  clearness  in  the  "Notes,"  but  in  after  years 
he  discusses  the  justice  of  God  in  its  application  to  future 
punishment  and  to  the  atonement  exactly  as  if  no  such  dis- 
tinction had  ever  entered  his  mind.  To  this  extent  the 
work  which  he  had  performed  in  the  formulation  of  the 
principle  of  all  virtue  remained  unappreciated  by  its 
author;  but  so  far-reaching  and  revolutionary  were  to  be 
its  effects  upon  succeeding  systems  that  it  merits  the  des- 
ignation of  Edwards'  principal  contribution  to  religious 
thought.  It  may  be  said  to  have  given  the  determining 
principle  to  the  whole  school  of  thinking  which  was  to  bear 
the  name  of  Edwardean. 

The  Nature  of  Virtue  cannot  be  fully  understood,  either 
in  its  own  greatness  as  a  philosophical  achievement  or  in 
the  peculiarities  which  mark  the  progress  of  its  discus- 
sions, without  a  glance  at  the  previous  history  of  ethical 
theory.^2  Edwards  himself  goes  back  to  Hobbes,  when 
noticing  antagonistic  views,  and  it  is  to  Hobbes  that  the 
rise  of  independent  and  valuable  discussion  upon  ethics  in 
the  English-speaking  world  is  to  be  attributed.  He  was 
the  first  to  bring  in  the  idea  of  the  good  as  something  to 
be  sought,  though  he  was  unfortunate  in  the  form  of  his 
discussion,  since  he  identified  it  too  largely  with  pleasure. 
Any  further  usefulness  which  he  might  have  served  was 
destroyed  by  the  common  understanding  that  he  taught 

1^  See  ihid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  700. 

^2  See  Sidgwick's  excellent  review  in  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  article 
"Ethics." 


92 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


that  the  only  foundation  of  social  morality  was  the  law 
of  the  state,  and  thus  denied  that  it  had  any  ground  in 
the  objective  nature  of  things.  The  Cambridge  Platonists 
opposed  him  at  this  point,  and  emphasized  the  eternal  dis- 
tinctions between  good  and  evil;  but  they  rendered  com- 
paratively little  service  in  promoting  the  growth  of  ethical 
doctrine,  since  they  produced  only  an  ill-arranged  collec- 
tion of  aphorisms  upon  morals,  and  substantially  went 
over  to  Hobbes's  ground  as  to  the  pursuit  of  pleasure. 
Richard  Cumberland,  however,  published  in  1672  a  treatise 
entitled  De  legibus  naturae  disquisitio  philosophica,  which 
has  been  worthily  styled  a  fountain-head  of  English 
ethics,^  ^  and  which  did  much  to  build  upon  the  founda- 
tion which  Hobbes  had  suggested  and  to  point  the  way,  at 
least,  to  the  elimination  of  the  errors  into  which  he  had 
fallen.  Like  Hobbes,  he  began  with  the  idea  of  the  good, 
but  he  defined  it  more  comprehensively,  since  he  embraced 
in  it  even  moral  acts,  though  always  considering  it  too  much 
under  the  category  of  the  natural  good — that,  namely, 
which,  preserves  or  renders  created  beings  "more  perfect 
or  happy."  He  introduces  an  idea  which  was  entirely  lack- 
ing in  Hobbes,  the  "common  good"  as  an  object  of  effort, 
under  which  he  almost  unconsciously  included  a  much 
wider  definition  of  good  than  his  more  formal  statements 
made  place  for.  But  his  chief  service  was  that  he  reduced 
all  the  maxims  of  morality  to  one  general  principle,  "re- 
gard for  the  common  good."  Three  separate  sentences 
mav  serve  to  afford  a  comprehensive  view  of  his  thought. 
"I  '  udge  it  requisite  to  the  natural  perfection  of  the  human 
will  that  it  follow  the  most  perfect  reason."  "Those  acts 
of  the  will  which  are  enjoined  by  the  same  law  may  all  be 
comprehended  in  the  general  name  of  the  most  extensive 
and  operative  benevolence."    "The  greatest  benevolence 

1'  See  Dr.  G.  F.  Magoun's  excellent  account,  Bibliotheca  Sacra,  Vol.  XLIII, 
pp.  528  ff.;  Vol.  XLIV,  pp.  91  ff. 


REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES  93 


does  consist  in  a  constant  volition  of  the  greatest  good 
towards  all."  Hence  an  action  is  "morally  good"  which 
contributes  to  this  end.  Cumberland  anticipated  the  objec- 
tion, which  has  been  voiced  in  our  own  day,  that  benev- 
olence cannot  be  said  to  include  all  virtue,  since  it  cannot 
include  the  proper  attitude  of  man  toward  God  except  by 
such  torsion  as  shall  evacuate  it  of  all  meaning,  and  laid 
down  the  proposition  that  "to  promote  the  common  good 
of  the  whole  system  of  rationals"  "includes  our  love  of 
God  and  of  all  mankind,  as  parts  of  this  system."  But  he 
could  not  have  defended  himself  successfully  against  the 
charge  of  utilitarianism,  for  utilitarian  he  undoubtedly 
was.  His  most  conspicuous  failure  as  a  moralist  was  in 
his  definition  of  conscience,  in  reference  to  which,  says  Dr. 
Magoun, 

It  is  difficult  to  decide  whether  our  author  regarded  conscience  as 
anything  more  than  the  discernment  of  our  acts  as  means  to  ends, 

or  of  the  results  of  acts,  pleasant  or  painful  One  will  look  in 

vain  through  this  ....  treatise  ....  for  any  discussion  of  the  rela- 
tions of  right  or  conscience  to  obligation,  either  as  an  idea  or  as 
feeling.^* 

Locke,  while  agreeing  with  Hobbes  as  tO'  the  egoistic 
basis  of  conduct  and  the  definition  of  good,  yet  does  some- 
thing to  suggest  a  higher  style  of  treating  the  subject  when 
he  supposes  that  ethics  might  be  put  among  the  demon- 
strative sciences,  like  mathematics,  if  the  idea  of  the  Su- 
preme Being  and  that  of  ourselves  in  relation  to  him  were 
properly  carried  out.  He  thus  substantially  makes  ethics 
to  rest  upon  intuitive  principles.  Shaftesbury  forwarded 
the  theme  by  showing  that  the  social  affections  are  natural, 
and  that  they  are  in  harmony  with  the  self-regarding.  Of 
all  this  series  of  writers  Hutcheson  was  the  greatest. 
Upon  the  basis  of  Shaftesbury's  work  he  erected,  by  the 
help  of  Cumberland's  principles,  the  most  complete  edifice 

1^  Articles  cited,  Vol.  XLIII,  pp.  539,  540. 


94  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


of  moral  philosophy  which  Britain  had  seen  till  that  time. 
He  brought  out  the  fact  that  there  is  a  special  power  in 
the  human  soul  to  discern  moral  ideas  and  relations,  for 
among  the  "senses"  he  enumerated  one  of  beauty,  a  "pub- 
lic sense,"  "a  determination  to  be  pleased  with  the  hap- 
piness of  others,"  and  a  "Moral  Sense"  "by  which  we 
perceive  virtue  and  vice."^^  True,  his  treatment  of  the 
moral  sense  is  too  loose  and  vague  to  throw  much  light 
upon  the  real  nature  of  this  faculty.  He  is  also 
completely  utilitarian,  at  least  in  the  criterion  by  which 
the  virtue  of  a  proposed  action  is  to  be  tested.  "That 
action  is  best  which  procures  the  greatest  happiness  for 
the  greatest  numbers,  and  that  worst  which,  in  like  manner, 
occasions  misery."  The  most  distinctive  feature  of  his 
work  is  the  consistency  with  which  he  carries  out  Cumber- 
land's principle  of  benevolence.  In  opposition  to  Hobbes's 
account  of  the  origin  of  moral  actions,  Hutcheson  main- 
tains that  benevolence  is  the  only  ground  upon  which  man 
approves  of  any  action.  He  thus  makes  it  the  sole  con- 
stituent of  virtue.  Actions  flowing  purely  from  self-love 
and  yet  evidencing  no  lack  of  benevolence  are  morally  in- 
different. In  respect  to  many  personal  actions  which  men 
generally  morally  approve,  such  as  industry,  man  is  vir- 
tuous in  them  because  he  is  to-  exercise  benevolence 
toward  himself.  If  Hutcheson  is  not  wholly  successful  in 
his  discussion  of  this  portion  of  the  theme,  he  contributes 
something,  at  any  rate,  in  incorporating  the  moral  subject 
himself  in  the  scheme  of  beings  toward  whom  moral  rela- 
tions are  to  be  sustained. 

It  is  at  this  point  that  the  work  of  Edwards  is  to  be 
introduced  into  the  history.  He  had  early  gained  the 
elevated  plane  upon  which  his  whole  consideration  of  the 
subject  is  conducted.    Though  he  followed  his  predeces- 

See  Professor  Fowler's  article,  "Hutcheson,"  Encyc.  Brit. 


REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES  95 


sors  in  viewing  some  things  as  "goods,"  he  did  not  begin 
his  development  of  his  theme  with  this  topic.  He  had 
found,  as  it  seemed  to  him,  the  reason  both  of  the  nature 
of  the  good  and  of  the  source  of  obligation  in  the  funda- 
mental idea  that  the  universe  was  a  "system"  and  that  its 
ideal  harmony  was  the  goal  of  all  individual  existence,  and 
hence  the  reasonable  and  obligatory  object  of  moral  choice. 
When  considered  in  this  light,  the  whole  nature  of  virtue 
and  its  binding  obligation  are  immediately  evident,  being 
written  in  the  very  nature  of  man.  And  hence,  while  the 
theory  is,  like  that  of  Cumberland  and  Hutcheson,  a  theory 
of  benevolence,  it  avoids  the  utilitarianism  into  which  they 
had  fallen,  and  replaces  their  defective  analyses  of  con- 
science, self-love,  etc.,  with  better. 

So  evident,  in  fact,  was  the  truth  of  his  theory  to  the  in- 
tuitive gaze  of  Edwards  that  he  scarcely  stops  to  give 
formal  proof  of  it.  The  body  of  his  short  treatise  is  occu- 
pied with  explanations  which  shall  unfold  its  meaning  and 
free  it  from  various  objections.  What  there  is  of  proof 
may  be  summarized  thus  : 

Virtue  is  something  beautiful,  or  some  kind  of  beauty, 
yet  not  every  kind  of  beauty,  but  a  beauty  of  a  moral  na- 
ture— that  is,  one  belonging  to  the  disposition  and  will. 
Nor  is  it  any  "particular"  beauty,  or  beauty  in  a  limited 
sphere,  but  it  is  one  which  still  appears  beautiful  when 
viewed  "most  "  perfectly,  comprehensively,  and  universally, 
with  regard  to  all  its  tendencies  and  its  connections  with 
everything  to  which  it  stands  related."  After  these  defini- 
tions, the  author  is  ready  to  answer  the  question  "wherein 
this  true  and  general  beauty  of  the  heart  does  most  essen- 
tially consist;"  and  the  reply  is:  "Benevolence  in  general. 
Or  perhaps,  to  speak  more  accurately,  it  is  that  consent, 
propensity,  and  union  of  heart  to  being  in  general,  which  is 

See  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  93-95. 


96  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


immediately  exercised  in  a  general  good  will."  And  he 
goes  on  to  say — thus  giving  all  the  proof  he  has  to  offer : 

The  things  before  observed  respecting  the  nature  of  true  virtue  nat- 
urally lead  us  to  such  a  notion  of  it.  If  it  has  its  seat  in  the  heart,  and 
is  the  general  goodness  and  beauty  of  the  disposition  and  its  exercise, 
in  the  most  comprehensive  view,  considered  with  regard  to  its  uni- 
versal tendency,  and  as  related  to  everything  with  which  it  stands 
connected;  what  can  it  consist  in  but  a  consent  and  good  will  to 
being  in  general?  Beauty  does  not  consist  in  discord  and  dissent,  but 
in  consent  and  agreement.  And  if  every  intelligent  being  is  in  some 
way  related  to  being  in  general,  and  is  a  part  of  the  universal  system 
of  existence,  and  so  stands  in  connection  with  the  whole;  what  can 
its  general  and  true  beauty  be,  but  its  union  and  consent  with  the 
great  whole. 

Edwards  supposed  himself  to  be  in  accord  in  this  posi- 
tion, not  only  with  the  Scriptures  and  "Christian  divines," 
but  with  the  "more  considerable  deists"  and  "the  most  con- 
siderable writers"  upon  such  topics.  He  could  therefore 
dispense  the  more  properly  with  lengthened  proofs,  and 
could  proceed  to  those  definitions  by  which  he  hoped  to 
clear  up  some  prevalent  "confusion  in  discourses  upon 
this  subject."  He  explains  therefore,  first,  that  such  benev- 
olence to  being  in  general  may  be  exercised  in  a  benevolent 
affection  toward  a  particular  person,  and  that  such  a  par- 
ticular act  of  benevolence  is  virtuous  when  it  arises  "from 
a  generally  benevolent  temper,  or  from  that  habit  or  frame 
of  mind  wherein  consists  a  disposition  to  love  being  in 
general."  In  other  words,  the  great  motive  of  universal 
love  must  underlie  every  volition  which  is  to  be  virtuous. 
He  also  defines  in  passing  the  "being"  had  in  mind  as  "in- 
telligent being,"  though  he  had  better  said  sentient  being. 

The  love  which  constitutes  virtue  is  thus  the  love  of 
benevolence,  that  which  seeks  the  well-being  or  happiness 
of  being  considered  simply  as  such.  It  is  thus  not  the  love 
of  complacence,  which  presupposes  beauty,  or  virtue,  in 


REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES 


97 


which  complacence  can  be  felt,  nor,  for  the  same  reason, 

is  it  gratitude. .  But — 

The  first  object  of  a  virtuous  benevolence  is  being,  simply  consid- 
ered; and  if  being,  simply  considered,  be  its  object,  then  being  in  general 
IS  its  object;  and  what  it  has  an  ultimate  propensity  to,  is  the  highest 
good  of  being  in  general.  And  it  will  seek  the  good  of  every  individual 
being  unless  it  be  conceived  as  not  consistent  with  the  highest  good 
of  being  in  general.  In  which  case  the  good  of  a  particular  being, 
or  some  beings,  may  be  given  up  for  the  sake  of  the  highest  good 
of  being  in  general.  And  particularly,  if  there  be  any  being  irre- 
claimably  opposite,  and  an  enemy  to  being  in  general,  then  consent 
and  adherence  to  being  in  general  will  induce  the  truly  virtuous  heart 
to  forsake  that  enemy  and  to  oppose  it.^''' 

One  more  quotation  is  needed  to  prepare  the  reader  for 
the  highest  reach  of  the  Edwardean  conception : 

Further,  if  being,  simply  considered,  be  the  first  object  of  a 
truly  virtuous  benevolence,  then  that  object  who  has  most  of  being,  or 
has  the  greatest  share  of  existence,  other  things  being  equal,  so  far 
as  such  a  being  is  exhibited  to  our  faculties,  will  have  the  greatest 
share  of  the  propensity  and  benevolent  affections  of  the  heart.^^ 

Hence,  since  God  is  the  being  who  has  "most  of  being," 
he  is  the  supreme  object  of  choice;  and  men,  since  they  are 
in  general  of  the  same  importance,  will  have  equal  shares 
in  the  choices  of  virtuous  beings.  Hence  this  theory  of 
virtue  is  summarized  in  the  biblical  rule  that  we  are  to 
love  God  with  all  our  heart,  and  our  neighbor  as  our- 
selves. 

Edwards  also  felt  the  force  of  that  objection  to  this 
theory  of  virtue  which  Cumberland  had  anticipated,  which 
denies  the  possibility  of  including  God  within  the  scope  of 
the  creature's  "benevolence."  He  set  at  work  vigorously 
to  remove  it.  He  reinforced  the  reasoning  just  sketched 
by  a  further  discussion.  He  distinguishes  first  between  the 
primary  ground  of  love,  which  is  simply  being,  and  a 
secondary,  which  is  the  moral  excellence  which  may  exist 

Ibid.,  p.  97. 
^8  Ibid.,  p.  97. 


98  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

in  any  being.  This  is  fitted  to  call  forth  complacence,  but 
it  is  also  fitted  to  call  forth  the  love  of  benevolence,  by 
which  he  means  the  choice  to  seek  to  promote  the  virtue 
in  which  it  delights.  Toward  God,  the  most  holy  of  all 
beings,  such  a  love  is  most  eminently  fit;  and  yet  in  his 
case  it  will  consist  largely  in  the  love  of  complacence.  Has 
it,  indeed,  any  true  benevolent  element?  It  has,  replies  Ed- 
wards ;  for  benevolence  consists  not  only  in  seeking  to  pro- 
mote, but  also  in  rejoicing  in,  the  happiness  of  the  being 
toward  whom  benevolence  is  exercised.  But  more  than 
this,  benevolence  can  be  directly  exercised  toward  God, 
since  men  can  be  instrumental  in  promoting  his  glory,  in 
which  he  delights. 

Edwards  insists  the  more  strenuously  upon  this  point 
because  upon  it  turns  the  chief  purpose  of  his  treatise, 
which  was  to  put  morality  in  a  new  relation  to  religion. 
Previous  moralists  had  been  too  exclusively  occupied  in 
considering  their  theme  with  simple  reference  to  the  rela- 
tions of  man  toward  man.  Edwards  would  show,  on  the 
contrary,  that  true  virtue  must  include  a  virtuous  attitude 
toward  God  himself,  which  is,  however,  the  essence  of  re- 
ligion, and  would  thus  advance  to  the  lofty  position  that 
there  can  be  no  true  virtue  in  the  narrower  sphere  of  what 
is  ordinarily  called  morality,  which  is  not,  at  the  same  time, 
religious.  Religion  and  morality  are  essentially  one.  He 
that  is  truly  moral  is  implicitly  already  religious;  and  he 
who  is  religious  must  also  be  moral.    In  his  own  words : 

Whatever  other  benevolence  or  generosity  towards  mankind,  and 
other  virtues  or  moral  qualifications  which  go  by  that  name,  any  are 
possessed  of,  that  are  not  attended  with  a  love  to  God  which  is  alto- 
gether above  them  and  to  which  they  are  subordinate  and  on  which 
they  are  dependent,  there  is  nothing  of  the  nature  of  true  virtue  or 
religion  in  them.  And  it  may  be  asserted  in  general  that  nothing 
is  of  the  nature  of  true  virtue  in  which  God  is  not  the  first  and  the 
last ;  or  which,  with  regard  to  their  exercises  in  general  have  not  their 
first  foundation  and  source  in  apprehensions  of  God's  supreme  dignity 


REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES  99 


and  glory,  and  in  answerable  esteem  and  love  of  him,  and  have  not 
respect  to  God  as  the  supreme  end.^® 

But  against  this  view  the  objection  would  be  raised  that 
there  are  many  things  which  do  not  spring  from  such  a 
benevolence  as  this  which  are  commonly  thought  to  par- 
take of  the  character  of  the  moral,  and  which  receive  the 
commendation  of  men.  How  can  they  have  this  seeming, 
without  having  a  true,  morality?  This  is  the  vital  question 
between  Edwards  and  most  of  his  predecessors,  and  to 
the  answer  of  it  he  devotes  the  remainder  of  his  treatise, 
nearly  two-thirds  of  its  entire  compass.  The  motive  of  the 
work  here  comes  to  light.  It  was  to  root  out  thoroughly 
from  the  minds  of  men  that  confidence  which  they  are  so 
prone  to  feel  in  the  value  of  a  morality  which  is  confess- 
edly not  religious.  These  actions  commonly  approved  have 
says  Edwards  in  substance,  a  certain  beauty  about  them, 
but  it  is  not  the  true  beauty  which  virtue  has.  It  is  an  in- 
ferior beauty,  analogous  only  to  that  consisting  in  the  fit- 
ness of  the  act  in  its  relations,  and  comparable  to  the  beauty 
of  a  chess-board,  or  of  a  piece  of  chintz  or  brocade,  or  of  a 
square,  an  equilateral  triangle,  or  a  regular  polygon.  To 
employ  his  own  words: 

There  is  a  beauty  of  order  in  society  besides  what  consists  in  be- 
nevolence or  can  be  referred  to  it,  which  is  of  a  secondary  kind;  as 
when  the  different  members  of  society  have  all  their  appointed  office, 
place,  and  station,  according  to  their  several  capacities  and  talents, 
and  every  one  keeps  his  place  and  continues  in  his  proper  business. 
In  this  there  is  a  beauty,  not  of  a  different  kind  from  the  regularity 
of  a  beautiful  building,  or  piece  of  skillful  architecture,  where  the 
strong  pillars  are  set  in  their  proper  place,  the  pilasters  in  a  place  fit 
for  them,  the  square  pieces  of  marble  in  the  pavement,  the  panels, 
partitions,  and  cornices,  etc.,  in  places  proper  for  them.^^ 

And  among  other  virtues  he  specially  instances  justice 
as  consisting  in  the  agreement,  or  fitness  which  there  is 

^»  Ibtd.,  p.  109. 
^oibid.,  p.  114. 


loo         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


between  the  doing  of  evil,  for  example,  and  the  receiving 
of  pain. 

Thus  these  so-called  virtues  have  a  beauty,  but  it  is  not 
the  beauty  of  true  virtue  consisting  in  love  to  being  in  gen- 
eral and  to  God,  the  being  of  beings. 

The  same  argumentative  necessity  leads  Edwards  now 
to  take  up  the  discussion  of  self-love  which  Hutcheson  had 
dropped.  Defining  it  as  having  meaning  only  when  it  sig- 
nifies regard  for  one's  ''confined  private  self,"  he  discusses 
here  in  the  main  the  question  whether  certain  so-called  vir- 
tues, such  as  love  to  friends,  gratitude,  etc.,  may  not  arise 
from  mere  self-love,  or  to  use  the  modern  term,  from  sel- 
fishness. He  shows  that,  since  kind  actions  toward  us 
gratify  our  selfishness,  it  may  be  nothing  but  our  percep- 
tion of  this  which  calls  forth  our  gratitude  for  them.  Far 
from  being  virtuous,  or  having  any  character  of  "public 
benevolence,"  such  affections  will  be  purely  selfish.  They 
may  possibly  at  times  spring  from  a  feeling  of  desert,  but 
then  they  are  to  be  referred  to  the  sense  of  justice  pre- 
viously spoken  of,  and  are  nothing  but  a  delight  in  the 
"secondary"  beauty,  which  gives  no  foundation  for  true 
virtue. 

With  the  same  general  purpose  in  mind,  Edwards  next 
passes  to  the  discussion  of  the  "natural  conscience,"  by 
which  he  means  the  conscience  of  the  natural  man.  It 
consists  in  two  things :  ( i )  in  a  "disposition  to  approve  or 
disapprove  the  moral  treatment  which  passes  between  us 
and  others  from  a  determination  of  the  mind  to  be  easy 
or  uneasy  in  a  conscio-usness  of  our  being-  consistent  or  incon- 
sistent with  ourselves;"  and  (2)  in  a  "sense  of  desert"  as 
previously  explained.  It  is,  in  other  words,  a  perception 
of  moral  relations,  and  perceives  even  the  beauty  of  true 
benevolence,  though  it  may  not  itself  "taste  its  primary  and 
essential  beauty;"  and  it  covers  in  the  range  of  its  utter- 


REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES  loi 


ances  the  same  subjects  as  are  covered  by  a  true  spiritual 
sense — that  is,  by  a  conscience  spiritually  enlightened.  But 
it  does  not  imply,  as  some  have  taught,  "a  disposition  to 
true  virtue,  consisting  in  a  benevolent  temper  naturally  im- 
planted in  the  hearts  of  all  men;"  for  then,  the  clearer  the 
perceptions  of  conscience,  the  stronger  the  virtuous  prin- 
ciple— which  experience  shows  frequently  not  to  be  the 
case.  Even  the  wicked  at  the  last  day  will  approve  their 
sentence;  but,  under  this  perception  of  conscience,  they 
will  not  manifest  a  disposition  to  repent  of  their  wicked- 
ness. 

In  the  same  way  Edwards  discusses  natural  instincts 
leading  to  natural  affections  which  have  no  real  virtue  in 
them;  and  then  passes  to  consider  the  reason  why  all  these 
things  are  often  mistaken  for  true  virtue.  And  he  closes 
the  whole  with  the  investigation  whether  virtue  is  founded 
in  sentiment,  and  whether  this  is  given  to  men  by  God  arbi- 
trarily, or  whether  it  is  founded  in  the  very  nature  of 
things.  The  considerations  presented  here  are  in  substance 
the  same  as  those  upon  which  the  whole  theory  was  first 
established. 

This  is  the  substance  of  the  great  ethical  treatise  which 
Edwards  wrote  in  his  closing  years  and  which  was  pub- 
lished after  his  death.  The  far-reaching  consequences  in- 
volved in  it  for  theology,  his  successors  were  only  slowly 
to  appreciate  and  develop;  but  it  finally  created  an  inde- 
pendent schoK  of  ethics,  as  well  as  of  theology. 

The  review  of  the  most  iniportant  services  of  Edwards 
to  theology  is  now  complete.  Were  it  the  present  object 
to  discuss  his  entire  career  and  influence  as  a  historical 
character,  much  more  would  need  to  be  said.  The  present 
problem  is  ?  rrriower  one.  Not  what  he  was,  bu-  what 
he  did ;  and  not  what  he  did  upon  the  broader  field  even  of 
theology,  but  what  he  contributed  to  the  improvemxnt  of 


I02         HISTORY  OF^NEW^ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


the  system  which  he  received  from  his  teachers,  is  the  sub- 
ject of  the  present  study.  He  performed  many  lesser  ser- 
vices not  fitted  to  rank  with  these  prime  labors.  Professor 
Park,  in  the  introduction  which  he  prefixed  to  his  collection 
of  Essays  from  various  New  England  writers  upon  the 
atonement,  has  shown  how  independent  the  mind  of  Ed- 
wards everywhere  was,  and  how  many  fruitful  sugges- 
tions he  let  fall  in  passing,  as  it  were,  upon  the  greatest 
themes.  His  preaching  of  future  punishment  was  valu- 
able for  the  refutation  of  numerous  dangerous  errors.^^ 
Perhaps  the  temper  of  mind  which  he  bequeathed  to  his 
spiritual  followers  was  his  greatest  gift— that  perfect  in- 
dependence combined  with  entire  loyalty  to  the  truth,  that 
living  sense  of  the  possibility  of  progress,  that  keen  vision 
of  the  necessities  of  the  present  hour  and  that  unquestion- 
ing subordination  of  every  merely  theoretical  interest  to 
the  practical  interests  of  the  Redeemer's  kingdom,  which 
have  largely  distinguished  the  New  England  school  among 
thinkers  to  this  day.  But  it  were  enough  to  substantiate 
his  claim  to  a  high  position  among  the  theologians  of  the 
Christian  ages  to  have  begun,  as  he  did,  those  discussions 
of  the  will,  of  the  nature  of  sin,  and  of  the  principle  of 
virtue  which  resulted  finally  in  the  large  inheritance  into 
which  his  children  have  entered.  If  his  daring  and  keen 
speculations  gave  tO'  the  theology  something  of  a  rational- 
istic turn,  which  his  own  deep  spirituality  could  not  neu- 

21  But  a  portion  of  the  manuscripts  of  Edwards  was  published.  The  re- 
maining portions  have  been  repeatedly  re-examined  to  see  if  they  threw  further 
light  upon  his  opinions,  but  without  leading  to  any  essential  enlargement  of  pub- 
lication. Two  little  tracts  upon  the  Trinity  have  been  published,  in  answer  to 
an  open  demand  made  by  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  in  connection  with  the  assertion 
that  Edwards  became  substantially  a  Unitarian  in  his  later  thinking;  but  they 
have  not  sustained  the  charge.  They  have,  however,  shown  how  he  subjected  all 
theological  topics  to  original  and  searching  investigation,  and  how  the  scope  of 
his  own  independent  thought  was  continually  enlarging.  See  the  tracts:  E.  C. 
Smyth,  Observations  concerning  the  Scripture  Economy  of  the  Trinity,  etc.,  and 
G.  P.  Fisher,  An  Unpublished  Essay  of  Edzvards'  upon  the  Trinity  (1903).  See 
also  Professor  Park's  valuable  remarks  upon  Edwards'  intellectual  habits  in  the 
Bibliotheca  Sacra,  Vol.  XXXVIII. 


REMAINING  METAPHYSICAL  TREATISES  103 

tralize,  it  was  because  the  age  succeeding  the  advocacy  of 
Deism  must  be  a  rationalizing  one;  and  if  the  evil  effects 
of  this  strain  of  thought  are  to  be  detected  even  to  the 
present,  it  is  because  the  forces  which  have  from  time  to 
time  arrayed  themselves  against  evangelical  theology  have 
been  the  direct  descendants  of  the  ancient  Deistic  move- 
ment. For  himself,  Edwards  as  powerfully  promoted  the 
spiritual  life  of  the  churches  as  he  did  their  theology. 


EDWARDS'  CONTEMPORARIES  AND 
COLABORERS 


CHAPTER  V 


JOSEPH  BELLAMY 

The  impetus  given  by  Edwards  to  New  England  the- 
ology began  to  exhibit  itself  before  he  himself  passed  off 
the  scene.  A  figure  so  unique  as  his,  and  one  of  so  great 
eminence  as  a  practical  worker,  could  not  fail  to  attract 
attention  and,  in  the  paucity  of  teachers  in  New  England, 
draw  pupils  for  longer  or  shorter  instruction  in  the  min- 
isterial calling.  It  was  in  this  way  that  he  gained  for  the 
new  principles  which  he  was  presenting  two  adherents  who 
were  to  prove  during  his  lifetime  efficient  colaborers  with 
him  in  his  practical  efforts,  and  after  his  death  successors 
and  leaders  in  his  school.  These  were  Bellamy^  and 
Hopkins. 

The  particular  course  which  Bellamy's  theological  la- 
bors took  was  determined  by  his  position  as  a  pastor  and 
by  the  number  of  important  controversies  which  were  car- 
ried on  during  his  time.  At  the  very  beginning  of  his 
ministry  he  took  part  in  the  great  revival  of  1741-43, 
preaching  widely,  and  observing  necessarily  the  widespread 
harm  done  by  certain  theological  errors.  It  was  the  direct 
consequence  of  this  that,  in  1750,  first  among  the  minis- 
ters of  his  state,  he  came  out  against  the  Half- Way  Cove- 
nant. He  noted  and  refuted  the  errors  of  "Antinomians," 
"Sandemeans,"  etc.  But  there  was  an  inner  force  in  his 
mind,  which  had  been  communicated  to  him  by  Edwards, 
which  impelled  him  to  more  fundamental  work  than  the 

1  Joseph  Bellamy,  born  in  Cheshire,  Conn,,  February  20,  17  xg;  graduated  at 
Yale  College  in  1735,  at  the  early  age  of  sixteen;  studied  with  Edwards  at  North- 
ampton in  1736;  settled  at  Bethlehem  (next  south  of  Litchfield)  April  3,  1740, 
when  a  little  more  than  twenty-cne  years  old;  remained  pastor  here,  having  de- 
clined many  calls,  among  others  one  to  New  York,  till  his  death  in  1790.  He 
was  created  Doctor  of  Divinity  by  Aberdeen  in  1768. 

107 


io8         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

mere  refutation  of  errors,  and  made  him  a  constructive 
theologian.  While  thus  we  find  treatises  from  his  pen 
upon  The  Half  Way  Covenant,  There  is  but  One  Cove- 
nant, etc.,  and  Theron,  Paiilinus,  and  Aspasio  (on  justifica- 
tion), his  great  works  are  his  True  Religion  Delineated 
and  The  Wisdom  of  God  in  the  Permission  of  Sin,  etc., 
which  are  lifted  by  their  themes  upon  the  high  plane  of 
constructive  discussion,  although  not  without  constant  ref- 
erence to  the  immediate  religious  needs  of  men.^ 

The  True  Religion  Delineated  discusses  the  nature  of 
religion,  and  gives  two  answers,  apparently  different,  but 
in  the  end  coalescing  in  one;  viz.,  that  it  consists  in  a  con- 
formity to  the  law  of  God,  and  a  compliance  with  the  gos- 
pel of  Christ.  These  two  answers  determine  the  two 
parts  of  the  treatise.  The  first  treats  the  law,  which  it 
finds  perfectly  fulfilled  in  the  one  exercise  of  love.  The 
second  then  considers  the  gospel,  and  is  thus  led  to  the  suc- 
cessive topics  of  the  ruin  of  man,  the  atonement,  and  the 
application  of  that  atonement  through  faith,  together  with 
the  reward  of  ev  rlasting  life  promised  to  the  believer. 

As  might  be  gathered  from  the  definition  given  of  con- 
formity to  the  law  of  God,  the  leading  idea  of  this  whole 
treatise  is  that  of  the  Edwardean  theory  of  virtue.  We 
have  here  accordir-rly  the  first  application  of  this  theory 
to  New  England  theology.  As  might  be  expected,  it  is  a 
partial  application  The  greater  and  more  profound  effects 
of  this  theory  upon  the  doctrine  of  sin  and  of  the  atone- 
ment escaped,  at  first,  the  eye  of  theologians.  But  at  least 
the  theory  was  definitely  held  by  Bellamy  and  beautifully 
applied  to  his  definition  of  religion. 

This  agreement  between  Edwards  and  Bellamy  has 
sometimes  been  denied.  It  has  been  said  that  Bellamy  did 
not  follow  Edwards  "in  this  single  exceptional  case  wherein 

*  Best  edition  of  his  works  is  that  of  the  Doctrinal  Tract  and  Book  Society 
(Boston,  1853),  from  which  the  citations  in  the  following  pages  are  made. 


JOSEPH  BFXLAMY 


109 


he  was  eccentric  to  his  main  orbit."  ^  But  careful  study  of 
Bellamy  will  show  a  minute,  as  well  as  a  general,  accep- 
tance of  the  theory  of  virtue.  In  a  letter  dated  1766  he  re- 
fers to  Edwards'  treatise  by  name.^  In  explaining  love 
toward  our  neighbor  he  coincides  with  his  teacher  in 
phraseology  as  well  as  thought.  He  speaks  of  the  "esteem'* 
which  is  due  to  our  neighbor  for  the  valuable  qualities 
which  he  possesses;^  then  of  his  "happiness  as  to  soul  and 
body"  toward  which  we  are  to  exercise  a  benevolent  re- 
gard; this  to  be  excited  by  his  "capacities;"  then  of  the 
delight  and  complacence  which  we  are  to  feel  in  his  holi- 
ness; all  of  which  are  strikingly  Edwardean.  The  same 
idea  of  obligation  is  held  by  him  as  by  Edwards.  The  ob- 
ligation to  love  God  arises  from  the  "infinite  excellence  of 
the  divine  nature  antecedent  to  all  selfish  consideration," 
and  is  infinitely,  unchangeably,  and  eternally  binding. 
Love  to  our  neighbor  is  "right  and  fit  in  itself."  Like  Ed- 
wards he  opposes  utilitarianism,  only  with  a  power  of  sar- 
casm and  a  keenness  of  wit  ^  which  Edwards,  with  all  his 
excellences,  did  not  possess. 

Bellamy  was,  then,  a  thoroughgoing  Edwardean  as  far 
as  the  theory  of  virtue  is  concerned.  Like  Edwards,  he 
was  also'  in  general  upon  the  plane  of  the  old  Calvinism. 
In  many  things  his  positions  will  be  found  to  be  identical 
with  those  of  Edwards,  sometimes,  however,  with  a  quiet 
suppression  of  Edwards'  more  daring  flights  of  specula- 
tion, as,  for  example,  his  attempt  to  explain  the  constitu- 
tional connection  of  Adam  with  his  posterity.  At  the  same 
time,  many  of  his  forms  of  statement  and  many  sugges- 
tions proved  fruitful  in  developing  am.ong  his  pupils  and 
successors  the  new  divinity. 

'  Bibliotheca  Sacra,  Vol.  X,  p.  706. 

*  Works  (Memoir),  Vol.  I,  pp.  xxix,  xxx, 
^  See  Works,  Vol.  I,  pp.  119  ff. 

•  Ibid.,  pp.  188  f¥. 


no 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


These  statements  and  suggestions,  found  in  the  True 
Religion,  m?y  be  grouped  under  the  following  heads: 

I.  Ability. — Here  he  follows  exactly  in  the  path  sug- 
gested by  Edwards  upon  the  will.  The  Arminians  and 
Antinomians  who  surrounded  him  sought  in  various  ways 
to  evade  the  searching  demands  of  the  gospel.  He  answers 
them  in  pungent  terms,  and  we  begin  at  once  to  see  the 
power  of  the  New  England  preaching,  stimulated  and 
directed  by  Edwards'  leading  ideas,  to  lay  hold  of  the  hearts 
and  consciences  of  men.  Something  of  his  style,  as  well 
as  his  contribution  to  thought,  will  be  seen  in  the  follow- 
ing extracts: 

"But  to  love  God,  or  to  have  any  disposition  to  love  him,  is  a 
thing  supernatural,  clean  beyond  the  powers  of  nature,  improved  to 
the  utmost:  how  can  I,  therefore,  be  wholly  to  blame?" — ^It  is  a 
thing  supernatural,  you  say;  that  is,  in  other  words,  you  have  no 
heart  to  it,  nor  the  least  inclination  that  way;  nor  is  there  any- 
thing in  your  temper  to  work  upon  by  motives  to  bring  you  to  it; 
and  now,  because  you  are  so  very  bad  a  creature,  therefore  you  are 
not  at  all  to  blame.  This  is  your  argument.  But  can  you  think  that 
there  is  any  force  in  it?  What!  are  moral  agents  the  less  to  blame 
the  worse  they  grow?  And  are  God's  laws  no  longer  binding  than 
while  his  subjects  are  disposed  to  obey  them?^ 

And  again: — 

Thus  we  see,  that,  as  to  a  natural  capacity,  all  mankind  are  cap- 
able of  a  perfect  conformity  to  God's  law,  which  requires  us  only  to 
love  God  with  all  our  hearts :  and  that  all  our  inability  arises  merely 
from  the  bad  temper  of  our  hearts,  and  our  want  of  a  good  disposi- 
tion, and  that,  therefore,  we  are  wholly  to  blame  and  altogether  in- 
excusable. Our  impotency,  in  one  word,  is  not  natural,  but  moral,  and, 
therefore,  instead  of  extenuating,  does  magnify  and  enhance  our 
fault.  The  more  unable  to  love  God  we  are,  the  more  are  we  to 
blame.  Even  as  it  was  with  the  Jews;  the  greater  contrariety  there  was 
in  their  hearts  to  their  prophets,  to  Christ  and  his  Apostles,  the 
more  vile  and  blame  worthy  were  they.  And  in  this  light  do  the 
Scriptures  constantly  view  the  case.  There  is  not  one  title  in  the  Old 
Testament,  or  in  the  New,  in  the  law  or  in  the  gospel,  that  gives  the 
least  intimation  of  any  deficiency  in  our  natural  faculties.    The  law 

Loc.  cit.,  p.  9S. 


JOSEPH  BELLAMY 


III 


requires  no  more  than  all  our  hearts,  and  never  blames  us  for  not 
having  larger  natural  capacities.  The  gospel  aims  to  recover  us  to 
love  God  only  with  all  our  hearts,  but  makes  no  provision  for  our 
having  any  new  natural  capacity;  as  to  our  natural  capacities,  all  is 
well.  It  is  in  our  temper,  in  the  frame  and  disposition  of  our  hearts, 
that  the  seat  of  all  our  sinfulness  lies.^ 

That  paradO'X  of  Bellamy's  rhetoric — *'the  more  un- 
able to  love  God  we  are,  the  more  we  are  to  blame"— be- 
came characteristic  of  the  school.  Inability,  instead  of 
being  accepted  as  an  excuse,  was  itself  ground  for  greater 
repentance,  because  it  was  voluntary.  It  will  be  said,  of 
course,  that  the  theory  of  the  will  underlying  such  state- 
ments affords  no  real  ground  for  them,  because  giving  no 
real  ability.  It  was  enough,  however,  that  Bellamy  sup- 
posed that  there  was  a  real  ability,  and  that  he  preached  it 
as  such.  No  one  can  get  from  his  words  any  other  im- 
pression. It  was  this  impression  that  prevailed.  The 
theory  of  the  doctrine  does  not  appear  in  his  pages  to  dis- 
turb the  mind;  the  fact  of  ability  is  stated  with  great  pop- 
ular power.  Such  preaching  had  its  natural  effect,  and 
the  way  was  prepared  for  the  improvement  of  the  theory. 

Out  of  such  preaching  began  another  style  of  exhorta- 
tion to  the  impenitent  which  was  soon  to  break  up  the  old 
paralysis  which  had  crept  over  the  New  England  churches. 
Men  had  ability  to  repent,  and  the  duty  of  the  minister 
was  to  exhort  them  to  exercise  this  ability.  They  were  no 
longer  to  ''read  the  Scriptures,"  or  to  "pray,"  or  to  ''choose 
God  as  their  best  good  and  last  end,"  and  remain  impeni- 
tent through  it  all,  as  in  former  times  they  had  too  often 
done.  But,  under  the  preaching  of  Bellamy,  they  were  ex- 
horted not  "to  do  any  duty  in  an  unholy  manner,  to  hear 
the  word  in  a  disposition  to  hate  and  reject  it,"  but  to  hear 
"in  a  disposition  to  love,  believe,  and  practice  it."  In  short, 
the  preaching  became  the  preaching  of  immediate  repent- 
ance. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  100. 


112 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


2.  Original  sin— In  respect  to  this  doctrine  Bellamy 
followed  Edwards  quite  closely,  teaching  that  by  divine 
appointment  Adam  stood  and  acted  as  our  public  head. 
This  was  as  well  for  us  in  every  respect,  and  better  in  some 
respects,  than  if  our  condition  had  been  made  to  depend 
entirely  upon  our  own  acts.  He  did  not,  however,  follow 
Edwards  into  his  speculations  as  to  the  method  of  our  con- 
nection with  Adam.  Leaving  that,  and  every  other  spec- 
ulative element,  he  enforced  in  the  following  manner  the 
direct  and  unmodified  responsibility  of  the  sinner  for  him- 
self: 

Let  it  be  by  Adam's  fall,  or  how  it  will,  yet  if  you  are  an  enemy 
to  the  infinitely  gloiious  God,  your  Maker,  and  that  voluntarily,  you 
are  infinitely  to  blame,  and  without  excuse;  for  nothing  can  make  it 
right  for  a  creature  to  be  a  voluntary  enemy  to  his  glorious  Creator, 
or  possibly  excuse  such  a  crime.  It  is,  in  its  own  nature,  irinitely 
wrong;  there  is  nothing,  therefore,  to  be  said;  you  stand  guilty  be- 
fore God.  It  is  in  vain  to  make  this  or  any  other  pleas,  so  long  as 
we  are  what  we  are,  not  by  compulsion,  but  voluntarily.  And  it  is  in 
vain  to  pretend  that  we  are  not  voluntary  in  our  corruptions,  when 
they  are  nothing  else  but  the  free,  spontaneous  inclinations  of  our 
own  hearts.  Since  this  is  the  case  every  mouth  will  be  stopped  and 
all  the  world  become  guilty  before  God,  sooner  or  later. ^ 

Like  Edwards,  Bellamy  also  teaches  that  our  natural 
corruption,  though  real,  is  something  privative,  so  that 
God  does  not  bring  us  into  the  world  infected  v/ith  any 
positive  taint.^^ 

3.  Election. — This  is  brought  out  in  the  clearest  terms. 
The  divine  sovereignty  is  exalted  in  connection  with  it. 
God  does  not  elect  this  or  that  man  for  anything  th?c  he 
himself  does,  or  for  any  goodness  that  there  is  in  him.  The 
condition  of  mankmd  is  but  one,  and  that  is  rebellion  and 
opposition  to  the  will  of  their  Maker.  At  times,  in  order 
to  exalt  the  sovere'gnty  of  grace,  expressions  are  used  by 
Bellamy  which  seem  to  imply  that  God  acts  arbitrarily. 

^  Loc.  cit.,  p.  99. 

1^  See  Works,  Vol.  I,  p.  153;  of.  also  pp.  138,  139. 


JOSEPH  BELLAMY 


But  this  is  not  his  meaning.  If  he  says,  "It  is  evident  that 
his  designs  of  mercy  took  their  rise  merely,  absolutely,  and 
entirely  from  himself,"  he  adds  in  the  next  member  of  the 
sentence :  "from  his  own  infinite  benevolence,  from  his 
self-moving  goodness  and  sovereign  grace."  And 
again:  "God  does  not  appear  to  be  a  Being  influenced, 
actuated  and  governed  by  a  groundless,  arbitrary  self-will, 
having  no  regard  to  right  reason,  to  the  moral  fitness  and 
unfitness  oi  things." 

Election  is  thus  taken  out  of  the  realm  of  the  absolutely 
unaccountable,  and  one  of  the  most  serious  objections 
against  it  is  removed.  This  is  the  retroactive  effect  of  the 
Edwardean  theory  of  virtue.  If  right  be  founded,  as  has 
been  so  often  said,  in  the  will  of  God,  then  it  may  be  that 
God  proceeds  in  election  according  to  his  arbitrary  will.  It 
will  then  be  right,  for  that  is  what  right  is.  But  if  right  is 
right  in  the  nature  of  things,  and  God  himself  is  obligated 
to  exercise  love  and  to  act  for  the  welfare  of  being,  then 
not  even  the  interests  of  sovereignty  can  justify  the  use 
of  phrases  which  put  the  divine  action  above  reason.  More 
and  more  was  this  feature  to  be  emphasized  in  New  Eng- 
land theology. 

4.  The  atonement. — Upon  this  topic  Bellamy's  services 
were  epoch-making,  for  he  introduced  to  New  England 
thinking  an  entirely  new  theory  of  the  atonement,  although 
it  was  left  for  another,  his  pupil  Jonathan  Edwards  the 
Younger,  to  propose  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  secure  its  gen- 
eral adoption. 

It  will  be  necessary,  in  order  to  understand  Bellamy's 
work,  to  review  biiefly  the  course  of  an  obscure  rivulet  of 
thought,  the  exis':ence  of  which  has  been  generally  forgot- 
ten.   In  the  year  161 7  Hugo  Grotius,  a  learned  jurist  and 

Ibid.,  p.  249. 
Ibid.,  p.  258. 


114 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


theologian  of  Holland,  published  a  Defence  of  the  Satisfac- 
tion of  Christ,  in  which  he  presented  a  new  theory  of  the 
atonement,  which  has  received  the  name  of  the  "govern- 
mental theory"  because  it  explains  the  atonement  as  a  gov- 
ernmental necessity,  and  transfers  the  central  point  of  the 
theory  by  teaching  that  God  is,  in  this  matter,  not  the  "of- 
fended party,"  but  the  supreme  "Ruler."  This  work  was 
early  known  in  New  England.  William  Pynchon  appar- 
ently referred  to  it.  John  Norton  quotes  it  in  1653. 
Charles  Chauncy  had  evidently  read  it  in  1659.  Baxter, 
who  adopted  the  theory,  and  Samuel  Clarke,  who  improved 
it  somewhat,  were  both  read  in  New  England.  Grotius' 
complete  works  were  in  the  library  of  Yale  College  in  1733- 
It  is  pretty  certain  that  the  younger  Edwards  and  later 
New  England  divines  read  the  Defence.  It  is  quite  prob- 
able that  Bellamy  also  did.^^ 

Grotius'  main  suggestion  must  have  been  a  very  wel- 
come one  to  Bellamy.  As  long  as  the  divine  justice  was 
conceived  as  a  single  unrelated  attribute,  and  theologians 
talked  of  the  necessity  of  the  satisfaction  of  justice  by  the 
sacrifice  of  Christ,  the  position  that  God  acted  as  the  of- 
fended party  was  the  logical  one.  But  as  soon  as  God  is 
conceived  as  acting  always  from  love,  and  his  justice  be- 
comes modified  both  in  what  it  demands  and  in  the  reason 
for  its  infliction  by  this  conception,  then  God  must  act  in 
the  matter  of  punishment  from  general  motives,  dictated 
by  love,  or  he  must  act  as  a  general  person,  and  in  this  case 
as  the  divine  Governor.  Bellamy  immediately  adopted 
this  line  of  thought,  and  put  at  the  very  head  of  his  dis- 
cussion the  term  "moral  Governor  of  the  world"  as  de- 
scriptive of  the  position  of  God  in  the  atonement.    To  this 

^3  A  fuller  account  of  the  historical  setting  of  the  Grotian  theory,  and  of  its 
connection  with  Nev/  England  thought,  has  been  given  by  the  present  writer  in 
his  "Historical  Introduction"  to  his  translatiDn  of  the  Defence  (Andover,  1889). 
In  some  respects  the  present  account  supersedes  the  former. 


JOSEPH  BELLAMY 


he  consistently  adheres.  He  thus  effected  the  transfer  of  the 
center  of  gravity  in  the  New  England  theory  to  this  new- 
point,  and  thus  determined  in  what  path  it  should  move. 
This  may  seem  strong  language,  especially  when  Bellamy's 
inconsistencies  of  expression  are  remembered.  Processor 
Park  claimed  for  him  only  that  he  ''directly  or  indirectly 
suggested  the  Edwardean  theory.^"*  But  he  did  far  more 
than  that.  He  took  the  two  positions  which  rendered  the 
theory  a  necessity  if  they  should  be  firmly  held  and  con- 
sistently applied.  For  his  use  of  the  word  "Governor"  was 
no  mere  verbal  change  in  phraseology.  Turretin  had  em- 
ployed the  term  "Ruler  of  the  Universe"  as  the  appro- 
priate designation  of  God  when  inflicting  punishment;  but 
he  had  never  really  changed  the  determinative  conception 
that  God  was  the  offended  party.  Bellamy,  however,  in 
his  explanation  of  the  term  is  everywhere  governed  by  the 
great  conceptions  of  the  theory  of  virtue,  and  these  compel 
a  real  change  of  position.    Thus  he  says : 

God  does  not  appear  to  be  a  being  influenced,  actuated,  and  gov- 
erned by  a  groundless,  arbitrary  self-will,  having  no  regard  to  right 
reason,  to  the  moral  fitness  and  unfitness  of  things;  nor  does  he  ap- 
pear to  be  a  being  governed  and  actuated  by  a  groundless  fondness 

to  his  creatures  He  considers  the  happiness  and  good  of  his 

creatures,  his  intelligent  creatures,  as  being  what  it  is.  He  sees  what 
it  is  worth,  and  of  how  great  importance  it  is,  and  how  much  to  be 
desired  in  itself,  and  compared  with  other  things :  he  sees  it  to  be 
just  what  it  really  is,  and  has  an  answerable  disposition  of  heart, 
that  is,  is  desirous  of  their  happiness  and  averse  to  their  misery,  in 
an  exact  proportion  to  the  real  nature  of  the  things  in  themselves. 

No  one  familiar  with  Edwards  can  fail  to  see  the  water- 
mark oi  the  master's  theology  here.  Nor  is  this  an  isolated 
passage.  For  pages  the  same  style  of  discussion  is  con- 
tinued. "Yea,  if  it  was  put  to  his  own  case,  if  we  could 
possibly  suppose  such  a  thing,  he  [God]  would  make  it  ap- 

"Introductory  Essay"  to   The  Atonement;    Discourses    and    Treatises,  p. 

xxxix. 

15  Works,  Vol.  I,  pp.  258  f. 


Ii6         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

pear  that  he  does  as  he  zvould  be  done  by,  when  he  punishes 
sinners  to  all  eternity."  "Rewards  and  punishments 
.  .  .  .  are  visible  public  testimonies  borne  by  the  Governor 
of  the  world  to  the  moral  amiableness  of  virtue  on  the  one 
hand  and  to  the  moral  hatefulness  of  vice  on  the  other."^^ 
He  also  many  times  defines  the  atonement  in  terms  like 
the  following,  which  are  a  full  expression  of  the  new  the- 
ory: 

To  the  end  that  a  way  might  be  opened  for  him  to  put  his  de- 
signs of  mercy  in  execution,  consistently  with  himself,  consistently 
with  the  honor  of  his  holiness  and  justice,  law  and  government,  and 
sacred  authority,  something  must  be  done  by  him  in  a  public  manner, 
as  it  were,  in  the  sight  of  all  worlds,  whereby  his  infinite  hatred  of 
sin,  and  unchangeable  resolution  to  punish  it,  might  be  as  effectually 
manifested  as  if  he  had  damned  the  whole  world.^^ 

Bellamy  also  taught  the  doctrine  of  general  atonement. 
The  older  Calvinism  had  taught  that  the  atonement, 
though  sufficient  for  all  men,  was  designed  only  for  the 
elect.  This  position  Bellamy  expressly  denies  again  and 
again.    For  example: 

And  indeed,  was  not  the  door  of  mercy  opened  to  all  indefinitely, 
how  could  God  sincerely  offer  mercy  to  all?  Or  heartily  invite  all? 
Or  justly  blame  those  who  do  not  accept?  Or  righteously  punish 
them  for  neglecting  so  great  salvation? 

Or,  at  greater  length : 

Besides,  if  Christ  died  merely  for  the  elect,  that  is,  to  the  intent 
that  they,  only  upon  believing,  might,  consistently  with  the  divine 
honor,  be  received  to  favor,  then  God  could  not,  consistently  with  his 
justice,  save  any  besides,  if  they  should  believe;  "for  without  shedding 
of  blood,  there  can  be  no  remission."  If  Christ  did  not  design,  by 
his  death,  to  open  a  door  for  all  to  be  saved  conditionally,  that  is 
upon  the  condition  of  faith,  then  there  is  no  such  door  opened;  the 
door  is  not  opened  wider  than  Christ  designed  it  should  be;  there 
is  nothing  more  purchased  by  his  death  than  he  intended;  if  this 
benefit  was  not  intended,  then  it  is  net  procured;  if  it  be  not  pro- 
cured, then  the  non-elect  can  not  any  of  them  be  saved,  consistently 


Loc.  cit.,  p.  259. 
18  Ibid.,  p.  267. 


1'^  Ibid.,  p.  260. 
1"  Ibid.,  p.  294. 


JOSEPH  BELLAMY 


117 


with  divine  justice.  And,  by  consequence  if  this  be  the  case,  then, 
first,  the  non-elect  have  no  right  at  all  to  take  any,  the  least  encour- 
agement from  the  deaih  of  Christ,  or  the  invitations  of  the  gospel,  to 
return  to  God  through  Christ,  in  hopes  of  acceptance;  for  there  are 
no  grounds  of  encouragement  given.  Christ  did  not  die  for  them  in 
any  sense.  It  is  impossible  their  sins  should  be  pardoned  consistently 
with  justice;  as  much  impossible  as  if  there  had  never  been  a 
Savior;  as  if  Christ  had  never  died;  and  so  there  is  no  encourage- 
ment at  all  for  them;  and  therefore  it  would  be  presumption  in  them 
to  take  any;  all  which  is  apparently  contrary  to  the  whole  tenor  of 
the  gospel,  which  everywhere  invites  all,  and  gives  equal  encourage- 
ment to  all. 20 

Thus  Bellamy  laid  down  the  fundamental  positions  of 
that  theory  of  the  atonement  which  was  later  to  be  called 
the  New  England.  He  did  more  than  this;  for  we  shall 
see,  when  we  are  brought  in  the  progress  of  our  history  to 
the  proper  point,  that  he  had  prepared  every  element  for 
the  hand  of  that  man  who  gave  it  its  place  in  the  new 
theology,  who  was,  moreover,  the  pupil  of  Bellamy,  and 
had  probably  derived  his  entire  scheme  from  his  teacher. 
But  of  this  at  the  proper  place. 

5.  Total  depravity. — This  common  position  of  Calvin- 
ism was  firmly  held  by  Bellamy.  No  one  could  state  it 
more  uncompromisingly  than  he  did  in  this  definition: 

The  very  best  religious  performances  of  all  unregenerate  men 
are,  complexly  considered,  sinful,  and  so,  odious  in  the  s'ght  of  God. 
They  may  do  many  things  materially  good,  but  the  principle,  end,  and 
manner  of  them  are  such  as  that,  complexly  considered,  what  they 
do  is  sin  in  the  sight  of  God.^^ 

The  new  element  in  his  view  was  the  reason  which  he  gave 
for  this  position.  This  was  derived  from  the  new  theory 
of  virtue.  Negatively,  all  acts  of  unregenerate  men  were 
sinful  because  they  lacked  the  one  motive  which  alone  could 
make  them  acceptable,  since  they  were  not  performed  from 
love  to  God.  Positively,  they  were  sinful  because  they 
were  performed  from  a  motive  thoroughly  sinful,  the  mo- 


2**  Ihid.,  p.  294. 


^^Ihid.,  p.  156. 


Ii8         HISTORY  OF|NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

tive  of  selfishness.  Bellamy  thus  propounds  the  doctrine, 
which  was  to  become  of  more  importance  in  later  writers, 
that  all  sin  is  selfishness ;  but  he  does  not  go  into  any  proof 
of  it.  The  gain  he  makes  is  simply  in  the  suggestion  that 
it  is  the  life-motive  which  makes  all  the  acts  of  the  sinner 
sinful. 

So  much  for  the  treatise  upon  True  Religion.  We  pass 
now  to  a  new  field  of  theological  effort,  opened  by  Ed- 
wards, in  which  Bellamy  is  the  first  of  the  New  England 
writers  formally  to  labor — that  occupied  by  the  treatise 
upon  the  Permission  of  Sin. 

Like  all  the  rest  of  Bellamy's  work,  this  was  suggested 
by  the  problems  which  press  themselves  upon  a  preacher  of 
repentance.  The  difficulties  which  trouble  the  minds  of  in- 
quirers call  for  an  argumentative  style  of  preaching.  Ed- 
wards had  set  the  example,  for  the  vein  of  argumentative 
defense  of  Christian  truth  runs  everywhere  through  it,  as 
it  does  through  all  strong  preaching.  From  his  MisceU 
laneons  Observations  a  tolerably  comprehensive  system  of 
Christian  evidences  could  be  constructed.  Bellamy  could 
not  fail  to  meet  the  objection  to  the  goodness  of  God  which 
is  constantly  drawn  in  practical  life  from  the  pain  which 
men  suffer.  If  he  answered  this  by  a  reference  to  the  fact 
of  sin,  it  was  only  to  have  the  objection  return  with  all  the 
more  force :  How  could  a  good  God  permit  sin  to  enter  the 
world?  To  the  full  answer  of  this  objection  he  addressed 
himself  in  the  treatise  before  us,  and  thus  began  that  long 
line  of  effort  culminating  in  the  famous  Taylor  contro- 
versies, and  in  the  so-called  New  Haven  theology.  It  was 
issued  in  the  darkest  period  of  the  French  and  Indian  War 
(March,  1758).  "These  sermons  are  the  rather  published 
at  this  season,"  says  Bellamy,  "when  the  state  of  the  world 
and  of  the  church  appears  so  exceedingly  gloomy  and  dark, 
and  still  darker  times  are  by  many  expected,  as  they  are 


JOSEPH  BELLAMY 


119 


calculated  to  give  consolation  to  such  as  fear  the  Lord  and 
are  disposed  to  hearken  to  his  holy  word." 

The  work  is  divided  into  four  discourses.  The  first 
defines  what  is  meant  by  the  permission  of  sin  and  defends 
the  wisdom  of  God  in  permitting  it.  By  God's  permitting 
sin  we  are  not  to  understand  that  he  loves  sin;  nor  that  he 
deprives  the  sinner  of  his  free  will  in  permitting  it.  It 
consists  simply  in  his  not  hindering  it.  He  does  not  permit 
it  in  the  character  of  an  unconcerned  spectator  who  does 
not  care  how  affairs  go,  but  only  because,  all  things  consid- 
ered, he  judges  it  best  not  to  hinder  it.  He  may  at  times 
interfere  to  prevent  individual  sins,  and  when  he  does  so, 
this  is  justifiable,  commendable,  and  praiseworthy,^^  In 
all  this  Bellamy  does  not  pass  beyond  the  Westminster 
Confession. 

Thus  Bellamy  seeks  by  his  earliest  definitions  to  disarm 
the  objection  which  was  commonly  made — that,  upon  the 
Calvinistic  system,  God  foreordains  sin.  His  relation  to 
sin  is  merely  one  of  permission.  Bellamy  thus  appropri- 
ates the  phrase  of  Edwards  in  his  Freedom  of  the  Will. 
We  may  regard  his  treatise  as  the  natural  supplement  to 
Edwards'  somewhat  restricted  remarks.  But  it  is  notice- 
able that,  as  he  writes  the  first  formal  treatise  upon  this 
subject,  so  he  falls  short  of  Edwards  in  the  philosophical 
part  of  the  matter.  The  philosophy  of  motives  is  not  in- 
troduced to  explain  the  method  of  God's  providential  gov- 
ernment. 

Bellamy  then  proceeds  to  justify  the  ways  of  God  in 
thus  permitting  sin.  He  conducts  the  argument  by  means 
of  a  multitude  of  scriptural  examples  in  which  he  shows 
how  God  overrules  the  sin  of  men  to  work  out  in  the  best 
way  possible  his  own  plans.  The  final  result,  for  example, 
of  the  course  of  wickedness  on  the  part,  first  of  Joseph's 


22L0C,  cil.,  Vol.  II,  p.  s. 


^*Ihid.,  p.  9- 


I20 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


brethren,  and  then  of  the  Egyptians  and  especially  Phar- 
aoh, was  to  reveal  the  heart  and  character  of  God  as  it 
could  not  otherwise  have  been  revealed,  to  give  his 
creatures  a  true  specimen  of  themselves,  and  thus  to  ad- 
vance his  own  glory  and  their  good.  For  the  greatest 
thing  we  can  possibly  have  is  an  increased  knowledge  of 
God  and  of  ourselves. 

This  ends  the  first  discourse,  and  here  Bellamy  has 
touched  only  upon  the  problem  of  justifying  the  wisdom 
of  God  in  permitting  sin  when  it  has  once  entered  the 
world.  But  how  shall  his  wisdom  in  permitting  it  to  enter 
be  justified  ?  This  is  the  topic  of  the  second  discourse. 

He  takes  as  his  starting-point  the  position  that  God  in 
creating  the  world  has  chosen  the  best  of  all  possible  plans, 
and  that  this  is,  accordingly,  the  best  possible  world.  He 
says : 

In  the  days  of  eternity,  long  before  the  foundation  of  the  world, 
this  system,  now  in  existence,  and  this  plan,  which  now  takes  place, 
and  all  other  possible  systems,  and  all  other  possible  plans,  more  in 
number  perhaps  than  the  very  sands  of  the  seashore,  all  equally  lay 
open  to  the  divine  view,  and  one  as  easy  to  Almightiness  as  another. 
He  had  his  choice.  He  had  none  to  please  but  himself;  beside  him 
there  was  no  being.  He  had  a  perfectly  good  taste,  and  nothing  to 
bias  his  judgment,  and  was  infinite  in  wisdom:  this  he  chose;  and 
this,  of  all  possible  systems,  therefore,  was  the  best,  infinite  wisdom 
and  perfect  rectitude  being  judges.  H,  therefore,  the  whole  were  as 
absolutely  incomprehensible  by  us  as  it  is  by  children  of  four  years 
old,  yet  we  ought  firmly  to  believe  the  whole  to  be  perfect  in  wisdom, 
glory,  and  beauty.^* 

This  will  remind  every  reader  of  the  optimism  of 
Leibnitz.^^    Every  Christian,  indeed,  must  be  an  optimist. 

2*  Loc.  cit.,  p.  28. 

25  Probably  Bellamy  had  read  Leibnitz.  I  find  a  book,  published  in  England 
after  Leibnitz*  death,  entitled,  A  Collection  of  Papers  Which  Passed  betzveen 
Mr.  Leibnitz  and  Dr.  Clarke,  quoted  by  Stephen  West  in  his  Essay  on  Moral 
Agency  (ist  ed.,  p.  139).  Evidences  of  Malebranche's  influence  appear  in  the 
same  author  and  book  (p.  47).  Edwards,  in  his  Original  Sin,  advances  the  doc- 
trine of  continued  creation.  Evidently,  then  a  decided  influence  from  these 
philosophers  upon  New  England  is  to  be  assumed. 


JOSEPH  BELLAMY 


121 


If  God  is  infinitely  wise  and  good,  he  must  be  able  to  pro- 
duce the  best  possible  world,  and  he  must  have  the  goodness 
and  the  will  to  do  this.  Thus,  says  Bellamy,  "were  there 
no  instance  in  which  we  could  see  the  wisdom  of  God  in 
the  permission  of  sin,"  this  argument  would  alone  convince 
us  that  it  must  be  wise  to  permit  it.  But  we  have  more 
than  this.  God's  ways  are  uniform,  and  what  is  true  of 
particular  parts  of  the  universe  will  be  true  of  all.  If  wis- 
dom is  evident  in  the  particular  parts  which  we  can  behold 
and  estimate,  then  it  will  be  found  in  the  rest  of  the  system, 
though  we  may  not  be  able  to  examine  the  whole.  Now, 
such  wisdom  is  evident  in  limited  portions  and  ranges  of 
experience — as,  for  example,  in  the  history  of  Joseph  and 
Israel  in  Egypt  already  cited.  Therefore,  could  we  but 
examine  more  widely,  we  should  everywhere  find  traces 
of  the  same  wisdom,  till  its  proof  was  complete. 

This  positive  argument  is  strengthened  by  the  answer 
of  objections  which  is  next  presented.  Bellamy  insists 
upon  the  ignorance  of  man.  This  is  so  great  that  our  in- 
ability to  see  the  meaning  of  any  particular  action  or  course 
of  action  cannot  be  employed  as  an  argument  against  the 
wisdom  of  such  action.  Under  the  darkest  circumstances 
perhaps  God  may  have  such  plans  in  view  as  justify  his 
course.  And  with  the  light  shed  upon  the  subject  by  the 
Scriptures  we  have  positive  reason  for  believing  this  in 
spite  of  seeming  difficulties. 

So  far  the  second  discourse.  In  the  third,  Bellamy  ad- 
vances still  nearer  the  heart  of  the  subject.  God,  he  says, 
does  not  act  arbitrarily,  but  upon  good  and  sufficient  rea- 
son. Relying  upon  this  truth,  we  may  advance  with  con- 
fidence in  the  attempt  to  discover  the  reason  of  this  great 
mystery, 

God  acts  reasonably.  What,  now,  in  the  first  place, 
was  exactly  that  which  he  did?    He  erected  a  grand  and 


1 


122         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

noble  theater,  the  world,  fit  to  be  the  scene  of  so  great 
events.  Upon  this  he  placed  man,  a  noble  creature,  an 
intelligent  free  agent,  capable  of  moral  action,  and  a  proper 
subject  of  moral  government.  He  treated  him  with  dis- 
tinguished goodness  in  making  him  capable  of  knowing, 
loving,  and  obeying  God;  and  in  giving  him  all  things 
necessary  for  his  comfort  in  such  abundance.  Man  was  thus 
under  the  highest  obligations  to  love  God,  his  Maker,  and 
to  dedicate  himself  to  his  service.  These  obligations  God 
specially  revealed  to  him,  put  him  under  a  law,  and  told 
him  the  penalty  which  would  be  inflicted  upon  him  in  case 
he  disobeyed.  God  thought  that  he  had  now  done  enough, 
and  that  he  might  reasonably  suspend  the  destiny  of  man 
upon  his  own  action,  without  taking  further  precautions 
for  his  safety.    Man  rebelled,  sinned,  and  fell. 

Now,  here  were  three  designs:  man's  design,  to  gain 
rapid  and  surprising  advance  in  knowledge  and  happiness; 
Satan's  design,  to  thwart  the  purpose  of  God  by  ruining 
man;  and  God's  design,  to  permit  Satan  to  succeed  so  far 
in  his  attempt  as  to  furnish  God  with  an  occasion  to  attain 
more  honor,  to  make  the  holy  part  of  his  creation  more 
humble,  holy,  and  happy,  and  to  defeat  Satan  in  his 
schemes  as  effectually  as  he  did  Pharaoh  when  he  over- 
whelmed him  in  the  Red  Sea.  How  was  God's  design 
justifiable? 

It  belongs  essentially  to  the  nature  of  finite  beings  to  be 
mutable  and  peccable.  Consequently  holiness  can  be  abso- 
lutely maintained  only  when  sin  is  positively  prevented,  or 
when  God  himself  becomes  surety  that  a  given  individual, 
or  number  of  individuals,  shall  not  sin.  He  must  confirm 
such  beings  in  holiness. 

But  innocent,  holy  beings,  though  mutable,  if  they  have 
never  felt  the  least  inclination  to  sin,  do  not  feel  them- 
selves exposed  to  the  danger  of  sin.    Was  it  possible  for 


JOSEPH  BELLAMY 


123 


Peter  to  feel  that  he  was  in  danger  of  denying  his  Lord? 
He  felt  the  greatest  aversion  from  such  a  deed,  and  only 
repeated  experience  of  his  weakness  could  teach  him  the 
possibility  of  such  a  fault. 

Now,  if  God  had  confirmed  these  holy,  mutable  beings 
in  holiness,  so  as  to  prevent  all  apostasy  on  the  part  of  any 
of  them,  although  the  kindness  done  them  would  be  in- 
finitely great,  and  so  perceived  by  God  himself,  they  would 
have  been  in  no  position  to  perceive  God's  goodness,  and  so 
their  knowledge,  both  of  God  and  of  themselves,  would 
have  been  inadequate.  They  were,  therefore,  not  fit  to  be 
confirmed;  and  to  have  confirmed  them  would  have  been 
to  deprive  the  universe  of  a  great  portion  of  its  knowledge 
of  God  and  of  itself,  which  would  have  been  a  great  loss 
to  it.  Hence  it  was  better  not  to  confirm  them  till  their 
need  of  confirmation  was  evident.  But  this  involved  the 
permission,  and  resulted  in  the  actuality,  of  sin. 

The  fourth  discourse  adds  nothing  essential  to  the  argu- 
ment. It  meets  the  principal  objection  to  this  line  of 
thought,  which  is  thus  phrased :  "But  was  there  no  other 
way  in  which  God  could  have  made  angels  and  men  as  holy 
and  happy,  without  the  permission  of  sin?"  The  answer 
is:  "Not  if  there  was  no  other  way  in  which  he  could  so 
fully  reveal  himself.  For  aught  I  or  the  objector  knows, 
this,  of  all  possible  plans,  may  be  the  best  contrived  to  give 
a  full  and  clear  manifestation  of  deity.  And  its  being 
chosen  by  infinite  wisdom  before  all  others,  demonstrates 
that  this  is  actually  the  case."  Thus  Bellamy  closes  the 
argument  where  he  began  it — in  the  assumption  that  this 
is  the  best  possible  world. 

This  doctrine  is  that  which  has  been  condensed  in  the 
phrase,  "sin  a  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good."  The 
greatest  good  involves  the  fullest  possible  knowledge  of 
God.   This  cannot  be  attained  without  the  existence  of  sin. 


124 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Therefore  sin,  because  it  is  necessary  to  a  complete  divine 
self-revelation,  which  is  the  greatest  good,  is  permitted. 
This  is  the  first  position  taken  by  New  England  divinity 
upon  this  theme. 

The  following  year  (1759)  a  reply  to  Bellamy  appeared 
in  the  form  of  a  tract  by  S.  Moody  (anonymously 
printed),  entitled  An  Attempt  to  Point  out  the  Fatal  and 
Pernicious  Consequences  of  the  Rev.  Mr,  Joseph  Bellamy's 
Doctrines  respecting  Moral  Evil.  If  Bellamy's  treatise 
had  been  an  epoch-making  one,  this  reply  was  also  epoch- 
making.  It  was  not  merely  an  evidence  that  every  theo- 
logical proposal  in  New  England  was  sure  to  receive  the 
fullest  and  freest  discussion — itself  a  most  important  fact, 
and  one  promising  that  theological  innovation  should  result 
in  theological  progress ;  but  it  also  revealed  the  fact  that  the 
young  school  of  thought  which  was  now  slowly  coming  to 
the  front  was  but  one  of  the  profoundly  earnest  and  pro- 
gressive movements  of  the  day,  and  that  these  several  move- 
ments, even  when  opposing  each  other,  had  much  in  com- 
mon. If  most  of  them  came  to  naught,  and  if  one  of  them 
took  later  a  wrong  direction  and  cut  itself  off  from  the  line 
of  evangelical  advance,  while  New  England  theology  held 
a  straighter  course  and  came  to  a  sounder  result,  it  was  not 
because  they  did  not  all  feel  the  same  great  influences.  The 
superiority  of  the  one  school  was  in  its  leaders;  and  their 
superiority  consisted  in  their  mingled  conservatism  and 
radicalism.  Underneath  the  whole  seething  surface  of  the 
controversies  lay  the  question  of  human  freedom.  Appar- 
ently the  only  safeguard  just  then  against  an  abuse  of  the 
idea  of  freedom  was  a  restriction  of  the  idea.  Edwards 
had  given  this  restriction;  and  in  his  theory  of  virtue  he 
had  at  the  same  time  given  a  great  impulsive  power  toward 
a  better  view  of  man.  The  co-operation  of  these  two  tend- 
so  See  Dexter,  No.  3380. 


JOSEPH  BELLAMY 


125 


encies  kept  the  Edwardean  school  from  many  a  premature 
position  and  many  an  error. 

Mr.  Moody  objected  against  the  idea  that  "it  is  most  for 
the  glory  of  God  and  the  good  of  the  moral  system  that 
there  should  be  moral  evil."  While  he  conducts  the  dis- 
cussion upon  the  surface  of  the  theme,  and  seems  scarcely 
to-  be  conscious  what  his  fundamental  difference  from  Bel- 
lamy is,  they  really  held  irreconcilable  ideas  of  the  nature  of 
man  and  of  his  freedom.  Moody  could  not  see  anything  but 
evil  in  sin,  and  referred  it  in  its  whole  entirety  to  man,  as  a 
free  agent  acting  in  opposition  to  God.  He  thus  gave  the 
creature  an  independence  before  God  which  Bellamy  was  in 
no  condition  to  admit.  And  when  Bellamy  urged  his  a 
priori  line  of  argument  by  which  God  must  always  do  the 
best,  since  he  was  infinite  and  perfect,  Moody  put  in  the 
reply  of  the  agnostic,  that  such  positions  are  speculative 
and  beyond  our  powers.^^ 

Moody  begins  by  pointing  out  fallacies  in  Bellamy's 
fundamental  principles.  He  has  no  right  to  argue  that 
''because  God  educes  many  happy  consequences  from  moral 
evil  ....  therefore  he  thought  best  that  moral  evil 
should  be  introduced  into  a  system  where  all  were  per- 
fectly holy nor  that  "the  sight  of  the  distress  of  others 
greatly  enhances  our  pleasure  in  this  state :  therefore  a  view 
of  the  misery  of  those  who  fell  made  a  prodigious  increase 
of  the  happiness  of  those  who  continued  innocent  and 
holy;"^^  nor  that  God  "must  necessarily  always  will  and 
do  that  which  is  most  for  his  own  glory."  His  thought 
in  this  last  is  that  "in  no  definite  period  of  time,  in  no  given 
quantity  of  space  can  there  be  a  full  discovery  of  God's 
glories."       He  questions  whether  this  present  scheme  can 


27  Attempt,  p.  4. 
^^Ibid.,  p.  5. 
^»  Ibid.,  p.  6. 


80  Ibid.,  p.  9. 
^'  Ibid.,  p.  12. 
'^Ibid.,  p.  13. 


126 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


be  properly  said  to  be  God's.  To  God  belong  its  "order, 
good,  and  happiness;"  "all  the  sin,  confusion,  and  misery 
to  Satan  and  wicked  men."^^ 

He  next  presents  a  number  of  the  common  objections, 
such  as  that  the  theory  of  Bellamy  makes  God  the  author 
of  sin,  and  sin  a  good,  not  to  be  opposed  or  lamented,  etc. 
And  then  he  presents  the  argument  which  in  N.  W.  Tay- 
lor's hands,  long  afterward,  was  to  be  one  of  the  principal 
arguments  to  destroy  the  idea  that  sin  was  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good;  viz.,  this,  that  if  all  rational 
beings  had  continued  holy  and  perfect,  there  would  have 
resulted  an  amount  of  blessedness  which  would  have  been 
more  to  the  glory  of  God  than  the  present  existing  evil.^^ 
Finally  he  objects  to  the  reasoning  of  Bellamy:  The  pres- 
ent scheme  is  a  fact;  therefore  it  is  best.^^ 

The  meaning  of  the  whole  pamphlet  was,  therefore: 
Bellamy  makes  sin  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good;  to  sustain  this,  he  makes  all  the  steps  necessary, 
leaves  no  place  for  man's  responsible  personal  action,  and 
throws  upon  God's  purpose  an  onus  which  belongs  upon  the 
will  of  man. 

Bellamy  issued  the  following  year  (1760)  a  Vindica- 
tion in  reply.  He  does  not  touch  the  point  really  at  issue, 
nor  advance  anything  essential  to  his  view  of  the  subject, 
and  hence  the  book  need  not  detain  us  long.  He  shows, 
however,  one  of  the  first  qualifications  of  a  controver- 
sialist, when  he  tries  to  find  common  ground  with  his  ad- 
versary, and  specifies  eight  points  in  which  they  agree.^"^ 
The  "grand  point  of  difference"  he  understands  to  be  the 
optimism  of  his  position,  whether  "God's  present  plan  is, 

3^  Loc.  cit.,  p,  15. 

Ibid. J  pp.  20  ff. ;  found  also  in  Butler's  Analogy. 
*^  Ibid.,  p.  25. 

36  lYorks,  Vol.  II.    Quotations  here  from  the  original  edition. 
Vindication,  pp.  s,  6. 


JOSEPH  BELLAMY 


127 


of  all  possible  plans,  the  best."  The  proposition  to 
which  the  book  is  directed  is  that  "God,  who  is  a  being  of 
infinite  wisdom  and  perfect  rectitude,  always  conducts 
agreeably  to  his  own  most  glorious  perfections;"^^  and 
this  he  carries  out  in  a  very  skilful  dialogue,  in  which  he 
puts  aside  the  unnecessary  agnosticism  of  his  opponent. 
The  real  gain  of  this  controversy  was  therefore  the  nega- 
tive result — not  then  fully  understood,  because  the  point  of 
the  whole  had  not  been  brought  out — that  to  defend  the 
freedom  of  man  the  overruling  government  of  God  must 
not  be  so  treated  as  to  reduce  it  to  a  nullity. 

But  the  process  which  was  hereafter  to  distinguish  the 
history  of  New  England  theology  had  begun.  Our  divines, 
who  were  so  absorbed  in  the  practical  labors  of  the  min- 
istry, which  demand  certainty  and  consistency  of  teaching, 
as  constantly  to  overlook  many  of  the  implications  of  their 
own  positions,  were  to  be  gradually  pushed  on  by  their  ad- 
versaries, whom  they  confuted  at  some  points,  but  from 
whom  they  had  to  learn  at  others,  into  greater  and  greater 
modification  of  their  original  system.  The  problems  of 
the  day  were  perceived  by  many  minds;  the  progress  of 
conviction  was  the  same  at  points  apparently  very  diverse; 
the  evolution  of  New  England  theology  was  more  the  work 
of  the  age  than  of  the  leaders  in  whose  works  it  was  grad- 
ually formulated. 

We  pause  here  in  our  review  of  Bellamy to  recur  to 
him  as  to  minor  points  repeatedly  in  connection  with  his 
successors.  It  was  evident  to  his  cotemporaries  that  a  new 
force  had  appeared  in  American  theology,  and  we  can  now 
see  that  it  was  a  new  school.  Upon  central  portions  of  the 
theological  system  a  number  of  valuable  suggestions  are 

38  Ibid.,  p.  7'  Ibid.,  p.  9. 

Another  pungent  treatise  of  Bellamy's  was  his  Blow  at  the  Root  of  the 
Refirued  Antinomianism  of  the  Present  Age,  etc.  (Boston,  1763;  reprinted  at 
New  York,  1812). 


128 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


made,  all  deriving  their  force  from  a  new  theory  of  man, 
as  embraced  in  the  ideas  of  virtue  and  of  freedom,  which 
had  entered  into  the  thinking  of  the  times,  partly  in  conse- 
quence and  partly  in  spite  of  the  labors  of  Edwards;  and  at 
the  central  point  of  all,  in  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement, 
the  theory  is  propounded  which  is  to  constitute  the  princi- 
pal service  of  New  England  theology  to  the  world,  and 
is  adequately  presented  in  its  leading  idea  and  in  the  rea- 
sons for  this.  Above  all,  a  new  air  breathes  through  Bel- 
lamy's writings — the  air  of  freedom ;  and  a  new  intellectual 
disposition  is  everywhere  manifest — the  disposition  to  dis- 
cuss, not  merely  in  order  to  refute,  but  also  to  learn,  and  to 
meet  new  difficulties  by  new  propositions  suited  to  the  day. 
It  is  the  unmistakable  influence  of  Edwards  that  we  see 
here.  The  protagonist  has  passed  through  the  first  great 
struggles  of  a  new  epoch,  and  come  to  a  knowledge  of  him- 
self and  his  work;  his  successor  stands  already  in  the  full 
freedom  of  the  new  position  gained  and  in  the  joyous  con- 
sciousness of  his  powers  addresses  himself  to  the  task  pre- 
scribed by  the  situation.  It  was  with  a  feeling  of  great 
expectation  that  men  looked  forward  to  the  future,  to  its 
struggles  and  to  their  outcome.  And  this  feeling  of  buoy- 
ant hope  long  continued  to  be  the  dominant  feeling  of  the 
New  England  school,  as  it  was  of  the  entire  new  American 
nation. 


CHAPTER  VI 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 

It  was  fortunate  for  the  new  theology  of  New  England 
that  so  rich  a  nature,  with  so  warm  a  heart  and  so  intensely 
practical  interests  as  Bellamy  had,  stood  at  its  fountain- 
head  to  direct  its  course.  The  other  colaborer  with  Ed- 
wards, Hopkins,^  was  naturally  of  a  more  prosaic  and  ex- 
clusively intellectual  turn ;  but  he  too  was  a  pastor,  and  was 
thus  made  constantly  solicitous  for  the  practical  usefulness 
of  every  theological  theory.  He  was,  perhaps,  not  so  large 
a  nature  as  Bellamy,  but  he  was  violently  uprooted  from  his 
retirement  in  the  depths  of  the  western  wilderness  and 
transplanted  to  one  of  the  principal  seaports  of  the  country, 
and  here,  amid  the  opportunities  and  under  the  incitements 
of  a  busier  life,  be  became  involved  in  larger  attempts,  and 
performed  a  larger  service,  than  fell  to  Bellamy's  lot.  His 
theological  service  was  larger,  for  he  gathered  his  theology 
into  the  first  New  England  ^'system;"  but  he  was  also  a  re- 
former, laboring  against  intemperance,  slavery,  secret  so- 
cieties, etc.,  gave  the  impulse  which  finally  brought  into  ex- 
istence the  American  Board  of  Commissioners  for  Foreign 
Missions,  and  engaged  in  large  miscellaneous  literary 
labors,  becoming,  in  particular,  the  editor  of  Edwards' 
literary  remains.  It  is  as  a  portion  of  a  widely  extended 
activity  that  we  are  to  view  those  labors  which  fall  under 
our  present  examination. 

Hopkins'  system  of  theology  was  a  growth  in  his  own 
mind,  and  was  formed  by  prolonged  study,  and  in  constant 

^Samuel  Hopkins,  born  in  Waterbury,  Conn.,  September  17,  1721;  died  in 
Newport,  R.  I.,  December  20,  1803;  entered  Yale  in  1737,  graduating  in  1741; 
studied  theology  for  a  short  time  (eight  months)  with  Edwards;  settled  in  Great 
Barrington,  Mass.,  1743;  dismissed  in  1769;  installed  in  Newport  1770.  Be- 
ginning his  writing  in  i759,  he  published  constantly  during  his  Newport  pastorate, 
closing  with  his  System  of  Doctrines  in  1793,  and  a  volume  of  sermons  (1803?). 

129 


I30         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


contact  with  other  minds.  It  was  presented  in  many  par- 
tial views  in  a  series  of  controversial  writings  beginning 
with  the  very  unpopular  tract,  Sin  through  the  Divine  In- 
terposition an  Advantage  to  the  Universe  (1759).  It  was 
finally  gathered  up  in  one  full  presentation  in  his  System 
of  Doctrines  (1793).  But  meantime  there  had  been  a  long 
and  varied  theological  history,  in  which  many  different 
minds  had  been  engaged,  from  some  of  whom  Hopkins 
took  much.  The  full  understanding  of  his  work  therefore 
requires  that  it  shall  be  divided,  and,  that  after  its  earlier 
portions  have  been  considered,  and  the  foundations  which 
he  laid  have  been  traced,  attention  shall  be  turned  to  the 
controversies  going  on  about  him  and  to  the  work  of  other 
laborers.  Only  thus  shall  we  be  able  to  understand  the 
System  when  it  comes. 

The  title  of  the  first  tract,^  already  mentioned,  was  "so 
shocking  to  many  that  they  would  read  no  further."  Such 
is  Hopkins'  own  account.  But  it  was  a  serious  and  rever- 
ent handling  of  the  great  theme  which  Bellamy  had  dis- 
cussed but  a  little  before — the  permission  of  sin.  Hopkins' 
first  proposition  is  that  sin  is  the  occasion  of  great  good. 
The  case  of  Joseph,  of  Pharaoh,  and  of  the  Savior  are  cited, 
very  much  as  Bellamy  had  cited  them.  Hopkins  also  de- 
clares under  this  head  that  God  could  have  made  intelligent 
creatures  and  kept  them  from  sin  without  destroying  their 
free  agency.  The  second  proposition  is  that  the  result  of 
sin  in  accomplishing  good  is  no  excuse  for  it.  The  argu- 
ment is  chiefly  biblical,  consisting  of  examples  which  illus- 
trate the  vileness  of  sin,  thus  bringing  to  the  heart  and 
conscience  of  the  reader  the  principles  to  which  heart  and 
conscience  must  ever  respond.  Sin  is  not  the  occasion  of 
good  because  of  any  tendency  to  good  in  itself. 

2  Works  (Boston  edition  of  1852,  which  will  be  uniformly  cited  in  the  fol- 
lowing pages),  Vol.  II,  pp.  491  ff. 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


Bellamy  had  uncoinpromisingly  declared,  on  the  basis  of 
the  Leibnitzian  optimism,  that  sin  was  the  necessary  means 
of  the  greatest  good.  Hopkins  was  also  an,  optimist,  and 
may  have  shared  Bellamy's  view.  But  there  are  two  distinct 
interpretations  of  optimism  possible — one  that  there  can  be 
no  world  better  than  the  present,  and  the  other  that  there 
can  be  none  so  good.  Bellamy  takes  the  latter  position; 
but  Hopkins  may  have  taken  the  former.  Though  he  says, 
"God's  greatest  and  most  glorious  work  is  to  bring  good 
out  of  evil  ....  to  make  sin  in  general,  which  is  the 
greatest  evil,  the  means  of  the  greatest  good,"  ^  he  is  else- 
where cautious  to  a  degree  that  implies  some  hesitation 
from  fully  following  Bellamy.  He  says :  "Christ  will  make 
sin  the  occasion  of  so  much  good,  that  the  world  shall  be 
at  least  as  good  a  world  as  if  sin  had  never  been  intro- 
duced." ^  His  last  word  upon  the  theme  is  the  supposition : 
"//  God  saw  that  sin's  entering  into  the  world  would  be  the 
best  means  of  ansv/ering  the  greatest  and  best  ends  .... 
would  be  the  occasion  of  the  greatest  good  ....  a  means 
of  the  world's  becoming  better,  more  excellent  and  glorious 
than  otherzvise  it  zvould  he,"  etc.^  But  he  never  introduces 
the  thought  that  the  revelation  of  God  could  not  be  per- 
fected without  sin,  or  any  other  position  that  must  involve 
Bellamy's  radical  affirmation. 

Hopkins'  next  work  was  his  Inquiry  concerning  the 
Promises  of  the  Gospel  (1765),^  written  in  reply  to  two 
sermons  of  Dr.  Jonathan  Mayhew,'''  pastor  of  the  West 
Church  in  Boston,  which  were  entitled,  Striving  to  Enter 
in  at  the  Strait  Gate  ....  and  the  Connection  of  Salva^ 
tion  Therewith  (1761).  Mayhew  was  entering  a  protest 
against  certain  applications  of  that  same  doctrine  of  inabil- 

8  Ihid.,  p.  503.  ■*  Ihid.,  p.  506. 

^Ihid.,  p.  50.  *Ibid.,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  183. 

'Born  October  8,  1720;  died  in  Boston,  July  9,  1766;  graduated  at  Har- 
vard 1744;  pastor  of  West  Church,  1747-66;  D.D.  (Aberdeen),  1749. 


132         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


ity,  inherent  in  the  ancient  Calvinism,  against  which  New 
England  theology  was  about  to  make  equal  protest.  He 
seems  to  have  come  already  upon  the  ground  of  Edwards 
so  far  as  to  teach  that  the  character  of  God  was  comprised 
in  his  love,  and  to  draw  the  consequences  that  later  gave 
the  New  England  doctrine  of  the  atonement.^  He  had  in 
mind  certain  extreme  statements  of  the  doctrine  of  pre- 
venient  grace,  which  led  men  to  "deny  there  is  any  sort  of 
connection  between  the  most  earnest  endeavors  of  sinners 
and  their  obtaining  eternal  life."  ^  He  was  writing  of  the 
"unregenerate,"  but  it  is  not  quite  certain  that  he  did  not 
mean  by  that  term  the  "unsanctified."  His  terms  are  a 
little  nebulous.  Hopkins  understood  him  to  mean  those 
who  have  not  received  the  new  heart  by  the  special  opera- 
tion of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Whatever  he  meant  at  this  point, 
so  much  is  clear,  that  he  taught  that  one  who  is  ''at  least  a 
speculative  believer  in  the  gospel,"  and  has  "some  sense  of 
his  sin,  guilt,  and  misery,"  has  "his  heart  engaged  in  this 
matter  as  a  thing  of  the  last  importance  to  him,"  earnestly 
prays,  strives  against  sin,  and  intends  to  persevere  "not  for 
a  month,  a  year,  or  any  definite,  given  time,  but  as  long 
as  it  shall  please  God  to  continue  him  in  the  world,"  may 
"strive  to  attain  holiness  and  eternal  life,"  and  that,  "if 
they  strive  in  the  manner  they  may  and  ought  to  do  ...  . 
God  will  certainly  afford  them  all  the  influences  of  his 
Spirit  and  grace  which  are  necessary  to  that  end."  The 
impression  which  the  book  makes  as  a  whole  is  that,  in  re- 
sisting certain  evil  tendencies  of  the  times,  Mayhew  had  un- 
consciously gone  over  into  substantial  Pelagianism,  ascrib- 
ing the  gift  of  converting  grace  to  the  divine  response  to 
efforts  of  the  sinner.^  ^ 

^  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  63  ff.  '-^  Slrivifig  (0  Enter,  etc.,  ip.  82. 

Ibid.,  pp.  11-20.  '^'^  Ibid.,  p.  45. 

Mayhew  is  an  illustration  of  a  fact  elsewhere  noted  in  these  pages,  viz., 
the  general  prevalence  of  the  theological  ferment  of  that  day  in  New  England, 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


133 


Mayhew  accordingly  favors  the  use  of  "means"  by  the 
unregenerate,  and  ascribes  to  them  some  degree  of  ac- 
ceptableness  before  God  for  such  use.  He  does  not  exhort 
them  to  enter  in  at  the  strait  gate,  but  to  strive  to  enter, 
and  the  exhortation  seems  to  Hopkins  to  have  the  force  of 
urging  them  to  strive  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  enter  in 
actually.^  ^  Hopkins  had  had  bitter  experiences  of  the  effect 
of  such  exhortations  in  suppressing  the  Christian  life  in  his 
own  personal  history.  The  book  before  us  was  written  out 
of  an  inner  necessity  of  the  writer's  mind.  It  was  the  first, 
but  not  the  last,  effort  to  strip  such  opinions  of  all  their 
disguises  and  reveal  them  in  themselves  and  in  their  bale- 
ful effects  upon  individual  piety  and  the  prosperity  of  the 
churches. 

The  new  theory  of  virtue  might  have  given  Hopkins 
a  means  of  complete  logical  refutation  of  Mayhew's  views. 
If  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  separate  virtue,  a  single  act 
of  the  will,  which,  without  regard  to  the  great  end  for 
which  man  is  living,  has  a  virtue  in  itself  as  an  individual 
act,  then  there  may  be  a  prayer  pleasing  to  God  which  yet 
falls  short  of  being  a  full  surrender  of  all  the  powers  of 
the  man  to  his  service.  But  the  Edwardean  theory  in- 
sisted first  upon  the  exercise  of  ''love  to  being  in  general," 
or  that  all  things  must  be  done  from  the  supreme  motive 
of  love  to  God,  and  thus  excluded  every  form  of  service 
of  God  which  did  not  involve  this.  Such  was  Hopkins' 
position,  and  he,  no  doubt,  saw  clearly  the  inconsistency 

and  the  common  sharing  of  many  ideas  which  in  the  New  England  school  served 
to  sustain  evangelical  religion,  but  which  with  others  developed  into  Unitarianism. 
Thus  in  Two  Sermons  on  the  Nature,  Extent,  and  Perfection  of  the'  Divine  Good- 
ness (1763)  Mayhew  presents  the  Edwardean  idea  of  the  character  of  God: 
"Perfect  goodness,  love  itself,  is  his  very  essence,  in  a  peculiar  sense;  immeas- 
urable, immutable,  universal,  and  everlasting  love.  And  nothing  that  is  in 
any  manner  or  degree  inconsistent  with  such  love  has  any  place  in  God"  (p.  44). 
And  he  presents  a  thoroughly  Grotian  view  of  the  atonement,  and  identifies  the 
justice  of  God  with  public  justice"   (pp.  63  ff.). 

Of  the  same  general  cast  were  Samuel  Williams'  two  sermons  on  Regenera- 
tion the  Most  Iml>ortant  Concern  (Boston,  1766). 


134         HISTORY  OF  NEWpNGLAND  THEOLOGY 


of  Mayhew's  teachings  with  this  fundamental  idea.  But 
it  is  remarkable  that  he  does  not  conduct  the  argument 
upon  this  basis.  To  have  done  so  would  have  been  to 
prejudice  his  case  before  a  public  which  knew  little  as  yet 
about  the  theory  of  virtue,  which  was,  indeed,  published 
the  same  year  with  Hopkins'  tract  under  his  editorial  super- 
vision (1765). 

The  question  in  dispute  between  Mayhew  and  Hopkins 
turned  upon  the  doctrine  of  total  depravity.  Mayhew 
thought  that  the  unregenerate  might  have  such  desires  and 
strivings  after  holiness  as  were  pleasing  to  God,  though 
they  were  still  unregenerate.  Hopkins  declared  that  if 
they  had  such  acceptable  strivings,  they  were  regenerate; 
and  if  they  were  unregenerate,  they  did  not  have  them. 
"All  must  see,  I  think,  by  this  time,"  says  Hopkins,  "that 
in  order  to  understand  and  settle  the  question  before  us, 
it  must  be  first  determined  what  can  be  justly  predicated 
of  the  doings  of  unregenerate  sinners,  and  that  a  just  solu- 
tion of  this  will  put  an  end  to  the  dispute."  To  the  resolu- 
tion of  this  issue  Hopkins  now  addresses  himself. 

The  expression  "desiring  salvation,"  if  it  means  any- 
thing which  it  should  mean,  must,  according  to  Hopkins, 
involve  the  choice  of  salvation;  and  this  signification,  he 
thinks,  is  contained  in  many  expressions  of  Dr.  Mayhew's, 
Now,  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  prove  that  all  who  come 
with  such  a  desire  will  obtain  salvation,  for  all  the  prom- 
ises of  the  gospel  are  made  to  them.  The  question  is  sim- 
ply whether  the  unregenerate  have  any  such  desires.^* 
This  the  Scriptures  deny  in  such  passages  as  this:  "No 

^*  He  should  have  said  choices.  We  note  here  the  old  ambiguity  between 
"inclination"  as  a  desire  and  as  a  choice,  which  so  vitiated  much  of  Edwards' 
reasoning,  returning  io  plague  this  argument.  Mayhew  could  insist  upon  the 
emotive  side  of  desire,  and  rightly  maintain  that  the  sinner  had  such  a  desire  for 
salvation,  from  which  position  he  could  not  be  driven  out.  Hopkins  was  insist- 
ing upon  its  volitional  side,  and  his  argument  would  have  gathered  both  clearness 
and  power  if  his  phraseology  had  always  made  this  evident. 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


135 


man  can  come  to  me  except  the  Father  which  hath  sent 

me,  draw  him."    This  drawing  is  regeneration,  before 

which  there  is  no^  true  ^'coming."    Says  Hopkins : 

There  must,  therefore,  be  a  distinction  kept  up  between  regenera- 
tion, which  is  the  work  of  God  in  giving  a  new  heart,  and  in  which 
men  are  perfectly  passive,  and  active  conversion,  in  which  men,  being 
regenerated,  turn  from  sin  to  God  in  •  the  exercise  of  repentance 
towards  God  and  faith  towards  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  and  in  con- 
sequence of  which  they  are  pardoned  and  received  to  favor  and  a  title  to 
eternal  life,  and  have  the  gift  of  the  spirit  to  dwell  with  them  forever,  as 
an  abiding  principle  of  life  and  holiness.  All  this,  with  every  benefit 
which  men  receive  by  Christ,  is  promised  to  those  who  believe  or 
heartily  embrace  the  gospel,  and  not  to  regeneration;  for  to  this,  con- 
sidered as  antecedent  to  all  action,  and  only  as  the  foundation  of 
right  exerciser  no  promise  is  made. 

Neither  are  those  influences  by  which  men  are  regenerated  in 
this  sense  meant  by  giving  or  receiving  the  Spirit,  as  the  Spirit  of 
promise,  by  which  believers,  and  they  only,  are  sealed  to  the  day 
of  redemption.  But  men  receive  the  Spirit,  in  this  sense,  as  a  Spirit 
of  adoption,  by  which  all  God's  children  are  led  by  faith,  or  a  hearty 
receiving  Christ  with  all  his  benefits.  (See  John  i.  12.  Gal.  iii.  14,  26. 
Eph.  i.  13.)  They  who  will  not  make  and  understand  this  distinction, 
must  think  and  talk  in  some  measure  unintelligibly  on  this  point. 
This  change,  therefore,  called  regeneration,  by  which  a  new  heart  is 
given,  as  the  foundation  of  all  true  discerning  of  the  things  of  God's 
moral  kingdom,  and  of  all  right  exercises  of  heart;  this  change,  I 
say,  wrought  by  the  Spirit  of  God,  immediately  and  instantaneously, 
and  altogether  imperceptibly  to  the  person  who  is  the  subject  of  it,— 
it  being  impossible  that  he  should  know  what  God  has  done  for  him 
but  by  a  consciousness  of  his  own  views  and  exercises,  which  are  the 
fruit  and  consequence  of  the  divine  operation, — these  views  and  exer- 
cises of  the  regenerate,  in  which  they  turn  from  sin  to  God,  or  em- 
brace the  gospel,  ?re  often  in  Scripture  spoken  of  as  included  in  that 
change  which  is  called  a  being  born  again;  as  all  the  change  which  is 
perceptible,  and  in  which  man  is  active,  consists  in  this.  And  this  is  some- 
times called,  by  divines,  active  conversion,  to  distinguish  it  from  re- 
generation, or  that  change  in  which  men  are  passive.^^ 

Hopkins  here  has  in  view  the  subjective  motive  lead- 
ing to  the  action  of  the  will.  "Things  that  exist  in  the 
view  of  the  mind,"  says  Edwards,  "have  their  strength, 

"  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  23s  f. 


136         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


tendency,  or  advantage  to  move  or  excite  the  will  from 
many  things  pertaining  to  the  nature  and  circumstances 
of  the  thing  viewed,  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  the 
mind  that  views,  and  the  degree  and  manner  of  its  view." 
To  give  this  subjective  condition,  in  the  critical  matter 
of  regeneration,  is  the  act  of  God,  and  before  it  the  will 
never  acts  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  God.  Yet  this 
philosophical  argument  is  never  introduced  by  Hopkins, 
who  no  more  quotes  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  than  he  does 
the  Nature  of  Virtue,  but  advances  other  arguments  more 
readily  accepted  by  his  audience.  For  example,  he  says : 
''That  there  are  no  promises  of  regenerating  grace  made 
to  the  exercises  and  doings  of  the  unregenerate  may  be 
argued  from  passages  of  the  Holy  Scriptures and 
then  proceeds  to  quote  the  requirements  of  the  Scripture 
to  repent  and  believe,  and  not  to  do  anything  short  of  this. 
He  might  have  said :  "This  theory  of  regeneration  puts 
it  in  the  act  of  man,  whereas  it  is  the  sovereign  act  of 
God."  But  he  does  not  use  this  argument;  he  proceeds 
with  his  quotations.  ''To  be  carnally  minded  is  death. 
.  ...  All  unregenerate  persons  are  according  to  this  in  a 
state  of  condemnation  and  death  and  are  in  the  way  to 
eternal  destruction."  And  he  says,  again:  "That  there 
are  no  promises  of  salvation  made  to  the  exercises  and 
doings  of  the  unregenerate  will  be  evident  if  it  be  consid- 
ered that  such  do,  with  their  whole  hearts,  oppose  the 
way  of  salvation  by  Christ  and  reject  the  salvation  offered 
them." 

Now,  that  exercises  of  enmity  against  Christ,  and  opposition  to 
the  gospel,  and  the  salvation  therein  revealed  and  offered,  or  those 
which  are  consistent  with  this,  are  made  the  condition  of  a  title  to,  and 
interest  in,  this  salvation,  so  as  that  all  the  promises  of  the  gospel  are 
made  to  such  exercises  and  acts,  I  presume  none  will  believe. 

If  salvation  is  offered  to  all  who  heartily  desire  it,  really  choose 

1^  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  237  f¥. 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


and  accept  of  it,  and  so  truely  ask  for  it,  it  is  offered  on  terms  low  enough, 
as  low  as  any  can  reasonably  desire;  yea,  on  the  lowest  conceivable  or  even 
possible  terms.  But  no  unregenerate  person  comes  up  to  these  terms. 
Therefore,  salvation  is  not  offered  or  promised  to  any  doings  of  the 
unregenerate. 

But,  now,  if  the  unregenerate  are  not  accepted  of  God 
and  blessed  in  their  prayers  and  in  the  use  of  the  other 
''means  of  grace,"  so  called,  what  is  the  proper  office  of 
the  Word  in  preaching,  of  the  services  of  the  sanctuary, 
of  the  reading  of  the  Bible,  of  pi*ayer,  etc.  ?  In  reply,  Hop- 
kins emphasizes  truth  as  "the  grand  medium  of  grace  and 
salvation,  and,  strictly  speaking,  the  sole  medium."  ^'^  The 
whole  object  of  the  use  of  these  means  by  Christians  is  to 
make  the  truth  come  home  with  greater  power  to  men's 
hearts.  And  unconverted  men  are  themselves  also  to  use 
these  means;  that  is,  they  are  to  seek  every  help  in  gain- 
ing a  larger  knowledge  of  the  things  relating  to  God's 
moral  government  and  kingdom. 

But  if  regeneration  is,  after  all,  God's  work,  what  will 
be  the  benefit  of  this?  Hopkins'  answer  is  that  the  degree 
of  knowledge  thereby  gained,  while  not  a  discernment  of 
the  true  beauty  of  divine  things,  is  the  necessary  condition 
of  such  a  discernment. 

This  [true  discernment]  is  a  kind  of  knowledge  which  is  peculiar 
to  the  regenerate,  the  foundation  of  which  is  laid  in  their  having  a 
new  heart.  The  former  is  necessary  in  order  to  the  latter,  as  it  is 
supposed  and  implied  in  it;  for  there  can  be  no  discerning  of  the 
beauty  of  those  objects  of  which  the  mind  has  no  speculative  idea.^^ 

But,  Still  further,  what  is  the  true  condition  of  the  un- 
regenerate under  the  use  of  these  means?  Are  they  the 
better  or  the  worse  for  them?  Hopkins  answers,  in  en- 
tire consistence  with  the  positions  he  has  taken  previously, 
that  there  is  no  true  holiness  in  such  use  of  means,  but  that. 

Ibid.,  p.  259. 
18  Ibid.,  p.  263. 


138         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

on  the  contrary,  if  the  sinner  continues  to  reject  the  gospel, 
he  does  not  grow 

better,  but  rather  grows  worse,  by  all  the  instruction  and  knowledge 
he  gets  in  the  use  of  means.  And  awakened,  convicted  sinners,  with 
whom  most  means  are  used,  and  who  are  most  atttentive  to  the  con- 
cerns of  their  souls,  and  most  in  earnest  in  the  use  of  means,  are  com- 
monly, if  not  always,  really  more  guilty  and  odious  in  God's  sight, 
than  they  who  are  secure  and  at  ease  in  their  sins.  Their  greater  sin- 
fulness does  not,  indeed,  consist  in  their  concern  about  themselves,  in 
a  sense  of  the  sad,  dangerous  state  they  are  in,  and  in  their  earnestly 
desiring  deliverance  and  safety,  or  in  the  pains  they  take  in  order 
hereto;  but  in  their  continuing  to  hate  God  and  his  law,  and  to  oppose 
and  reject  the  Savior;  even  under  all  their  concern,  exercises,  and  en- 
deavors, and  with  all  the  light  and  conviction  they  have.^^ 

But  if  all  these  efforts  and  all  the  use  of  means  only- 
make  the  sinner  worse  and  worse,  what  is  he  to  do  ?  Shall 
he  continue  to  use  these  ineffective  means?  Yes,  says  Hop- 
kins, they  are  necessary  to  salvation,  inasmuch  as  their 
absence  is  a  fatal  bar  in  the  way  of  salvation. 

God  can,  doubtless,  as  easily  change  the  heart  of  the  most  igno- 
rant, deluded  Mahometan,  or  heathen,  yea,  the  most  blind,  stupid  Hot- 
tentot in  the  world,  as  that  of  the  most  awakened,  enlightened  sin- 
ner under  the  gospel.  But  if  he  should  do  so  by  the  regenerating  in- 
fluences of  his  Spirit,  there  could  be  no  right  and  proper  exercises  of 
Christian  virtue  and  holiness;  because  such  a  one  is  without  any  right 
speculative  knowledge  of  those  truthr,  in  the  view  of  which  alone 
Christian  holiness  is  exercised.  And  giving  a  new  heart,  or  a  right 
taste  and  temper  of  mind,  would  not  remove  this  darkness.  This  only 
prepares  the  mind  to  discern  and  relish  the  beauty  and  sweetness  of 
divine  things,  when  set  before  it  in  the  use  of  means,  but  does  not  give 
any  new  speculative  ideas  or  knowledge.  Therefore,  we  have  no 
reason  to  think  God  ever  does  so.^^ 

Hopkins'  hopes  for  the  heathen  were  not  greater  than 
Luther's,  though  the  rational  ground  of  his  despair  was 
not  precisely  the  same. 

To  sum  up,  then  the  substance  of  this  treatise  in  a  few 
words :  Hopkins  taught  that  the  sinner  is  totally  wicked ;  is 

1^  Loc.  cit.,  p.  264. 
Ibid.,  p.  266. 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


139 


under  immediate  obligations  to  repent;  and  nothing  short 
of  this  is  acceptable  before  God.  He  is  bound  to  use  the 
means  of  enlightenment,  but  in  a  holy  manner,  repenting 
of  his  sins  as  fast  as  he  discovers  them,  casting  himself 
wholly  upon  God,  and  choosing  his  service.  Every  prom- 
ise is  made  to  him  under  such  circumstances,  and  nothing 
less  can  be  or  will  be  accepted  by  God.  But  if  he  refuse 
to  give  God  his  heart,  all  that  he  does  is  wicked,  and  the 
more  he  strives  to  put  something  else  in  the  place  of  this 
simple,  easy,  and  single  duty,  the  more  wicked  he  is.  Such 
is  the  meaning  of  Hopkins;  and  the  positions  he  thus  laid 
down  became  at  once  and  remained  commonplaces  in  the 
New  England  school. 

The  men  who  opposed  Hopkins  so  violently  in  this 
"new  doctrine"  claimed  to  be  good  Calvinists.  It  is  there- 
fore interesting  to  ask  what  were  the  actual  relations  of 
Hopkins'  teaching  tO'  Calvinism,  and  especially  tO'  the 
Westminster  Confession.  The  answer  is  brief.  Hopkins 
was  simply  reaffirming  the  Westminster  doctrine,  in 
almost  the  very  words  of  the  Confession.    We  read: 

Works  done  by  unregenerate  men,  although  for  the  matter  of  them 
they  may  be  things  which  God  commands,  and  of  good  use  both  to 
themselves  and  others,  yet  because  they  proceed  not  from  a  heart 
purified  by  faith,  nor  are  done  in  a  right  manner,  according  to  the 
Word,  nor  to  a  right  end,  the  glory  of  God;  they  are  therefore  sinful 
and  cannot  please  God  or  make  a  man  meet  to  receive  grace  from 
God.  And  yet  their  neglect  of  them  is  more  sinful  and  displeasing 
unto  God.2i 

This  contest  was  the  first  shock  of  the  battle  of  the 
new  divinity  with  conservative  Calvinism.  It  is  natural 
at  the  present  time  to  suppose  that  Edwards'  works  were 
recognized,  when  they  first  appeared,  as  possessing  the  im- 
portance which  was  later  ascribed  to  them,  and  that  his 
coteniporaries  had  the  same  respect  for  him  which  pos- 

21  Westminster  Confession,  chap,  xvi,  §  vii. 


I40         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

terity  has  felt.  But  such  was  not  the  case.  The  contro- 
versies into  which  Hopkins  fell  illustrate  the  prevalent  con- 
dition of  theological  thinking,  and  thus  throw  very  im- 
portant light  upon  the  times;  but  they  were  also  essential 
steps  in  the  contest  which  had  to  be  waged  in  behalf  of 
the  new  opinions  before  these  could  boast  of  the  general 
acceptance  which  they  finally  received,  and  thus  are  indis- 
pensable topics  in  a  genetic  history  of  New  England  the- 
ology. Into  their  details  it  will  therefore  be  necessary 
to  go. 

In  1767  Rev.  Jedidiah  Mills,  of  Ripton,  Conn.,  wrote 
an  Inquiry  concerning  the  State  of  the  Unregenerate  under 
the  Gospel,  etc.^^  This  essay  was  particularly  called  out 
by  the  tenth  section  of  Hopkins'  tract  against  Mayhew,  in 
which  he  dealt  with  the  use  of  means  and  the  condition 
of  the  unregenerate  while  using  them.  Mr.  Mills  did  not 
approve  of  the  position  that  the  unregenerate,  under  con- 
viction of  sin  in  consequence  of  the  application  to  them  of 
the  means  of  grace,  are  more  sinful  than  they  would  be  in 
a  state  of  indifference  and  neglect  of  the  means.^^  This 
seemed  to  him  an  extreme  against  which  he  wished  to  pro- 
test. 

His  own  starting-point  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to  deter- 
mine, for  he  does  not  seem  to  have  been  a  clear  and  in- 
cisive thinker.  He  sometimes  describes  the  "unregenerate" 
man  in  a  way  which  applies  only  to  the  regenerated^  In 
such  passages  "unregenerate"  would  almost  seem  equiv- 
alent to  "unsanctified."  He  implies  that  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  "unregenerate,  as  a  means  among  others,  to  pray  for 
re;^cnerating  grace."  He  speaks  of  them,  though  un- 
regenerate, as  "less  wicked,  and,  in  the  true  sense  of  Scrip- 
ture, in  a  state  brought  nearer  to  the  kingdom  of  God" 


22  New  Haven,  124  pages. 
Ibid.,  p.  7- 


2^  Op.  cit.,  p.  5. 
25  Ibid.,  p.  41. 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


141 


when  awakened  and  convicted.^^  He  does  not  intend  by 
this  to  abandon  the  Calvinistic  system  in  favor  of  the 
Pelagian,  although  he  approaches  the  latter;  he  is  deeply 
interested  in  one  main  thing — in  avoiding  discouraging  im- 
pressions as  to  the  outcome  of  "using  the  means,"  in  order 
that  the  unregenerate  may  not  be  led  to  neglect  them. 

However  vague,  rambling,  and  weak  Hopkins  felt  the 
book  to  be,  as  it  was  in  no  small  degree,  he  saw  in  it  an 
epitome  of  the  objections  with  which  his  work  was  being 
met,  and  proceeded  to  answer  it  at  length.^^  It  is  often 
more  difficult  to  answer  a  vague  and  weak  man  than  one 
strong  and  exact.  With  the  thoroughness  of  Edwards 
himself,  he  set  out  to  demolish  the  adversary  and  all  he 
represented.  It  will  obviously  be  unnecessary  to  follow 
the  controversy  into  all  its  ramifications,  for  we  are  con- 
cerned here  only  with  getting  before  us  the  contributions 
that  came  from  it  to  the  growing  system  of  New  Eng- 
land thought.  But  the  main  positions  of  Hopkins  we  must 
note,  and  they  were  these: 

After  remarking  that  Mr.  Mills  had  "carefully  kept  the 
character  which  I  give  of  the  unregenerate  sinner  under 
true  awakenings  and  convictions  of  conscience  out  of 
view,"  and  had  "done  it  through  his  whole  performance," 
Hopkins  redefines  his  position  in  the  following  paragraph: 

The  unregenerate  sinner,  who  is  under  genuine  and  thorough 
awakenings  and  convictions  of  conscience  respecting  his  own  state  and 
circumstances  and  the  truths  of  the  gospel,  particularly  respecting  this 
truth,  that  salvation  is  freely  offered  to  him  through  a  Mediator, 
which  he  is  obliged  by  the  strongest  ties  of  duty  and  interest  imme- 
diately to  accept  and  embrace,  being  at  the  same  time  wholly  without 
any  excuse  for  his  neglect  in  not  embracing  it,  and  for  the  opposi- 
tion of  his  heart  to  Christ,  of  which  he  is  conscious,  and  who  yet  con- 
tinues, under  all  this  light,  and  contrary  to  the  plain  dictates  and 
pressing,  painful  convictions  of  his  own  conscience,  obstinately  to 

2«  Ibid.,  p.  59. 

27  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  277-497  (large  octavo!). 


142 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


oppose  and  reject  Jesus  Christ;  such  a  one  is,  on  the  account  of  this  his 
impenitence  and  obstinacy  under  this  clear  light  and  conviction  of 
conscience,  more  guil;;y,  vile,  and  odious  in  God's  sight  than  he  was 
before  he  had  this  light  and  conviction  and  was  in  a  state  of  security 
and  ignorance,  whatever  alteration  or  reformation  has  taken  place  in 
him  in  other  respects. 

He  then  goes  into  an  elaborate  discussion  of  "the  true 
state  and  character  of  the  unregenerate  sinner  under  awak- 
enings and  convictions,"  in  which  he  maintains  that  he 
is  "an  enemy  to  God and  that,  "however  distressed 
and  anxious  he  is  about  his  case,  ....  he  is  as  real  and 
as  great  an  enemy  to  the  divine  character  as  ever." 
Then  he  illustrates  as  follows: 

Many  a  profligate  wretch,  who  has  long  indulged  himself  in  un- 
cleanness  and  debauchery,  when  he  has  been  brought  into  such  cir- 
cumstances that  his  wickedness  is  likely  to  be  discovered  so  as  to 
bring  disgrace  and  contempt  upon  him  and  ruin  him  in  all  his  worldly 
interests,  has  been  filled  with  anxiety  and  distress,  so  that  he  could 
find  no  quiet  night  nor  day;  he  has  been  convinced  of  his  folly,  con- 
demned himself,  and  reformed  his  vile  practices,  being  afraid  to  in- 
dulge himself  in  the  least  degree  as  he  had  done,  and  resolved  that 
he  would  carefully  avoid  such  conduct  for  time  to  come,  and  has  used 
unwearied  attempts  to  escape  the  evil  he  feared;  and  in  this  time  of 
his  fear  and  distress  has  made  many  prayers  to  God,  hoping  that  he 
would  interpose  in  his  behalf,  so  that  he  might  escape  the  evil  he 
feared.  But  when  his  fears  were  over  and  nothing  was,  in  his  view, 
in  the  way  of  his  going  into  his  former  practices  without  danger  of 
punishment  or  a  discovery,  he  has  returned  to  them  with  as  much 
delight  and  eagerness  as  ever.  In  this  case  every  one  will  be  sensible 
how  little  in  his  favor  was  his  reformation,  and  that  under  all  his 
fears  and  terrors  and  earnest  endeavors  to  avoid  evil,  his  heart  was 
really  no  better  than  it  was  before,  and  was  as  much  in  love  with 
sin.  This  may  in  some  measure  illustr.  te  the  case  of  the  awakened  sin- 
ner with  respect  to  what  I  have  just  now  been  speaking;  for  there 
is  no  more  virtue  and  goodness  in  fearing  evil  in  the  future  world, 
even  the  punishment  of  hell,  than  worldly  evil ;  and  the  reformation  of 
any  particular  practices  from  such  fear  is  from  no  better  principles 
and  no  more  an  evidence  of  real  opposition  of  heart  to  sin  than  in  the 
instance  just  mentioned.^^ 

28  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  288,  289.        29  ibid.^  p.  292.  Also  ihid,j  p.  292, 

31  Ihid.,  p.  292.  32  iifid.^  pp.  295,  296, 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


"This,"  says  Hopkins  again,  "is  carefully  kept  out  of 
sight"  by  Mr.  Mills;  and— 

he  represents  the  unregenerate  as  not  wholly  to  blame  for  their  un- 
regeneracy,  their  unbelief,  and  not  embracing  the  gospel,  but  as  being 
under  an  impotence  which  does  in  some  measure,  if  not  wholly,  ex- 
cuse. This  representcition  runs  through  his  whole  book,  .  .  .  ,  and  is 
laid  as  the  foundation  of  all  his  opposition  to  me.^^ 

In  other  words,  here  was  again  the  old  paralyzing  doc- 
trine of  inability,  which  was  to  Hopkins  a  "refuge  of 
lies."  3^ 

The  dispute  between  the  parties  gathered,  then,  as  Hop- 
kins says,  "about  the  true  character  of  the  unregenerate 
sinner." 

At  a  later  point  Hopkins  takes  up  the  question  whether 
"the  apathy  of  the  awakened  sinner  is  an  encouragement 
to  the  abandoned  sinner."  He  answers  this  by  a  con- 
sideration of  the  ruling  motive  of  sinners,  which  he  finds 
in  their  selfishness.  He  sketches  the  efforts  of  such  a  sin- 
ner, under  fear  of  hell,  to  secure  salvation;  and  declares 
that,  if  the  sinner  is  convinced  that  "attendance  on  means" 
will  bring  salvation,  he  will  not  be  deterred  by  any  idea 
of  increased  guilt,  for  it  is  not  his  guilt  that  disturbs  him, 
but  his  danger. 

If,  therefore,  he  does  neglect  means,  and  live  in  known  ways  of 
open  sin,  under  a  pretence  that  he  is  afraid  of  that  greater  sin  he  shall 
be  guilty  of  if  he  attends  on  means  and  becomes  a  convinced  sinner, 
it  is  certain  it  is  but  a  pretence,  in  which  there  is  no  truth;  for  if  he 
is  afraid  of  greater  sinfulness,  why  not  of  less;  why  does  he  go  on  in 
known  sin?  If  he  hates  sin  and  hence  sincerely  desires  to  be  delivered 
from  it,  why  does  he  not  leave  off  sinning  and  fly  to  Christ,  the  only 
deliverer? 

Thus  Part  I  of  the  answer.  Upon  this  follows  a  Part 
n,^^  which  is  entitled:    "Wherein  it  is  inquired,  whether 

Ibid.,  p.  300.  Ibid.,  p.  299;  cf.  p.  428. 

35  Ibid.,  p.  303.  36  7j,j(f.^  406  ff. 

5'  Ibid.,  p.  409.  38  Ibid.,  p.  418. 


144         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


God  has  g-iven  any  commands  to  unregenerate  sin- 
ners, which  they  do  truly  comply  with  and  may  per- 
fectly obey  while  unregenerate?"  Hopkins'  line  of  argu- 
ment is  already  familiar  to  us.  He  insists  on  the 
''heart"  or  the  motive,  necessary  to  fulfil  any  command 
of  God's,  and  this  is  that  element  which  only  the  regenerate 
have.  And,  finally,  we  need  only  notice,  near  the  end  of 
his  treatise,  and  after  much  other  discussion,  his  summary 
of  the  evil  tendency  of  Mr.  Mill's  Inqitiry.^^  This  con- 
sists in  his  ''representing  sinners  more  to  blame  for  other 
sins  than  for  the  sin  of  unbelief,"  in  the  tendency  "to  pre* 
vent  sinners  from  coming  to  any  proper,  true,  and  thorough 
conviction  of  their  guilt,"  to  flatter  the  superficially  inter- 
ested, and  to  discourage  "every  sinner  who  has  any  good 
degree  of  true,  genuine  conviction,"  etc.,  etc. 

A  second  antagonist  arose  in  the  person  of  Rev.  Wil- 
liam Hart,  who  wrote  a  small  tract  upon  President  Ed- 
wards' theory  of  virtue.^^ 

Mr.  Hart  had  evidently  been  repelled  by  the  style  of  Ed- 
wards, especially  by  his  excessive  abstractness  and  the  un- 
usual significations  given  to  his  terms,  which  mark  this 
brief  treatise  on  virtue  more  than  any  other  of  Edwards' 
writings.  That  he  had  taken  little  pains  to  penetrate  the 
hard  shell  to  the  kernel  and  come  to  an  understanding  of 
what  Edwards  really  meant  is  equally  evident;  unless,  in- 
deed, we  are  to  suppose  him  too  indefinite  in  his  own 
thinking  to  be  able  to  follow  another  as  logical  as  Ed- 
wards was. 

3^  Loc.  cit.,  p,  419. 
^0  Ibid.,  p.  481- 

The  full  title:  "Remarks  on  President  Edwards'  Dissertations  concerning 
the  Natvtre  of  true  Virtue:  Shewing  that  he  has  given  a  wrong  Idea,  and 
Definition  of  Virtue,  and  is  inconsistent  with  himself.  To  which  is  added  an 
Attempt  to  shew  wherein  true  Virtue  docs  consist.  By  William  Hart,  Pastor  of 
the  first  Church  in  Say-Brook.  Great  men  are  not  always  wise.  Elihu.  Beware 
lest  any  Man  spoil  you  through  philosophy  and  vain  deceit,  after  the  tradition 
of  men,  after  the  rudiments  of  the  world,  and  not  after  Christ.  Paul.  New 
Haven,  etc.,  1771-"  (53  pages.) 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


As  an  illustration  of  his  attitude  we  may  note  the  fol- 
lowing passage: 

Is  true  religious  love  to  God  such  as  Mr.  Edwards  here  repre- 
sents it?  Does  the  virtuous  or  holy  mind  first  entertain  a  benevolent 
affection  for  being  in  general,  abstractly  considered,  simply  as  intelli- 
gent, and  in  the  next  step  direct  this  benevolence  chiefly  to  God,  con- 
sidering him  as  having  the  greatest  share  of  mental  being?  and  thus 
viewing  him  as  most  benevolent  and  beneficent  to  being  simply  con- 
sidered, does  the  benevolent  mind  rise  in  greater  benevolence  to  him, 
and  settle  in  complacence  in  him,  on  this  account,  from  a  sort  of  grati- 
tude to  him,  as  thus  befriending  the  grand  object  of  his  primary  love? 
Does  not  this  represent  being  simply  considered  as  the  supreme 
object  of  virtuous  regard,  and  make  it  an  idol,  and  virtue  itself  idol- 
atrous? Does  it  not  in  effect  represent  love  to  God  as  the  result  of 
our  own  virtuous  love  to  simple  being,  virtue's  idol,  rather  than  of 
his  virtuous  attraction,  and  quickening  love  to  us  while  we  were  sin- 
ners? Do  we  receive  any  such  ideas  from  inspired  teachers  in  holy 
scripture? — These  views  are  too  shocking.*^ 

The  historical  process  by  which  a  man  comes  to  love 
God  is  here  confounded  with  the  logical  relations  of  ideas. 
Being  simply  considered  is  taken  as  if  it  were  a  different 
being  from  God,  in  opposition  to  the  most  express  cautions 
and  explanations  of  Edwards.  The  last  sentence  is  also 
characteristic,  for  the  work  is  pervaded  by  a  kind  of  holy 
indignation,  which  provoked  Hopkins  to  some  sarcasms 
that,  however  deserved,  might  have  been  better  omitted. 

The  argumentative  value  of  the  work  was  not  great, 
for,  though  he  tries  to  catch  Edwards  in  inconsistencies 
with  himself,  he  never  grapples  with  the  true  question  at 
issue  between  them,  which  was  in  fact  the  question  between 
Calvinism  and  Pelagianism.^^   And  when,  in  the  last  chap- 

*2  Remarks,  p.  9. 

*3  Hart  seems,  from  an  extract  from  a  "Letter  to  Dr.  Whitaker"  given  by 
Hopkins  (Works,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  87),  to  have  been,  at  least  half-and-half,  a  Pelagian. 
He  said:  "The  Holy  Spirit  accompanies  this  ministration  of  the  word  of  life  with 
some  degree  of  his  influence,  as  a  common  grace.  If  sinners  improve  this,  and  the 
outward  helps  they  have  by  the  gospel,  as  far  as  they  arc  improvable  by  them, 
I  believe  he  will  crown  his  common  influence  with  special  and  effectual,  leading 
them  on  to  saving  faith,  and  so  regenerate  them."  This  is  Dei  gratiam  secundum 
tnerita  nostra  dari. 


146         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

ter  but  one,  he  attempts  to  state  the  "real  nature  and  es- 
sence of  true  virtue  or  real  holiness,"  he  approaches  very 
near  to  Edwards,  for  he  defines  it  thus:  "It  consists  in 
right  and  equitable  dispositions  and  actions  towards  God 
and  our  fellow  servants." 

Still  another  antagonist  had  to  be  met  in  the  person  of 
Rev.  Moses  Hemmenway,^^  of  Wells,  Mass.,  who  in  1767 
published  Seven  Sermons  on  the  Obligation  and  En- 
couragement of  the  Unregenerate  to  Labour  for  the  Meat 
Which  Endureth  to  Everlasting  Life.  They  seem  to  have 
had  a  purely  practical  purpose — to  increase  the  attend- 
ance upon  the  means  of  grace  by  the  uncoverted — and 
are  by  no  means  marked  by  extremes  of  any  sort.  Under 
the  head  of  "mistaken  ends  of  religious  duties"  he 
guards  against  a  number  of  the  same  misunderstandings 
which  Hopkins  was  laboring  against.  "No  one  is  required 
to  do  anything  to  atone  or  satisfy  for  his  past  offences;" 
"nor  are  these  duties  to  be  required  as  meritorious  of  the 
favour  and  kindness  of  God,  or  as  rendering  us  worthy 
objects  of  his  mercy;"  they  are  not  "a  condition  of  accep- 
tance with  God;"  they  have  not  "a  promise  of  faith,  or  the 
grace  of  regeneration  annexed  to  them;"  and  "the  duties 
or  endeavors  which  God  has  prescribed  to  the  unregenerate 
are  not  prescribed  because  there  is  any  spiritual  goodness 
in  the  performances  of  such  persons."  The  positive  doc- 
trine which  he  is  inculcating  is  summed  up  in  the  follow- 
ing sentences : 

Th^y  ought  to  repent  and  believe  the  gospel  and  obey  all  the 
precepts  therein  contained,  from  a  true  faith  in  God  and  in  his  Son, 
Jesus  Christ  the  redeemer,  from  a  holy  reverence,  love,  and  grati- 
tude, for  the  majesty  and  grace  displayed  in  the  work  of  redemption. 
Bu'!;  they  are  morally  incapable  of  acting  from  such  views  and  ends 
as  these,  till  chey  have  a  spiritual  knowledge  of  the  glory  of  God  in 
Born  at  Framingham,  Mass.,  i735;  graduated  at  Harvard,  i755;  ordained 
pastor  at  Wells,  Mass.,  August  8,  1759;  died  there  August  5,  181 1. 

*s  Op.  cit.,  pp.  39  ft". 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


147 


the  face  of  Jesus  Christ;  yet  they  are  capable  of  performing  the  mat- 
ter of  the  duties  required  from  lower  views,  from  natural  principles, 
and  a  different  kind  of  light  and  influence  from  the  Holy  Spirit.  And 
it  is  their  duty  and  they  have  encouragement  to  do  what  God  has  re- 
quired of  them,  in  such  a  manner  and  for  such  ends  as  these,  how- 
ever defective,  rather  than  not  at  all.  Till  their  hearts  are  divinely 
renewed  and  their  minds  savingly  enlightened,  they  are  to  attend 
upon  the  instituted  means  of  grace  from  a  conviction  of  conscience 
that  God  has  commanded  them  to  do  so,  and  it  is  their  duty  to  obey. 
They  are  to  do  it  from  a  desire  of  further  light  and  instruction,  which 
God  has  directed  them  to  seek  for  in  this  way.  They  are  to  do  it 
from  a  serious  concern,  if  it  may  be,  to  find  rest  to  their  weary  souls, 
to  flee  from  the  wrath  to  come,  and  obtain  reconciliation  with  God.*^ 

When,  now,  Hopkins  put  forth  his  True  State  and  Char- 
acter of  the  Unregenerate  in  reply  to  Mr.  Mills,  Hemmen- 
way  found  himself  as  much  attacked  as  Mr.  Mills.  He 
therefore  issued  (1772)  a  Vindication^  which  will  answer 
the  question  which  will  have  arisen  in  the  mind  of  every 
reader:  how  it  was  that,  when  he  was  so  near  to  Hopkins, 
he  could  not  come  nearer.  That  answer  will  be  given 
by  the  fact  that  he  had  by  no  means  accepted  the  new  Ed- 
wardean  philosophy,  whether  of  the  will  or  of  the  nature 
of  virtue. 

He  could  not,  in  the  first  place,  accept  the  distinction 
which  Edwards  had  made  between  natural  and  moral  abil- 
ity and  inability.^^  He  could  not  understand  what  was 
meant  by  natural  inability  (defined  by  Edwards  as  in- 
ability because  of  ''some  impeding  defect  or  obstacle  that  is 
extrinsic  tO'  the  Will"),  because  he  could  not  get  at  the 
precise  meaning  of  'Svill"  in  such  a  connection.  He  is  not 
ready  to  accept  the  division  of  the  soul  into  faculties;  for 
"some,  who  have  been  no  mean  philosophers,  have  thought 
that  no  real  and  natural  distinction  could  be  made  between 
the  faculties,  habits,  acts,  and  objects  of  the  understand- 
ing and  the  will."    He  mentions  the  threefold,  and  Ed- 

*«  Ibid.,  pp.  58  f. 

Vindication,  pp.  ii  ff. 


148         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

wards'  twofold,  division  of  the  faculties,  but  decides  for 
neither,  and  is  indeed  averse  to  such  discussions,  for  "it  is 
not  surely  fit  that  a  distinction  of  so  much  importance  as 
this,  between  that  inability  which  excuses  and  that  which 
does  not,  should  turn  upon  so  nice  and  abstruse  a  point 
as  whether  the  defect  or  obstacle  lies  in  the  understanding 
or  the  will."  He  notes  the  ambiguity  which  attended 
Edwards'  use  of  the  word  ''inclination,"^^  but  does  not 
press  this  as  he  should. 

When  he  comes  to  state  what  he  himself  understands 
under  the  inability  of  the  unregenerate,  he  distinguishes 
between  the  powers  or  faculties  of  the  soul,  in  respect  to 
which  it  is  "indifferently  capable  of  sin  or  holiness,"  and 
its  "habits,"  which  he  otherwise  terms  "secondary  powers 
of  moral  action,"  and  which  are  "any  principle,  disposi- 
tion, or  propensity  which  is  the  foundation  of  men's  lov- 
ing or  hating  particular  objects,  or  acting  in  a  particular 
manner."  It  is  the  lack  of  such  a  habit  (comparable  to 
skill  in  speaking  a  particular  language), "disposing  them 
tO'  holy  affections  and  actions,"  which  constitutes  the 
inability  of  the  unregenerate. 

It  is  for  the  purpose  of  still  further  clearing  up  this 
topic  that  Hemmenway  now  passes  to  the  nature  of  true 
holiness;  and  here  his  second  great  difference  from  Ed- 
wards appears.  "Holiness,"  he  says,  "consists  in  con- 
formity to  the  preceptive  will  of  God."  He  does  not 
mean  thereby  that  right  and  wrong  are  founded  in  the 
will  of  God.  God  has  commanded  us  to  be  holy  "because 
it  is  right." 

Now,  one  would  expect,  if  there  was  to  be  a  difference 
from  Hopkins  established  here,  that  Hemmenway  should 


Loc.  cit.,  p.  15. 
Ibid.,  p.  22. 
Ibid.,  p.  25 


*»  Ibid.,  pp.  16  ff. 
^1  Ibid.,  p.  23. 
63  Ibid.,  p.  26.  Jljid,^  p.  31. 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


149 


next  declare  that  an  outward  act,  such  as  attendance  upon 
the  pubHc  worship  of  God,  performed  by  an  unregenerate 
person,  might  be  holy,  at  least  in  some  respect,  because  it 
is  *'in  conformity  to  the  preceptive  will  of  God."  Indeed, 
he  does  use  expressions  which  hint  at  this.  He  speaks  of 
an  action  as  *'not  absolutely  holy,  though  in  some  particu- 
lars it  may  be  good."  But  when  he  comes  to  define  the 
"principles  of  holy  obedience,"  they  are  (i)  "a  super- 
natural habit  communicated  in  regeneration,"  (2)  "a  true 
faith  in  God,  in  Christ,"  (3)  "the  special  influence  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  dwelling  within  us,"  (4)  "love,  the  greatest 
of  Christian  graces,  without  which  we  with  all  our  en- 
dowments and  works  are  nothing."  This  falls  very 
little  short  of  being  Edwardean.  But  it  is  not  intended 
to  be  that,  for  a  little  later,  with  explicit  reference  to  Ed- 
wards, Hemmenway  says  of  true  holiness  that  "it  seems 
not  to  be  an  exact  and  just  definition  to  say,  'its  essence 
consists  in  general  benevolence.'  "       He  continues : 

For,  though  it  be  true  that  general  benevolence  is  a  holy  affection, 
yet  holiness  does  not  consist  wholly  in  right  affections.  Not  only 
love  but  good  works  are  required  in  the  divine  command.  Effective 
acts  of  the  soul  are  as  really  of  the  nature  of  holiness  as  immanent 
exercises,  when  they  are  in  themselves,  and  in  their  circumstances 
and  qualifications,  conformable  to  the  will  of  God  And,  be- 
sides, there  is  a  rectitude  of  nature  comformable  to  the  law,  distinct 
from  all  exercises  of  the  soul  whatever.  This  definition  then  ap- 
pears to  be  defective,  narrow,  and  inadequate. 

With  the  true  meaning  of  Edwards  he  does  not,  there- 
fore, grapple.  He  is  both  more  pointed  and  more  suc- 
cessful in  refuting  Hopkins'  statement  that  "the  unregen- 
erate act  wholly  from  self-love." 

The  final  outcome  of  all  his  discussions  is  perhaps  suf- 
ficiently embraced  in  the  following  paragraph  in  the  sec- 

"  Ibid.,  p.  36.  Ibid.,  p.  41. 


Ibid.,  p.  46. 


Ibid.,  pp.  60  ff. 


I50         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

tion  entitled,  "the  unregenerate  able  and  obliged  to  do 
actions  materially  good:'' 

It  has  been  proved  that  the  unregenerate  who  enjoy  gospel  privi- 
leges are  able,  by  the  common  assistance  of  divine  providence  and 
grace,  to  reform  their  lives;  to  break  off  from  courses  and  acts  of 
open  sin  in  opposition  to  the  dictates  of  their  own  conscience;  to  do 
actions  materially  good,  and  that  seriously  and  conscientiously  accord- 
ing to  their  present  light.  They  have  both  faculties  and  principles 
of  action  sufficient  for  these  things.  If  these  things  are  enjoined  upon 
them  by  and  contained  in  those  commands  Vv^hich  God  in  his  word  has 
laid  upon  them,  then  it  is  their  duty  thus  to  reform  their  lives,  and 
attend  the  means  of  grace,  that  is,  something  is  their  duty  which  they 
have  a  power  to  do  before  regeneration.^^ 

A  serious  problem  was  now  presented  to  Hopkins. 
With  Hart's  Remarks  on  President  Edwards*  Dissertation 
and  Hemmenway's  Vindication  before  him,  he  saw  that 
the  true  difficulty  as  to  "unregenerate  doings"  was  the  fail- 
ure to  understand,  or  at  least  to  accept,  the  doctrines  of 
the  will  and  of  virtue  which  the  master  had  set  forth.  He 
determined,  therefore,  in  order  that  he  might  introduce 
these  doctrines  to  the  thinking  of  the  day,  to  reply  to  these 
last  tracts  by  a  new  presentation,  in  his  own  language, 
of  the  theory  of  holiness  which  Edwards  had  originated. 
This  he  did  in  1773,  issuing  his  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  of 
True  Holiness,^^  to  which  were  added  appendices  in  which 
he  paid  detailed  attention  to  his  opponents.  He  confessed 
his  entire  agreement  with  Edwards,  and  our  treatment  of 
the  book  may,  therefore,  be  the  briefer.^^ 

5^  hoc.  cit.,  p.  104. 

Hopkins'  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  1-141. 

«i  Hopkins  had  issued  Edwards'  treatise  upon  virtue  in  1765.  The  same 
year  Thomas  Clap,  president  of  Yale  College,  issued  an  Essay  on  the  Nature  and 
Foundation  of  Moral  Virtue  and  Obligation,  etc.,  for  his  pupils  in  college.  It 
serves  to  show  the  atmosphere  into  which  Edwards'  treatise  was  introduced.  Clap 
made  the  nature  of  virtue  to  be  "conformity  to  the  moral  perfections  of  God" 
(p.  3) ;  or  "it  is  an  imitation  of  God  in  the  moral  perfections  of  his  nature." 
He  paid  particular  attention  to  Cumberland  and  Hutcheson  (pp.  17,  22),  and 
rejected  their  theory  because  it  did  not  provide  for  the  divine  justice  and  truth. 
His  theory  was  essentially  atomistic. 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


The  preface,  however,  contains  a  remark  which  may 
attract  our  attention: 

I  humbly  conceive  there  has  been  too  little  attention  to  the  nature 
of  holiness  among  divines  in  general,  and  that  a  proper  and  intelli- 
gible definition  of  it  ii  not  easily  to  be  found  in  bodies  of  divinity  or 
elsewhere.  And  most  of  those  who  think  it  a  very  easy  matter  to 
tell  what  holiness  is,  and  that  we  are  all  agreed  in  this,  have  been 
contented  with  a  set  of  words  which  express  no  distinct  ideas,  but 
leave  the  thing  wholly  in  the  dark.  They  will  perhaps  say,  God's  holi- 
ness is  his  purity.  If  it  is  asked,  In  what  does  this  purity  consist? 
the  common  answer  h  In  that  which  is  opposite  to  all  sin,  the  greatest 
impurity.^2  We  have  now  got  what,  I  think,  is  the  most  common 
definition  of  holiness.  But  who  is  the  wiser?  This  does  not  help  us 
to  any  idea  of  this  purity,  unless  we  knew  what  sin  is.  But  this  can 
not  be  known  so  long  as  we  know  not  what  holiness  is ;  for  we  do  not 
learn  what  holiness  is  by  first  obtaining  the  idea  of  sin,  but  we  must 
first  know  what  holiness,  or,  which  is  the  same,  what  the  divine  law 
is,  in  order  to  the  knowledge  of  sin.®^ 

The  method  of  Hopkins  in  traversing  the  ground  which 
Edwards  had  so  fully  covered  was  evidently  governed  by 
the  reasons  which  led  him  to  write  the  treatise.  He  does 
not  begin  at  a  point  so  remote  from  the  thinking  of  ordi- 
nary men  as  Edwards  did,  nor  seek  to  ground  his  theory  so 
entirely  in  one  fundamental  principle.  Yet  it  will  be  noted 
that  his  method  is  substantially  the  same.  Thus  he  begins, 
not  with  ideal  harmony  in  the  universe,  nor  with  virtue 
as  beauty,  but  with  a  series  of  plain  statements  as  to  holi- 
ness— that  it  is  reasonable,  as  the  greatest  good  in  the  uni- 
verse, the  highest  possible  excellence,  the  most  perfect  and 
beautiful  union  of  intelligent  beings,  the  same  thing  in  all 
beings,  simple,  etc.    He  then  advances  to  his  proposition, 

^2  It  would  almost  seem  as  if  Hopkins  had  just  been  reading  Vincent's 
Explanation  of  the  Shorter  Catechism,  written  at  least  before  1666,  and  re- 
printed in  this  country  as  late  as  1805.  We  read  in  that  luminous  work,  in 
answer  to  the  question,  "What  is  the  holiness  of  God?"  this  reply:  "The 
holiness  of  God  is  his  essential  property  whereby  he  is  infinitely  pure,  loveth 
and  delighteth  in  his  own  purity  and  in  all  resemblances  of  it  which  any  of 
his  creatures  have;  and  is  perfectly  free  from  all  impurity  and  hateth  it  wher- 
ever he  seeth  it."  In  other  words,  holiness  is — holiness. 
«3  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  6. 


152         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


"Holiness  consists  in  Love,"  which  he  proves  from  the 
Scriptures  exclusively.  Then  follows  the  question,  "What 
is  that  love  in  which  all  true  holiness  consists?"  and  he  de- 
fines it  as  "universal  benevolence,  or  friendly  affection  to 
all  intelligent  beings."  This  is  more  intelligible  than  Ed- 
wards' "love  to  being  in  general."  Then,  after  discussing 
self-love,  Hopkins  goes  over  all  those  particulars  which  he 
laid  down  in  the  opening  section,  and  shows  that  universal, 
"disinterested"  (his  favorite  and  characteristic  term)  be- 
nevolence satisfies  all  those  statements.  After  some  further 
Scripture  proofs,  and  the  brief  discussion  of  objections, 
his  treatise  is  brought  to  an  end. 

But  Hopkins  did  not  suppose  himself  to  be  merely  re- 
stating what  Edwards  had  already  stated.  He  viewed  him- 
self as  having  made  certain  substantial  and  important  "im- 
provements." 

The  chief  of  these  consisted  in  his  statement  of  the 
"opposition  of  holiness  to  self-love."  The  improvement 
does  not  consist  in  any  new  view  of  self-love  in  itself,  for 
the  definition  given  by  the  two  divines  is  substantially  the 
same.  Edwards  says:  "Self-love  ....  signifies  a  man's 
regard  to  his  confined,  private  self,  or  love  to  himself  with 
respect  to  his  private  interest. "•^'^  Hopkins  says:  "It  is  a 
man's  love  of  his  own  self  as  self,  and  of  nothing  else." 
According  to  both,  such  self-love  is  sinful,  for  a  man  must 
love  himself  for  the  same  reason  as  he  loves  other  men,  or 
else,  not  having  the  right  motive  in  it,  such  love  is  not  vir- 
tuous. He  must  love  himself  and  consider  his  own  inter- 
ests as  a  part  of  being  in  general.  Thus  alone  will  he  be 
able  to  subordinate  his  own  good  to  the  good  of  others, 
and  thus  only  to  love  his  neighbor  as  himself,  and  God 
supremely. 

But  Hopkins  deemed  that  he  added  to  the  doctrine  of 

6*  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  119. 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


Edwards  a  valuable  element  when  he  taught  that  "all  sin 
consists  in  self-love  and  what  is  implied  in  this."^^  We  have 
already  considered  Edwards'  definition  of  sin.  Sin,  ac- 
cording to  him,  is  any  other  elective  preference  than  that 
of  the  good  of  being  in  general.  The  whole  treatise  is  in 
accordance  with  this  idea,  and  gives  no  indication  of  Hop- 
kins' new  position.  Edwards'  chapter  in  the  Nature  of 
Virtue  upon  self-love  is  engaged  in  showing  how  many 
supposed  virtues  may  flow  from  nothing  but  self-love,  and 
so  have  no  really  virtuous  character,  however  amiable  they 
may  appear.  Hopkins  does  not  stop  with  this  plain  propo- 
sition that  all  selfishness  is  sin,  but  converts  it  and  maintains 
that  all  sin  is  selfishness. 

There  is  something  attractive  about  the  proposition  to 
reduce  sin  to  one  principle,  as  virtue  may  be  reduced  to 
one;  for  there  is  a  certain  symmetry  thereby  introduced 
into  ethics.  But  it  is  doubtful  if  sin  is  a  very  symmetrical 
thing.  Hopkins  has  probably  presented  this  matter  as 
strongly  as  any  of  his  successors,  many  of  whom  adopted 
his  view.  But  he  does  not  prove  his  case.  His  arguments 
may  be  briefly  summarized  thus : 

1.  "Self-love  is  in  its  whole  nature  and  in  every  degree 
of  it,  enmity  against  God."  True;  but  this  is  only  to  say: 
"All  selfishness  is  sin." 

2.  "Self-love,  exercised  and  indulged,  blinds  the  heart 
to  every  true  moral  excellence  and  beauty:  this  does  not 
suit  the  taste  of  the  selfish  heart  but  gives  it  disgust."  In 
other  words,  selfishness  is  injurious;  but  it  does  not  show 
that  every  injury  of  the  kind  arises  from  selfishness. 

3.  Self-love  is  the  source  of  all  the  profaneness  and  im^ 
piety  in  the  world."  This  is  not  proved.  Is  there  not 
some  impiety  which  develops  from  another  root  than  sel- 
fishness ? 

*5  Hopkins'  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  29.  The  same  doctrine  was  maintained  by 
Dr.  Samuel  Spring.    See  Disquisitions,  pp.  16  f. 


154         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


4.  A  final  argument  is  rather  implied  than  stated  by 
Hopkins,  It  may  be  put  in  modern  phrase  thus :  The  op- 
position between  holiness  and  selfishness  is  that  between  a 
wholly  disinterested  affection  and  a  wholly  interested  affec- 
tion. As  the  disinterested  affection  comprises  the  whole  of 
holiness,  so  the  interested  affection  comprises  the  whole  of 
sin.  This  is  as  strong  a  statement  of  the  argument  as  can 
be  made;  but  it  derives  its  whole  force  from  the  idea  of 
symmetry  above  alluded  to,  and  that  force  falls  short  of 
proof.  The  rest  of  the  argument  is  conspicuously  falla- 
cious. It  is  the  simple  conversion  of  the  universal  affirm- 
ative proposition  without  limitation.  It  is  as  absurd  as  to 
maintain  that  all  white  men  are  Englishmen,  because  all 
Englishmen  are  white. 

Another  particular  in  which  Hopkins  attempted  to  im- 
prove upon  Edwards  was  in  the  answer  to  objections.  The 
most  important  of  these  at  the  present  day,  and  the  most 
plausible  in  itself,  was  that  which  appealed  to  the  biblical 
use  of  rewards  to  induce  men  to  repent.  They  suppose 
that  men  have  self-love,  and  that  it  is  proper  to  be  in- 
fluenced by  this.  But  if  so,  it  cannot  be  sinful.  Hopkins 
makes  short  work  with  this.  They  are,  after  all,  not  ad- 
dressed to  self-love,  because  they  are  rewards  of  a  character 
which  will  never  appeal  to  a  selfish  man;  and  the  evils 
which  the  Bible  uses  as  threats  are  such  as  a  selfish  man 
will  dread,  but  also  such  as  will  lead  him  to  forsake  his  sel- 
fishness with  his  sin. 

The  honor  which  the  proud  man  seeks  is  not  the  same  which 
Christ  promises  to  him  who  humbleth  himself,  but  entirely  of  a  differ- 
ent nature  and  contrary  to  it.  A  person  who  humbles  himself  re- 
nounces that  self-exaltation  and  honor  in  comparison  with  other  beings 
which  pride  and  selfishness  seek,  and  places  his  honor  and  happiness  in 
abasing  himself  and  becoming  the  servant  of  all,  by  exalting  God  and 
promoting  his  glory,  and  serving  his  fellow  creatures,  ministering  to 
their  greatest  good  in  the  exercise  of  universal  benevolence;  and  so 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


155 


obtains  true  exaltation  and  honor  which  is  most  contrary  to  selfish- 
ness and  pride.6*^ 

Hopkins  thus  brought  out  more  clearly  than  Edwards 
had  done  the  absolute  inconsistency  of  selfishness  with  re- 
ligion. He  recognized  how  largely  the  religion  of  some 
men  consists  in  selfishness  and  lacks  the  elements  of  true 
religion.  Much  preaching  consisted  of  little  else  but  ap- 
peals to  selfishness,  thus  attempting  to  build  up  the  people 
in  holiness  by  fostering  the  very  principle  in  which  Hop- 
kins saw  the  essence  of  all  sin.  Accordingly,  in  his  "in- 
ferences," he  attacked  the  same  point  again,  and  here  ad- 
vanced the  doctrine  which,  probably  more  than  any  other 
feature  of  his  teaching,  excited  the  opposition  of  his  critics 
and  reflected  discredit  in  their  eyes  upon  its  author,  viz., 
the  doctrine  that  a  man,  in  order  to  be  saved,  must  be  will- 
ing to  be  damned.^^ 

This  doctrine  comes  in  under  the  second  inference,  as 
to  the  nature  of  true  self-denial.  The  question  is  sug- 
gested whether  persons  are  to  give  up  their  eternal  interest 
in  self-denial  so  as  not  to  have  a  selfish  regard  to  this  in 
their  religious  exercises.  The  answer  is  sufficiently  stren- 
uous : 

Whatever  temporal  good  any  one  gives  up  for  the  sake  of  his  own 
eternal  interest,  and  wholly  from  selflove,  he  is,  by  the  supposition, 
as  selfish  in  this  as  he  can  be  in  anything  whatsoever;  and  there- 
fore there  is  no  selfdenial  in  it,  if  selfdenial  is  acting  contrary  to 
self  or  denying  ourselves.  So  that  he  who  does  not  know  how  to 
deny  himself  with  respect  to  his  eternal  interest,  is  really  a  stranger 

to  selfdenial  But  let  it  be  kept  in  mind  that   in  the  practice 

of  the  greatest  selfdenial  a  person  does  not  divest  himself  of  a  love 
of  happiness ;  .  .  .  .  but  he  places  his  happiness,  not  in  his  own  private 
interest,  but  in  a  good  more  worthy  to  be  sought,  viz.,  the  glory  of 
God,  and  the  prosperity  of  his  church  and  kingdom.  For  the  sake  of 
this  he  gives  up  the  former  and  forgets  himself.^^^ 

Or,  as  he  says  a  little  below,  we  are  to  love  God  "with- 


•«  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  54. 
^8  Ibid.,  p.  59. 


^7  Ibid.,  p.  59. 


156         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

out  making  any  conditions  in  regard  to  ourselves."  The 
further  question  is  then  asked:  "How  can  our  eternal  in- 
terest be  inconsistent  with  the  greatest  display  of  God's 
glory,  and  the  highest  interests  of  his  kingdom?"  And 
the  answer  is : 

If  we  know  that  we  are  true  Christians,  we  may  be  sure  that  it  is 
for  the  glory  of  Grod  and  good  of  the  whole  that  we  should  be 
eternally  happy  in  his  kingdom.  But  even  in  this  case  we  are  capable 
of  making  the  supposition  that  it  v/ould  not  be  so;  and,  on  this  sup- 
position, we  shall  be  disposed  to  give  up  all  our  personal  interest,  so 
far  as  we  are  in  the  exercise  of  disinterested  affection  and  willing  to 
deny  ourselves.  But  if  we  do  not  know  that  we  have  embraced  the 
gospel,  we  cannot  be  sure  that  it  is,  on  the  whole,  most  for  the 
honor  of  God  and  the  glory  and  happiness  of  his  kingdom  that  our 
eternal  happiness  should  be  secured;  so  we  have  opportunity  to  try 
how  we  shall  feel  and  be  disposed  on  such  a  supposition. '^^ 

This  doctrine  excited  so  much  opposition  that  Hopkins 
thought  it  best  to  defend  it  in  a  special  tract,  which  he  en- 
titled A  Dialogue  betzireen  a  Calvinist  and  a  Semi-Calvin- 
ist  — which,  by  the  way,  shows  his  idea  of  his  own  thor- 
ough-going Calvinism.  He  reiterates  the  doctrine  that  if 
being  cast  off  by  God  is  necessary  in  order  to  secure  a 
greater  good  than  his  own  salvation,  the  Christian  ought 
to  be  willing  thus  to  be  cast  off.  It  is  a  very  large  if;  as 
Hopkins  repeatedly  says,  "a  supposition,"  an  ^'impossible 
supposition;""^^  but  it  is  a  supposition  which  it  is  well  to 
make  in  order  "to  show  that  there  may  be  a  greater  evil 
than  the  damnation  of  one  individual." 

The  objections  to  his  view  which  Hopkins  answers  in 
this  tract  show  his  estimate  of  the  importance  of  the  idea. 
One  of  them  is  "that  it  would  be  wicked :  for  we  are  com- 

This  was  not  a  new  position  for  the  young  New  England  school.  Bellamy- 
had  already  copiously  defended  it  in  a  tract,  Remarks  on  the  Rev,  Mr.  Cros- 
well's  Letter  to  the  Rev.  Mr.  Cuniming  (Boston,  1763),  PP-  36-  See  Dexter,  nos. 
3437.  3445,  3452. 

'0  Loc.  cit.,  p.  61. 

'1  Ibid.,  pp.  143  ff.  A  posthumous  work. 
72  Ibid.,  p.  144. 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


157 


manded  to  do  that  which  is  directly  contrary  to  this,  viz., 
to  desire  and  to  seek  to  escape  damnation  and  to  be  saved." 
The  reply  is  that  by  being  willing  to  be  damned  is  not  meant 
being  pleased  with  it,  or  desiring  and  choosing  it  for  its 
own  sake,  but  only  being  willing  if  it  be  necessary  to  secure 
some  greater  good.  Another  objection  is:  ''It  is  impos- 
sible that  a  man  should  be  willing  to  give  up  all  good  and 
to  be  miserable  forever  for  the  sake  of  the  good  of  others, 
be  it  ever  so  great."  The  answer  is  that  it  is  not  impos- 
sible, for  it  is  reasonable,  and  men,  like  St.  Paul  who  was 
willing  to  be  accursed  from  Christ  for  his  brethren's  sake, 
have  actually  been  thus  willing.  A  third  objection  is: 
''We  ought  to  make  the  glory  of  God  our  supreme  end; 
but  this  will  be  so  far  from  making  us  willing  to  be  damned 
that  it  will  lead  us  to  desire  and  pursue  our  salvation,  that 
he  may  be  glorified  in  that  and  that  we  may  glorify  him 
forever."  The  reply  rests  upon  the  doctrine  advanced  in 
the  sermons  upon  the  permission  of  sin,  that  the  damnation 
of  unrepentant  sinners  is  for  the  glory  of  God.    It  runs : 

But  it  is  not  for  the  glory  of  God  that  all  should  be  saved,  but 
most  for  his  glory  that  a  number  should  be  damned;  otherwise  all 
would  be  saved.  We  will,  therefore,  now  make  a  supposition,  which 
is  not  an  impossible  one,  viz.,  that  it  is  most  for  God's  glory  and  for 
the  universal  good  that  you  should  be  damned;  ought  you  not  to  be 
willing  to  be  damned  on  this  supposition,  that  God  could  not  be 
glorified  by  you  in  any  other  way?"^^ 

The  objector  now  takes  another  position:  "But  sup- 
pose he  knows  he  loves  God,  and  therefore  knows  that  it 
is  for  the  glory  of  God  that  he  should  be  saved  ?"  To  which 
Hopkins : 

No  man  can  know  that  he  loves  God  until  he  really  does  love  him; 
that  is  until  he  does  seek  his  glory  above  all  things,  and  is  disposed 
to  say,  "Let  God  be  glorified  whatever  may  be  necessary  in  order  to 
it,"  without  making  any  exception.  And  this  is  to  be  willing  to  be 
damned,  if  this  be  necessary  for  the  glory  of  God."^* 


''•^  Ibid.,  p.  147. 


Ibid.,  p.  148. 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


And  finally  the  objector  says  that  this  is  a  puzzling  doc- 
trine, tending  to  perplex  and  discourage  Christians,  and 
should  therefore  be  avoided.  Hopkins  replies  that  it  may 
puzzle  half-hearted  Christians,  or  true  Christians  who  have 
never  considered  these  matters,  but  it  will  powerfully  tend 
to  expose  the  weakness  and  wickedness  of  the  former  when 
understood,  and  will  confirm  the  latter  and  establish  them. 
And  hence  it  is  a  doctrine  exceedingly  important  to  strip 
false  professors  of  all  disguises  and  bring  them  really  to 
Christ. 

The  intensely  earnest  and  radical  spirit  of  Hopkinsian- 
ism  appears  here  more  clearly,  perhaps,  than  anywhere  else. 
What  will  such  a  spirit  effect  in  the  development  of  a  new 
theology?    We  are  to  see  what  it  did  effect. 

But  to  return  from  this  digression  to  the  treatise  upon 
holiness.  The  first  appendix  is  taken  up  with  a  more  de- 
tailed answer  to  Hart's  Remarks,  which  have  already  been 
summarized.  The  book  would  seem  to  have  required  little 
reply  in  any  case,  and  to  have  received  all  it  needed  in  the 
exhaustive  discussions  which  Hopkins  had  just  finished 
in  the  body  of  his  new  presentation  of  the  theory  of  virtue. 
But  it  was  a  critical  moment  in  the  fortunes  of  the  new 
theology;  and  Hopkins  felt  called  upon,  as  Edwards  had 
before  him,  to  pulverize  all  opposition.  He  therefore 
seized  upon  every  weak  point  and  exposed  every  incon- 
sistency in  his  adversary.  Three  special  points  needed  a 
more  substantial  consideration  :  Hart's  objections  to  Ed- 
wards' ''being  simply  considered,"  his  confusion  as  to  the 
meaning  of  Edwards'  "secondary  beauty,"  and  his  own 
attempts  to  state  the  nature  of  true  virtue.  His  reply  to 
the  first  of  these  we  miay  summarize  in  the  phrase  that  by 
such  expressions  as  ''being  simply  considered,"  being  "in 
general,"  etc.,  Edwards  meant  being  as  such,  or  for  its 
own  sake.    We  are  commanded  to  love  God  for  his  own 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


sake,  for  what  he  is  in  himself.   The  answer  to  the  second 

was  as  follows: 

Mr.  Edwards  observes  there  are  two  kinds  of  beauty.  One  is 
moral  beauty,  or  the  beauty  of  true  virtue  or  holiness,  which  is  the 
highest  kind  of  beauty,  and  consists  in  cordial  agreement  and  harmony, 
or  general  benevolence,  and  is  discerned  and  approved  of  by  such  only 
who  love  true  holiness,  which  love  is  itself  the  exercise  of  holiness. 
The  other  is  natural  beauty,  which  consists  in  natural  harmony  or 
agreement,  and  takes  place  in  the  natural  and  material  world  in  num- 
berless instances.  And  this  same  kind  of  beauty  is  found  in  things  im- 
material and  mental,  as  well  as  in  other  things,  and  there  is  a  natural 
beauty  in  virtuous  exercises  of  the  mind,  and  the  fruit  of  those  exer- 
cises, which  is  entirely  distinct  from  the  moral,  holy  beauty,  and  of 
a  different  nature;  even  the  same  kind  of  beauty  which  is  found  in 
the  material  world.  ....  This  natural  beauty  is  found  ....  especially 
in  relative  duties  between  man  and  man,  according  to  their  different 
stations  and  relations,  which  may  be  relished  and  delighted  in  by  those 
who  have  no  virtue,  as  a  taste  for  this  natural  beauty  is  natural  to  all  men, 
and  does  not  emply  disinterested  benevolence,  but  is  consistent  with  the 
highest  degree  of  selfishness  and  sin.'s 

As  to  the  last  point,  Hopkins  declared  that  Hart  really 

agreed  with  Edwards : 

Thus  we  see  Mr.  H.  represents  his  equitable  affection  as  a  friendly 
love,  which  is  really  universal  benevolence,  which  is  love  to  being  in 
general.  And  he  says,  "This  spirit  of  equitable,  friendly  regard  will 
dispo:e  the  virtuous  m/:id  to  behave  to  every  one  in  a  manner  suit- 
able to  their  various  ch.iracters,  offices,  and  relations."  This  "friendly 
regard"  is  benevolence  and  nothing  else;  and  it  must  be  universal 
benevolence  if  it  will  dispose  to  behave  to  every  one  in  a  suitable 
manner.  And  th's  must  be  true  virtue  in  its  essential  nature,  and 
comprehend  the  whole  of  holiness,  as  this  will  lead  to  all  right  exer- 
ci:.es  and  conduct  towards  every  one.'^^ 

The  third  appendix  took  up  in  like  manner  Mr.  Hem- 
menway's  Vindication.  It  does  not  attempt  to  go  to  the 
bottom  of  Hemmenway's  differences,  for  this  has  already 
been  done  in  the  body  of  the  work.  If  he  could  be  brought 
to  accept  the  Edwardean  doctrine,  he  would  relinquish 

Loc.  cit.,  p.  74. 
''o  Ihid.,  p.  95. 
Ihid.,  pp.  109  f. 


i6o         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

his  minor  errors  of  himself.  But  Hopkins  did  not  excuse 
himself  for  this  reason  from  a  more  detailed  consideration 
of  these  minor  errors.  He  attempted  to  show  how  they  all 
rested  upon  confusion  of  thought.  Hemmenway's  "act  of 
the  will  ab  extra/'  considered  without  reference  to  its  mo- 
tive and  in  this  aspect  possessing  something  of  an  accept- 
able quality  before  God,  Hopkins  declared  to  be  incon- 
ceivable, because,  if  you  abstract  from  the  motive,  the  act 
is  not  moral  at  all,  and  so  does  not  enter  into  the  consid- 
eration. But  he  does  not  pause  here;  he  pushes  Hemmen- 
way  to  the  wall,  after  the  manner  of  this  school  of  terrible 
dialecticians,  by  showing  that  Hemmenway  has  really 
acknowledged  as  much  by  what  he  said  of  Judas,  when  he 
said  it  was  not  "matter  of  duty"  but  "vile  treachery,  in 
Judas,  to  kiss  his  Lord  in  order  to  betray  him."  Hopkins 
disposes  of  the  supposition  in  one  sentence:  "If  matter  of 
duty  was  the  effective  act  of  the  will  abstracted  from  all 
circumstances,  then  Judas  did  the  matter  of  duty  as  much 
as  any  one  can."  '^^  He  also  brings  out  Hemmenway's  in- 
consistency in  still  another  position,  in  supposing  that  acts 
of  duty  may  be  done  from  self-love,  an  innocent  principle, 
and  so  be  externally  right.  In  discussing  inability  '^^  a 
more  fundamental  question  was  touched  upon,  and  Hop- 
kins pushed  Hemmenway  hard  when  he  urged  the  ques- 
tion how  a  "natural  inability"  could  be  maintained  which 
did  not  excuse  the  sinner.  The  advantage  here  was  di- 
vided between  the  contestants,  for  Hemmenway  was  right 
in  affirming  that  Edwards'  moral  inability  was  really  a 
natural  inability,  and  Hopkins  was  right  in  emphasizing, 
upon  the  basis  of  the  new  theory  which  was  beginning  to 
emerge  in  his  own  mind,  that  the  sinner  was  subjected  to 
no  real  natural  inability.  In  one  sentence  Hopkins  planted 
himself  entirely  upon  the  "exercise"  platform,  when  he  said 

'8  Loc.  cit..  p.  III.  ''*  Ibid.,  p.  132. 


SAMUEL  HOPKINS 


i6i 


that  Hemmenway  ought  to  "have  offered  some  proof"  that 
there  is  "a  holy  principle,  distinct  from  all  exercise  of  the 
heart,  necessary  in  order  to  all  holy  acts  of  the  will." 

These  were  the  principal  controversies  in  which  Hop- 
kins engaged.  Other  controversial  writings  of  a  minor 
character  will  be  noticed  in  their  appropriate  connections: 
Those  we  have  just  reviewed  led  him  to  a  more  precise 
formulation  of  his  thought,  and  developed  him  as  a  con- 
structive theologian,  as  well  as  gave  him  fame  and  in- 
fluence throughout  New  England.  He  has  thus  proved 
his  power  and  given  sample  of  his  work.  Will  he  do  still 
more,  and  will  he  inscribe  his  name  among  the  great  sys- 
tematic divines  of  the  world?  The  next  chapter  must 
show. 

Ibid.,  p.  134. 


CHAPTER  VII 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY 

The  progress  of  our  history  has  brought  us  to  the  last 
decade  of  the  eighteenth  century.  From  the  moment  that 
Edwards  began  to  exert  his  mighty  personal  influence,  we 
have  found  New  England  seething  with  thought.  Even 
the  distractions  of  war  have  not  been  able  to  put  a  stop 
to  theolrgical  reconstruction.  The  new  school  has  been 
marked  by  great  independence  and  originality,  by  great 
force  and  logical  power.  It  has  engaged  in  controversy  in 
various  directions,  and  has  passed  over  a  wide  field  of  in- 
vestigation and  discussion;  but  its  results  have  been  some- 
what miscellaneous  and  unsystematic.  The  time  has  now 
come  for  summing  up  what  has  been  gained,  and  for  pre- 
senting the  system  of  theology,  which  Willard  had  last 
drawn  out  (1707)  in  entire  conformity  with  Westminster, 
with  the  modifications  which  the  study  of  three-quarters 
of  a  century  had  produced.  This  work  fell  to  the  lot  of 
Samuel  Hopkins,  who  published  his  System  of  Doctrines 
in  1793.^ 

While  the  situation  of  our  divines  in  the  small  and  re- 
tired hamlets  of  a  new  country  prevented  them  from  being 
great  readers  of  books,  evidence  has  continually  presented 
itself  that  they  diligently  improved  such  opportunities  as 
they  had,  and  that  they  were  adequately  equipped  with  a 
knowledge  of  the  best  that  had  been  written  upon  the 
themes  which  they  treated.  Professor  Park  has  spoken 
of  Hopkins'  learning  in  the  following  words: 

He  was  a  diligent  reader  of  commentaries,  particularly  of  Poole's 
Synopsis.  He  read  through  the  whole  of  Poole's  five  folios  in  Latin. 
He  commented  three  several  times  on  every  chapter  of  the  Bible  in  his 

1  Found  in  the  first  volume  of  the  Works. 

162 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY  163 


expository  discourses;  and  this  extensive  exposition  required  of  him, 
what  he  pursued,  a  diligent  perusal  of  the  critics  Among  the  au- 
thors which  are  most  familiarly  mentioned  by  him  are  Calvin  and  Van 
Mastricht  (both  of  whom  he  studied  in  their  original  Latin),  Saurin, 
Owen,  Manton,  Goodwin,  Bates,  Baxter,  Charnock,  Prideaux,  Sharp, 
Matthew  Henry,  John  Locke,  Whitby,  Dr.  S.  Clarke,  Dr.  John  Tay- 
lor, Mosheim,  Doddridge,  etc.,  etc.^ 

We  shall  therefore  not  be  surprised  to  find  in  Hopkins' 
system  a  due  appreciation  of  the  past.  It  was,  in  fact,  the 
old  system  reproduced,  for  it  rests  throughout  upon  the 
ancient  theological  foundation,  and  is  in  essential  agree- 
ment with  Westminster  and  Dort.  And  yet  it  is  a  new 
system.  It  is  permeated  with  new  ideas,  which  do  not  fully 
reveal  themselves  or  are  not  fully  applied  to  the  great  sub- 
jects under  consideration,  but  which  are  already  beginning 
to  work  powerfully  in  remodeling  and  improving  the  sys- 
tem, and  still  more  powerfully  in  preparing  the  way  for 
subsequent  improvement. 

The  affinity  of  the  system  with  its  predecessors  among 
Calvinists  is  evident  from  the  slightest  examination.  Its 
general  course  of  topics  follows  closely  the  Westminster 
Confession.  We  have:  Revelation;  God;  Decrees;  Provi- 
dence; the  Fall;  Redemption;  the  Redeemer;  Regenera- 
tion; Faith;  Justification;  Sanctification ;  Eschatology;  the 
Church ;  the  Christian  Life.  Repeated  allusions  to  the  Con- 
fession are  made,  as  when  decrees  are  defined  in  its  lan- 
guage. The  idea  of  a  true  system  was  warmly  embraced 
by  Hopkins.    He  explains: 

Is  not  a  system  of  divinity  as  proper  and  important  as  a  system 
of  jurisprudence,  physic,  or  natural  philosophy?  If  the  Bible  be  a 
revelation  from  heaven,  it  contains  a  system  of  consistent  important 
doctrines,  which  are  so  connected  and  implied  in  each  other  that  one 
cannot  be  so  well  understood  if  detached  from  all  the  rest,  and  con- 
sidered by  itself;  and  some  must  be  first  known  before  others  can 
be  seen  in  a  proper  and  true  light.^ 

2  "Memoir,"  in  Hopkins'  Works,  Vol.  I,  p.  53. 

3  Preface  to  the  System. 


164 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Thus  the  presupposition  which  underlies  Edwards'  theory 
of  virtue  appears  again  in  this  form  in  Hopkins,  that  there 
is  uhimate  harmony  in  the  universe.  If  this  be  so,  truth 
is  a  harmony  and  is  capable  of  being  stated  in  a  systematic 
and  consistent  form.  To  deny  this,  or  to  slight  it,  is  to  do 
violence  to  one's  thinking.  In  the  last  analysis  there  must 
be  a  system  of  truth,  or  there  is  no  such  thing  as  truth, 
nor  even  such  a  thing  as  thinking. 

As  to  the  Scriptures  Hopkins  did  not  differ  from  the 
generality  of  his  predecessors.  The  proofs  given  are  the 
usual  ones.  The  definition  of  scriptural  infallibility  and 
authority  as  the  standard  of  faith  and  practice  is  the  same 
with  that  of  the  Westminster  divines.  The  effect  of  the 
controversy  with  the  Deists  is  at  once  evident  by  the  pains 
taken  to  show  that  unaided  human  reason  is  not  enough  to 
give  man  a  knowledge  of  "every  necessary  and  important 
truth."  For  the  same  reason,  proofs  are  subjoined  that 
these  writings  are  not  forgeries.  The  evidence  of  miracles 
is  also  discussed,  though  the  question  of  their  possibility  is 
not  argued  at  length,  and  the  reliability  of  the  Scripture 
record  is  assumed  upon  such  proof  as  has  already  been  sug- 
gested. The  argument  from  prophecy  is  also  considered. 
But  the  great  reliance  is  placed  upon  the  general  view  of 
the  contents  of  the  Scriptures,  upon  their  harmony,  and 
upon  the  truths  revealed.  In  this  Hopkins  is  in  full  accord 
with  the  Confession.  "The  greatest  and  crowning  evi- 
dence" are  the  "contents  of  the  Bible."  The  perfections 
and  works  of  God,  the  rule  of  duty,  etc.,  commend  them- 
selves to  every  reasonable  mind.  But 

the  honest  virtuous  mind  only,  which  does  discern  and  relish  the 
beauty  and  excellence  of  truth  and  virtue  [i.  e.,  the  converted  mind], 
will  see  and  feel  the  full  force  of  this  argument  for  the  divinity  of  the 

Holy  Scriptures  To  such  the  true  light  shines  from  the  Holy 

Scriptures  with  irresistible  evidence,  and  their  hearts  are  established 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY  165 


in  the  truth.  They  believe  from  evidence  they  have  within  themselves, 
from  what  they  see  and  find  in  the  Bible. ^ 

Thus  the  Scriptures  are  proved  from  themselves,  and  Hop- 
kins has  the  immense  advantage  of  employing  the  Bible  in 
the  construction  of  the  whole  system,  including  the  doc- 
trine of  God.  At  one  point  only  does  he  fall  short  of  the 
Confession — in  not  ascribing  the  illumination  of  the  Chris- 
tian, by  which  he  perceives  the  truth,  directly  to  the  Holy 
Spirit.  But  this  lack  is  made  up  in  other  parts  of  the  work. 
No  distinction  is  made  between  revelation  and  inspiration, 
and  no  special  proof  of  inspiration  is  attempted. 

Hopkins  immediately  takes  advantage  of  the  ground 
thus  occupied  in  the  development  of  the  existence  and  char- 
acter of  God.  All  knowledge  of  God  "depends  greatly  if 
not  wholly  on  divine  revelation."  But,  *'when  once  sug- 
gested to  us,  it  becomes  an  object  of  intuition  in  a  sense,  so 
that,  though  there  be  reasoning  in  the  case,  it  is  so  short 
and  easy  that  it  strikes  the  mind  at  once,  and  it  is  hardly 
conscious  of  any  reasoning  upon  it."  ^  Hence  Hopkins 
gives  briefly  some  rational  arguments  for  the  existence  of 
God,  but  soon  comes  to  the  Scriptures  whose  mere  existence 
is  a  proof  of  God's  existence,  but  whose  testimony  is  itself 
the  great  proof.  The  Scriptures  are  immediately  employed 
as  the  chief  source  of  knowledge  as  to  God's  attributes,  and 
almost  entirely  so  as  to  his  moral  character.  Here  we  have 
introduced  the  distinguishing  principle  of  New  England 
divinity,  the  theory  of  virtue,  and  the  moral  character  of 
God  is  defined  as  consisting  in  his  holiness,  which  is  com- 
prehended in  love.  The  proof  of  the  love  of  God  is  scrip- 
tural, and  the  great  example  of  it  cited,  and  great  proof  of 
it,  is  the  sacrifice  of  Calvary.  And  thus  the  benevolence  of 
God  is  proved  before  difficulties  are  raised  about  the  exist- 
ence of  evil,  and  the  proof  is  made  from  Christ  as  the  cen- 

*  Works,  Vol.  I,  p.  24.  5  iijici^ 


i66 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


ter  and  substance  of  the  divine  revelation.  Here  Hopkins 
passes  far  beyond  the  Westminster  Confession  in  the  spirit- 
ual character  of  his  theology,  and  develops  the  best  thought 
of  his  master,  Edwards. 

In  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  there  is  nothing  new  or 
different  from  the  general  course  of  presentation  in  the 
early  church.  There  are  references  to  some  new  opinions 
or  to  the  revival  of  old  ones,  now  becoming  evident.  The 
preacher  of  the  sermon  on  the  divinity  of  Christ  in  the  Old 
South,  Boston,  in  1768,  enters  somewhat  fully  into  the 
refutation  of  Socinian  errors  in  the  system  of  1793.  At  one 
point  there  is  an  interesting  connection  between  Hopkins 
and  the  subtle  speculations  of  the  Greek  Fathers  of  the 
Nicene  age.  They  held  that  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  oc- 
cupied the  true  mean  between  the  polytheism  of  heathenism 
and  the  abstract  monotheism  of  Judaism.  It  displayed  God 
as  the  source  of  the  universe,  as  fitted  in  his  divine  nature 
to  sustain  it  and  communicate  himself  to  it  as  well  as  to  re- 
deem it.  Hence  no  philosophy  which  did  not  contain  in  it 
the  essential  elements  of  the  Christian  Trinity  would  be  able 
to  explain  satisfactorily  the  origin  and  history  of  the  uni- 
verse. So  thought  the  Greek  Fathers.  And  now  we  hear 
Hopkins  saying:  ''Had  there  not  been  this  distinction  of 
persons  in  God,  there  would  have  been  no  foundation  or 
sufficiency  in  him  for  the  exercise  of  mercy  in  the  recovery 
of  apostate  man."  ^  He  maintains  also  the  usage  of  the 
early  Fathers  in  respect  to  the  terms  "Son  of  God"  and 
''etern?!  generation,"  employing  the  former  of  the  second 
person  of  the  Trinity,  and  the  latter  as  describing  the  rela- 
tion of  the  Father  and  Son  within  the  Trinity  itself. 

The  modifying  ideas  of  Hopkins'  system,  as  already 
stated,  are  the  Edwardean,  or:  moral  agency  consists  in 
choice;  human  ability;  love,  the  essence  of  virtue.    As  to 

*  Loc.  cit.,  p.  66. 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY 


167 


these  ideas  it  may  be  well  to  repeat  that  in  the  theory  of 
virtue  Hopkins  had  nothing  to  change  in  the  teachings  of 
Edwards,  except  to  introduce  the  incorrect  idea  that  all  sin 
is  selfishness.  In  respect  to  the  doctrine  of  the  will  there  is 
a  considerable  difference.  Hopkins  does  not  seem  to  be  en- 
tirely consistent,  but  upon  the  whole  it  is  tolerably  clear 
that  the  tone  of  his  thought,  if  not  his  formulated  conclu- 
sions, had  undergone  modifications  which  carried  him 
somewhat  away  from  the  Edwardean  positions  toward 
what  was  finally  to  be  a  doctrine  of  a  more  genuine  free- 
dom. He  seems  to  have  been  dependent  upon  Stephen 
West  as  well  as  upon  Edwards,  as  we  shall  have  occasion 
later  to  trace.''' 

The  new  elements  to  be  found  in  Hopkins'  system,  de- 
rived from  these  leading  ideas,  and  constituting  the  gain 
made  by  New  England  up  to  this  point  of  her  history,  are 
the  following: 

I .  Hopkins  meant  to'  maintain  a  true  freedom  of  the  zuill 
— that  freedom  of  which  we  are  all  conscious  and  which  we 
regard  as  essential  tO'  accountability.  There  are  many  pas- 
sages in  which  he  exalts  the  agency  of  God,  but  he  main- 
tains with  equal  steadiness  and  firmness  the  liberty  of  man. 
He  defines  this  somewhat  difTerently  from  Edwards,  so  as 
to  make  a  real  adva^^ce  upon  him.  While  Edwards  had  put 
liberty  in  the  external  ability  to  execute  our  volitions,  Hop- 
kins places  it  in  the  volition  itself.   He  says : 

The  internal  freedom  of  which  [a  man]  is  conscious  consisteth  in  his 
voluntary  exercises,  or  in  choosing  and  willing;  that  he  is  conscious 
that  in  all  his  voluntary  exertions  he  is  perfectly  free  and  must  be  ac- 
countable, and  has  no  consciousness  or  idea  of  any  other  kind  of  moral 
liberty,  or  that  the  liberty  he  exerciseth  hath  anything,  more  or  less, 
belonging  to  it,  or  that  it  could  be  increased  or  made  more  perfect  free- 
dom by  the  addition  of  anything  that  is  not  implied  in  willing  and 
choosing.  He  may,  indeed,  not  be  able  to  accomplish  the  thing  or 
event  which  is  the  object  of  his  choice,  and  in  this  respect  be  under 

Cf.  his  own  citations,  Works,  Vol.  I,  p.  87. 


i68 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


restraint;  hut  thts  ts  not  inconsistent  with  his  exercising  perfect  freedom 
in  his  choice  and  in  all  voluntary  exertions  or  in  all  he  does  with  respect  to 
such  object  or  event. ^ 

This  is  undoubtedly  sound.  The  only  further  question 
would  be  whether  Hopkins  did  not  hold  a  theory  of  the 
action  of  the  will  and  of  the  influence  of  motives  which, 
like  Edwards',  introduced  elements  which  destroyed  the 
possibility  of  such  freedom.  He  proceeds  to  examine  and 
reject  the  so-called  "self-determining  power  of  the  will" 
upon  the  same  grounds  as  Edwards,  by  reducing  it  to  the 
absurdity  of  the  infinite  series.  Then  comes  the  following 
remarkable  passage: 

Agreeable  to  this  notion  of  a  self-determining  power,  and  in  sup- 
port of  it,  it  is  said  that  a  man  cannot  be  free  in  his  voluntary  actions 
unless  he  has  a  freedom  to  either  side;  that  is,  has  a  freedom  to  choose 
or  refuse,  to  prefer  one  thing  or  the  contrary,  or  has  power  and  free- 
dom to  choose  that  which  is  directly  contrary  to  that  which  is  actually 
the  object  of  his  choice.  H  by  this  be  meant  that  whenever  any  one 
freely  chooses  any  particular  object  or  act  or  is  inclined  any  par- 
ticular way,  he  is  at  liberty  to  prefer  a  contrary  object  or  act  and  to 
incline  the  contrary  way  if  he  please,  or  wills  and  chooses  so  to  do; 
this  is  no  more  than  to  say  that,  in  the  exercise  of  liberty,  a  man  must 
choose  agreeable  to  his  choice,  or  has  his  choice;  that  is,  must  be 
voluntary,  and  therefore  is  not  a  contradiction  to  that  which  has 
been  above  asserted,  namely,  that  liberty  consists  in  the  exercises  of 
will  and  choice,  or  voluntary  action.^ 

At  first  sight  Hopkins  seems  in  this  passage  to  deny  the 
power  of  alternate  choice,  or,  as  was  later  said,  "power  to 
the  contrary."  But  the  next  paragraph  makes  it  clear,  al- 
though it  is  a  clearness  somewhat  muddied  by  the  confusing 
psychology  brought  down  from  Edwards,  that  he  is  oppos- 
ing the  idea  of  the  perfect  indifference  of  the  will  as  essen- 
tial to  freedom.   He  says : 

If  by  a  freedom  to  choose  either  side  be  meant  that,  in  order  to  the 
exercise  of  a  free  act  of  choice,  he  must  at  the  same  time  be  as  much 
disposed  or  inclined  to  choose  the  contrary,  or  be  no  more  inclined 

^  Loc.  cit.,  p.  83. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  86. 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY  169 


one  way  than  the  other;  there  is  no  need  of  saying  anything  to  ex- 
pose the  absurdity  and  inconsistence  of  this  to  those  who  allow  them- 
selves to  think. 

The  rejected  definition  of  freedom  he  understood  as  sup- 
posing an  inclination  to  one  alternative  as  great  as  that  to 
the  other.  Had  he  distinguished  indination  from  choice, 
the  sensibiHty  from  the  will,  he  would  have  rejected  as 
sharply  as  he  did  an  indifference  of  inclination,  which  is 
certainly  contrary  to  the  facts  of  consciousness.  He  could 
then  have  recognized  back  of  the  desire,  however  strong  it 
might  be,  a  will  as  yet  unmoved.  But  the  inclination  was 
confounded  with  choice,  and  then  the  impossible  idea  of  an 
indifference  of  choice  and  a  positive  determination  of  choice 
in  the  same  act  was  introduced  which  must,  of  course,  be 
immediately  rejected.  In  all  this  Hopkins  does  not  differ 
from  Edwards. 

The  first  part  of  the  passage  quoted  suggests,  in  connec- 
tion with  its  surroundings,  an  advance  upon  Edwards.  If 
we  should  ask  Hopkins  this  question,  "Before  a  given  act 
of  choice,  may  not  the  will  choose  either  alternative?"  he 
would  answer  first,  with  the  instinctive  tendency  of  the 
theologian  to  guard  the  great  doctrines:  'Tt  is  perfectly 
certain  which  alternative  will  be  chosen?"  "Yes,"  we  might 
reply,  "but,  so  far  as  the  power  of  the  will  is  concerned, 
may  it  not  be  exerted  in  either  direction?"  I  think  he 
would  reply,  "Yes."  And  this  would  be  a  near  approach 
to  the  modern  doctrine  of  the  will  as  a  first  cause. 

In  confirmation  of  this  interpretation,  note  ( i )  that  Hop- 
kins insists  that  the  will  cannoc  be  compelled  to  a  given 
choice.  "No  compulsion  can  be  offered  to  the  will  or  the 
freedom  of  it  be  any  way  affected  by  any  operation  or 
influence  on  the  mind  which  takes  place  antecedent  to  the 
exercise  of  the  will  and  in  order  to  the  choice  that  is 
made."       (2)  In  the  same  line,  he  enters  at  one  point  a 

10  Ibid.,  p.  374. 


lyo         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

disclaimer  of  any  knowledige  of  the  connection  which  sub- 
sists between  God's  activity  and  man's.  God,  "by  his  own 
operation  and  agency"  causes  moral  evil  to  take  place  as  he 
does  as  also  the  holiness  which  takes  place  in  men ;  "but  as 
to  the  manner  of  the  operation,  as  the  cause  of  either,  we 
are  wholly  in  the  dark — as  much  as  we  are  with  respect  to 
the  manner  of  the  divine  operation  in  the  creation  of  the 
world  and  the  different  and  various  existences."  We 
know  that  Hopkins  believed  in  the  immediate  operation  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  upon  man  in  regeneration.  He  probably 
held  Edwards'  theory  of  motives  in  general;  but  the  fact 
that  he  never  introduces  that  theory  in  his  explanations  of 
the  various  questions  which  gather  about  the  will,  the  fact 
that  he  declares  the  manner  of  God's  action  inscrutable, 
and  this  doctrine  of  the  immediate  operation  of  the  Spirit 
in  regeneration,  unite  to  show  that  he  did  not  regard  that 
metaphysical  explanation  as  enough  to  exhaust  the  case. 
In  other  words,  he  purposed  to  hold  fast  to  the  freedom  of 
the  will,  and  in  doing  this  found  insuperable  difficulties  in 
the  Edwardean  scheme. 

2.  The  next  feature  of  Hopkins'  system  was  his  strong 
emphasis  upon  the  doctrine  of  decrees. 

It  is  always  a  question  whether  a  theologian,  in  modify- 
ing the  Calvinistic  doctrine  of  the  will  in  favor  of  a  larger 
recognition  of  human  freedom,  will  go  in  the  direction  of 
Arminianism.  The  New  England  school  was  kept  from 
this  by  the  influence  of  Edwards,  who,  having  in  mind  the 
Arminianism  of  his  own  surroundings,  which  was  associ- 
ated with  many  departures  from  evangelical  theology,  had 
put  forth  his  mightiest  efforts  directly  and  openly  against 
it.  Hopkins  entertained  the  sentiments  of  Edwards  as  to 
the  essential  character  of  Arminianism,  and  therefore  laid 
the  more  emphasis  upon  the  distinguishing  features  of  Cal- 

1^  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  139,  140.    Such  expressions  suggested  Emmons'  doctrine. 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY 


171 


vinism.  In  fact,  he  was  a  high  Calvinist — higher  than  his 
Calvinistic  contemporaries. 

Decrees  are  the  plan  of  God  in  the  government  of  the 
universe.  This  plan  is  the  best  conceivable,  for  God  had 
all  possible  plans  before  him  when  he  created  the  world, 
and  he  chose  the  best.  This  is  the  Leibnitzian  optimism  of 
Bellamy  repeated.  God  chose  the  best  plan,  and  he  exe- 
cutes it  in  the  best  way,  because  he  is  himself  infinitely 
good.  And  hence  the  divine  decrees  are  founded  in  the 
love  of  God.  This  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  Ed- 
wardean  theory  of  virtue.  The  following  passage  will 
exhibit  this,  and  will  also  show,  what  needs  to  be  borne  in 
mind  with  reference  to  subsequent  questions  as  to  Hopkins' 
system,  that  the  love  of  God  is  not  first  exercised  when 
creatures  have  been  brought  into  being,  but  respects  pri- 
marily himself. 

The  moral  excellence  and  perfection  of  God  consists  in  love,  or 
goodness,  which  has  been  proved  in  a  former  chapter.  This  infinite 
love  of  an  infinite  Being,  is  infinite  felicity.  This  consists  in  his  in- 
finite regard  to  himself  as  the  fountain  and  sum  of  all  being;  and 
his  pleasure  and  delight  in  himself,  in  his  own  infinite  excellence  and 
perfection;  and  in  the  highest  possible  exercise,  exhibition  and  dis- 
play of  his  infinite  fulness,  perfection  and  glory.  And  his  pleasure  in 
the  latter,  so  as  to  make  it  the  supreme  and  ultimate  end  of  all  his 
works,  necessarily  involves  and  supposes  his  pleasure  and  delight  in 
the  happiness  of  his  creatures.  If  he  be  pleased  with  the  greatest  pos- 
sible exercise,  communication,  and  exhibition  of  his  goodness,  he 
must  be  pleased  with  the  happiness  of  creatures,  and  the  greatest 
possible  happiness  of  the  creation,  because  the  former  so  involves  the 
latter  that  they  cannot  be  separated ;  and  may  be  considered  as  one 
and  the  same  thing;  and  doubtless  are  but  one  in  the  view  of  the 
all  comprehending  mind;  though  we,  whose  conceptions  are  so  im- 
perfect and  partial,  are  apt  to  conceive  of  the  glory  of  God,  and  the 
good  of  the  creature,  as  two  distinct  things,  and  different  ends  to 
be  answered,  in  God's  designs  and  works. 

Thus  whatsoever  comes  to  pass  from  the  beginning  of  time  to 
eternity  is  foreordained,  and  fixed  from  eternity  by  the  infinitely 
wise  counsel  and  unchangeable  purpose  of  God.^^ 

12  Loc.  cit.,  p.  73. 


172 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


This  is  the  point  upon  which  Hopkins — and  I  may 
also  say  the  whole  line  of  New  England  divines — laid  the 
chief  emphasis.  Few  men  would  be  so  bold  as  to  deny  that 
God  has  a  plan  in  the  government  of  the  world,  and  few 
so  foolish  as  to  deny  that  this  plan  is  governed  by  infinite 
love.  The  tendency  of  Hopkins'  whole  scheme  is  thus  to 
maintain  the  loving  government  of  God.  If  there  be  any 
other  element  in  this  problem,  it  must  be  interpreted 
so  as  to  preserve,  not  only  the  fact  of  his  loving  govern- 
ment, but  the  emphasis  which  belongs  to  this  fact. 

The  fact  of  the  divine  decrees  is  proved  from  the  Scrip- 
tures and  from  the  divine  foreknowledge. 

But  Hopkins  has  an  eye  also  for  the  difficulties  of  the 
theme,  and  he  states  them  with  great  force.  The  crucial 
objection  is  that  decrees  seem  to  destroy  freedom,  to  make 
vice  necessary,  and  thus  to  impugn  the  character  of  God. 
The  reply  is  from  the  Scriptures.  Cases  are  cited  to  show 
that  God  did  decree  certain  acts,  which  were  nevertheless 
free  acts  of  men.  Decrees,  he  says,  include  the  freedom 
of  man,  because  God  makes  use  of  that  freedom  to  carry 
out  his  decrees.  Particularly  does  freedom  consist  in  voli- 
tions; and  w^hen  God  decrees  that  men  shall  be  saved,  it  is 
that  they  shall  be  saved  through  their  volitions — that  is, 
that  their  freedom  shall  be  preserved.  This  is  not  a  phil- 
osophical defense  of  the  doctrine.  As  we  have  seen,  Hop- 
kins had  no  theory  of  the  action  of  the  will  which  he  was 
willing  to  introduce  for  such  a  purpose.  He  many  times 
intimates  that  in  a  limited  sphere  we  readily  see  how  God 
through  motives  can  govern  man  without  infringing  upon 
his  freedom,  and  this  proves  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
nature  of  volition  to  prevent  control  of  a  free  agent.  But 
into  any  hopeless  attempt  to  uncover  the  point  in  our  sub- 
conscious nature  where  the  divine  and  human  action  join, 
Hopkins  does  not  go. 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY  173 


The  second  principal  objection  to  decrees  is  derived 
from  the  existence  of  evil  which  the  doctrine  seems  to 
charge  home  upon  God.  Hopkins'  answer  is  the  same  as 
in  his  earlier  treatise,  except  that  he  now  states,  without 
the  slightest  qualification,  that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of 
the  greatest  good.^^  Next,  the  objection  was  raised  that 
the  doctrine  made  God  the  author  of  sin.  Here  no  new 
points  are  brought  out.  But  the  great  plainness  of  his 
language  gives  occasion  to  an  important  query.    He  says: 

That  God  did  will  the  existence  of  moral  evil,  in  determining,  at 
least,  to  permit  it,  when  he  could  have  prevented  it,  had  he  been 
pleased  to  do  it,  must  be  granted  by  all  who  would  avoid  ascribing 
to  Him  that  imperfection,  impotence,  and  subjection  to  that  power, 
be  it  what  it  may,  which  introduced  sin,  contrary  to  his  will ;  which 
is  indeed  shockingly  impious,  and  real  blasphemy,  to  every  consid- 
erate, and  rationally  pious  mind.  We  may  infer  from  this,  with  the 
greatest  certainty,  that  it  is,  all  things  considered,  or  in  the  view 
of  the  omniscient  God,  zvisest  and  best  that  moral  evil  should  exist. 
For  to  suppose  that  it  was  his  will  that  it  should  take  place;  or  that 
he  has  permitted  it,  when  he  could  have  prevented  it;  and  yet  that 
it  was  not  wisest  and  best  in  his  sight,  that  it  should  exist,  is  beyond 
expression  impious,  and  at  once  strips  the  Deity  of  all  moral  good  or 
holiness ;  and  gives  him  the  most  odious  and  horrid  character !  1* 

Finally,  he  sums  up  the  whole  subject  of  the  divine 
and  human  operation  in  the  volition  of  man  in  the  follow- 
ing terms: 

Here  are  two  distinct  agents,  infinitely  different;  God,  absolutely 
independent,  and  almighty;  and  a  creature  absolutely  dependent  for 
every  thought  and  volition,  having  no  power  and  sufficiency,  that  is 
not  derived  immediately  from  his  Maker :  and  the  agency  or  opera- 
tion is  as  distinct  and  different  as  the  agents.  The  creature's  agency 
is  as  much  his  own  as  in  the  nature  of  things  can  be,  and  as  it  could  be  if 
it  were  not  the  effect  of  the  divine  agency,  if  this  were  possible.  And  the 
creature  acts  as  freely,  as  if  there  were  no  agents  concerned  but  him- 
self, and  his  exercises  are  as  virtuous  and  holy;  and  it  is  really  and 
as  much  his  own  virtue  and  holiness,  and  he  is  as  excellent  and 

13  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  89,  90,  91,  98. 
^*  Ibid.,  p.  108. 

1^  It  is  the  emphasis  of  such  expressions  as  this  that  gives  Emmons  bis 
justification   for  claiming  entire   agreement  with  Hopkins. 


174 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


praiseworthy,  as  if  he  did  not  depend  on  divine  influences  for  these 
exercises,  and  they  were  not  the  effect  of  the  operation  of  God.^^ 

The  question  which  is  thus  pressed  upon  us  is  whether 
Hopkins  had  escaped  from  the  supralapsarian  predestina- 
tion of  Willard  and  his  predecessors  in  general.  His 
treatment  of  this  theme,  as  of  all  the  remaining  topics  of 
theology,  is  marked  by  a  certain  largeness.  He  does  not 
engage  himself  with  mere  scholastic  details,  but  goes  at 
once  to  the  heart  of  his  subject.  Thus  he  never  raises  the 
question  of  the  "order"  of  the  decrees.  But  supralap- 
sarianism  is  at  bottom  not  a  question  of  order,  but  of  the 
universal  prevalence  of  the  divine  decree  to  the  exclusion 
of  human  agency.  He  might  have  escaped  from  such  a 
theory  by  emphasizing  the  theory  of  virtue;  for  it  leaves 
that  place  for  humanity  which  Hopkins'  evident  tendencies 
toward  a  better  doctrine  of  human  freedom,  elsewhere 
noted,  should  have  led  him  to  welcome.  He  does  partially 
escape  by  this  very  path,  for  he  makes  decrees  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  love  of  God,^^  and  not  of  his  "justice  and 
grace"  with  which  supralapsarians  are  so  much  engaged. 
In  fact,  justice  merges  with  him  into  love.  But  decrees 
still  continue  to  cover  all  the  action  of  men  as  well  as  that 
of  God.^^  No  place  is  left  for  an  undecreed  freedom  of 
the  fall,  as  Augustine  seemed  to  leave  it.  The  freedom  of 
man  is  the  mystery,  not  the  decree  of  God.  It  is  a  mystery 
imbedded  in  the  decree  and  providence  of  God.  Its  ulti- 
mate explanation  must  admit  of  the  view  that  all  things 
are  finally  done  by  God.  He  is  the  first,  and  in  the  last 
analysis,  the  only  cause.  Thus  there  is  nothing  placed  in 
the  will  of  rnan  in  distinction  from  the  will  of  God,  or 
done  by  man  and  not  done  by  God.^^    The  day  of  struggle 

i«  Loc.  cit.,  p.  139. 
1'^  Ihid.,  p.  73. 

Ibid.,  pp.  90,  103,  104;  and  very  strongly,  p.  124. 
i»  Ibid.,  p.  141. 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY 


175 


with  supralapsarianism  had  come,  indeed,  but  not  the  day 
of  deHverance  from  it. 

3.  Original  sin. — Hopkins'  doctrine  is  summarized  in 
his  own  words  as  follows : 

On  the  whole,  it  is  hoped  that  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  has 
been  stated  and  explained  agreeable  to  the  holy  scripture;  and  that  it 
does  not  imply  anything  unreasonable  and  absurd,  or  injurious  to 
mankind ;  but  is  the  result  of  a  constitution  which  is  perfectly  agree- 
able to  the  nature  of  things,  reasonable,  wise  and  good;  that  the 
children  of  Adam  are  not  guilty  of  his  sin,  are  not  punished,  and 
do  not  suffer  for  that,  any  farther  than  they  implicitly  or  expressly 
approve  of  his  transgression,  by  sinning  as  he  did; — that  their 
total  moral  corruption  and  sinfulness  is  as  much  their  own  sin  and 
as  criminal  in  them,  as  it  could  be  if  it  were  not  in  consequence  of 
the  sin  of  the  first  father  of  the  human  race,  or  if  Adam  had  not 
sinned; — that  they  are  under  no  inability  to  obey  the  law  of  God, 
which  does  not  consist  in  their  sinfulness  and  opposition  of  heart  to  the 
will  of  God; — and  are  therefore  wholly  inexcusable,  and  may  justly  suffer 
the  wages  of  sin,  which  is  the  second  death.^° 

The  intimate  connection  of  Hopkins  with  Edwards  in 

all  this  is  evident  both  from  his  phraseology  and  his  ideas. 

He  speaks  of  the  ''constitution"  in  the  same  language  as 

Edwards.    Even  his  figures  are  drawn  from  Edwards. 

There  is  no  imputation  ''considering  men  as  sinners  when 

they  are  not,"  but  sin  is  imputed  because  they  are  sinners. 

But  how  can  they  be  sinners  antecedent  to  any  sin  of  their 

own?    Is  not  all  sin  voluntary  sin?    "Yes,"  says  Hopkins: 

This  sin,  which  takes  place  in  the  posterity  of  Adam,  is  not  prop- 
erly distinguished  into  original,  and  actual  sin,  because  it  is  all  really 
actual,  and  there  is,  strictly  speaking,  no  other  sin  but  actual  sin. 
.  ...  If  the  sinfulness  of  all  the  posterity  of  Adam  was  certainly 
connected  with  his  sinning,  this  does  not  make  them  sinners,  before 
they  actually  are  sinners ;  and  when  they  actually  become  sinners, 
they  themselves  are  the  sinners,  it  is  their  own  sin,  and  they  are  as 
blamable  and  guilty  as  if  Adam  had  never  sinned,  and  each  one 
were  the  first  sinner  that  ever  existed.  The  children  of  Adam  are 
not  answerable  for  his  sin,  and  it  is  not  their  sin  any  farther  than 
they  approve  of  it,  by  sinning  as  he  did :    In  this  way  only  they  be- 

20  Loc.  cit.,  p.  235. 


176 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


come  guilty  of  his  sin,  viz.,  by  approving  of  what  he  did,  and  joining 
with  him  in  rebellion.  And  it  being  previously  certain  by  divine  con- 
stitution, that  all  mankind  would  thus  sin,  and  join  with  their  com- 
mon head  in  rebellion,  renders  it  no  less  their  own  sin  and  crime, 
than  if  this  certainty  had  taken  place  on  any  other  ground,  or  in 
any  other  way;  or  than  if  there  had  been  no  certainty  that  they 
would  thus  all  sin,  were  this  possible. 21 

It  will  require  but  a  brief  review  of  Edwards'  posi- 
tions upon  this  topic  to  show  how  entirely  Hopkins  is 
following  his  master  in  all  this.  There  is  the  same  "union" 
established  between  Adam  and  his  descendants,  the  same 
''consent"  to  his  sin,  the  following  imputation,  the  conse- 
quent guilt  for  the  sin  consented  to.  With  both  Hopkins 
and  Edwards  the  consequence  of  Adam's  sin  is  to  establish 
the  certainty  of  this  evil  consent,  and  thereby  to  make 
all  men  sinners. 

The  first  and  most  important  result  of  this  method  of 
viewing  the  subject  for  Hopkins  was  that  he  accepted  thor- 
oughly the  doctrine  that  all  sin  was  voluntary,  or  that  there 
is  no  sin  but  actual  sin.  His  expressions  of  this  principle 
are  clearer  than  Edwards',  though  the  substance  of  his 
doctrine  is  merely  a  repetition  of  what  Edwards  had  laid 
down.  We  may  see  the  preparation  for  a  transfer  from 
the  theory  of  a  constitution  to  that  of  the  voluntary  char- 
acter of  all  sin  under  which  the  connection  with  Adam 
becomes  a  natural  one  (e.  g.,  through  heredity),  in  such  a 
passage  as  this:  "The  posterity  of  Adam  become  guilty 
and  fall  under  condemnation  by  consenting  to  his  sin  and 
by  a  union  of  heart  to  him  as  a  transgressor;  that  is,  by 
sinning  themselves."  More  explicitly  he  says  in  the 
longer  passage  just  quoted :  "This  sin  which  takes  place 
in  the  posterity  of  Adam  is  not  properly  distinguished 
into  original  and  actual  sin,  because  it  is  all  really  actual, 
and  there  is,  strictly  speaking,  no  other  sin  but  actual  sin." 

21  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  224,  230.  22  jjjid.^  p.  464. 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY 


177 


4.  Ability  and  inability. — The  fall  being  included  in  the 
decrees  of  God,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  condition  of 
man  before  the  fall  should  be  a  "probation"  in  any  sense 
in  which  it  is  not  later.  Hence  Hopkins  taught  that  man 
after  the  fall  is  in  a  state  of  probation — that  is,  under  a 
moral  government — with  the  alternatives  of  life  and  death 
set  before  him,  and  with  the  full  ability  to  choose  the  one 
or  the  O'ther.  Upon  the  subject  of  ability  Hopkins  is  spe- 
cially emphatic.  Though  he  teaches  tot_,l  depravity,  and 
emphasizes  it  against  the  Deists,  it  is  a  moral  depravity. 

Man  has  not  lost  any  of  his  natural  powers  of  understanding 
and  will,  etc.,  by  becoming  sinful.  He  has  lost  his  inclination,  or  is 
wholly  without  any  inclination  to  serve  and  obey  his  maker,  and  en- 
tirely opposed  to  it.  In  this  his  sinfulness  consists  ....  and  in 
nothing  else ;  and  the  stronger  and  more  fixed  the  opposition  to  the  law 
of  God  is,  and  the  farther  he  is  from  any  inclination  to  obey,  the 
more  blamable  and  inexcusable  he  is.^s 

If  there  could  have  been  any  question,  after  the  revival 
preaching  of  both  Edwards  and  Bellamy,  and  after  Bel- 
lamy had  emphasized  so  strongly  the  ability  of  man  to  re- 
pent, whether  that  paralyzing  doctrine  of  inability  which 
had  wrought  unspeakable  disaster  to  early  New  England 
was  to  be  repudiated  and  replaced  by  a  doctrine  of  abil- 
ity which  should  pave  the  way  for  aggressive  preachmg 
and  for  the  winning  of  souls,  it  was  now  settled  favorably 
to  progress  by  the  clear  adhesion  of  Hopkins  to  ability. 
From  this  point  we  shall  have  occasion  only  to  mark  the 
different  forms  given  to  the  rationale  of  the  doctrine.  The 
conviction  and  the  usage  of  the  whole  New  England  school 
is  henceforth  uniform. 

5.  The  atonement. — We  should  also  expect  that  Hop- 
kins  would  fall  in  with  the  course  of  progress  upon  this 
doctrine  already  marked  out  by  Bellamy  (1750)  and  Dr. 
Edwards  (1785).  How  far  this  expectation  is  realized 
we  are  now  to  see. 

23  Ibid.,  p.  233. 


178 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


He  begins  by  exalting  the  law  of  God.  This  is  the  eter- 
nal, unchangeable  rule  of  righteousness.  It  cannot  be 
abrogated.  An  essential  portion  of  it  is  its  penalty  threat- 
ened against  the  disobedient.  This  is  as  unchangeable  as 
the  law  itself.  Man  by  transgression  has  fallen  under  this 
penalty.  By  the  nature  of  law,  it  must  be  executed  in  the 
true  meaning  and  spirit  of  it,  or  else  God  himself  joins 
with  the  sinner  in  dishonoring  the  law,  and  favors,  justi- 
fies, and  encourages  rebellion. 

This  otherwise  insuperable  difficulty,  this  mighty  bar  and  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  shewing  any  favour  to  man,  and  escaping  eternal  de- 
struction, is  the  ground  of  the  necessity  of  a  Mediator  and  Redeemer 
by  whom  it  may  be  wholly  removed,  and  man  be  delivered  from  the 
curse  of  the  law;  and  saved  consistent  with  the  divine  character,  with 
truth,  infinite  rectitude,  wisdom  and  goodness;  and  so  as  not  to  set 
aside  and  dishonour,  but  support  and  maintain  the  divine  law  and 
government.-* 

The  fundamental  idea  of  Hopkins'  theory,  then,  is  the 
necessity  on  God's  part  of  a  mediator  before  he  could  for- 
give sin;  or,  he  teaches  distinctly  the  objective  theory  of 
the  atonement. 

The  work  of  the  atonement  consists  of  two  parts:  first, 
that  accomplished  by  the  suffering  of  Christ,  and,  second, 
that  accomplished  by  his  obedience.  At  first  sight  it  would 
appear  that  Hopkins  accepted  exactly  the  old  theory  where- 
by the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  the  literal  penalty  of  the 
law  suffered  in  the  place  of  sinners.  Christ  was  to  make 
atonement  for  the  sins  of  men  ''by  suffering  in  his  own  per- 
son the  penalty  or  curse  of  the  law  under  which  by  trans- 
gression they  had  fallen."  The  sacrifices  of  the  Old  Tes- 
tament are  quoted  to  prove  the  doctrine  of  vicarious  sacri- 
fice. Christ  "by  his  sufferings  took  on  him  the  penalty  of 
sin,  and  bore  the  punishment  of  it  so  as  effectually  to  put 


2*  Loc.  cit..  p.  322. 
'■'^  Ibid.,  p.  324. 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY 


179 


it  away  from  all  who  believe  in  him  that  it  may  never  be 
laid  to  their  charge  to  condemn  them." 

But  modifying  expressions  begin  soon  to  appear.  In 
commenting  upon  the  favorite  text  of  subsequent  divines 
(Rom.  3:  25,  26),  Hopkins  says: 

Here  the  design  of  the  Redeemer  is  expressed,  and  the  great 
thing  he  is  to  accomplish  is  to  maintain  and  declare  the  righteousness, 
the  rectitude,  and  unchangeable  truth  and  perfection  of  God  in  open- 
ing a  way  by  his  blood,  his  sufferings  unto  death,  for  the  free  pardon 
of  sinful  man,  consistent  ziith  his  rectoral  justice  and  truth,  and  doing 
that  which  is  right  and  just  both  with  respect  to  himself,  his  law 
and  government,  and  all  the  subjects  of  his  kingdom.^'^ 

Note  the  phrases  "rectoral  justice,"  "right  and  just 
both  with  respect  to  himself,  his  law  and  government,  and 
all  the  subjects  of  his  kingdom."  This  points  to  a  new  un- 
derstanding of  the  suffering  of  the  penalty.  A  new  kind 
of  justice  is  introduced.  Hopkins  was  perfectly  familiar 
with,  and  accepted  Edwards'  doctrine  that  mere  "natural 
justice,"  though  having  in  itself  a  kind  of  beauty,  had  no 
moral  beauty  or  virtue,  and  therefore  was  not  fit  to  be  the 
governing  motive  of  the  divine  action,  and  could,  accord- 
ingly, never  be  executed  by  God.  The  demands  of  love 
might  make  the  execution  of  justice  the  only  course  left 
to  the  divine  being.  But  a  mere  and  exact  satisfaction  of 
natural  justice  as  such  could  have  no  place  in  his  govern- 
ment. 

The  word  "equivalent"  is  often  used  to  express  the  rela- 
tion of  the  sufferings  of  Christ  to  those  required  by  the 
law.^^  They  were  equivalent  because  of  the  greatness  and 
worth  of  his  person.    Says  Hopkins  further: 

Thus  we  see  how  Christ  sufifered  for  sin,  was  made  a  curse,  that 
is,  suffered  the  curse  of  the  law,  the  curse  of  God :  and  in  his  suffer- 
ings, he,  in  a  sense,  suffered  and  felt  the  displeasure  and  wrath  of 
God;  and  the  anger  of  God  against  sin  and  the  sinner  was  in  a  high 
Ibid.,  p.  326.  '^'^  Ibid.,  p.  323. 

28  Ibid.,  p.  328. 


i8o         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


and  eminent  degree  manifested  and  expressed  in  the  sufferings  and 
death  of  Christ,  consistent  with  his  not  being  displeased,  but  well 
pleased  with  Christ  himself,  and  loving  him  because  he  laid  down 
his  life  for  his  people.29 

We  see  here  how  completely  Hopkins,  in  spite  of  in- 
felicities of  diction,  has  adopted  the  new  theory  of  the 
atonement,  how  he  has  changed  the  view  of  God's  position 
from  that  of  the  "offended  party"  to  that  of  "Governor," 
has  made  the  sufferings  of  Christ  an  example  rather  than 
the  literal  suffering  of  punishment,  and  brought  the  whole 
transaction  under  the  rectoral,  or  public,  justice  of  God. 

At  the  heart  of  the  matter  Hopkins  is,  therefore,  alto- 
gether Grotian  (or  Edwardean)  in  his  theory  of  the  atone- 
ment. But  in  the  second  portion  of  his  doctrine,  that  re- 
ferring to  the  obedience  of  Christ,  he  seems  to  remain  with 
the  older  Calvinism.  The  Westminster  Confession  taught 
that  the  obedience  of  Christ  was  the  price  with  which  posi- 
tive blessings  were  purchased  for  believers,  and  that  his 
righteousness  was  imputed  to  them.  Hopkins  followed  the 
Confession,  and  yet  in  his  own  fashion.  The  suffering  of 
Christ  atoned  for  the  sins  of  men,  and  procured  for  them 
forgiveness.    But  it 

only  delivers  from  the  curse  of  the  law,  and  procures  the  remission 
of  their  sins  who  believe  in  him,  but  does  not  procure  for  them  any 
positive  good :  It  leaves  them  Uiider  the  power  of  sin,  and  with- 
out any  title  to  eternal  life,  or  any  positive  favour,  or  actual  fitness 
or  capacity  to  enjoy  positive  happiness.  This  would  be  but  a  very 
partial  redemption,  had  the  Redeemer  done  no  more  than  merely  to 
make  atonement  for  sin,  by  suffering  the  penalty  of  the  law  for  sin- 
ners, and  in  their  stead.  It  was  therefore  necessary  that  he  should 
obey  the  precepts  of  the  law  for  man,  and  in  his  stead,  that  by  this 
perfect  and  meritorious  obedience,  he  might  honour  the  law^^  in  the 
preceptive  part  of  it,  and  obtain  all  the  positive  favour  and  benefits 
which  man  needed,  be  they  ever  so  many  and  great. 

The  foundation  of  this  idea  is  the  doctrine  of  the  federal 

20  Loc.  cit.,  p.  339. 

30  This  is  a  Grotian  turn  to  the  thought. 

31  Loc.  cit.,  p.  345. 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY 


i8l 


headship.  Adam  was  a  federal  head.  His  obedience, 
though  he  owed  it  for  himself,  would  have  gained  certain 
benefits  for  his  posterity,  and  they  would  have  been  posi- 
tively blessed  with  good  and  granted  eternal  life.  But  he 
fell,  and  so  the  federal  headship  reij.Ucd  in  their  being 
sinners  and  lying  under  the  wrath  of  God.  Just  as  his 
obedience  might  have  procured  them  blessings,  so  the 
obedience  of  Christ  procures  them  blessings.  But  as 
Christ  is  of  far  greater  dignity  than  Adam,  he  procures 
blessings  far  greater  than  would  have  been  bestowed  in 
consequence  of  Adam's  obedience. 

By  the  obedience  of  Christ  all  the  positive  good,  all  those 
favours  and  blessings  are  merited  and  obtained,  which  sinners  need, 
in  order  to  enjoy  complete  and  eternal  redemption,  or  everlasting 
life  in  the  kingdom  of  God.  By  this  he  has  purchased  and  obtained 
the  Holy  Spirit,  by  whom  sinners  are  so  far  recovered  from  total 
depravity,  and  renewed,  as  to  be  prepared  and  disposed  to  believe  on 
Christ  and  receive  him,  being  offered  to  them;  and  he  carries  on  a 
work  of  sanctification  in  their  hearts,  until  they  are  perfectly  holy.^- 

We  perceive  immediately  that  the  conception  of  impu- 
tation here  involved,  like  that  already  considered  under  the 
head  of  "origin?!  sin,"  is  different  from  that  ordinarily 
held  by  the  Calvinistic  divines  of  Hopkins'  time.  It  will 
be  best  for  us  to  defer  our  special  consideration  of  its 
nature,  however,  until  a  later  point. 

In  conclusion,  under  this  head,  Hopkins  teaches  general 
atonement : 

The  Redeemer  has  made  an  atonement  sufficient  to  expiate  for  the 
sins  of  the  whole  world;  and,  in  this  sense,  has  tasted  death  for 
every  man,  has  taken  away  the  sin  of  the  world,  has  given  himself 
a  ransom  for  all,  and  is  the  propitiation  for  the  sins  of  the  whole  world, 
so  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him  may  be  saved,  and  God  can  now 
be  just,  and  the  justifier  of  him  that  believeth  in  Jesus.  Therefore, 
the  gospel  is  ordered  to  be  preached  to  the  whole  world,  to  all  nations, 
to  every  human  creature.  And  the  offer  of  salvation  by  Christ  is  to 
be  made  to  every  one,  with  this  declaration,  that  whosoever  believeth, 

82  Ibid.,  p.  348. 


l82 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


is  willing  to  accept  of  it,  shall  be  delivered  from  the  curse  of  the 
law,  and  have  eternal  life.^^ 

6.  Regeneration. — The  distinction  between  regenera- 
tion and  conversion,  which  Hopkins  early  established,  en- 
ables him  now  to  distinguish  sharply  between  the  divine  and 
human  part  in  conversion.  God  regenerates ;  man  converts. 
The  former  is  the  rendering  of  the  man  willing;  the  latter 
is  the  performance  of  holy  exercises  by  the  man  himself. 

There  are  no  express  statements,  so  far  as  appears, 
which  exhibit  clearly  Hopkins'  views  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
depravity  which  men  derive  from  Adam.  It  is,  however, 
probable  from  not  obscure  intimations,^^  that  he  accepted 
Edwards'  theory  that  it  consisted  in  no  positive  impairment 
of  our  faculties,  but  only  in  the  results  of  one  positive  cause 
— that  is,  the  withdrawal  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  If  this  be 
so,  it  is  easy  to  understand  why  he  puts  our  corruption 
wholly  in  the  will,  not  the  understanding  (the  second  of 
the  two  faculties  of  the  mind),  and  makes  regeneration 
consist  in  an  immediate  operation  upon  this.  There  is  no 
need  of  more  light  or  of  the  use  of  any  other  means,  in 
Hopkins'  view,  because  the  trouble  is  not  with  the  intellect, 
but  with  the  will.  Man  has  light  enough,  only  as  his  intel- 
lect is  darkened  by  his  perverse  will.  It  is  to  the  will,  then, 
that  the  remedy  must  be  applied.  Here  God  works  imme- 
diately and  miraculously.^^  When  the  will  is  inclined  to 
the  right  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  man's  exercises  become 
right,  and  he  is  himself  right. 

Regeneration  is  thus  but  one,  though  the  chiefest,  illus- 
tration of  the  "Divine  illumination."  The  regenerated  man 
now  sees  the  being  and  perfections  of  God  in  their  true 
nature,  sees  and  approves  of  the  law  of  God,  discerns  the 
character  of  Christ  and  the  way  of  salvation;  and,  in  view 


38  Loc.  cit.,  p.  365.  3*  Ibid.,  pp.  219  ff. 

Ibid.,  p.  371.    This  again,  prepares  for  Emmons. 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY 


183 


of  these  great  motives  now  rendered  accessible  to  him,  he 
turns  to  God,  accepting  that  law,  obeying,  beh'eving,  choos- 
ing, loving,  all  of  which  are  essentially  the  same,  or  putting 
forth  the  holy  volition,  which  is  disinterested  benevolence. 
This  is  conversion.  I  pause  to  quote  a  paragraph  in  which 
is  not  only  described  this  ''divine  illumination"  but  also 
given  the  foundation  of  that  ''testimony  of  the  spirit"  upon 
the  basis  of  which  Hopkins  constructed  the  proof  of  the 
Scriptures. 

The  real  Christian  is,  in  becoming  such,  turned  from  this  darkness 
to  marvelous  light,  which  is  effected  by  the  omnipotent  influences  of 
the  Spirit  of  God  in  the  renovation  of  the  heart,  which  was  before 
totally  corrupt,  forming  it  to  disinterested,  universal  benevolence,  and 
so  making  it  an  honest  and  good  heart;  and  forming  the  single  eye, 
by  which  the  truths  revealed  in  the  Scriptures  relating  to  the  being 
and  perfections  of  God,  his  law,  and  moral  government,  the  sta.te  and 
character  of  man,  the  character  and  works  of  the  mediator,  the  way 
of  salvation  by  him,  the  nature  of  duty  and  true  holiness,  etc.,  are 
seen  in  their  true  light,  as  realities,  beautiful,  divine,  important,  ex- 
cellent, harmonious,  glorious,  and  above  all  things  else  interesting  and 
affecting,  and  the  mind  is  filled  with  this  spiritual,  marvelous,  glorious 
light.  By  this  all  the  powers  of  the  mind  are  enlarged  aiid  strength- 
ened. Reason  and  judgment,  being  no  longer  biased  by  an  evil  heart, 
are  rectified,  and  the  reasoning,  speculative  faculty  is  exerted  in  an 
honest,  attentive  pursuit  in  the  investigation  of  truth. 

Here,  again,  we  have  seen  the  application  of  the  theory 
of  virtue. 

Conversion,  wrought  by  man  in  connection  with  the 
action  of  God  in  regeneration,  an  act  of  the  will,  is  instan- 
taneous.   Hopkins  says : 

This  change,  of  which  the  Spirit  of  God  is  the  cause,  and  in  which 
he  is  the  only  agent,  is  instantaneous ;  wrought  not  gradually,  but  at 
once.  The  human  heart  is  either  a  heart  of  stone,  a  rebellious  heart, 
or  a  new  heart.  The  man  is  either  under  the  dominion  of  sin,  as  ob- 
stinate and  vile  as  ever,  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins;  or  his  heart  is 
humble  and  penitent;  he  is  a  new  creature  and  spiritually  alive.  There 
can  be  no  instant  of  time,  in  which  the  heart  is  neither  a  hard  heart, 
nor  a  new  heart,  and  the  man  is  neither  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins, 
Ibid.,  p.  416. 


i84 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


nor  spiritually  alive.  The  Spirit  of  God  finds  the  heart  of  man  wholly 
corrupt,  and  desperately  wicked,  wholly  and  strongly,  even  with  all 
the  power  he  has,  opposed  to  God  and  his  law,  and  to  that  renovation 
which  he  produces.  The  enmity  of  the  heart  against  God  continues 
as  strong  as  ever  it  was,  till  it  is  slain  by  the  instantaneous  energy 
of  the  divine  Spirit,  and  from  carnal  it  becomes  spiritual,  betwixt 
which  there  is  no  medium,  according  to  scripture  and  reason-^*^ 

This  is  an  advance  in  clearness  of  view  upon  his  prede- 
cessors and  prepares  the  way  for  the  revival  preaching  of 
subsequent  times.  When  conversion  was  viewed  as  instan- 
taneous and  human  efficiency  was  exalted  to  its  proper 
place,  then  it  became  natural  to  preach  to  men  that  conver- 
sion was  their  own  work,  that  they  could  then  and  there, 
before  leaving  their  seats — yes,  while  listening  to  the 
preacher — repent,  believe,  and  be  saved.  Thus  the  last 
strand  in  the  old  doctrine  of  inability  was  broken.  Imme- 
diate repentance  became  the  distinguishing  point  urged  by 
New  England  revival  preaching,  and  was  the  source  of  its 
great  effectiveness. 

As  to  the  nature  of  saving  faith,  Hopkins  says  concisely : 
'Tt  is  considered  and  represented  as  consisting  in  the  exer- 
cise of  the  heart  and  choice  of  the  will :  this  being  essential 
to  it  and  including  the  whole."  This  is  the  foundation 
of  its  instantaneous  character,  and  also  of  its  being  an  ob- 
ject of  command.  The  belief  of  the  truth  of  the  gospel  is 
also  implied  in  it;  holy  love  is  essential  to  it;  true  repent- 
ance is  included  in  it;  obedience  is  connected  with  it;  its 
ultimate  nature  is  love.  The  formal  definition  of  it  is  not 
as  good  as  the  enumeration  of  particulars  just  given.  It  is 
this:  ''Saving  faith  is  an  understanding,  cordial  receiving 
the  divine  testimony  concerning  Jesus  Christ  and  the  way 
of  salvation  by  him;  in  which  the  heart  accords  and  con- 
forms to  the  gospel." 


Loc.  cit.,  p.  367. 
^^Ihid.,  p.  448. 


*s  Ibid.,  p.  423. 


HOPKINS'  SYSTEM  OF  THEOLOGY  185 


We  are  now  prepared  to  consider  more  closely  Hop- 
kins' idea  of  imputation,  which  was  deferred  from  an  ear- 
lier point.  The  definition  of  justification  contains  no  real 
imputation. 

The  justification  of  a  sinner,  now  under  consideration,  consists 
in  forgiving  his  sins,  or  acquitting  him  from  the  curse  and  condem- 
nation of  the  law ;  and  receiving  him  to  favour,  and  a  title  to  all 
the  blessings  contained  in  eternal  life;  which  is  treating  him  as  well, 
at  least,  as  if  he  never  had  sinned,  and  had  been  always  perfectly 
obedient^o 

The  sinner  is  received  to  favor,  not  for  what  he  has 
done,  because  there  is  nothing  in  it  to  recommend  him  to 
God's  favor;  but  for  Christ's  sake,  because  the  believer  is 
united  with  Christ.  The  righteousness  of  Christ  is  not 
transferred  to  the  sinner  that  he  may  be  regarded  righteous. 
He  is  treated  as  though  he  were  righteous,  although  he  is 
not,  for  Christ's  sake.  There  is  a  natural  fitness  that  he 
*'whose  heart  is  united  to  Christ,  as  it  is  by  believing,  should 
be  recommended  to  favour  and  justified  by  his  worthiness 
and  righteousness  to  whom  he  is  thus  united  and  in  whom 
he  trusts."  So  Christ  gains  by  the  merit  of  congruity, 
through  his  obedience,  the  title  to  eternal  life  for  the  be- 
liever. 

We  have  thus  passed  in  review  the  first  complete,  in- 
digenous system  of  theology  issued  in  New  England.  Dis- 
tinguished by  marked  independence,  it  is  nevertheless 
built  upon  the  foundations  laid  by  Hopkins'  predecessors  in 
dogmatic  work  from  the  beginning  of  Christian  history, 
and  is  thus  conservative  and  historical.  Particularly  does 
it  maintain  the  historic  connection  of  our  theology  with 
English  Puritanism,  and  with  its  embodiment  in  the  West- 
minster Confession.  The  great  spiritual  elements  of  this 
Confession  it  maintains  without  abridgment.    It  even  am- 

Ibid.,  p.  458. 
*i  Ihid.,  p.  472. 


^86         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


plifies  them.  The  authority  of  the  Scriptures  is  derived 
from  the  divine  witness  in  the  soul,  and  they  are  then  em- 
ployed in  the  development  of  all  the  system,  by  whr'jli  cir- 
cumstance the  exaggerated  emphasis  given  to  the  rational 
element  in  later  New  England  theologians  is  avoided,  and 
the  distinction  between  natural  and  revealed  theology,  cur- 
rent since  the  days  of  Butler,  is  obliterated.  The  great 
ideas  of  Edwards  are  incorporated  in  the  system,  and  al- 
ready determine  its  character,  though  not  yet  perfectly 
wrought  out.  The  work  is  great  for  its  adherence  to  facts, 
and  for  its  faithfulness  to  the  Scriptures  as  the  source  of  re- 
ligious knowledge.  It  is  pervaded  by  a  marked  religious 
purpose,  for  every  major  section  is  followed  by  an  *'im- 
provement,"  as  the  application  of  a  discourse  was  tech- 
nically called  in  New  England.  On  the  whole,  for  compre- 
hensiveness, thoroughness,  high  tone,  power  of  reasoning, 
independence,  ethical  and  spiritual  value,  and  solid  contri- 
butions to  the  advancing  system  of  thought,  it  deserves  to 
be  called  a  great  work — great  in  comparison  with  the  great 
systems  of  the  Christian  world,  and  unsurpassed  within  its 
own  special  school.  It  illustrates  the  Ritschlian  canon  that 
the  true  spirit  of  a  movement  will  be  found  in  its  earliest 
documents.  He  who  will  thoroughly  know  the  New  Eng- 
land school  must  read  deeply  in  the  system  of  Samuel  Hop- 
kins. 


THE  DEVELOPING  SCHOOL 


CHAPTER  VIII 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT 

From  the  two  leaders  whom  we  have  just  studied,  Bel- 
lamy and  Hopkins,  proceeded  two  streams  of  theological 
influence  which  differed  somewhat  from  each  other.  Not 
that  there  was  any  strong  or  divisive  difference;  for  they 
themselves  labored  in  entire  harmony,  and  both  contributed 
to  the  forming  of  many  of  their  colaborers  and  successors. 
Still  it  may  be  said  that  there  was  a  "school"  of  Bellamy, 
and  there  was  a  school  of  the  followers  of  Hopkins  suf- 
ficiently marked  to  give  rise  to  the  common  name  "Hop- 
kinsians."  The  line  proceeding  from  Bellamy  has  for  its 
principal  names  Edwards  the  Younger,  Smalley,  Dwight, 
Taylor,  Beecher,  and  Tyler;  and  that  from  Hopkins,  Em- 
mons, Woods,  and  finally  Park. 

Among  the  first  generation  of  the  pupils  of  Bellamy  the 
most  conspicuous  name  is  the  younger  Edwards.^  When 
he  came  to  Bellamy,  it  was  with  a  letter  of  introduction 
from  Hopkins,  with  whom  he  had  been  at  Great  Barrington 
for  about  nine  months.^  He  was  no  "Edwardean"  when  he 
arrived  at  Hopkins',  but  the  instruction  of  this  friend  of 
his  father's  soon  brought  him  into  cordial  accord  with  the 
teachings  of  the  first  Edwards.  With  Bellamy  he  remained 
but  three  months,  when  he  was  licensed  to  preach  (1766). 
He  thus  drew  from  both  of  these  teachers,  and  might  be 
thought  to  be  a  Hopkinsian  rather  than  a  follower  of  Bel- 
lamy.   But  because  of  his  temper  and  relations  to  the  gen- 

1  Jonathan  Edwards  the  Younger,  called  often  Dr.  Edwards  to  distinguish 
him  from  his  father,  was  born  at  Northampton  in  1745;  died  1801;  graduated 
at  Princeton,  1765,  and  was  successively  pastor  at  White  Haven  (1769-95)  and 
at  Coleridge  (1796-99),  both  in  Connecticut,  when  in  1799  he  was  elected  presi- 
dent of  Union  College  in  Schenectady,  New  York. 

2  See  Hopkins'  Works,  Vol.  I,  "Memoir,"  p.  59. 

189 


IQO         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

eral  movements  in  Connecticut,  he  belongs  with  the  latter 
rather  than  with  the  former. 

In  spite  of  all  the  disturbance  involved  in  the  Revolu* 
tionary  War,  theological  thought  in  New  England  con- 
tinued to  move  steadily  on.  The  close  of  the  war  was  to  be 
signalized  by  the  more  open  appearance  of  a  movement 
which  threatened  the  very  existence  of  the  new  divinity,  and 
delivered  the  mightiest  blow  against  New  England  Con- 
gregationalism which  it  ever  received — Unitarianism.  But 
still  earlier  there  w^as  another  movement,  of  a  kindred  na- 
ture, and  itself  assuming  ultimately  a  Unitarian  form, 
which  called  out  some  of  the  most  important  treatises  which 
fall  under  our  view  in  the  whole  history  of  New  England 
— Universalism.  And  from  this  attack  there  resulted,  not 
only  a  thorough  discussion  of  eschatological  questions,  but 
also  the  general  introduction  among  the  New  England  di- 
vines of  Bellamy's  Grotian  theory  of  the  atonement. 

The  introduction  of  Universalism  ^  into  America  was 
performed  by  Rev.  Jo'hn  Murray,  who  came  to  this  coun- 
try in  1770.  He  was  a  follower  of  James  Relly,  of  London, 
who,  in  a  book  entitled  Union;  or  A  Treatise  of  the  Con- 
sanguinity and  Affinity  betzveen  Christ  and  his  Church, 
propounded  the  doctrine  of  salvation  en  masse  in  its  ex- 
tremest  form.    He  says : 

Christ's  righteousness  is  upon  all  his  seed;  by  his  single  act,  be- 
fore they  had  any  capacity  of  obeying  after  the  similitude  of  his 
obedience,  or  of  assenting  to  what  he  did  or  suffered.  This  manifests 
such  a  union  to  him,  such  an  inclusion  of  the  whole  seed  in  him,  as 
renders  his  condition  theirs  in  every  state  which  he  passes  through. 
Insomuch  that  his  righteousness,  with  all  the  blessings  and  fruits 
thereof,  is  theirs,  before  they  have  known  it,  believed  it,  or  ever  were 
conscious  of  existence.  Thus  by  the  obedience  of  one  are  many  made 
righteous."* 

3  For  a  considerably  fuller  account  of  this  controversy  and  of  all  the  New 
England  publications  upon  these  themes,  the  reader  may  compare  a  series  of 
articles  by  the  present  writer  in  the  Bibliotheca  Sacra,  extending  from  January, 
1886,  to  January,  1889. 

*  Union  (Am.  ed.),  pp.  26,  27. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT 


191 


Murray  always  preached  upon  the  basis  of  this  theory.^ 
Hosea  Ballou  2cl,  than  whom  there  could  be  no  better  au- 
thority, summarizes  his  teaching  as  follows: 

A  few  are  elected  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  the  truth  in  this  life, 
and  these  go  into  Paradise  immediately  at  death.  But  the  rest,  who 
die  in  unbelief,  depart  into  darkness,  where  they  will  remain  under 
terrible  apprehensions  of  God's  wrath  until  they  are  enlightened. 
Their  sufferings  are  neither  penal  nor  disciplinary,  but  simply  the 
effect  of  unbelief.  Some  will  believe  and  be  delivered  from  their 
darkness  in  the  intermediate  state.  At  the  general  judgment,  such  as 
have  not  been  previously  brought  into  the  truth  will  "com.e  forth 
to  the  resurrection  of  damnation;"  and,  through  ignorance  of  God's 
purpose,  they  will  "call  on  the  rocks  and  mountains  to  fall  on  them," 

etc  Then  the  Judge  will  make  the  final  separation,  dividing  the 

"sheep"  or  universal  human  nature,  from  the  "goats"  which  are  the 
fallen  angels,  and  send  the  latter  away  "into  everlasting  fire."  ^ 

The  effects  of  Murray's  preaching  began  to  be  imme- 
diately felt  in  New  England.  A  small  community  of  Uni- 
versalists  was  gathered  and  organized  into  separate 
churches.  What  the  influence  of  the  Rellyan  mode  of 
thought  was  upon  theologians  it  is  difficult  to  say.  That  it 
achieved  some  influence  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  in 
1796  there  appeared  a  posthumous  work  by  Rev.  Joseph 
Huntington,  D.D.,  long  the  pastor  of  Coventry,  Conn., 
under  the  title  Calvinism  Improved,  which  is  complete  Relly- 
anism,  though  the  disciple  is  in  this  case  greater  than  the 
master.  These  ideas  must  have  long  been  in  his  mind,  and 
it  cannot  be  said  in  how  many  others'.  Huntington  founds 
salvation  upon  the  divine  election,  and  declares  that  ''the 

^  See,  for  example,  his  Universalisni  Vindicated  (Charlestown,  undated;  in 
Harvard  College  Library),  a  discourse  from  the  text  Gen,  28:14 — "In  thy  seed 
shall  all  the  families  of  the  earth  be  blessed" — in  which  the  federal  headship 
of  Christ  is  urged  to  the  point  of  the  inclusion  of  all  men — that  is,  all  individuals 
of  the  human  race — in  all  the  acts  of  Chris'.  Thus  "when  our  Savior  was  sus- 
pended on  the  cross  between  heaven  and  earth,  he  contained  in  Jiimself  as  the 
second  Adam,  the  fulness  of  the  human  nature."  Hence,  as  all  men  have  in 
Christ  died  to  sin,  they  are  all  in  that  fact  already  eternally  saved.  See  par- 
ticularly pp.  16  f¥. 


«  Universalist  Quarterly,  January,  1848. 


192 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


elect  body  is  all  human  nature."'^  But  the  foundation  of 
election  is  in  the  atonement.  Christ  is  strictly  a  substitute 
for  us.  "The  true  doctrine  of  the  atonement  is  in  very  deed 
this.  A  direct,  true,  and  proper  setting  all  our  guilt  to  the 
account  of  Christ,  as  our  federal  head  and  sponsor,  and  a 
like  placing  his  obedience  unto  death  to  our  account."  ^ 
Hence,  as  the  atonement  was  made  for  all  men,  their  guilt 
is  removed  by  it,  and  "by  a  true  and  proper  imputation"  ^ 
its  benefits  are  immediately  communicated  to  the  race. 
Huntington  goes  so  far  as  to  answer  expressly  the  argu- 
ments which  New  England  men  were  beginning  to  use, 
founded  upon  the  idea  that  personal  guilt  and  righteousness 
cannot,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  transferred.  This  is  pos- 
sible because  property  can  be  transferred,  and  all  "men  are 
God's  property,  absolutely  and  wholly  so;  and  of  conse- 
quence [ !]  all  their  doings  are  equally  his  property." 
Through  their  "union  with  Christ"  the  character  of  men  be- 
comes the  character  of  Christ  when  he  is  to  be  punished  for 
them,  and  then  his  obedience  becomes  their  obedience,  thus 
giving  them  salvation.^  ^  This  is  the  Rellyan  idea,  and  it  is 
often  expressed  in  phrases  strikingly  like  Relly's.^^ 

Against  such  a  movement,  which  was  beginning  to  draw 
away  their  people  from  evangelical  truth,  and  which  was 
having  an  influence,  more  or  less  certain,  among  thinkers, 
the  New  England  school  must  protest.  They  did  this  with 
one  consent;  and  they  would  not  have  been  the  children  of 
the  Puritans  if  they  had  not. 

The  Edwardeans  had  always  shown  a  decided  interest 
in  questions  of  escliatology.  Edwards  himself  preached 
some  powerful  and  famous  sermons  upon  this  theme,  led 

op.  cit.,  p.  81,  8  Ibid.,  p.  98. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  108.  Ibid.,  p.  iii. 

'^'^  Ibid.,  pp.  67,  83,  127,   171.    In  1791  he  had  himself  published  at  New- 
buryport,  Thoughts  on  the  Atonement  of  Christ,  in  criticism  of  the  Edwardeans. 
12  E.  g.,  see  ibid.,  pp.  55,  130,  133,  165,  1S3. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT  193 


thereto  by  the  prevailing  indifference  and  spiritual  slug- 
gishness of  the  times,  and  the  disposition  to  deny  the  doc- 
trine already  manifest  in  many  quarters.  He  discussed 
it  with  great  power  and  vividness.  His  great  positive  ar- 
guments were  brought  to  the  support  of  the  position  that 
eternal  punishment  is  just.  This  is  so  because  an  infinite 
evil  demands  an  infinite  punishment,  because  of  the  great- 
ness of  man's  depravity,  because  of  God's  honor,  and  be- 
cause of  the  good  results  which  follow  upon  punishment. 
He  also  went  into  the  refutation  of  errors,  discussing  two 
principal  ones — annihilation  and  final  restoration.  Annihi- 
lation is  a  relief,  whereas  future  punishment,  as  represented 
in  the  Bible,  seems  to  have  no  such  element.  And  restora- 
tion implies  a  future  probation,  as  to  which  there  is  no 
Scripture  evidence  for  it,  and  nothing  in  the  way  of  a  mani- 
fest superiority  to  the  present  probation  to  warrant  it. 

Bellamy  also  turned  to  this  theme,  and  contributed  an 
epoch-making  discussion  of  the  probation  of  the  heathen, 
teaching  that 

all  mankind  have  not  only  sufficient  natural  powers  but  also  sufficient 
outward  advantages  to  know  God  and  perfectly  conform  to  his  law, 
even  the  heathen  themselves ;  and  that  the  very  reason  they  do  not  is 
their  want  of  such  a  temper  as  they  ought  to  have,  and  their  volun- 
tary, rooted  enmity  to  God,  and  love  to  sin.^^ 

The  new  note  of  freedom  and  true  ability  to  repent  inherent 
in  all  men  was  here  struck,  which  was  later  to  sound  still 
more  loudly. 

Among  these  earlier  writers  upon  eschatology  the  first 
place  belongs  to  Samuel  Hopkins,  who  published  in  1783 
An  Inquiry  concerning  the  Future  State  of  Those  Who  Die 
in  Their  Sins}"^  It  was  a  tract  springing  out  of  the 
discussions  of  the  times,  but  it  did  not  mention  Murray  by 
name,  and  was  throughout  of  a  strictly  impersonal  char- 
ts Works.  Vol.  I,  p.  III. 
1*  Works,  Vol.  II,  p.  365. 


194         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


acter.  Only  Jeremiah  White,  a  writer  of  the  previous  cen- 
tury, whose  Salvation  for  All  Men  had  been  recently  pub- 
lished, receives  direct  answer.  Hopkins  intended  to  take  up 
every  important  phase  of  the  subject,  thoroughly  ground 
the  doctrine  in  Scripture  and  reason,  and  answer  every  im- 
portant argument  against  the  eternal  punishment  of  the 
finally  impenitent.  He  even  incorporated  a  sufficient  an- 
swer to  Murray.^ ^  But  he  did  not  judge  the  movement  in- 
augurated by  this  extremist  of  as  great  importance  as  it 
later  seemed  to  be,  and  hence  passed  over  it  without  de- 
tailed notice. 

The  central  idea  controlling  Hopkins'  eschatology  is  his 
lofty  conception  of  the  government  of  God.  It  comprises 
peculiar  views  of  the  being  governed,  man,  of  the  Being 
governing,  and  of  the  character  of  that  government.  As 
to  man,  Hopkins  exalted  him  to  a  very  high  position.  Not 
only  did  he  give  great  scope  to  man's  natural  ability,  and 
emphasize  his  responsibility,  but  he  viewed  him  as  clothed 
with  the  most  exalted  intellectual  powers.  He  was  totally 
depraved ;  that  is,  he  was  totally  turned  away  from  God  and 
engaged  in  his  own  pursuits.  But,  though  thus  morally 
fallen,  his  intellectual  powers  were  unimpaired,^  ^  and  he 
was  capable  of  piercing  by  their  exertion  to  the  counsels  of 
eternity,  and  certainly  of  knowing  fully,  and  with  the  most 
absolute  clearness  and  distinctness,  his  duty  toward  God 
and  man.  As  to  God,  Hopkins'  new  ideas  may  be  com- 
pendiously stated  in  the  single  phrase  that  he  viewed  him 
more  constantly  than  others  had  done  as  a  Governor.  Un- 
der this  conception  it  was  his  intention  to  make  his  readers 
feel  the  infinitely  lofty  and  amiable  character  of  the  divine 
government  as  the  reflection  of  the  divine  character,  which 
was  summarized  in  the  word  "love."  Holiness  is  the  lofti- 
ly Loc.  cit.,  p.  467. 
1®  Cf.  Vol.  I,  pp.  229,  369,  370. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT 


195 


est  thing  in  the  universe.  A  God  of  love,  who  chooses  the 
well-being  of  the  universe,  must  choose  its  holiness  first  of 
all.  Love  of  holiness  is  the  same  as  hatred  of  sin.  God 
hates  it  for  what  it  is  toward  himself,  who  is  the  chief  Being 
in  the  universe;  he  hates  it,  as  a  Governor,  for  its  harmful 
tendency  to  his  government;  he  hates  it  in  that  he  loves 
holiness,  for  this  hate  and  love  are  as  inseparable  as  the  two 
sides  of  a  piece  of  paper.  Thus  he  punishes  it;  and  his  pun- 
ishment of  sin  is  as  amiable  as  his  rewarding  of  righteous- 
ness, for  the  one  motive  extending  through  all  his  actions  is 
love. 

The  general  course  of  his  argument  is  simple.  In  the 
first  section  he  proves  that  the  Scriptures  "teach  that  the 
wicked  will  be  punished  in  the  future  state."  The  text  is 
almost  continuous  quotation.  Then  he  advances  to  the 
proof  that  this  punishment  will  be  *'endless."  His  discus- 
sion includes  a  careful  treatment  of  the  words  employed 
to  express  the  idea  of  endlessness,  which,  if  it  has  not  pre- 
vented later  attempts  to  limit  them  in  various  ways,  ought 
to  have  done  so.  But  the  argument  is  not  petty.  It  pays 
suitable  attention  to  the  general  impression  of  the  Bible. 
It  then  passes  to  the  passages  which  have  been  supposed  to 
teach  another  doctrine.  Incidentally,  among  these,  I  Pet. 
3:19  is  discussed,  with  the  result  that  the  preaching  was 
done  by  Noah  to  the  men  about  him  at  the  time  of  their  sin. 

The  fourth  section  treats  the  rational  argument.  Hop- 
kins was  disposed  to  teach  that  "reason,  without  the  help  of 
divine  revelation,  can  determine  nothing  with  certainty 
about  future  and  endless  punishment."  But  this  position 
did  not  shut  out  all  argument  upon  it  as  improper;  and  he 
believed  that  thorough  reasoning  would  do  much  to  estab- 
lish the  doctrine  by  showing  that  it  was  in  perfect  accord 
with  right  reason.  His  first  argument  was  the  one  al- 
ready elaborated  by  Edwards,  that  sin  was  an  infinite  evil, 


196         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

and  so  deserving  of  an  infinite — that  is,  unending — punish- 
ment. The  magnitude  of  a  sin  is  measured,  he  says,  by  the 
being  against  whom  it  is  committed.  Now,  all  sin  is  ulti- 
mately against  God,  who  is  the  infinite  Being.  Hence  it  is 
an  infinite  evil.  Hopkins  adds  the  thought  that  the  infinite 
evil  of  sin  is  also  seen  in  the  evil  which  it  naturally  tends  to 
produce,  and  will  produce  unless  it  is  prevented. 

It  tends  to  dishonor  and  dethrone  the  Almighty;  to  destroy  all  his 
happiness,  and  to  ruin  his  whole  interest  and  kingdom;  to  introduce 
the  most  dreadful  confusion  and  infinite  misery,  and  render  the  whole 

universe  infinitely  worse  than  nothing,  to  all  eternity  Nothing 

short  of  an  endless  punishment  can  be  its  proper  reward. 

And  he  illustrates  the  argument  thus: 

If  one  who  has  defamed  the  character  of  a  worthy  personage, 
being  prosecuted,  convicted,  and  condemned,  should  be  punished  only 
by  paying  a  small  fine,  viz.,  one  penny  or  shilling,  the  language  of 
this  would  be  that  the  character  of  the  person  defamed  was  worth 
no  more,  and,  therefore,  would  be  so  far  from  answering  to  the  injury, 
and  wiping  off  the  reproach,  that  it  would  really  fasten  the  disgrace 
upon  him,  and  his  character  would  suffer  more  than  if  the  criminal 
had  not  been  condemned  and  punished.  [So]  a  temporary  punish- 
ment only  ....  would  be  infinitely  worse  than  none.^^ 

This  argument,  with  its  utter  neglect  of  the  second  party 
in  the  matter,  man,  is  now  given  up.  It  is,  indeed,  in  fla- 
grant antagonism  to  the  principle  which  New  England 
theology  was  to  bring  forward,  that  obligation  and  ability 
are  commensurate.  But,  held  by  Hopkins  in  all  its  rigidity, 
it  is  easy  to  see  why  he  would  not  hear  to  the  various  ex- 
cuses that  were  offered,  as  if  man  were  too  insignificant 
or  too  ignorant  to  commit  an  infinite  evil.  *Tf  a  finite  being 
can  affront  and  abuse  his  Creator,"  if  he  can  desire  to  de- 
throne his  Maker  and  destroy  his  kingdom,  he  can  commit 
an  infinite  evil. 

Another  striking  argument  in  the  same  line  is  derived 
from  the  atonement.  "One  end  of  the  atonement  which 

1'  Works,  Vol.  11,  p.  445» 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT  197 


Christ  made  for  sin  was  to  show  what  evil  there  is  in  sin 
and  its  ill  desert.  But  this  is  every  way  sufficient  to  atone 
for  sin  which  has  an  infinite  ill  desert;  therefore  this  de- 
clares sin  to  be  an  infinite  evil,  or  to  deserve  infinite  or  end- 
less punishment."  In  modern  phrase,  God  will  not  put 
forth  more  energy  in  the  atonement  than  the  occasion  de- 
mands. He  continues:  *'To  deny  that  there  is  infinite  evil 
in  sin  is,  in  effect,  to  deny  the  divinity  of  our  Saviour."  To 
understand  the  historical  significance  of  this  last  sentence, 
we  must  remember  that  Hopkins  lived  in  the  shadow  of  the 
two  great  coming  controversies,  the  Unitarian  and  the  Uni- 
versalist,  which  he  thus  recognizes  as  closely  allied. 

Hopkins  gave  fuller  expression  than  his  predecessors  to 
the  argument  that  good  will  arise  from  the  eternal  punish- 
ment of  the  wicked.  It  maintains  the  divine  government, 
which  is  a  good.  It  promotes  the  perfect  display  of  God's 
character,  his  displeasure  and  anger  with  sin,  and  thus  his 
righteousness  and  goodness.  Hence  it  will  promote  the 
highest  good  of  the  blessed.  He  expresses  himself  in  the 
characteristic  passage,  more  candid  and  powerful  than 
adroit  or  circumspect : 

The  smoke  of  their  torment  shall  ascend  up  in  the  sight  of  the 
blessed  forever  and  ever,  and  serve,  as  a  most  clear  glass,  always 
before  their  eyes,  to  give  them  a  constant,  bright,  and  most  affecting 
view  of  all  these.  And  all  this  display  of  the  divine  character  and 
glory  will  be  in  favor  of  the  redeemed,  and  most  entertaining,  and 
give  the  highest  pleasure  to  all  who  love  God,  and  raise  their  happi- 
ness to  ineffable  heights,  whose  felicity  consists  summarily  in  the 
knowledge  and  enjoyment  of  God.  This  eternal  punishment  must 
therefore  be  unspeakably  to  their  advantage,  and  will  add  such  im- 
mense degrees  of  glory  and  happiness  to  the  kingdom  of  God,  as  in- 
conceivably to  overbalance  all  they  will  suffer  who  shall  fall  under 
this  righteous  judgment,  and  render  it  all,  in  this  view  and  connec- 
tion, an  infinite  good.^^ 

It  was  upon  this  passage  that  the  caricature  was  issued 
which  represented  Hopkins  as  "entertained"  at  the  suffer- 

18  Ibid.,  p.  459, 


iqS         history  of  new  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

ings  of  the  lost.  Yet  the  passage  reads:  "This  display  of 
the  divine  character  ....  will  be  most  entertaining;" 
and :  Punishment  is  ''in  this  viezv  and  connection,  an  infinite 
good."  The  passage  cannot  be  said  to  breathe  a  spirit  of 
sympathy  or  tenderness;  and  yet  Hopkins  was  not  without 
sensibility  to  the  dreadful  character  of  the  sufferings  of  the 
lost,  considered  in  themselves.  His  constant  thought  is 
that,  if  sin  were  not,  a  happy  universe,  ultimately  without 
trace  of  suffering,  would  be  the  only  one  consistent  with  the 
perfections  of  God.  But  sin  having  entered  by  the  free 
choice  of  man,  punishment  increases  the  glory  of  God. 

One  final  thought  was  contributed  by  Hopkins :  that  the 
number  of  the  saved  will  be  much  greater  than  that  of  the 
lost,  "it  may  be,  many  thousands  to  one."  Even  granting 
that  the  most  part  living  in  the  first  six  thousand  years  of 
the  world's  history  perish,  yet  there  is  to  come  a  seventh 
thousand,  the  blessed  period  of  the  millennium,  when  so 
great  multitudes  will  live  upon  this  earth,  all  of  whom  will 
be  saved,  that  the  great  disparity  will  be  completely  wiped 
out.  Upon  this  thought  of  the  millennium  Hopkins  ex- 
patiates at  great  length  and  with  delight  in  the  appendix  to 
his  System.  His  eschatology,  stern  and  rugged  at  it  is, 
ends  nevertheless  in  a  prophecy  of  unutterable  glory.  Says 
Channing:  "Whilst  to  the  multitude  he  seemed  a  hard,  dry 
theologian,  feeding  upon  the  thorns  of  controversy,  he  was 
living  in  a  region  of  imagination,  feeding  upon  visions  of 
a  holiness  and  a  happiness  which  are  to  make  earth  all  but 
heaven." 

From  this  digression  we  must  now  return  to  the  course 
of  our  history.  We  had  noted  the  arrival  of  John  Murray 
in  America,  and  the  character  of  the  Universalism  which  he 
had  derived  from  James  Relly,  and  which  he  preached. 

i»  Works  (Boston,  1875),  p.  428.  This  sermon  ("Christian  Worship")  gives 
an  excellent  view,  from  an  Unitarian  standpoint,  of  Hopkins'  system  of  theology. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT 


199 


But  our  digression  has  not  been  in  vain,  for  we  have  seen 
the  materials  which  were  in  the  hands  of  those  who  finally 
came  to  the  reply  to  Murray  and  Relly,  which  had  been 
gathered  together  by  their  predecessors  in  this  field.  A  few 
years  had  necessarily  to  elapse  before  this  reply  was  called 
for.  No  teacher  comes  to  his  full  power  at  once;  and  the 
labors  of  Mr.  Murray  could  not  at  once  produce  results 
sufficient  to  call  for  general  public  notice.  In  1779  he  or- 
ganized the  first  Universalist  church  in  Gloucester,  Mass. 
By  the  year  1785  Universalists  were  numerous  enough  in 
Massachusetts  to  justify  the  calling  of  a  convention.  In 
1784  Rev.  Charles  Chauncy,  D.D.,  minister  of  the  First 
Church,  Boston,  issued  his  Salvation  of  All  Men,  the  first 
marked  evidence  that  Universalism  was  beginning  to  find  a 
place  among  the  Congregational  clergy.  Hence  it  was  in 
the  year  1785  that  the  New  England  divines  first  published 
upon  the  new  theories,  when  there  appeared  three  works : 
Smalley's  Wallingford  sermon,  "delivered  by  particular 
agreement,  with  special  reference  to  the  Murryan  contro- 
versy;" Dr.  Edwards'  Three  Sermons  upon  the  atonement; 
and  Stephen  West's  Scripture  Doctrine  of  Atonement.  In 
1789  Edwards  replied  to  Chauncy,  and  in  1796  Nathan 
Strong  to  Huntington.  The  object  of  all  these  treatises 
was  to  refute  the  Rellyan  Universalism  which  had  ap- 
peared, and  all  sought  to  do  it  by  the  same  method,  by  cor- 
recting the  false  premises  upon  which  Relly  had  based  his 
argument.  The  result  of  them  was  to  introduce  into  New 
England  theology,  as  already  remarked,  a  new  theory  of 
the  atonement. 

Smalley's  reply  to  Rellyanism  was  introduced  by  the 
following  statement  of  its  argument.    "God  is  obliged  in 

John  Smalley,  born  at  Columbia,  Conn,  (then  Lebanon),  June  4,  1734; 
studied  theology  under  Bellamy,  1736-37;  ordained  at  New  Britain,  1758;  died 
at  New  Britain,  June  i,  1820.  The  sermons  quoted  are  reprinted  in  Park's 
Collection  of  Discourses  and  Treatises  upon  the  Atonement  (Boston,  1863). 


200         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

justice  to  save  men  as  far  as  the  merit  of  Christ  extends: 
but  the  merit  of  Christ  is  sufficient  for  the  salvation  of  all 
men;  therefore  God  is  obliged  in  justice  to  save  all."  Smal- 
ley  had  been  a  pupil  of  Bellamy,  who  taught  that  Christ 
died  for  all  men.    Hence  he  naturally  said: 

The  minor  proposition  I  dare  not  deny.  I  question  not  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  merit  of  Christ  for  the  salvation  of  all  mankind  

The  only  thing  therefore  which  I  have  to  dispute  in  this  argument 
is  the  obligatoriness  of  the  Redeemer's  merit  on  the  Supreme  Being: 
or,  that  it  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  afford  any  ground  to  demand  sal- 
vation from  God  as  a  just  debt. 

That  is  to  say,  he  questioned  the  major  premise,  which  was 
to  question  the  whole  idea  that  the  death  of  Christ  was  a 
satisfaction  to  justice,  as  Calvinism  had  hitherto  held.  He 
thereby  followed  Bellamy  farther,  and  with  him  made  God 
a  governor,  and  not  the  offended  party,  in  the  matter  of 
sin  and  forgiveness,  as  is  evident  from  his  whole  discussion. 
He  had  apparently  read  Grotius,  for  he  cites  an  illustration 
which  Grotius  gives,  the  act  of  self-mutilation  by  Zaleucus, 
by  which  he  spared  one  eye  to  his  son  who  had  broken  the 
law  the  penalty  of  which  was  to  lose  both  eyes.  Smalley's 
contention  is,  therefore,  that  justification  is  an  act  of  free 
grace,  to  which  God  is  in  no  sense  obligated  in  justice,  and 
which  he  freely  performs  unto  believers  alone.  His  two 
sermons  are  in  full  accord  with  what  other  writers  were 
bringing  out  about  the  same  time  upon  the  atonement,  but 
he  was  too  much  restricted  by  the  practical  aim  of  his 
efforts,  the  refutation  of  Murray,  to  present  the  new  theory 
in  the  most  comprehensive  way  or  to  give  to  it  the  best 
analytical  statement. 

This  special  service  has,  by  general  consent,  been  as- 
cribed to  Dr.  Jonathan  Edwards,  who  delivered  at  New 
Haven,  also  in  the  year  1785,  Three  Sermons  on  the 
necessity  of  the  atonement  and  its  consistency  with  free 

21  In  Park's  collection  of  essays,  The  Atonement,  pp.  i  ff. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT 


20I 


grace.  A  somewhat  fuller  account  of  Edwards'  discourses 
will  therefore  be  required  to  put  the  theory  in  its  historical 
setting. 

The  first  sermon  is  from  the  text :  "In  whom  we  have  redemp- 
tion through  his  blood,  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  according  to  the  riches 
of  his  grace"  (Eph.  i:ii).  Forgiveness  is  here  said  to  be  in  the 
exercise  of  grace,  and  at  the  same  time  in  consequence  of  a  redemp- 
tion by  the  blood  of  Christ.  How  are  these  two  parts  of  the  propo- 
sition consistent?  This,  Edwards  says,  "has  been  to  me  one  of  the 
gordian  knots"  of  theology.  He  seeks  to  loosen  it  by  proposing  three 
successive  questions. 

I.  "Are  we  forgiven  through  the  redemption  or  atonement  of  Jesus 
Christ  only?"  This  question  he  answers  in  the  affirmative.  The 
Scriptures  clearly  teach  it.  Then  "the  necessity  of  the  death  and 
atonement  of  Christ  sufficiently  appears  by  the  bare  event  of  his  death. 
....  We  cannot  suppose  ....  that  the  infinitely  wise  and  good  Father 
would  have  consented  to  the  death  of  his  only  begotten  and  dearly 
beloved  Son  ....  if  there  had  not  been  the  most  urgent  necessity." 
With  this  a  posteriori  argument,  which  is  Calvin's,  he  supports  an 
argument  otherwise  entirely  scriptural. 

n.  Our  next  inquiry  is,  what  is  the  reason  or  ground  of  this 
mode  of  forgiveness?  or  why  is  an  atonement  necessary  in  order  to 
the  pardon  of  the  sinner?  I  answer,  it  is  necessary  on  the  same 
ground,  and  for  the  same  reason,  as  punishment  would  have  been 
necessary,  if  there  had  been  no  atonement  made.  The  ground  of  both 
is  the  same.  The  question  then  comes  to  this:  Why  would  it  have 
been  necessary,  if  no  atonement  had  been  made,  that  punishment 
should  be  inflicted  upon  the  transgressors  of  the  divine  law?  This, 
I  suppose,  would  have  been  necessary  to  maintain  the  authority  of 
the  divine  law.  If  that  be  not  maintained,  but  the  law  fall  into  con- 
tempt, the  contempt  will  fall  equally  on  the  legislator  himself;  his 
authority  will  be  despised  and  his  government  weakened  

"When  moral  creatures  are  brought  into  existence,  there  must  be 

a  moral  government  This   is  the   dictate  of  reason  from  the 

nature  of  things.    Besides  the  nature  of  things,  we  have  in  the  present 

instance  fact,  to  assist  our  reasoning  But  in  order  to  moral 

law,  there  must  be  a  penalty;  otherwise  it  would  be  mere  advice,  but 
no  law.  In  order  to  support  the  authority  and  vigor  of  this  law,  the 
penalty  must  be  inflicted  upon  the  transgressors  It  is  no  im- 
peachment of  the  divine  power  and  wisdom  to  say  that  it  is  impos- 
sible for  God  himself  to  uphold  his  moral  government  over  intelli- 
gent creatures  when  once  his  law  hath  fallen  into  contempt.  He  may, 
indeed,  govern  them  by  irresistible  force,  as  he  governs  the  material 


202 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


world;  but  he  cannot  govern  them  by  law,  by  rewards  and  punish- 
ments For  these  reasons  it  appears  that  it  would  have  been 

necessary,  provided  that  no  atonement  had  been  made,  that  the  pen- 
alty of  the  law  should  have  been  inflicted,  even  in  every  instance  of 
disobedience :  and  for  the  same  reasons  doubtless  was  it  necessary, 
that  if  any  sinners  were  to  be  pardoned,  they  should  be  pardoned  only 
in  consequence  of  an  adequate  atonement.  The  atonement  is  the  sub- 
stitute for  the  punishment  threatened  in  the  law;  and  was  designed 
to  answer  the  same  ends  of  supporting  the  authority  of  the  law,  the 
dignity  of  the  divine  moral  government,  and  the  consistency  of  the 
divine  conduct  in  legislation  and  execution.  By  the  atonement  it  ap- 
pears that  God  is  determined  that  his  law  shall  be  supported;  that  it 
shall  not  be  despised  or  transgressed  with  impunity;  and  that  it  is  an 
evil  and  a  bitter  thing  to  sin  against  God." 

This  is  the  substantial  part  of  the  first  sermon.  Its  concluding 
portion  is  taken  up  with  the  consideration  of  a  number  of  objections,, 
such  as  this,  that,  if  God  had  seen  fit  to  order  it  so,  we  might  have 
made  atonement  for  our  own  sins,  etc.,  all  derogating  from  the  strict 
necessity  of  Christ's  death. 

The  second  sermon  proceeds : 

in.  "Are  we,  notwithstanding  the  redemption  of  Christ,  forgiven 
freely  by  grace?"  After  considering  several  ways  of  bringing  in  the 
word  ''grace,"  when  the  theories  upon  which  forgiveness  was  ex- 
plained, like  those  of  Relly  and  of  the  older  Calvinists,  really  ren- 
dered its  application  improper,  he  continues  the  exposition  of  his  own 
theory.  He  begins  by  defining  the  terms  "justice"  and  "grace."  The 
word  "justice"  is  used  in  three  distinct  senses.  "Sometimes  it  means 
commutative  justice,"  which  "respects  property  and  matters  of  com- 
merce only  and  secures  to  ever}'  man  his  own  property."  Sometimes  it 
means  distributive  justice,  which  "consists  in  properly  rewarding  vir- 
tue or  good  conduct,  and  punishing  crimes  or  vicious  conduct.  To 
treat  a  man  justly  in  this  sense  is  to  treat  him  according  to  his  per- 
sonal character  or  conduct."  Sometimes  it  means  general  or  public 
justice,  which  "comprehends  all  moral  goodness;  and  though  the  word 
is  often  used  in  this  sense,  it  is  really  an  improper  use  of  it.  In  this 
sense,  whatever  is  right  is  said  to  be  just,  or  an  act  of  justice;  and 
whatever  is  wrong  or  improper  to  be  done,  is  said  to  be  unjust,  or  an 
act  of  injustice.  To  practise  justice  in  this  sense,  is  to  practise  agree- 
ably to  the  dictates  of  general  benevolence,  or  to  seek  the  glory  of 
God  and  the  good  of  the  universe. 

"The  term  grace  comes  now  to  be  explained.  Grace  is  ever  so 
opposed  to  justice  that  they  mutually  limit  each  other.  Wherever 
grace  begins,  justice  ends;  and  wherever  justice  begins,  grace  ends. 
Grace,  as  opposed  to  commutative  justice,  is  gratuitously  to  relinquish 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT 


203 


your  property,  or  to  forgive  a  man  his  debt.  And  commutative  in- 
justice is  to  demand  more  of  a  man  than  your  own  property,  Grace 
as  opposed  to  justice  in  the  distributive  sense,  is  to  treat  a  man  more 
favorably  or  mildly  than  is  correspondent  to  his  personal  character, 
or  conduct.   To  treat  him  unjustly  is  to  use  him  with  greater  severity 

than  is  correspondent  to  his  personal  character  With  regard  to 

the  third  kind  of  justice,  ....  as  it  comprehends  all  moral  goodness, 
it  is  not  at  all  opposed  to  grace;  but  comprehends  that,  as  well  as 

every  other  virtue,  as  truth,  faithfulness,  meekness,  etc  And 

even  grace  itself,  which  is  favor  to  the  ill-deserving,  so  far  as  it  is 
wise  and  proper  to  be  exercised,  makes  but  a  part  of  this  kind  of 
justice. 

"We  proceed  now  to  apply  these  explanations  to  the  solution  of 
the  difficulty  under  consideration.  The  question  is  this.  Is  the  pardon 
of  the  sinner,  through  the  atonement  of  Christ,  an  act  of  justice  or  of 
grace?  To  which  I  answer,  That  with  respect  to  commutative  jus- 
tice, it  is  neither  an  act  of  justice  nor  of  grace,  because  commutative 
justice  is  not  concerned  in  the  affair.  We  neither  owed  money  to  the 
deity,  nor  did  Christ  pay  any  in  our  behalf.  His  atonement  is  not  a 
payment  of  our  debt.  If  it  had  been,  our  discharge  would  have  been 
an  act  of  mere  justice,  and  not  of  grace  With  respect  to  dis- 
tributive justice,  the  discharge  of  the  sinner  is  wholly  an  act  of  grace. 
This  kind  of  justice  has  respect  solely  to  the  personal  character  and 

conduct  of  its  object  With  regard  to  the  case  now  before  us, 

what  if  Christ  has  made  an  atonement  for  sin?  This  atonement  con- 
stitutes no  part  of  the  personal  character  of  the  sinner;  but  his  per- 
sonal character  is  essentially  the  same  as  it  would  have  been  if  Christ 
had  made  no  atonement.  And  as  the  sinner  in  pardon  is  treated  not 
only  more  favorably,  but  infinitely  more  favorably,  than  is  corre- 
spondent to  his  personal  character,  his  pardon  is  wholly  an  act  of  in- 
finite grace  In  the  third   sense  of  justice  before  explained, 

according  to  which  anything  is  just  which  is  right  and  best  to  be  done, 
the  pardon  of  the  sinner  is  entirely  an  act  of  justice." 

There  are  a  number  of  other  discussions  in  this  sermon,  some  of 
which  are  marked  by  great  dialectical  keenness.  We  hasten  on  to  the 
third  sermon,  which  is  occupied  with  "inferences  and  reflections." 
Of  these  it  will  be  necessary  to  note  here  only  four,  and  these  very 
briefly. 

"The  atonement  of  Christ  does  not  consist  in  his  active  or  positive 
obedience,"  for  this  "would  never  support  the  authority  of  the  law 
and  the  dignity  of  the  divine  government."  Again,  in  requiring  an 
atonement,  "God  acts,  not  from  any  contracted,  selfish  motives,  but 
from  the  most  noble  benevolence  and  regard  to  the  public  good.  It 
hath  often  and  long  since  been  made  a  matter  of  objection  to  ...  .  the 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


atonement  of  Christ  that  it  represents  the  deity  as  having  regard  merely 
to  his  own  honor  and  dignity,  and  not  to  the  good  of  his  creatures, 
and  therefore  represents  him  as  deficient  in  goodness."  But  this  is 
far  from  the  case.  [This  is,  of  course,  not  an  adequate  treatment  of 
the  point  whether  God  acts  as  the  offended  party  or  as  Ruler,  but  it 
will  be  noted  that  it  covers  that  point.]  Still  again,  the  atonement  of 
Christ  is  not  a  satisfaction  to  distributive  justice,  but  only  to  general 
justice,  or  the  well-being  of  the  universe.  And,  finally,  God  was  under 
no  obligation  in  distributive  justice  to  accept  the  atonement  of  Christ, 
though  ''the  glory  of  God  and  the  greatest  good  of  the  moral  system" 
did  require  him  to  accept  it,  and  in  this  sense  obligate  him. 

This  treatment  of  the  subject  is  hampered  by  the  circum- 
stances which  called  it  forth,  so  as  not  to  afford  a  complete 
view  of  the  atonement,  or  to  present  it  from  its  proper 
starting-point.  It  is  only  inferentially  that  the  great  dif- 
ference between  it  and  the  old  Calvinistic  theory  is  intro- 
duced, the  change  of  the  view  of  God  from  that  of  "of- 
fended party"  to  ''ruler."  Nor  is  the  theory  of  virtue  ap- 
plied as  it  should  be,  although  God  is  said  to  act  with  a  view 
to  the  highest  good  of  all.  But  from  this  time  on,  the  rec- 
toral  theory  of  the  atonement  took  the  place  of  the  satis- 
faction theory,  and  as  time  went  on  received  better  state- 
ments from  successive  theologians.  The  progress  of  our 
history  will  lead  us  to  pass  later  presentations  in  review. 
But  we  must  tarry  still  a  little  upon  the  other  original  state- 
ments of  it,  noticing  next  West's.^^ 

West  presented  his  views,  as  was  possible  in  an  essay  of 
more  than  two  hundred  pages,^^  in  a  much  fuller  and  more 
satisfactory  form  than  Edwards  had  done,  but  in  complete 
accord  with  him  as  to  the  positions  taken.   He  carries  back 

22  Stephen  West,  born  at  Tolland,  Conn.,  November  13,  1735;  died  at 
Stockbridge,  Mass.  (where  he  was  minister  from  1758  to  1818),  May  15,  1819. 
Educated  at  Yale,  graduating  in  1755,  he  studied  theology  with  Rev.  Timothy 
Woodbridge  at  Hatfield,  Mass.,  probably  in  1757-  He  published  Essays  upon 
Moral  Agency  (1772)  and  Evidence  of  the  Divinity  of  Our  Lord  Jesus  Christ 
(1816),  besides  the  essay  now  under  consideration. 

23  Entitled  The  Scripture  Doctrine  of  the  Atonement,  Proposed  to  Careful 
Examination  (1785). 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT  205 


not  merely  the  atonement,  but  the  creation,  to  the  character 

of  God  as  its  foundation. 

A  display,  or  manifestation,  of  his  own  true  and  infinitely  holy  char- 
acter was  the  chief  and  ultimate  end  which   God  had  in  view  in 
creation. — As  God  is  most  eminently  good,  it  is  evident  that  the  real 
disposition  of  his  infinite  mind  doth  not  appear  excepting  in  works  of 
goodness  and  where  some  good  is  actually  done.    His  true  charac- 
ter, therefore,  cannot  otherwise  be  manifested  then  in  doing  good. — 
The  same  glorious  design  which  is  expressed  in  creation,  will  be  in- 
variably expressed  in  preservation,  for  in  strictness  of  speech,  preser- 
vation is  no  more  than  creation  continued.    What  gave  birth  to  the 
existence  of  creatures  will  direct  in  the  government  over  them.  And 
should  we  entertain  a  thought  that  God's  moral  government  will  not 
be  eternally  administered  in  such  a  manner  as  to  express  to  the  best 
advantage  his  true  character,  we  must  at  once  admit  either  that  he 
has  changed  his  original  scheme,  or  that  the  government  of  so  vast 
and  complicated  a  system  is  become  too  unwieldy  for  its  great  and 
original  creator,  either  of  which  suppositions  is  atheistical  and  absurd. 
The  community  must  have  confidence  in  God;  and   the  confidence 
of  a  community  in  the  character  of  a  governor  arises  in  a  great  meas- 
ure from  the  apprehensions  they  have  of  his  sincere,  benevolent  re- 
gards for  the  general  good.    And  they  can  no  further  confide  in  his 
regards  to  the  public  good  than  they  believe  him  to  be  averse  from 
everything  that  injures  the  public.    As  it  is  impossible  that  the  love 
of  virtue  in  any  being  whatever  should  exceed  his  hatred  of  vice, 
it  is  impossible  for  any  one  to  give  evidence  of  the   former  when, 
the  object  being  presented,  he  neglects  expressing  the  latter  in  ways 
becoming  his  character. — ^As  far  as  God's  love  of  righteousness  and 
hatred  of  iniquity  can  be  separately  viewed  and  distinguished  from 
each  other,  the  great  end  of  the  death  of  Christ  was  to  exhibit  the 
latter  and  not  the  former.    The  disposition  of  the  divine  mind  is 
perfectly  uniform  and  harmonious.    There  is  nothing  in  God  or  in 
the  disposition  of  his  mind  but  benevolence  and  love.    Yet  general 
good  operates  in  a  different  manner  toward  different  objects,  and 
obtains  different  epithets  according  to  these  severally  different  oper- 
ations.   Should  we,  for  instance,  conceive  no  different  ideas  of  divine 
justice  from  those  which  we  entertain  of  divine  mercy,  it  is  evident 
we  should  have  no  proper  and  adequate  conceptions  of  either.  Or, 
should  we  form  no  different  ideas  of  God's  love  of  virtue  and  of  his 
hatred  of  vice,  it  is  manifest  that  we  should  view  him  as  being  indif- 
ferent to  virtue  and  vice.    Yet  the  very  different  ways  in  which  God's 
love  of  virtue  and  his  hatred  of  vice  express  themselves  in  fruits, 
and  the  extremely  different  effects  they  produce  in  the  subjects  on 


206 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


whom  they  are  severally  displayed,  naturally  lead  us  to  view  them 
as  in  some  respects  exceedingly  different  from  each  other,  and  that, 
however  obviously  they  discover  in  their  several  operations  beautiful 
harmony  and  uniformity  in  the  disposition  of  the  divine  mind. 

Here  we  see  the  government  founded  upon  the  character 
of  God,  and  this  presented  as  goodness,  love,  which  con- 
sists in  regard  for  the  general  good.  And  what  is  more  im- 
portant, the  maintenance  of  the  government  of  God  is  no 
maintenance  of  this  as  a  mere  government,  but  it  is  a  main- 
tenance of  the  character  through  the  government,  and  this 
for  the  "public  good."  In  other  words,  the  love  of  God  to 
his  creatures,  though  not  this  alone,  leads  him  for  their  sake 
not  to  forgive  without  the  atonement. 

The  theory  of  atonement  thus  introduced  received  con- 
stant study  and  exposition  in  subsequent  years,  to  which 
the  progress  of  our  history  will  bring  us  again.  Leaving  it 
now  in  the  form  in  which  it  was  first  stated,  we  return  for 
a  brief  review  of  its  closing  stages,  to  the  early  Universalist 
controversy. 

The  year  1784  saw,  as  noted  above,  the  publication  of 
Chauncy's  Salvation  of  All  Men.  This  was  not  Chauncy's 
first  appearance  against  evangelical  theology,  for  in  1743 
he  had  written  against  the  revivals  of  that  year,  and  par- 
ticularly against  Edwards'  Distinguishing  Marks  of  a 
Work  of  the  Spirit  of  God.  The  doctrine  he  now  advocated 
was  "that  the  scheme  of  revelation  has  the  happiness  of  all 
mankind  lying  at  bottom,  as  its  great  and  ultimate  end." 
He  teaches  future  punishment,  which  he  designates  as 
"awful  misery;"  but,  however  long  it  may  be,  or  "however 
many  states  some  of  the  individuals  of  the  human  species 
may  pass  through,"  it  will  issue  in  such  a  change  of  mind  as 
shall  fit  men  for  salvation,  and  "the  Son  of  God  ....  will 
not  deliver  up  his  trust  into  the  hands  of  the  Father  .... 
till  he  has  fully  discharged  his  obligations  in  virtue  of  it, 

24  Op.    Cit.,   pp.    12,  13. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT 


207 


having  finally  fixed  all  men  in  heaven,  when  God  will  be  all 
in  all." 

The  work  rests  upon  what  was,  doubtless,  a  well-nigh 
self-evident  proposition  to  Chauncy — that  universal  happi- 
ness was  the  designed  goal  of  the  universe.  Still  the  argu- 
ment is  carefully  exegetical,  however  defective.  On  Rom. 
5:12  ff.  he  argues  that,  as  mankind  universally  is  the  object 
of  condemnation,  *'the  same  mankind  must  universally  be 
the  object  of  the  opposite  justification."  The  discussion 
of  the  meaning  of  the  words  for  "everlasting"  in  the  Greek 
Testament,  alcov  and  alcovLo^;,  is  an  extended  one.  He 
curiously  inverts  the  argument  from  Matt.  25:46,  robbing 
it  of  all  power  to  bear  independent  witness  in  the  matter. 
He  says : 

The  precise  duration  intended  by  the  words  ....  must  be  determined  by 
the  nature  of  the  thing  spoken  of,  or  other  passages  of  Scripture  that  explain 
it.  When  it  is  affirmed  of  the  wicked  that  they  shall  go  away  ets  Kb\a<TLv 
aiwvLov,  into  everlasting  punishment,  the  certain  meaning  of  this  word  alibvios, 
everlasting,  is  clearly  and  fully  settled  by  the  above  proof  of  the  final  salvation 
of  all  men. 26 

The  reply  of  Edwards  was  predominantly  rational.  He 
thus  recognized  the  essential  rationalism  underlying  the 
whole  of  Chauncy's  argument.  Not  that  he  neglected  the 
exegetical  reply;  for  this  was  both  elaborate  and  annihilat- 
ing. In  discussing  the  words  alcov  and  ala)vLo<;,  he 
counts  their  occurrences  in  the  New  Testament,  classifies 
them,  subjoins  a  concordance.  He  proves  their  entire  cor- 
respondence to  our  English  words  "eternity"  and  "eternal," 
and  shows  that  the  presumption  with  which  we  come  to  the 
subject  of  future  punishment  is  in  favor  of  their  strict  use 
here.  He  follows  Chauncy  into  all  his  windings  and  con- 
futes him  everywhere,  manifesting  all  the  keenness  and  de- 
light in  dialectics  which  his  father  had  shown. 

25  7&tV.,   p.  60. 

Ibid.,  p.  270. 


208 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


But  the  book  was  more  than  merely  a  successful  piece  of 
debate.  It  furthered  essentially  the  understanding  of  its 
theme  among  the  New  England  divines.  The  same  dis- 
criminations as  to  various  kinds  of  justice  which  appeared 
in  the  sermons  on  the  atonement  are  applied  to  this  theme. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  principle  of  all  virtue  is  beginning 
to  modify  even  the  definition  of  distributive  justice;  for, 
v/hile  distributive  justice  respects  the  "personal  character" 
of  the  sinner,  the  nature  and  amount  of  a  just  punishment 
are  determined  by  the  proportion  which  ought  to  exist  be- 
tween it  and  the  crime.  A  punishment  is  just  "when  by  the 
pain  or  natural  evil  of  the  punishment  it  exhibits  a  just  idea 
of  the  moral  evil  or  ruinous  tendency  of  the  crime,  and  a 
proper  motive  to  restrain  all  intelligent  beings  from  the 
commission  of  the  crime."  This  is  to  determine  distrib- 
utive justice  by  the  consideration  of  the  general  good,  or 
to  convert  it  into  public  justice.  Thus  the  relation  to  the 
goodness  of  God  of  his  punishment  of  men  is  brought  in  at 
this  early  point ;  but  there  is  also  a  special  discussion  of  this 
relation.  In  order  to  answer  Chauncy's  fundamental  as- 
sumption, Edwards  asks  the  question  "whether  the  damned 
deserve  any  other  punishment  than  that  which  is  conducive 
to  their  personal  good."  If  they  do  not,  and  do  not  re- 
ceive any  other,  then  it  is  perfectly  easy  to  reconcile  their 
punishment  with  the  divine  goodness,  for  it  is  nothing  but 
an  exercise  of  the  divine  goodness  toward  them.  Edwards 
answers  the  question  affirmatively,  because  of  the  words 
which  the  Scripture  employs  to  designate  this  punishment 
— "curse,"  "vengeance,"  "great  evil,"  etc. — which  are  ir- 
reconcilable with  Chauncy's  idea.  But,  now,  how  is  future 
punishment  consistent,  upon  this  basis,  with  the  divine 
goodness?    Edwards  replies:  Pain  inflicted  in  this  life,  and 

Edwards'  Works,  Vol.  I,  p.  74. 
Ibid.,  p.  24. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT  209 


some  punishment  in  the  world  to  come  (which,  it  will  be 
remembered,  Dr.  Chauncy  did  not  deny),  are  evidently  for 
the  good  of  the  universe  upon  the  whole.  *'Why  may  not 
endless  misery  be  so  too,  provided  it  be  just?"  Thus  Ed- 
wards answers  the  objections  by  an  irrefutable  hypothesis. 
He  compels  his  opponent  to  prove  a  universal  negative,  if 
he  will  maintain  the  irreconcilability  of  eternal  punish- 
ment with  the  divine  goodness ;  viz. :  Endless  punishment 
answers  no  good  end.  But  he  does  not  stop  here;  he  goes 
on  with  an  argument  positively  supporting  the  consistency 
of  punishment  with  goodness.  To  make  a  law  which  is  in- 
consistent with  goodness  is  just  as  bad  as  to  execute  it. 
But  here  is  a  law  threatening  eternal  punishment.  To  exe- 
cute it  is  no  worse  than  to  make  it.  Both  must  be  consistent 
with  goodness,  if  either  is.  But,  since  sin  is  in  the  world, 
God  must  punish  it.    If  he 

were  never  to  punish  it,  it  would  seem  that  he  is  no  enemy  to  it. 
Or,  if  he  punish  it  in  a  far  less  degree  than  it  deserves,  still  it  would 
seem  that  his  displeasure  at  it  is  far  less  than  it  is  and  ought  to  be. 
.  .  .  .  But  will  any  man  say  that  it  is  conducive  to  the  good  order 
and  happiness  of  the  intellectual  system,  that  God  should  appear  t© 
be  no  enemy,  but  rather  a  friend,  to  sin?^^ 

One  more  work  must  be  briefly  reviewed,  and  then  we 
may  turn  away,  for  a  time,  from  the  Universalist  contro- 
versy. This  is  Dr.  Nathan  Strong's  reply  to  Huntington's 
Calvinism  Improved.^'^  This  is  one  of  the  best  books  of 
the  series.  It  is,  however,  in  so  perfect  harmony  with  the 
works  already  examined,  in  the  carefulness  of  its  exegetical 
discussions,  in  its  emphasis  of  the  new  theory  of  the  atone- 

Ibid.,  p.  124. 

30  Ibid.,  p.  140. 

31  Nathan  Strong,  born  at  Coventry,  Conn.,  October  i6,  1748;  died  December 
25,  1816.  He  graduated  from  Yale  College  in  1769,  was  tutor  there  in  1772  and 
1773,  and  was  ordained  minister  of  the  First  Church  in  Hartford  *in  the  fall 
of  1773.  He  held  this  position  till  his  death.  He  published  a  number  of  ser- 
mons, was  the  founder  of  the  Connecticut  Evangelical  Magazine,  and  one  of  the 
founders  of  the  Connecticut  Missionary  Society.  He  received  the  degree  of  D.D. 
from  Princeton  in  1801. 


2IO 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


ment  as  the  proper  answer  to  Rellyanism,  and  in  the  thor- 
oughness with  which  it  pursues  the  antagonist  through  all 
the  intricacies  of  his  argument,  that  we  should  be  only  re- 
peating what  has  already  been  presented  if  we  indulged  in 
special  citations.  He  repudiates  with  great  force  Relly's 
doctrine  of  ''union."  And  the  divergence  of  Huntington 
from  evangelical  theology  is  shown  by  the  difference  of  his 
doctrine  of  saving  faith. 

At  this  point  we  may  break  off  the  discussion  of  Univer- 
salism  for  a  time.  The  work  of  the  New  England  divines 
did  not  stop  the  spread  of  the  movement,  for  it  founded  a 
small  number  of  churches,  which  had  for  many  years  a  lin- 
gering existence,  and  have  perpetuated  themselves  to  the 
present  day.  But  these  powerful  collections  of  argument 
did  arrest  the  tendency  toward  Universalistic  views  of  the 
future  among  the  New  England  churches,  and  determined 
that  the  course  of  New  England  theology  should  embrace 
no  such  divergence  from  the  evangelical  theology  of  the 
past. 

We  return,  therefore,  to  the  history  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  atonement  which  we  broke  off  with  the  essay  of  Stephen 
West.  We  had  found  him  presenting  more  fully  than  his 
predecessors  the  origin  of  the  atonement  in  the  love  of 
God,  though  leaving  something  to  be  desired  in  respect  to 
the  orderly  development  of  this  great  central  thought.  His 
successors  remedied  this  defect  with  increasing  plainness 
of  statement. 

Dr.  Nathaniel  Emmons  (i  745-1 840)  expresses  the  con- 
nection between  the  love  of  God  and  the  atonement  by  a 
more  orderly  deduction.    He  says  : 

All  the  moral  perfections  of  the  Deity  are  comprised  in  the  pure 
love  of  benevolence.  God  is  love.  Before  the  foundation  of  the 
world  there  was  no  ground  for  considering  love  as  divided  into 
various  and  distinct  attributes.    But  after  the  creation  new  relations 

'2  Park's  Discourses  and  Treatises,  pp.  ii6,  117. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT 


211 


arose;  and  in  consequence  of  new  relations,  more  obligations  were 
formed,  both  on  the  side  of  the  Creator,  and  on  that  of  his  creatures. 
Before  created  beings  existed,  God's  love  was  exercised  wholly  to- 
wards himself.  But  after  moral  beings  were  brought  into  existence, 
it  was  right  in  the  nature  of  things  that  he  should  exercise  right 
affections  towards  them  according  to  their  moral  characters.  Hence 
the  goodness,  the  justice,  and  the  mercy  of  God  are  founded  in  the 
nature  of  things.  That  is,  so  long  as  God  remains  the  Creator,  and 
men  remain  his  creatures,  he  is  morally  obliged  to  exercise  these 

different  and  distinct  feelings  towards  them  Now,  there  never 

was  any  difficulty  in  the  way  of  God's  doing  good  to  the  innocent, 
nor  in  the  way  of  his  punishing  the  guilty;  but  there  was  a  difficulty 

in  sparing  and  forgiving  the  wicked  This  was  a  difficulty  in 

the  divine  character,  and  a  still  greater  difficulty  in  the  divine  gov- 
ernment; for  God  had  revealed  his  justice  in  his  moral  government, 
.  .  .  .  How  then  could  grace  be  displayed  consistently  with  justice? 

This  question  God  alone  was  able  to  solve  By  inflicting  such 

sufferings  upon  Christ,  when  he  took  the  place  of  a  substitute  in  the 
room  of  sinners,  God  as  clearly  displayed  his  hatred  of  sin,  and  his 
inflexible  disposition  to  punish  it,  as  if  he  had  made  all  mankind  per- 
sonally miserable  forever.^^ 

Thus  again,  the  government  of  God  is  founded  upon  his 
character,  and  ruled  in  accordance  with  it.  There  is  still 
something  of  the  juridical  and  external  in  the  form  of  pre- 
sentation, however,  and  it  needs,  perhaps,  to  be  corrected 
by  emphasizing  the  fact  that  the  government  which  is  here 
to  be  maintained  is  not  a  government  of  brute  force,  but  a 
moral  one,  a  government  of  moral  agents  by  means  of 
influence.    Emmons  says  : 

It  belongs  to  God  not  only  to  exercise  a  natural  government  over  the 
natural  world,  but  to  exercise  a  moral  government  over  the  moral 
world.  The  proper  mode  of  governing  moral  subjects  is  by  laws,  re- 
wards, and  punishments.^^ 

32  The  discussion  from  Emmons  to  the  end  of  this  chapter  appeared  origi- 
nally in  the  Bibliotheca  Sacra  for  October,  1890  (pp.  575  l¥.). 
Works  (ed.  1842),  Vol.  VI,  p.  182. 

An  objection  sometimes  made  to  the  statement  that  the  interests  of  God's 
government  required  the  atonement  is,  that  God  is  able  to  take  care  of  his 
government,  and  nothing  that  a  sinner  can  do  on  account  of  the  free  for- 
giveness of  men  can  ever  weaken  it.  It  will  be  seen  upon  reflection  that 
this  objection  views  the  government  of  God  as  a  government  of  force,  and 
not   a   moral   government.     It   is   important,   therefore,   with   reference   to  the 


212 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


We  may  pass  on,  however,  for  a  more  satisfactory  treat- 
ment of  this  joint,  to  Dr.  Edward  D.  Griffin  (i 770-1837), 
whose  treatise  upon  the  extent  of  the  atonement  emphasized 
topic,  and  so  had  occasion  to  dwell  more  at  length  upon  the 
nature  of  a  moral  government.  Whatever  difference  there 
is,  is  more  of  form,  however,  than  of  substance.  Griffin 
says : 

Considered  in  relation  to  its  dominion  over  the  mind,  a  moral  gov- 
ernment may  be  called  a  government  of  motives;  for  these  are  the  in- 
struments by  which  it  works.  It  is  a  course  of  acting,  not  upon  the 
disposition  by  insensible  influence,  but  upon  the  reason  and  conscience 

of  a  rational  being  by  manifest  motives  In  a  limited  sense  a 

moral  government  is  the  mere  administration  of  law ;  but  in  a  more 
general  and  perfect  sense  it  includes  the  whole  treatment  which  God 

renders  to  moral  agents  A  moral  government  wields  all  the 

motives  in  the  universe.  It  comprehends  the  entire  system  of  in- 
struction intended  for  creatures.  The  Bible  lies  wholly  within  its 
bounds.  It  comprehends  the  public  dispensation  both  of  law  and 
gospel,  with  the  whole  compages  of  precepts,  invitations,  promises, 
and  threatenings.  It  comprehends  the  atonement,  and  all  the  cove- 
nants made  with  men,  and  all  the  institutions  of  religion,  with  the 

whole  train  of  means  and  privileges  It  comprehends  a  throne  of 

grace,  with  all  the  answers  to  prayer.  It  comprehends  a  day  of  proba- 
tion, with  all  the  experiments  made  upon  human  character  It 

comprehends  the  day  of  judgment  It  comprehends  all  the  sen- 
sible communion  between  the  Infinite  and  finite  minds;  all  the  percep- 
tible intercourse  between  God  and  his  rational  offspring;  all  the  treat- 
ment of  intelligent  creatures  viewed  otherwise  than  as  passive  re- 
ceivers of  sovereign  impressions.^^ 

Caleb  Burge  (i 782-1838),  whose  Essay  on  the  Scrip- 
ture Doctrine  of  Atonement  is  one  of  the  very  best  of  the 
New  England  treatises  upon  the  subject,  reproduces  these 
ideas  in  various  forms.  He  employs  certain  forms  of  ex- 
pression, not  common  elsewhere,  which  present  with  special 
felicity  the  substitute  which  New  England  theology  has  to 

objection,  to  note,  as  we  proceed,  the  true  conception  of  the  government  of 
God  which  underlies  the  governmental  view.  It  will  be  evident  at  last  that 
it  is  the  force-theory  which  is  "external,"  and  not  the  view  resting  upon  the 
thought  of  a  moral  government. 

Park's  Discourses  and   Treatises,   pp.  293-98. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT  213 


offer  for  the  doctrine  that  the  atonement  satisfied  the  dis- 
tributive justice  of  God.  Its  emphasis  upon  the  individual- 
ity of  man  forced  it  to  the  position  that,  as  justice  de- 
manded the  punishment  of  the  sinner  himself,  no  other  ar- 
rangement could  satisfy  exactly  this  demand.  Yet  there 
was  something  in  God  himself  which  must  be  satisfied  by  an 
atonement,  which  Burge  styles  his  "justice  to  himself." 
He  says : 

Every  good  being,  in  order  to  do  justice  to  his  own  character, 
must  manifest  his  goodness.  A  wise  being,  in  order  to  do  justice  to 
his  character,  must  manifest  his  wisdom;  or,  at  least,  he  must  not 
manifest  anything  which  is  opposite  to  wisdom.  All  must  allow  that 
if  one  being  should  knowingly  give  a  wrong  representation  of  the 
character  of  another,  who  is  wise  and  good,  he  would  be  very  un- 
just. But  if  a  good  and  wise  being  should  give  a  wrong  representation 
of  his  own  character  (if  this  were  possible)  there  would  be  the  same 
injustice  done  which  there  would,  if  the  same  representation  were 
made  by  another.^'^ 

Hence,  in  order  properly  to  represent  his  own  character, 
and  be  just  to  himself,  God  must  forgive  only  upon  a  pro- 
vided atonement.  This  is  the  truth  underlying  the  incorrect 
statements  of  the  strict  satisfaction  theory. 

We  pass  on  rapidly  to  Dr.  N.  W.  Taylor  (1786-1858). 
He  placed  the  moral  government  of  God  in  the  forefront  of 
his  theology,  and  two-thirds  of  his  printed  lectures  are 
more  decidedly  the  freedom  of  man  in  connection  with  this 
topic.  But  they  are  only  the  development  of  what  had  been 
taught  from  the  first  in  New  England.  This  appears  in  the 
very  form  of  the  definition  of  a  perfect  moral  government 
given  at  the  beginning  of  the  treatise.  Taylor  defines  thus : 
''The  influence  of  the  ....  rightful  authority  of  a  moral 
governor  on  moral  beings,  designed  so  to  control  their 
action  as  to  secure  the  great  end  of  action  upon  their  part, 
through  the  medium  of  law."       Moral  beings  are  defined 

^"^  Ihid.,  p.  450, 

Lectures  on  the  Moral  Government  of  God  (1859),  Vol.  I,  p.  7. 


214         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


as  "beings  capable  of  moral  action."  The  points  which 
Griffin  had  emphasized,  form  the  main  staple  of  Taylor's 
argument,  except  that  they  receive  new  force  from  the  new 
theory  of  the  constitution  of  the  mind,  which,  beginning 
with  Asa  Burton,  had  now  in  Taylor's  hands  given  Ameri- 
can theology  a  better  division  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind, 
and,  by  separating  the  sensibility  and  the  will,  had  made  a 
reasonable  theory  of  moral  action  for  the  first  time  possible. 
The  "control"  spoken  of  is  a  control  through  influence, 
and  this  is  the  influence  of  authority.  The  law  promul- 
gated requires  "benevolence  ....  as  the  best  kind  of 
action  and  as  the  sum  of  obedience."  Taylor  views  "be- 
nevolence on  the  part  of  the  moral  governor  and  its  mani- 
festation as  one  essential  ground  of  his  authority." 

In  this  fact  is  involved  another.  The  moral  governor  who  is  truly 
and  perfectly  benevolent,  must  feel  the  highest  approbation  of  right 
moral  action  and  the  highest  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action  on 
the  part  of  his  subjects.  These  particular  emotions  in  view  of  the 
true  nature  and  tendency  of  right  and  wrong  moral  action  are  in- 
separable from  the  nature  of  benevolence  in  every  mind.  Again,  be- 
nevolence, in  the  specific  form  of  it  now  stated  as  the  character  of  the 
moral  governor,  must,  from  the  very  nature  and  design  of  his  rela- 
tion be  supremely  concerned  and  absolutely  committed  to  secure  so 
far  as  he  is  able,  right  moral  action  in  every  instance,  and  to  prevent 
wrong  moral  action  in  every  instance  by  the  influence  of  his  au- 
thority.^^ 

Even  the  legal  sanctions  ratify  God's  authority  by  mani- 
festing his  benevolence.  And  so,  when  men  have  sinned, 
their  salvation  can  be  given  only  upon  an  atonement,  since 
otherwise  God  would  not  appear  to  hate  sin,  or  would  dis- 
regard the  obligations  imposed  by  benevolence  to  maintain 
the  authority  of  the  law.  In  the  development  of  this  line 
of  thought  he  is  particularly  strong.  The  immutability  of 
God's  character  is  the  foundation  of  the  immutability  of 
his  law,  which  is  the  expression  of  that  character.    The  im- 

8»  Loc.  cit..  p.  86. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT  215 


mutability  of  the  law  is  the  same  as  the  immutability  of  its 
sanctions.  Hence,  as  God  is  what  he  is,  he  must  maintain 
the  authority  of  his  law,  and  hence  the  principle :  the  per- 
fect equity  or  justice  of  a  moral  governor  can  be  reconciled 
with  mercy  to  transgressors  only  through  an  atonement. 
He  shuts  up  the  objector  to  an  atonement  successively  to 
denying  the  benevolence  of  God,  or  else  to  maintaining  the 
future  exact  retribution  of  this  wicked  world,  or  else  to  ad- 
mitting an  atonement.  He  does  this  with  so  great  cogency 
and  force  as  almost  to  amount  to  a  new  proof  of  the  neces- 
sity of  the  atonement.  The  necessity  lies  in  the  demands 
of  real  and  comprehensive  benevolence.^^ 

it  is  unnecessary  to  quote  from  the  writings  of  Charles 
G.  Finney  (i  792-1 875).  The  same  views  would  be  found 
to  be  repeated  in  connection  with  his  more  radical  and  cor- 
rect opinions  upon  the  freedom  of  the  will.  The  meaning 
of  a  moral  government;  the  character  of  God  as  love, 
which  constitutes  the  divine  response  to  the  immediate  af- 
firmations of  his  own  intellect  as  to  obligation ;  love  as  hav- 
ing respect  to  the  moral  system  as  a  whole  and  demanding 
a  satisfaction  to  '^public  justice;"  and  the  perfect  adapta- 
tion of  the  divine  government  and  of  the  atonement  to 
securing  the  best  good  of  all  concerned,  are  brought  out 
by  him  in  terms  largely  identical  with  those  employed  by 
his  predecessors,  but  with  the  added  clearness  which  cor- 
recter  views  as  to  the  nature  of  the  mind  and  moral  agency 
rendered  possible. 

Our  whole  review  up  to  this  point  has  shown  us  that, 
while  the  New  England  writers  emphasized  the  divine  gov- 
ernment as  the  sphere  within  which  the  atonement  was 
wrought,  they  all  with  increasing  clearness  founded  that 
government  upon  an  ethical  idea,  a  conception  of  the  char- 
acter of  God  as  love,  which  redeems  the  theory  from  the 

*oCf.  ibid..  Vol.  I,  pp.  270  ff.;  Vol.  II,  pp.  149  ff. 


2l6 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


charge  of  artificiality  and  superficiality,  though  they  did  not 
seek  to  make  the  ethical  idea  prominent,  or  generally  to  de- 
duce the  whole  theory  from  the  ideal  basis  of  it.  But  even 
the  points  already  discussed  cannot  be  made  as  full  and 
clear  as  they  should  be,  till  we  have  read  further.  We  there- 
fore pass  on  without  delay  to  the  relation  of  election  to  the 
atonement. 

The  question  of  the  extent  of  the  atonement  was  promi- 
nently brought  before  the  New  England  writers  from  the 
first  of  their  investigations  upon  the  subject.  The  Univer- 
salists  had  made  the  proposition  that  Christ  died  for  all  a 
principal  step  in  their  argument.  The  old  theories  had 
avoided  their  conclusion  only  by  denying  that  he  died  for 
all;  but  this  truth  was  too  plain  to  admit  of  denial,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  New  England  thinkers.  So,  from  the  first, 
they  taught  the  doctrine  of  a  general  atonement. 

Dr.  Edwards  says  nothing  in  particular  upon  this  point 
in  his  three  sermons.  West,  however,  proceeds  to  draw  the 
conclusion  which  could  but  follow  so  soon  as  the  premises 
of  the  new  theory  were  adopted.^^  The  atonement  was  suf- 
ficient for  the  whole  world,  not  in  the  sense  that  it  "super- 
seded all  use  of  punishment  in  the  divine  government," 
but  in  the  sense  that  it  made  "such  a  manifestation  of  di- 
vine displeasure  against  the  wickedness  of  men  as  is 
enough  to  convince  every  candid  spectator  that  the  dis- 
position of  the  divine  mind  is  perfectly  conformable  to  the 
true  spirit  of  God's  written  law."  "The  direct  end  of 
atonement  is  answered,"  he  says,  "and  such  a  manifesta- 
tion made  of  divine  righteousness  as  prepared  the  way  for 
a  consistent  exercise  of  mercy.  Now,  God  would  not  ap- 
pear to  give  up  his  law  even  though  he  pardoned  the  sin- 
ner."   West  then  dwells  largely  upon  the  dignity  of  the 

Loc.  cit.,  pp.  135  ff. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT  217 


person  of  Christ  as  exalting  the  atonement  made  by  him, 
and  contributing  to  its  perfection,  and  so  to  its  universality, 
Emmons  is  axiomatic  and  incisive,  as  usual.  The  prop- 
osition of  his  sermon  upon  the  necessity  of  the  atonement 
is:  ''That  the  atonement  of  Christ  was  necessary  entirely 
on  God's  account,"  i.  e.,  not  at  all  upon  man's.  Hence  he 
argues : 

Then  it  was  universal,  and  sufficient  for  the  pardon  and  salvation 
of  the  non-elect.  ....  If  it  has  rendered  it  consistent  with  the  jus- 
tice of  God  to  exercise  pardoning  mercy  to  one  sinner,  it  has  ren- 
dered it  equally  consistent  with  his  mercy  to  exercise  pardoning  mercy 

to  all  sinners  It  opens  as  wide  a  door  of  mercy  to  the  one  as 

to  the  other.*2 

If  the  only  obstacles  were  upon  God's  part,  once  removed 
they  were  removed. 

The  great  treatise  upon  this  part  of  the  subject  was, 
however.  Griffin's.  We  shall  not  fully  understand  his  argu- 
ment unless  we  have  somewhat  clearly  in  mind  the  course 
of  New  England  thought  upon  the  whole  subject  of  the 
will,  for  Griffin  seeks  to  find  a  solution  of  the  difficulties 
between  the  maintainers  of  limited  and  of  general  atone- 
ment by  sharper  distinctions  upon  moral  agency.  We  are 
therefore  conpelled  partly  to  anticipate  the  discussion  to 
which  the  next  chapter  is  to  be  devoted.  The  freedom  of 
the  will,  as  needs  scarcely  to  be  recalled,  was  the  great 
first  question  which  engaged  New  England  theology  when 
Edwards  began  his  contest  with  the  Arminians.  His  solu- 
tion, while  providing  for  the  divine  sovereignty,  and  an  ex- 
ternal freedom  of  the  man  to  do  what  he  willed,  did  not 
provide  for  the  freedom  of  the  will  itself.  This  was  felt 
by  his  contemporary  and  successor,  Samuel  Hopkins,  who 
brought  forward  the  idea  that  freedom  was  an  inalienable 
attribute  of  the  will  as  such,  and  made  it  to  reside,  not  in 
Edwards'  external  freedom,  but  in  the  very  exercise  of 

*2  Park's  Discourses  and  Treatises,  p.  119. 


2l8 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


volition.  Emmons,  who  was  fond  of  paradoxical  forms 
of  statement,  emphasized  human  agency  as  much  as  he  did 
divine  sovereignty,  and  often  employed  much  the  same 
terms  to  describe  each.  God  governs  man  through  motives, 
and  yet  when  motives  have  been  presented,  he  acts  upon 
the  will,  which  without  his  action  never  could  respond  to 
their  stimulus.  Thus  God  ''produces"  our  volitions.  In 
fact,  all  action  in  the  universe  is  God's,  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  by  a  mysterious  connection  between  man  and  God, 
man  acts  exactly  as  if  God  did  not  act.  He  is  perfectly 
free,  and  this  in  the  same  sense  as  God  himself  is.  Under 
his  universal  agency,  man  has  a  real  agency,  which  must  no 
more  be  neglected  than  that  of  God.  With  varying  success 
as  to  the  theory  of  the  will,  the  deepening  tendency  of  the 
New  England  school  was  to  view  the  divine  and  human  op- 
erations in  the  matter  of  volition  as  if  they  were  two  con- 
centric spheres.  The  ultimate  question  as  to  the  possi- 
bility of  the  communication  of  independence  to  man  they 
did  not  attempt  to  solve.  The  fact  of  natural  powers  was 
enough. 

Now  Griffin  approaches  the  problem  very  much  after  the 
manner  of  Emmons.  His  purpose  is  to  reconcile  the  two 
schools  of  thought  upon  the  extent  of  the  atonement,  and 
he  says: 

One  party  contemplate  men  as  passive  receivers  of  sanctifying  im- 
pressions ;  and  their  question  is,  How  many  did  God  intend  by  re- 
generating influence  to  make  partakers  of  the  benefit  of  the  atone- 
ment ?  The  answer  is,  The  elect.  And  so  say  we.  The  other 
party  contemplate  men  as  moral  agents;  and  their  question  is,  How 
many  did  God  intend  to  furnish  with  a  means  of  pardon  which  they 
should  be  under  obligations  to  improve  to  their  everlasting  good? 
The  answer  is,  All  who  hear  the  gospel.  And  so  say  our  brethren. 
....  The  mistake  of  our  brethren,  as  we  view  it,  has  arisen  from 
not  keeping  these  two  characters  of  man  distinct  [viz.,  passive  sub- 
jects and  agents]  The  two  characters  are  about  as  distinct  as 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT  219 


body  and  soul;  and  on  their  marked  separation  the  solution  of  almost 
every  difficulty  in  metaphysical  theology  depends^^ 

This  idea  is  more  fully  brought  out  as  follows: 

None  but  moral  agents  bear  any  relation  to  law,  obligation,  guilt, 

pardon,  rewards,  or  punishments  This  is  what  we  mean  when 

we  say  that  the  atonement  was  a  measure  of  moral  government  

Now  one  of  the  things  which  essentially  belong  to  a  moral  agent  is, 

that  he  must  act,  and  on  his  action  his  happiness  depends  You 

cannot  therefore  contemplate  a  man  as  needing  an  atonement,  with- 
out contemplating  him  as  one,  who,  if  he  has  opportunity,  is  to  act 
towards  the  atonement,  and  is  to  enjoy  or  lose  the  benefit  according 
as  he  receives  it  or  rejects  it.  ...  .  Anything,  therefore,  which  is 
done  for  a  moral  agent  is  done  for  his  use  after  the  manner  in  which 
things  are  for  the  use  of  free  moral  agents,  or  creatures  governed  by 
motives  and  choice  and  bound  to  act.  That  is,  it  is  done  that  he  may 
use  it  if  he  pleases,  and  that  he  may  be  under  obligation  to  use  it.** 

The  statement  of  Griffin's  fundamental  thought  here  is 
as  follows: 

The  foundation  of  the  whole  divine  administration  towards  the 
human  race  lies  in  this,  that  men  sustain  two  relations  to  God.  As 
creatures  they  are  necessarily  dependent  upon  him  for  holiness,  as 
they  are  for  existence,  and  as  such  they  passively  receive  his  sanctify- 
ing impressions ;  and  they  are  moral  agents.  Now  the  great  truth 
to  be  proved  is,  that  these  two  characters  of  men  (passive  receivers 
and  moral  agents)  are  altogether  distinct  and  independent  of  each 
other.  And  the  proof  is  found  in  the  single  fact,  that  their  moral 
agency  is  in  no  degree  impaired  or  affected  by  their  dependence  and 
passiveness,  nor  their  passiveness  and  dependence  by  their  moral  agency. 
That  is  to  say,  they  are  none  the  less  dependent  (as  Arminians  would 
make  us  believe)  for  being  moral  agents;  and  on  the  other  hand  (and 
this  is  the  main  point  to  be  proved),  they  are  none  the  less  moral 
agents  (as  Antinomians  seem  to  suppose),  that  is,  are  none  the  less 
susceptible  of  personal  and  complete  obligations,  for  being  dependent. 
For  instance,  they  are  none  the  less  bound  to  believe  because  faith  is 
"the  gift  of  God,"  nor  to  love  because  love  is  "the  fruit  of  the  Spirit." 
Their  obligations  rest  upon  their  capacity  to  exercise,  not  on  their 
power  to  originate;  on  their  being  rational,  not  on  their  being  inde- 
pendent. On  the  one  hand,  the  action  of  the  Spirit  does  not  abate 
their  freedom.  The  soul  of  man  is  that  wonderful  substance  which 
is  none  the  less  active  for  being  acted  upon,  none  the  less  free  for 

*3  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  252  f.  *^  Ibid.,  pp.  262,  263. 


220 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


being  controlled.  It  is  a  wheel  within  a  wheel,  which  has  complete 
motion  in  itself  while  moved  by  machinery  from  without.  While  made 
ivilling,  it  is  itself  voluntary,  and  of  course  free.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  absence  of  the  Spirit  does  not  impair  the  capacity  on  which  obli- 
gation is  founded.  The  completeness  of  moral  agency  has  no  depend- 
ence on  supernatural  impressions,  and  on  nothing  but  a  rational  exist- 
ence combined  with  knowledge.  The  bad,  equally  with  the  good,  are 
complete  moral  agents,  the  one  being  as  much  deserving  of  blame  as 
the  other  are  of  praise;  otherwise  (which  forever  settles  the  ques- 
tion), the  unsanctified  are  not  to  blame  and  cannot  be  punished.*^ 

The  argument  is  continued : 

I  have  shown  you  two  independent  characters  on  earth.  If  God 
acts  towards  these  according  to  truth,  there  will  be  a  counterpart  of 
them  in  the  heavens ;  he  himself  will  sustain  two  characters  .... 
altogether  independent  of  each  other.  As  he  stands  related  to  the 
moral  agent,  he  is  the  Moral  Governor;  as  he  stands  related  to  the 

mere  passive  receiver,  he  is  the  Sovereign  Efficient  Cause  Now 

the  atonement  was  certainly  provided  by  the  Moral  Governor,  because 
it  was  a  provision  for  moral  agents.  It  follows,  then,  that  in  making 
this  provision  he  had  no  regard  to  the  distinction  of  elect  and  non- 
elect  [in  distinguishing  between  which  he  acts  as  the  Sovereign  Effi- 
cient Cause].  An  atonement  made  for  agents  could  know  nothing 
of  passive  regeneration  or  any  decree  concerning  it.*^ 

These  ideas  represent  the  highest  point  attained  by  the 

New  England  writers  upon  the  subject.    They  all  re-echo 

more  or  less  distinctly  the  teaching  of  Griffin.    Burge  says : 

The  atonement  of  Christ  is,  in  a  strict  and  proper  sense,  for  all 
mankind.  Christ  tasted  death  for  every  man ;  for  the  non-elect  as  much 
as  for  the  elect.  Indeed,  election  has  nothing  to  do  with  atonement, 
any  more  than  it  has  with  creation,  resurrection  from  the  dead,  or 
the  general  judgment.** 

He  adds  immediately: 

From  the  necessity  and  nature  of  the  atonement  it  is  evident  that 
its  extent  is  necessarily  universal  The  death  of  Christ  com- 
pletely removes  them  [the  obstacles  which  stood  in  the  way  of  God's 
pardoning  sinners]. 

But  we  hasten  to  consider  the  artificial  elements  of  the 


Loc.  cit.,  pp.  264,  265. 
Ihid.,  p.  525- 


Ihid.,  pp.  269,  273. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT  221 


doctrine  which  these  writers  rejected.  Among  these  the 
principal  is  the  doctrine  of  imputation,  with  its  associated 
idea  of  the  strict  equivalency  of  Christ's  sufferings  to  our 
punishment.  Doubtless  the  prime  motive  force  in  this 
modification  of  the  old  theology  was  the  sense  of  reality 
and  spirit  of  honesty  which  were  characteristic  of  the  New 
England  thinkers.  It  is  interesting  to  note  the  workings 
of  President  Edwards'  mind  upon  these  topics.  His  treatise 
upon  original  sin  we  have  seen  to  be  the  most  important 
of  his  works  as  illustrating  the  operations  of  his  mind  and 
the  character  of  his  theology  in  their  relations  to  conserv- 
atism and  progress.  On  the  one  hand  he  will  have  nothing 
to  do  with  "treating  men  as"  they  are  not;  but,  on  the 
other,  he  cannot  avoid  a  connection  with  Adam  and  a  guilt 
for  Adam's  sin;  and  so  he  struggles  with  theories  of  iden- 
tity and  with  ideas  of  divine  constitution,  till  he  makes  us 
one  with  Adam  in  some  sense,  and  yet  declares  that  we  are 
not  guilty  of  Adam's  sin  by  imputation  till  we  are  partici- 
pators in  it  by  '^consent."  But  such  efforts  in  behalf  of 
imputation  were  in  vain.  Edwards'  successors  regarded 
the  idea  with  more  and  more  distrust,  and  the  Universalist 
controversy  put  an  end  to  every  effort  to  retain  it.  At  this 
time  it  became  an  evangelical  interest  which  contended 
against  the  theory.  Universalism  and  some  forms  of  or- 
thodoxy maintained  that  there  was  no  grace  in  saving 
men,  since  the  atonement  had  merited  salvation  for  them, 
and  the  merits  of  Christ  were  directly  imputed  to  believers. 
Hence  eternal  life  was  bestowed  as  a  thing  which  had  been 
duly  bought  by  this  infinite  price.  The  New  England 
thinkers  found  this  too  abhorrent  to  the  gospel.  We  are 
saved  by  grace,  they  said,  and  they  devoted  a  large  part 
of  those  various  discourses  and  treatises,  which  we  have 
been  reviewing  in  this  chapter,  to  proving  that  an  atone- 
ment is  consistent  with  the  exercise  of  grace.    Smalley  pro- 


222 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


tests  against  forms  of  expression  which  the  revered  Thomas 
Hooker,  of  Hartford,  had  once  employed,  as  if  the  sinner 
could  claim  forgiveness  from  God.  "Where  do  we  find," 
he  asks,  "our  infallible  Teacher  instructing  his  disciples  to 
make  such  challenges  from  the  Father,  even  on  his  account, 
of  deliverance  from  all  evil  and  the  bestowment  of  all  good, 
as  their  just  due?"'*^  Emmons  answers  the  question  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  New  England  theory  of  the  atone- 
ment, as  when  he  says: 

Though  Christ  suffered,  the  just  for  the  unjust,  though  he  made 
his  soul  an  offering  for  sin,  and  though  he  suffered  most  excruciating 
pains  in  the  garden  and  on  the  cross,  yet  he  did  not  lay  God  under 
the  least  obhgation,  in  point  of  justice,  to  pardon  and  save  a  single 

sinner  By  obeying  and  suffering  in  the  room  of  sinners,  he 

only  rendered  it  consistent  for  God  to  renew  or  not  renew,  to  pardon 
or  not  to  pardon,  to  reward  or  not  to  reward,  sinners;  but  did  not  lay 
him  under  the  least  obligation,  in  point  of  justice,  to  do  either  of  these 
things  for  them.49 

But  he  also  appeals  to  our  sense  of  the  majesty  of  God, 
who  "is  above  being  bound  by  any  being  in  the  universe." 
And,  in  general,  he  rests  upon  the  fundamental  absurdity 
of  teaching  that  the  character  of  one  man  can  be  trans- 
ferred to  another,  since  a  character  consists  in  acts  which, 
done  by  one  man,  cannot  be  also  acts  done  by  another. 
Burge  is  perhaps  as  pointed  as  any  of  these  writers.  He 
says : 

The  righteousness  of  Christ,  like  that  of  every  other  holy  being, 
consists  entirely  in  his  actions,  feelings,  and  attributes.  Essentially  it 
consists  in  his  love  to  God  and  other  beings,  and  is  as  unalienably 
his  as  is  any  other  attribute  of  his  nature.  Is  it  even  possible  that  the 
actions  which  Christ  performed  while  here  on  earth,  in  which  his  right- 
eousness in  part  consists,  should  be  so  transferred  from  him  to  believ- 
ers as  to  become  actions  which  they  have  performed? 

He  says  trenchantly,  in  reference  to  the  idea  that  believers 
receive  the  righteousness  of  Christ  by  faith: 


*8  Loc.  cit.,  p.  52. 


*o  Ibid.,,  p.  121. 


ESCHATOLOGY  AND  ATONEMENT  223 


It  is  confidently  believed  that  neither  Scripture  nor  reason  affords 
any  more  warrant  for  the  opinion  that  it  is  even  possible  for  the  be- 
liever's faith  to  receive  Christ's  faith,  or  love,  than  for  the  opinion 
that  a  believer's  walking  in  the  highway  receives  Christ's  walking  upon 
the  water. 

When  it  is  said  that  ''God  views  and  represents  them 
[sinners]  as  righteous,  by  virtue  of  the  righteousness  of 
Christ;  then  the  inquiry  which  arises  is,  Whether  God  do 
not  view  and  represent  things  precisely  as  they  are  ?" 
In  all  this,  which  is  the  style  of  remark  pursued  by  later 
New  England  divines  as  well,  it  should  be  remembered  that 
what  the  antagonist  had  in  mind  was  the  ignorant  Univer- 
salist  preacher  with  his  Rellyan  doctrine  of  "union."  But 
though  the  form  of  answer  was  thus  determined,  the  New 
England  divines  held  that  the  substance  of  their  argument 
was  valid  also^  against  the  exaggerations  oi  the  Old  School. 

We  have  thus  outlined  the  course  of  the  doctrine  in  the 
New  England  writers;  have  shown  the  determining  influ- 
ence of  the  doctrine  of  Edwards  as  to  the  nature  of  virtue, 
which  furnishes  the  ideal  side  of  the  theory;  the  influence 
also  of  increasing  light  as  to  the  freedom  of  the  will;  and 
the  strong  effect  of  the  idea  of  individuality  introduced 
into  the  school  by  its  founder.  The  theory  underwent  no 
essential  change  from  this  point  during  the  progress  of 
the  New  England  school.  In  the  theology  of  Professor 
Park  it  received  some  enrichment  by  his  steady  effort  to  in- 
corporate whatever  of  good  he  found  in  other  writers  wher- 
ever laboring.  Our  study  of  this  subject  will  therefore 
come  to  its  legitimate  conclusion  while  we  are  considering 
the  theology  of  Park,  to  which  time  further  discussion  is 
deferred. 

Ibid.,  pp.  504-6. 


CHAPTER  IX 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 

At  the  time  at  which  we  have  now  arrived  in  the  prog- 
ress of  this  history  (1795),  the  air  was  full  of  the  portents  of 
the  great  controversy,  commonly  styled  the  Unitarian  con- 
troversy, which  was  soon  to  engage  the  energies  of  the 
churches  and  to  rend  them  into  two  hostile  divisions.  One 
brief  campaign  with  an  allied  movement,  the  Universalists, 
had  already  been  fought.  It  might  have  seemed  as  if  such 
struggles  were  enough  to  exhaust  the  attention  of  our  di- 
vines. But  it  was  not  so.  Out  of  many  a  quiet  pastor's 
study  came  a  book,  the  product  of  profound  reflections 
upon  themes  suggested  by  no  immediate  issue,  which  after 
a  little  called  forth  a  reply  from  some  other  study  where 
the  same  great  themes  had  been  meditated  in  all  retirement 
and  seclusion.  So  the  debate  went  on;  and  many  a  move- 
ment of  thought,  destined  in  the  end  to  find  a  close  applica- 
tion tO'  the  practical  necessities  of  troubled  days,  was  car- 
ried on  in  entire  unconsciousness  of  any  such  probable  ap- 
olication. 

One  of  these  movements,  in  many  respects  the  most  im- 
portant, certainly  the  most  tragic,  we  must  now  turn  aside 
to  describe.  It  is  that  which  resulted  in  great  practical 
modifications  of  the  theory  of  the  will,  as  derived  from  Ed- 
wards, from  which  flowed  other  and  great  modifications 
in  both  theory  and  practice.  Modifications  of  Edwards' 
views  began  with  the  very  first  writers  who  carried  on 
his  work,  as  we  have  already  had  occasion  to  remark. 
These  became  considerable  in  the  process  of  time  and 
brought  the  school  to  the  very  verge  of  a  doctrine  of  genuine 
freedom.    Many  of  the  results  of  such  a  doctrine  were 

224 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


225 


actually  incorporated  in  the  received  systems  of  theology. 
But  the  tragic  element  was  not  wanting,  for  upon  the 
whole,  even  in  the  person  of  its  final  and  greatest  represen- 
tative, Professor  Edwards  A.  Park,  the  New  England  the- 
ology did  not  break  loose  from  the  substantial  supralapsa- 
rianism  in  which  Edwards  had  left  it.  Every  great  reasoner 
upon  this  theme  believed  himself  to  be  in  entire  accord  with 
Edwards.  So  profound  was  their  admiration  for  their  great 
leader  that  his  successors  scarcely  conceived  it  possible  that 
they  should  disagree  with  him,  except  in  some  small  de- 
tails of  phraseology,  or  possibly,  now  and  then,  of  thought. 
Whether  they  did  differ  or  not  we  are  soon  to  see;  but 
the  outcome  of  this  intense  loyalty  to  one  man  and  one 
book  was  that  they  remained  restricted  by  both  phraseology 
and  thought  to  the  narrow  limits  there  found.  Their 
mighty  struggles  to  escape,  all  incomprehensibly  futile,  re- 
mind one  of  nothing  so  much  as  of  a  lion  caught  in  a  net. 

When  we  look  at  the  so-called  "New  England"  writers 
exclusively,  we  are  in  danger  of  thinking  that  they  repre- 
sent the  whole  of  New  England,  and  that  Edwards'  work 
upon  the  will  was  received  with  the  universal  conviction 
of  its  unanswerable  greatness  with  which  they  were  im- 
pressed. But  this  was  not  so,  and  the  progress  made  in 
the  theory  of  the  will  was  the  result  of  the  action  and  re- 
action of  many  minds,  of  which  some  were  decidedly  hostile 
to  the  whole  Edwardean  theology.  For  twelve  years  the 
silence  of  the  opposing  party  was  unbroken,  and  then  ap- 
peared an  Examination  ^  by  Rev.  James  Dana,  of  Walling- 
ford.  Conn.,  which  very  sharply  and  effectively  called  Ed- 
wards to  account.  Its  view  of  Edwards'  theory  was  pre- 
cisely that  taken  in  this  history.  It  rested  upon  the  con- 
trary theory  of  a  self-determination  of  the  will,  by  which 
was  intended  a  real  and  originative  causality,  conceived  as 

1  Issued  anonymously  (Boston,  1770). 


226 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


the  special  and  distinctive  peculiarity  of  man.  The  exam- 
ination begins  with  an  inquiry  into  the  connection  of  mo- 
tives with  the  action  of  the  will,  and  an  indication  is  soon 
given  that,  in  the  examiner's  opinion.  President  Edwards 
must  view  every  volition  as  an  immediate  and  necessary 
effect  of  the  supreme  cause,  God.^  This  intimation  soon 
becomes  a  vigorous  argument,  and  the  chief  merit  of  the 
book  is  its  strongly  maintained  thesis  that  upon  the  Ed- 
wardean  foundation  the  divine  efficiency  becomes  the  only 
efficiency  in  the  universe.    Finally  he  asks: 

To  what  extrinsic  cause,  then,  or  to  whom,  are  the  volitions  of 
men  to  be  ascribed,  since  they  are  not  the  cause  of  them  themselves? 
By  whom  or  what  is  the  state  of  men's  will  determined?  According 
to  Mr.  Edwards,  it  is  the  strongest  motive  from  without.  But  mo- 
tives to  choice  are  exhibited  to  the  mind  by  some  agent.  By  whom 
are  they  exhibited?  In  regard  to  sinful  volitions,  we  know  that  one 
man  enticeth  another,  and  Satan  enticeth  all  mankind.  But  this  will 
not  be  given  as  an  answer  to  our  question,  since  the  sinful  act  of  one 
sinner  in  enticing  another,  and  of  Satan  in  tempting  all  men,  must  be 
determined  by  a  previous  cause — an  antecedent  highest  motive  exhib- 
ited by  some  other  agent.  (Though,  by  the  way,  it  may  be  difficult  to 
show  how  one  man  can  be  the  cause  of  sin  in  another,  when  he  can- 
not be  the  cause  of  it  in  himself-)  What  we  are  inquiring  after  is 
the  cause  of  "the  first  and  leading  sinful  volition,  which  determines  the 
whole  affair."  Nor  is  there  any  stop,  till  we  arrive  at  the  first  cause, 
whose  immediate  conduct  Mr.  Edwards  saith  is  first  in  the  series  of 
events,  connected  with  nothing  preceding.^ 

Edwards  was  himself  so  merciless  in  the  pursuance  of 
any  infelicity  of  diction  into  which  an  adversary  might  fall, 
like  the  selection  of  the  word  "self-determination"  to  ex- 
press originative  and  causal  action  on  the  will's  part,  that 
it  may  be  interesting  to  remark  that  Dana  held  him  squarely 
to  the  implications  of  that  remarkable  passage  in  which  he 
identified  the  choice  and  the  motive.   Dana  writes : 

As  no  authority  can  be  of  equal  weight  to  overthrow  this  main 
position  as  the  author's  own,  we  beg  the  reader  would  consider  the 
^  Op.  cit.,  p.  6. 
3  Ibid.,  pp.  48  f. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


227 


following  passage;  which  is  so  full  to  our  purpose  that  we  are  saved 
the  trouble  of  a  labored  confutation  of  the  principle  alluded  to.  "I 
have  rather  chose  to  express  myself  thus,  that  the  will  always  is  as 
the  greatest  apparent  good,  or  as  what  appears  most  agreeable,  than 
to  say  that  the  will  is  determined  by  the  greatest  apparent  good  or 
by  what  seems  most  agreeable,  because  an  appearing  most  agreeable 
or  pleasing  to  the  mind,  and  the  mind's  preferring  and  choosing,  seem 
hardly  to  be  properly  and  perfectly  distinct.  If  strict  propriety  of 
speech  be  insisted  on,  it  may  more  properly  be  said  that  the  voluntary 
action,  which  is  the  immediate  fruit  and  consequence  of  the  mind's 
volition  or  choice,  is  determined  by  that  which  appears  most  agree- 
able, than  the  preference  or  choice  itself."  Here  it  is  fully  declared 
that,  "properly  speaking,"  volition  and  the  highest  motive  are  not  dis- 
tinct things — that  the  former  is  only  as  the  latter,  and  not  determined 
by  it.  Motive  cannot  be  the  ground  and  determiner  of  volition  and 
at  the  same  time  the  act  of  volition  itself.  It  is  not  the  cause  of  voli- 
tion, but  the  thing,  "if  strict  propriety  of  speech  be  insisted  on."  In- 
stead of  the  strongest  motive's  being  the  cause  of  volition,  the  real 
truth  is  that  volition  is  the  cause  of  external  action.'^ 

And  on  this  basis  he  later  affirms  that  the  whole  ques- 
tion, What  determines  the  will?  is  ^'unanswered,  and  yet 
returns."  ^ 

It  is  unnecessary  to  quote  at  greater  length  from  Dana, 
since  the  work  which  it  called  out,  the  Essay  on  Moral 
Agency^  by  Stephen  West,  of  Stockbridge  (1772),  was  an 
independent  treatise  rather  than  a  detailed  reply. 

West's  essay  is  divided  into  two  parts,  of  which  the  sec- 
ond is  occupied  with  the  problem  of  the  existence  of  evil.  It 
takes  the  general  Hopkinsian  position  that  sin  is  the  neces- 
sary means  of  the  greatest  good.^  The  first  part  is  occu- 
pied with  the  theory  of  the  will,  and  hence  particularly 
calls  for  our  present  attention. 

West  professes  his  general  agreement  with  Edwards. 
He  agrees  with  him  in  the  first  and  determinative  pecu- 
liarity of  his  treatise,  in  the  view  of  the  constitution  of  the 
mind.    Evidence  of  this  appears  upon  the  earliest  pages  of 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  17  f.  B  Ibid.,  p.  29. 

*  West's  Essay,  p.  178. 


228         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


the  book.'^  He  rejects  the  idea  that  "the  action  and  pref- 
erence of  the  mind"  may  be  "so  different  from  each  other 
as  that  they  might  properly  be  treated  of  as  cause  and 
effect."  ^  He  speaks  of  the  "moral  beauty  and  deformity 
of  affections."  ^  Again,  motives  "obtain  the  appellation  of 
motives  only  in  the  mind's  feeling  their  influence,  or  being 
in  actual  motion  in  view  of  them."  "When  the  mind 
feels  or  perceives  the  influence  of  a  motive,  it  is  then  too 
late  for  the  motive  to  produce  effects  in  the  mind — exciting 
it  to  motion,  choice,  or  action;  the  mind  being  already 
moved,  the  will  exerted,  towards  some  common  object;  and 
choice  having  gained  existence."  "In  the  mind's  perceiv- 
ing anything  ....  is  really  all  the  choice  which  is  ever 
made  of  it." 

In  his  definitions  of  moral  agency,  while  in  the  main 
agreeing  with  Edwards,  West  reminds  us  frequently  of 
Hopkins,  who  was  the  friend  under  whose  influence  he  had 
made  the  transfer  of  himself  from  Arminianism  to  Calvin- 
ism. "When  we  talk  of  moral  agency  ....  it  is  agree- 
able to  the  common  sense  ....  of  men  to  consider  him 
[man]  as  in  exercise."  Freedom  is  made  to  reside  not 
in  "liberty  to  do  as  we  please,"  as  Edwards  makes  it,  but 
in  "spontaneous,  voluntary  exertion."  "To  be  free  and 
to  be  voluntary  in  any  action  whatsoever,  whether  internal 
or  external,  I  suppose  are  one  and  the  same  thing."  But, 
whereas  in  Hopkins  this  position  looked  toward  greater 
freedom  of  the  will,  in  West  it  looks  toward  less. 

Advancing  still  farther  upon  the  path  which  Edwards 
had  marked  out,  but  still  in  essential  accord  with  him. 
West  emphasizes  the  fact  that  we  can  have  no  conscious- 

Loc.  cit.,  p.  ii.  *  Ibid.,  p.  37. 

-  e  Ibid.,  p.  48.  Ibid.,  p.  59. 

11  Ibid.,  p.  59.  12  jjjid^^  18. 

Ibid.,  p.  19.  Ibid.,  p.  21. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


229 


ness  of  a  power  to  choose  "distinguishable  from  actual 
choosing."       He  says: 

Minds  are  conversant  only  with  their  own  ideas :  they  perceive  and 
are  immediately  conscious  of  nothing  beside  their  own  exercises  and 
ideas.  However  they  may  reason  and  infer  concerning  other  things 
and  form  premises  and  make  conclusions  with  a  great  degree  of  jus- 
tice or  precision,  still  those  things  of  which  they  attain  knowledge  in 
such  a  way  as  this  are  not  the  objects  of  direct,  immediate  percep- 
tion. H  liberty  is  what  we  perceive  actually  to  exist  in  the  mind,  it 
can  certainly  be  perceived  no  otherwise  than  in  its  exercise:  just  as 
a  power  of  choice  can  be  perceived  only  in  actual  choosing.^^ 

He  thus  attempts  to  cut  the  nerve  of  the  argument  for 
freedom  from  consciousness. 

West's  discussions  of  the  subject  of  power  form  the 
most  original  and  important  part  of  his  book.  He  was 
brought  to  some  difference  with  Edwards  upon  certain 
points,  but  with  regard  to  the  relations  of  power  to  moral 
agency  he  remains  exactly  where  Edwards  was.  "Power 
.  ...  is  not  essential  to  moral  agency,  virtue,  or  vice." 
It  is  an  external  matter.  "When  an  event  taketh  place 
upon  our  choosing  it  and  in  consequence  of  our  choice, 
according  to  the  use  and  import  of  the  word  in  common 
language,  we  have  the  power  of  that  event,  or  power  to 
produce  it."  "Power  implieth  a  connection  between  the 
volitions  of  the  agent  and  the  event  which  is  the  object 
of  the  volition."  It  was  natural  that  the  question  should 
arise  upon  this  view  of  the  matter:  Who  established  this 
"connection"  ?  West  has  removed  from  the  idea  of  power 
the  idea  of  efficient  causation,  so  far  as  man  is  concerned, 
when  he  has  said  that  we  have  power  over  an  event  if  it 
"taketh  place  upon  our  choosing  it,"  for  we  have  no  more 
real  causation  under  such  a  definition  than  under  John 
Stuart  Mill's  "invariable  consequence"  upon  unchanged  an- 
tecedents.   But  the  question  as  to  the  efficient  cause  of  an 

15  Ibid.,  p.  22.  i«  Ibid.,  p.  22. 

17  Ibid.,  p.  45.  IS  ii^id.^  p.  47. 


230         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

event  cannot  be  suppressed.  Accordingly  West  says: 
"Power,  therefore,  strictly  speaking,  is  no  more  than  a 
law  of  constant  divine  operation."  That  is,  when  I  will, 
God  operates  in  a  predetermined  manner,  producing  the 
corresponding  event.  He  thus  introduces  the  idea  of  occa- 
sionalism, derived  from  Edwards  or  directly  from  Berkeley, 
to  explain  our  efficiency. 

And  now  we  have  arrived  at  the  critical  point  of  the 
whole  question.  West  has  left  us  no  true  efficiency  in  the 
external  world ;  will  he  maintain  the  same  position  as  to  the 
internal  world  ?  This  is  the  next  step,  and  it  is  boldly  taken 
in  the  following  discussion  of  motives.  After  a  number  of 
useful  distinctions  in  respect  to  motives,  he  says: 

It  appeareth  that  there  is  an  utter  impropriety  in  saying  that  the 
mind  is  governed  and  determined  by  motive,  if  the  expression  is  de- 
signed to  represent  motive  as  the  cause,  and  choice  or  volition  its 

effect  To  view  the  matter  in  such  a  light  as  this  would  lead  to 

evident  inconsistency  and  confusion. 20  Motives  are  not  the  causes  of 
volitions.  When  we  are  inquiring  into  the  sources  of  things  and  the 
cause  of  their  existence;  as  in  the  natural,  so  in  the  moral  world,  we 
are  compelled  to  resolve  all  into  the  divine  disposal  and  a  certain  law 
or  method  of  constant  divine  agency  and  operation.  What  are  usually 
termed  secondary  causes  have  no  productive  agency  or  efficiency  in 

them  When  motives  are  represented  as  the  causes  of  volition 

....  the  word  cause  ....  implieth  nothing  more  than  an  occasion 
of  the  event. 21 

Here,  then,  lie  West's  difference  from  Edwards,  and  his 
contribution  to  the  thinking  of  the  school,  the  idea  that 
moral  agency  consists  in  exercises,  and  that  these  are  the 
action  of  the  deity  as  the  sole  efficient  cause. 

So  far  as  the  work  is  intended  as  a  reply  to  Dana,  it  ac- 
cepts at  this  important  point  the  doctrine  to  which  Dana 
intended  to  drive  the  Edwardeans,  that  God  was  the  true 
efficient  cause  of  volitions. 

i»  Loc.  cit..  p.  48. 

-0  Ihid.,  p.  61. 

2^  Ihid.,  pp.  66,  67. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


231 


The  relation  of  this  position  to  Hopkins'  doctrine  of 
the  will  is  even  more  interesting.  Hopkins  contributed  all 
the  elements  of  this  conclusion  which  West  has  only 
been  consistent  in  drawing;  but  he  did  not  himself  draw  it. 
He  taught  that  God  is  the  cause  of  our  volitions,  but  he 
did  not  say  exactly  how,  whether  through  motives  or  im- 
mediate agency,  and  evidently  intended  to  leave  place  for 
the  agency  of  man.  He  had  place  in  his  philosophy  for 
second  causes,  and  a  difference  between  God's  immediate 
and  mediate  agency.  Yet  he  says :  "All  power  is  in  God, 
and  all  creatures  which  act  or  move,  exist  and  move  or  are 
moved  in  and  by  him."  And  again :  '*The  divine  hand 
of  power  and  energy  is  as  really  and  as  much  concerned 
arid  exerted  ....  as  if  no  instrument,  agent,  or  second 
cause  were  used  or  had  any  concern  in  the  matter."  While 
he  was  thus  moving  toward  a  doctrine  of  freedom,  as 
already  said,  his  movement  was  quite  capable  of  being  re- 
versed, and  West  reversed  it.  He  reversed  it  effectively 
for  more  than  one  theological  generation;  and  although  at 
last  some  of  the  later  members  of  the  school  refused  to  fol- 
low in  the  direction  thus  prescribed  to  them,  the  influence 
of  Edwards  prevented  them  from  giving  a  consistent  form 
to  the  new  truths  they  dimly  saw. 

The  controversy  between  Dana  and  West  did  not  stop 
here,  for  Dana  replied  with  an  Examination  ....  Con- 
tinued,^^ which  considered  some  topics  of  the  controversy 
more  fully,  particularly  defining  self-determination  better, 
and  discussing  the  questions  connected  with  moral  evil  and 
the  divine  foreknowledge.  He  did  not,  however,  make  any 
large  contributions  to  the  theme,  nor  did  West  when,  in 
an  appendix  to  a  new  edition  of  his  Essay, he  took  special 

22  Works,  Vol.  I,  pp.  140  ff.  23  Published,  New  Haven,  1773. 

2*  Of  the  year  1794. 


232         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

notice  of  Dana's  second  book.  He  merely  reiterated  Ed- 
wards' arguments,  especially  that  of  the  infinite  series  in- 
volved in  the  idea  of  self-determination.  The  matter  was 
left  where  it  was  before,  every  suggestion  of  a  better  view 
of  the  subject  being  rejected  with  emphasis. 

Of  course,  so  downright  contradiction  of  the  protest 
which  Dana  had  attempted  to  put  in  against  the  strangling 
of  all  human  freedom  by  Edwards'  treatise  could  not  be  al- 
lowed to  pass  without  another  effort  to  give  it  effective  utter- 
ance. This  was  made  by  Samuel  West,^^  of  New  Bedford, 
in  his  Essays  on  Liberty  and  Necessity,  in  the  year  1793.  It 
was  the  fruit  of  long  reflection  and  no  mere  hasty  reply  to 
an  obnoxious  tract.  It  is  said  that  he  disputed  with  his 
teacher,  who  superintended  his  preparation  for  college, 
against  the  common  necessitarian  ideas  of  his  day.  He 
probably  had  embraced  the  old  Arminian  system  which 
Stephen  West  had  also  earlier  embraced,  from  which  arises 
his  reputation  as  a  '^Unitarian."  The  book  was  brief,  exer- 
cised but  little  influence,  and  has  now  become  exceedingly 
rare ;  but  Dr.  Edwards,  who  answered  it,  called  it  the 
ablest  thing  which  had  appeared  upon  that  side.  It  was  in 
fact  revolutionary,  and  ought  to  have  called  forth  that  de- 
cisive change  in  New  England  psychology  which  it  was 
reserved  for  Burton  to  produce.  But  it  suffered  the  mis- 
fortune of  being  ahead  of  its  times. 

West  begins  his  treatise  by  proposing  a  threefold  divi- 
sion of  the  faculties  of  the  mind.  Stephen  West,  he  says, 
confounds  the  perception  of  an  object,  in  which  we  are  en- 
tirely passive,  with  a  volition,  in  which  we  are  active. 

25  Samuel  West,  born  1730,  graduated  at  Harvard  7754,  D.D.  1793,  pastor  at 
New  Bedford,  Mass.,  1761-1803;  died  1807. 

26  The  full  title  of  the  book  was:  "Essays  on  Liberty  and  Necessity  in 
which  the  true  Nature  of  Liberty  is  stated  and  defended,  and  the  principal 
Arguments  used  by  Mr.  Edwards  and  others,  for  Necessity  are  considered.  By 
Samiuel  West,  DD.,  Pastor  of  the  First  Church  of  Christ  in  New  Bedford  .... 
1793."    Reissued  in  1795  with  a  second  part.    Citations  from  the  reissue. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


233 


Hence  he  observes  that  there  are  three  main  faculties  of 

the  mind — ''the  perception,  the  propension,  and  the  will."^'^ 

The  last  only  is  properly  the  active  faculty  of  the  mind  

The  active  faculty  is  exerted  to  acquire  many  of  our  perceptions,  but 

still  perceptions  are  not  acts  of  the  will  In  demonstrating  the 

truth  of  a  proposition,  a  man  is  active  in  orderly  arranging  the  several 
steps  of  the  demonstration;  but  when  he  has  done  that,  the  perception 
of  the  truths  demonstrated  depends  not  upon  an  act  of  his  will.  By 
propension  I  mean  to  include  inclination,  afifection,  passion.  These 
are  all  entirely  distinct  from  the  will.  That  bodily  appetites,  such  as 
hunger,  thirst,  drowsiness,  etc.,  are  involuntary,  I  suppose  will  be 
allowed ;  and  we  may  say  the  same  of  mental  propensions,  such  as 

fear,  love,  anger,  etc  A  man  may  love  a  person  whom  he 

knows  to  be  utterly  unworthy  of  his  affections,  and  may  really  choose 
to  eradicate  this  propension  from  his  breast ;  and  yet  he  may  find  this 
passion  rising  in  his  breast  in  direct  opposition  to  his  will  and  choice. 

This  is  a  perfectly  clear  and  comprehensive  description 
of  the  essential  elements  of  the  case.  And,  if  it  was,  as  it 
may  have  been,  derived  from  Locke,  it  is  clearer  than  his. 
West  also  seems  to  see  the  confusing  effect  of  Edwards' 
philosophy  upon  his  theory  of  the  wiU,  for  he  says :  ''He 
everywhere  confounds  the  propensity  of  the  mind  with 
volition.  Hence  he  tells  us,  'The  affections  are  only  cer- 
tain modes  of  the  exercise  of  the  will ;'  whereas  I  think  the 
propensities  of  the  mind,  whether  you  call  them  inclina- 
tions, affections,  or  passions,  are  as  different  from  the  exer- 
cises of  the  will  as  light  is  from  darkness."  But  he  fails 
to  bring  out  the  exact  nature  of  the  fallacy  under  which 
Edwards  labored,  for  he  goes  on  to  say:  "It  is  very  evi- 
dent ....  that  the  will  and  the  propensities  are  so  dis- 
tinct that  they  may  be  in  direct  opposition  to  each  other; 
and  that  though  these  propensities  may  be  so  strong  as  to 
hinder  us  from  doing  what  we  choose,  yet  they  cannot  take 
away  the  freedom  of  the  will;  that  is,  the  freedom  of  the 
will,  or  a  self-determining  power,  is  consistent  with  the 


Essays,  p.  12. 

Ibid.,  Part  II,  p.  29. 


28  Ibid.,  pp.  12,  13. 


234         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


strongest  habits  of  virtue  or  vice."  He  adds  below :  "I 
believe,  now,  that  it  will  appear,  my  notion  of  self-deter- 
mination is  very  different  from  that  which  Mr.  Edwards 
opposes,  being-  a  kind  of  medium  between  that  and  the  doc- 
trine of  necessity."  There  is  nothing  further  upon  this 
point.  A  positive,  Edwards-like  annihilation  of  his  adver- 
sary was  called  for  if  West  could  hope  to  make  an  impres- 
sion upon  the  obstinacy  with  which  the  New  England  writ- 
ers were  still  prepared  to  follow  their  great  leader;  but  it 
was  not  forthcoming. 

Upon  the  basis  of  this  division  of  the  mind,  yet  with- 
out consistent  application  of  it,  West  now  proceeds  to 
make  several  forcible  objections  to  Edwards^  theories.  His 
fundamental  objection  to  necessity  goes  to  the  bottom  of 
the  subject.  He  says:  *'We  certainly  feel  ourselves  agents 
— feel  ourselves  free  and  accountable  for  our  conduct — 
we  feel  ourselves  capable  of  praise  and  blame.  How  all 
these  things  can  be  reconciled  to  a  doctrine  of  necessity  I 
cannot  conceive." 

In  opposition  to  Edwards'  theory  he  therefore  teaches 
that  the  will  is  self-determined.  He  expresses  his  meaning 
in  a  variety  of  ways.  He  says :  "By  liberty  or  freedom 
we  mean  a  power  of  acting,  willing,  or  choosing:  and  by  a 
power  of  acting  we  mean  that,  when  all  circumstances  neces- 
sary for  action  have  taken  place,  then  the  mind  can  act 
or  not  act."  Again :  "The  sense  in  which  we  use  self- 
determination  is  simply  this,  that  we  ourselves  will  or 
choose;  that  we  ourselves  act;  that  is,  that  we  are  agents 
and  not  mere  passive  beings;  or,  in  other  words,  that  we 
are  the  determiners  in  the  active  voice,  and  not  the  deter- 
mined in  the  passive  voice."       Again :    "There  is  no  in- 


30  Loc.  cit.,  p.  30. 
Ibid.,  p.  18. 
Ibid.,  p.  16. 


21  Ibid.,  p.  31. 
33  Ibid.,  p.  15. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


235 


fallible  connection  between  motive  and  action."  He  de- 
fines self-determination  by  reference  to  the  Deity,  who,  he 
says,  ''has  a  self-determining  power  ....  being  the  first 
cause."  He  often  says  ''Volition  is  no  effect."  And, 
finally,  he  holds  that  by  divine  communication  we  have  the 
same  self-determining  power,  or  power  of  first  causation, 
which  the  Deity  has.^^  Certainly  these  distinctions  are 
clear  enough  to  have  called  attention,  if  anything  could 
have  done  so,  to  Edwards'  misinterpretation  of  his  antag- 
onists, and  to  the  merely  verbal  character  of  his  argument 
when  he  pressed  the  term  "self-determination"  in  a  way 
acute  and  strong,  but  in  no  relation  to  their  real  meaning. 
If  there  is  any  idea  expressed  by  the  phrase  "first  cause" 
whatever,  then  it  is  no  absurdity  to  apply  it  to  man,  whether 
the  application  is  correct  or  not. 

In  defense  of  this  doctrine  West  denies  the  Edwardean 
doctrine  that  motives  are  the  causes  of  volitions.  He  main- 
tains that,  if  motives  are  causes,  they  must  be  efficient 
causes,  and  hence  minds,  which  is  absurd. He  appeals 
to  experience  to  show  that  "when  motives  have  done  all 
that  they  can  do,"  the  mind  may  act  or  not  act.^^  If  voli- 
tion is  an  efifect,  then  man  is  passive  in  willing;  and  if  so, 
then  he  is  active  in  nothing  else;  that  is,  he  is  no  agent.^^ 
If  volition  were  an  effect,  we  could  not  be  causes  of  efTects, 
and  so  could  never  have  the  idea  of  cause.^^  He  even  re- 
duces Edwards  to  the  absurdity  of  the  infinite  series,  which 
may  be  said  to  be  carrying  the  war  into  Africa.  If  voli- 
tion is  the  activity  of  the  mind,  as  Edwards  maintains, 
and  at  the  same  time  caused  from  abroad,  then  our  only 
activity  is  caused.  But  it  is  caused  by  some  mind,  which 
in  its  activity  needs  another  mind  to  cause  it,  which  in  its 

Ibid.  Ibid.,  p.  26. 

^'^  Ibid.,  p.  10.  "  '^^  Ibid.,  pp.  16,  17. 

38  Ibid.,  p.  22.  4  0  /j,,-^,^  p_  23. 


236 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


turn  needs  another  mind  to  cause  it,  and  so  ad  infinitum}^ 
He  also  says  that  motives  cannot  be  compared  so  as  to 
obtain  the  strongest  motive  which  Edwards  seeks  as  the 
cause  of  action. 

In  order  to  compare  motives  together  to  enable  us  to  determine 
which  is  the  strongest,  the  motives  compared  must  all  belong  to  the 
same  faculty  of  the  soul;  and  if  they  belong  to  different  faculties  of 
the  mind  no  comparison  can  be  made  between  them.  Thus  we  find 
ourselves  possessed  of  two  different  faculties,  reason  and  propensity. 
Obiects  that  are  agreeable  to  our  propensities  are  easily  compared:  thus 
of  different  kinds  of  food  ....  we  can  easily  tell  which  we  have  the 
greatest  relish  for  -We  can  also  compare  things  that  are  agree- 
able to  reason  and  judgment  But  how  can  we  compare  things 

together  that  belong  to  different  faculties  of  the  mind?  For  example, 
one  has  an  inordinate  thirst  after  strong  drink  though  his  reason  tells 
him  it  will  ruin  his  health,  his  estate,  and  his  reputation,  etc.*^ 

Turning  now  to  the  work  of  Stephen  West,  Samuel 
West  notices  the  idea  that  the  efficient  cause  in  human 
volitio-ns  is  the  Deity.  He  himself  prefers  the  doctrine  that 
the  Deity  produces  all  the  requisites  for  action  in  the  mind, 
and  that  then  it  is  capable  of  acting  or  not  acting.  But, 
he  says,  if  volition  is  the  immediate  action  of  the  Deity, 
then  there  is  no  action  in  the  mind  but  the  divine  action, 
and,  since  action  is  essential  to  the  life  of  every  mind,  it 
will  follow  that  the  Deity  is  the  only  living  principle  in 
the  mind,  and  so  in  the  universe,  and  that  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  a  creation.  Hence  there  is  no  Creator  who  has 
made  and  who  governs  all  things  by  his  power  and  provi- 
dence.^^ 

But  Edwards  would  have  objected  to  West's  arguments 
against  necessity  that  he  himself  was  defending  only  cer- 
tainty. This  leads  West  to  consider  the  natural  and  moral 
necessity  and  ability  taught  by  Edwards,  which,  in  agree- 
ment with  Dana,  he  finds  to  be  one  and  the  same  thing.'^^ 

^1  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  25,  26;  cf.  pp.  II,  12,  21  for  other  applications. 
*2  Ihid.,  Part  II,  pp.  5,  6.  43  iiji^^^  8. 

^^Ihid.,  p.  7- 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


237 


He  also  maintains  that  the  certainty  of  future  events  does 
not  involve  their  necessity.  "The  deity,"  he  says,  "being 
himself  uncaused,  must  be  possessed  of  an  underived,  self- 
existing  knowledge,  which  is  independent  of  any  cause  or 
medium  whatever." 

Thus  an  attack,  strong  in  its  main  positions,  however 
defective  in  amplitude  of  statement  or  dialectic  form,  had 
been  made  upon  the  New  England  theory  and  upon  its 
latest  exponent.    Would  it  produce  any  effect? 

Upon  one  man  at  least  it  produced  an  effect;  but  he  was 
only  led  to  reject  it  as  a  part  of  the  old  "Arminianism" 
against  which  he  had  long  set  himself.  This  was  the 
younger  Edwards,  who  came  to  the  defense  of  his  father 
and  of  Stephen  West  in  a  considerable  treatise  entitled  A 
Dissertation  concerning  Liberty  and  Necessity,  etC*^  It 
was  strictly  a  reply  to  West  and  other  Arminians,  and 
therefore  does  not  present  any  distinct  and  systematic 
theory  of  the  will.  It  was,  however,  said  by  Professor 
Park  to  be  the  best  exposition  of  President  Edwards' 
theory.  We  may  dismiss  it  for  this  reason  with  the  briefer 
consideration,  occupying  ourselves  with  the  points  in  which 
it  lends  its  aid  to  the  current  already  so  strongly  setting  in 
in  the  work  of  Stephen  West.  As  a  reply  it  is  a  masterpiece. 
It  has  the  Edwardean  thoroughness.  Its  favorite  method 
is  to  show  that  West  really  meant,  and  often  said,  precisely 
what  President  Edwards  had  said,  and  that  nothing  but 
consistency  is  necessary  to  make  him  a  full-fledged  Ed- 
wardean. Its  keenness  makes  it  constantly  interesting, 
and- even  absorbing,  to  everyone  who  loves  thought.  And 
yet,  fundamentally,  it  concerns  itself  with  words  rather 
than  realities,  and  Edwards  fails  to  understand  the  im- 
portant and  new  truth  which  his  adversary  was  so  richly 
offering  him. 

*5 /ibtV.,  p.  30.  Works   (Boston,   1850),  Vol.  I,  pp.  295  ff. 


238         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

The  great  contribution  which  West  had  made  to  the 
discussion  of  the  will  was  the  proposal  of  the  division  of 
the  faculties  of  the  mind  into  three — perception,  propen- 
sion,  and  will.  This  made  no  impression  upon  Edwards. 
He  noticed  it,  but  did  not  seem  to  understand  it.  And  yet, 
by  that  strange  mental  obliviousness  by  which  men  repeat- 
edly miss  great  opportunities  in  every  department  of  human 
thought,  he  once  came  near  both  understanding  and  accept- 
ing it,  only,  however,  to  do  neither!  When  engaged  in  re- 
futing West's  theory  as  to  our  choice  between  objects  of 
equal  eligibility,  he  says  that  President  Edwards  ascribed 
"a  great  part  of  our  volitions  to  disposition,  inclination, 
passion,  and  habit,  meaning  certain  biases  of  the  mind  dis- 
tinct from  volition  and  prior  to  it."  If  he  could  have 
seen  that  they  were  radically  distinct  from  volition,  he 
would  have  been  ready  to  understand  West.  But  he  let 
the  issue  drop  without  adequate  thought.  He  left  to  oth- 
ers to  reap  the  benefits  and  the  glory  of  accomplishing  this 
forward  step. 

West's  irrefutable  argument  from  self-consciousness  is 
evaded  in  the  same  way  as  Stephen  West  would  have 
evaded  it.  Samuel  West  had  expressed  himself  as  if  free- 
dom were  the  object  of  immediate  consciousness,  for  he 
said,  "We  feel  ourselves  free."  But  he  had  also  expressed 
his  idea  in  better  form  by  saying  that  we  "feel  ourselves 
accountable  for  our  conduct,  and  capable  of  praise  and 
blame."  Hence  he  would  reason  to  freedom.  This  is  the 
decisive  argument,  and  was  made  by  Lotze,  for  example, 
the  turning-point  of  the  argument  for  freedom.  But  Ed- 
wards contents  himself  with  bringing  out  the  fact  that  we 
cannot  be  conscious  of  freedom,  but  only  of  volitions.^^ 
He  does  not  enter  into  the  significant  and  vital  question 
which  West  had  started:    What  is  the  freedom  we  must 


Loc.  cit.,  p.  331. 


*8  Ihid.,  pp.  388,  421. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


239 


conceive  human  agents  to  have  to  render  them  responsible? 
This  is  the  crucial  failure  of  his  reply. 

West's  arguments  against  the  causative  power  of  mo- 
^  tives  seem  to  have  made  more  impression  upon  him.  In 
reply  he  has  recourse  tO'  Stephen  West's  doctrine  of  occa- 
sionalism. He  says  that  President  Edwards  has  "explained 
himself  to  mean  by  cause  no  other  than  occasion,  reason, 
or  previous  circumstance  necessary  for  volition."  '^^  It  is 
true  that  President  Edwards  did  include  every  antecedent 
of  a  volition  in  its  cause,  and  that  he  can  be  interpreted, 
as  his  son  here  interprets  him,  by  straining  his  language. 
Hence  arose  that  school  of  Edwardeans  of  which  men- 
tion is  to  be  made  at  length  later.  Dr.  Edwards  constantly 
reverts  to  this  explanation,  and  it  constitutes  his  standard 
interpretation  of  his  father.  That  it  was  false  we  have 
already  seen.  Indeed,  Dr.  Edwards  only  presents  it  in  this 
instance  to  cancel  it  effectually  almost  in  the  article  of  pro- 
posing it;  for  he  continues: 

I  do  not  pretend  that  motives  are  the  eMcient  causes  of  volition. 
If  any  expression  importing  this  have  dropped  from  any  defender  of  the 
connection  between  motive  and  volition,  either  it  must  have  happened 
through  inadvertence,  or  he  must  have  meant  that  motive  is  an  efficient 
cause  in  no  other  sense  than  rain  and  the  rays  of  the  sun  are  the 
efficient  cause  of  the  growth  of  vegetables,  or  than  medicine  is  the  effi- 
cient cause  of  health. 

Now,  in  accordance  with  the  Berkeleian  idealism  which  per- 
vaded, whether  consciously  or  unconsciously,  the  whole 
New  England  school  at  this  point  of  its  history,  physical 
causes  had  no  efficient  power.  Hence  Edwards  could  deny 
that  motives — which,  it  should  be  strictly  marked,  he  puts 
in  the  same  category  with  these  physical  causes — had  effi- 
cient causation.  But  if  one  was  not  an  idealist,  and  at- 
tached to  the  physical  causes  of  events  real  power  and  a 
consequent  efficiency,  then  to  him  the  causation  of  motives 

*9  Ibid.,  p.  344- 


240         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


became  an  efficient  causation,  and  West's  interpretation  of 
Edwards  must  become  his  interpretation.  Dr.  Edwards 
proceeds  now  to  carry  out  his  line  of  defence  to  its  conse- 
quences. If  motives  have  no  efficient  causation,  where  is 
the  causative  force  efficiently  producing  volitions?  He 
says : 

It  is  denied  that  man  himself  is  the  efficient  cause  of  it  [volition]. 
He  who  established  the  laws  of  nature  so-called  is  the  primary  cause 
of  all  things.  What  is  meant  by  the  efficient  cause  in  any  case  in 
which  an  effect  is  produced  according  to  established  laws?  For  in- 
stance, what  is  the  efficient  cause  of  the  sensation  of  heat  from  fire? 
If  it  be  answered:  Fire  is  the  efficient  cause;  I  also  answer  that  the 
motive  is  the  efficient  cause  of  the  volition  and  doing  aforesaid.  If 
it  be  said  that  the  Great  First  Cause  is  the  efficient  of  the  sensation  of 
heat,  the  same  Great  Agent  is  the  efficient  cause  of  volition,  in  the 
same  way,  by  a  general  law  establishing  a  connection  between  motives 
and  volitions,  as  there  is  a  connection  between  fire  in  certain  situa- 
tions and  the  sensation  of  heat.^*^ 

Here  the  son  is  true  to  the  father,  who  said  that  the  differ- 
ence between  causation  in  the  moral  and  physical  realms 
lay,  not  in  the  nature  of  the  connection,  but  in  the  nature 
of  the  things  connected.  Thus  the  milder  interpretation 
proposed  by  Edwards  really  vanishes,  and  the  critics  of 
the  original  treatise  of  the  elder  Edwards  are  abundantly 
justified. 

But  Dr.  Edwards  goes  still  farther.  He  has  banished 
efficient  causation  from  the  physical  universe,  and  he  now 
proceeds  to  banish  it  from  the  universe  at  large.  The 
Deity,  says  Edwards,  ''is  no  more  the  efficient  cause  of  his 
own  volitions  than  he  is  of  his  own  existence."  How 
mightily  the  lion  is  struggling  in  the  entanglements  of  the 
invisible  net!  This  is  utter  confusion  of  thought,  and 
should  have  brought  Edwards  back  to  the  error  lurking  in 
his  premises.  But  he  remains  entangled  in  the  result  of  his 
own  consistency.    God  is,  however,  he  grants,  the  efficient 


50  Loc.  cit.,  p.  381. 


51  P.  425. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


241 


cause  of  our  volitions.  Certainly,  these  sentences  constitute 
a  rediictio  ad  ahsurdum,  perpetrated  by  Edwards  himself, 
greater  than  all  the  infinite  series  of  his  father  together! 

Emmons  closes  this  drift  of  thought.  He  puts  the 
theory  of  the  divine  agency  in  its  extremest  form.  Men 
act  freely  in  view  of  motives.  They  act  freely  because  they 
act  voluntarily,  since  these  two  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 
When  they  act  in  view  of  motives,  God  ''exhibits  the  mo- 
tives and  then  excites  them  to  act  voluntarily  in  view  of 
the  motives  exhibited,"  "for  the  bare  perception  of  motive 
is  incapable  of  producing  volition."  Thus  God  "pro- 
duces" our  volitions.  For  producing,  Emmons  often  uses 
the  word  "creating,"  and  the  operations  of  God  in  creating 
the  material  world  and  governing  it  are  made  exactly  par- 
allel with  his  operations  in  renewing  the  hearts  of  men.  He 
expressly  rejects  the  idea  "that  God  only  upholds  moral 
agents  in  existence  and  preserves  their  active  powers  with- 
out exerting  any  influence  upon  their  wills  which  moves 
them  to  act  in  every  instance  according  to  his  pleasure." 
"Adam  could  not  be  the  efficient  cause  of  his  own  volition." 

But  this  is  only  a  part  of  Emmons.  Extreme  as  his 
statements  are,  they  must  be  understood  in  the  light  of 
equally  extreme  statements  upon  the  other  side.  He  also 
says:  "How  God  operates  on  our  minds  in  our  free  vol- 
untary exercises,  we  are  unable  to  comprehend."  He  pro- 
poses therefore  to  hold  the  fact  that  God  so  operates,  and 
also  to  hold  every  other  fact,  let  them  be  consistent  or  in- 
consistent. Therefore  he  teaches  that  God  has  made  men 
free  moral  agents.  They  are  this  in  the  same  sense  that  he 
is.  Under  his  universal  agency,  human  beings  have  a  true 
agency.  In  the  divine  mind  this  consists  in  volition,  and  in 
the  human  mind  it  consists  in  the  same.    Moral  agency  and 

52  Nathaniel  Emmons,  born  1745;  pastor  at  Franklin,  Mass.,  1773-1827;  died 
1840. 

83  Works  (Ide's  edition),  Vol.  IV,  pp.  352  ff.,  for  all  these  citations. 


242 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


moral  character  consist  in  "exercises/'  God  works  in  men 
to  lead  them  to  perform  the  ordinary  actions  of  life,  such 
as  sowing,  planting,  etc.,  in  the  same  way  as  he  does  to 
produce  the  religious  actions,  such  as  repentance.  Man  is 
as  free  in  the  one  class  as  the  other.  He  has  all  the  free- 
dom of  which  he  can  conceive.^^ 

Up  to  this  point  the  tendency  of  New  England  theology 
has  been  to  destroy  more  and  more  completely  the  freedom 
of  the  will.  The  two  tendencies  characteristic  of  Calvinism 
and  Berkeleianism — to  exalt  the  agency  of  God,  and  to 
deny  to  second  causes  efficiency  and  even  existence — have 
been  reducing  man  more  and  more  to  the  position  of  a 
mere  puppet  upon  the  stage  of  human  history.  But  now 
there  was  introduced  by  a  remarkable  book,  written  by  an 
obscure  country  minister,  the  idea  which  was  finally  to  re- 
verse the  current  and  set  this  theology  in  motion  toward 
a  doctrine  of  freedom.   It  did  not  break  with  the  prevailing 

Professor  Park,  who  is  the  profoundest  student  of  the  history  of  New 
England  theology  that  has  yet  appeared,  maintains  that  Emmons  did  believe  in 
the  reality  of  second  causes,  and  continues: 

"His  allusions  to  second  causes  are  so  much  more  infrequent  than  his  allu- 
sions to  the  great  First  Cause  that  even  Professor  Stuart  misunderstood  him  to 
teach  that  there  is  in  fact  only  one  real  cause  in  existence.  The  objector  asks: 
Does  not  Emmons  affirm  that  man  is  not  the  efficient  cause  of  his  own  choices? 
He  does,  sometimes;  but  then  he  means  by  efficient  cause,  that  agent  who  pro- 
duces a  volition  by  previously  choosing  to  produce  it;  and  a  man  does  not  produce 
his  choice,  his  first  choice,  for  example,  by  previously  choosing  to  produce  it. 
Man  does  not  begin  his  moral  action  by  choosing  to  choose.  He  docs  not  put 
forth  his  first  preference  as  an  effect  of  his  antecedently  preferring  to  put  it 
forth.  On  this  point,  Emmons  is  the  truest  representative  who  has  appeared 
of  the  Edwardean  philosophy.  But,  rejoins  the  critic,  Does  not  Emmons  affirm  or 
imply  that  God  is  the  only  efficient  cause  in  the  universe?  He  does.  But  here  he 
uses  the  word  efficient  as  denoting  independent.  He  teaches  that  all  other  choices 
are  put  forth  by  the  intervention  of  powers  which  absolutely  depend  on  the 
first  eternal  choice  of  the  First  Cause.  That  first  eternal  choice  is  the  only 
independent,  and,  with  this  meaning,  the  only  efficient  cause  in  the  universe. 
....  Although  his  language  is  more  nervous  than  perspicuous,  more  com- 
pressed than  precise,  on  this  theme,  yet  it  may  be  understood  by  considering 
the  general  scope  of  his  theology,  and  by  remembering  his  favorite  principle, 
tliat  agency  in  God  is  like  agency  in  man,  that  causation  in  God  is  like  causation 
in  man.    If  man,  therefore,  be  not  a  real  cause,  God  himself  is  not  a  real  cause." 

See  the  "Memoir,"  Boston  edition  of  Emmons'  Works,  pp.  385  f.,  with  the 
cross-references. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


243 


necessitarianism,  and  so  was  not  denied  a  hearing  at  the 
very  start,  as  its  predecessors  upon  the  same  path  had  been. 
This  was  Asa  Burton's  Essays  on  Some  of  the  First  Prin- 
ciples of  Metaphy sicks,  E thicks,  and  Theology  (1824) 
which  is  one  of  the  classics  of  New  England  theology,  and 
one  of  the  great  influential  philosophical  books  of  the 
world. 

All  the  previous  writers  had  maintained  the  twofold 
division  of  the  mind  into  understanding  and  will.  As  we 
have  seen,  Samuel  West's  clear  statement  of  the  threefold 
division  had  been  without  effect.  The  common-sense  which 
had  directed  what  opposition  was  made  to  the  prevailing 
necessitarianism  had  had  no  sufficient  theoretical  basis  in  a 
sounder  psychology.  Burton  supplied  this  basis.  After 
showing  that  there  are  faculties  in  the  mind,  and  develop- 
ing briefly  the  fact  that  there  are  three  main  faculties — 
the  understanding,  the  heart,  and  the  will — he  takes  up 
each  of  these  faculties  in  order.  In  his  treatment  of  the 
understanding  we  find  him  determining  the  terminology 
of  a  long  line  of  successors.  The  special  treatment  of  the 
"taste,"  as  he  calls  the  sensibility,  begins  upon  page  53. 
He  classifies  the  emotions,  desires,  etc.,  as  properly  belong- 
ing to  one  class  of  mental  affections,  and  declares  that  they 
must  have  a  cause,  which  cause  is  the  "taste."  This  he 
defines  as  "that  preparedness,  adaptedness,  or  disposition  of 
the  mind  by  which  the  mind  is  affected  agreeably  or  dis- 
agreeably when  objects  are  presented  to  it."  At  a  later 
point  he  distinguishes  sharply  between  the  "heart"  and  the 
will.^"^  It  is  evident,  he  says,  "that  neither  a  pleasant  nor 
a  painful  sensation  is  a  volition." 

Asa  Burton,  born  at  Stonington,  Conn.,  August  25,  1752;  graduated  at  Dart- 
mouth  College,    1777;   ordained  in  Thetford,   Vt.,    1779;   instructed  about  sixty 
students  for  the  ministry;  D.D.,  1804;  died  in  Thetford,  May  i,  1836. 
Op.  cit.,  p.  54. 
57  Pp.  87  ff. 


244 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Volitions  and  desires  are  not  operations  of  the  same  faculty  

Though  desire  has  an  object,  yet  its  object  is  not  an  action  nor  an 

effect  I  may  desire  meat  or  drink  ....  and  yet  not  one  effect 

follow  necessary  to  obtain  them.  But  when  I  will  these  effects,  they 
follow,  they  are  produced  Whether  objects  shall  please  or  dis- 
gust us  does  not  depend  upon  anything  in  us  except  our  nature;  but 

whether  they  shall  be  chosen  or  not  depends  upon  our  pleasure  

Pleasure  and  pain  are  not  produced  by  choice,  neither  can  choice 
prevent  them.  Whether  we  will  or  not,  some  objects  will  please  us 
and  others  will  disgust  us.  But  whether  they  are  chosen  or  not  de- 
pends upon  our  pleasure. 

Burton  thus  brings  out  distinctly,  though  not  with  abso- 
lute correctness,  the  fact  that  there  is  a  distinction  between 
the  sensibility  and  the  will.  We  shall  see  that  through 
the  ambiguity  of  the  word  "pleasure"  he  seems  to  state 
here  more  than  he  actually  does. 

Varying  the  order  of  Burton's  discussion  somewhat,  we 
now  advance  to  his  definition  of  liberty.  Here  he  makes  a 
very  decided  improvement  upon  any  of  his  predecessors. 
Liberty,  he  says,  is  not  to  be  predicated  of  the  intellect  or 
of  the  desires.^^  The  operations  of  these  faculties  is  neces- 
sary. Neither  does  liberty  consist  in  volition.  A  person 
may  be  bound  and  so  have  no  power  of  motion,  though  he 
wills  it.  He  is  not  then  at  liberty,  and  hence  volitions  do 
not  constitute  liberty.  Neither  is  it  a  power  which  the 
mind  possesses,  as  to  act  or  not  to  act.  Burton  distin- 
guishes between  liberty  of  action  and  liberty  of  will.  We 
have  liberty  of  will  when  we  can  choose  objects  accord- 
ing to  our  wish — that  is,  our  strongest  wish  or  desire. 
This,  evidently,  can  never  be  taken  from  us,  and  we  there- 
fore always  have  it.  Liberty  of  action  is  the  privilege  of 
acting  externally  according  to  our  volitions;  and  of  this 
we  may  be  deprived. 

We  are  thus  introduced  to  Burton's  theory  of  the  will. 
The  action  of  the  taste  is  necessary.    Objects  excite  our 

58  Pp.     Ill  f{. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


245 


desires,  and  our  desires  move  our  wills.    Hence  the  taste 

is  the  "spring  of  action  in  all  moral  agents,"  and  operates 

as  the  cause  of  volitions.    "The  will  is  only  an  executive 

faculty;  ....  its  office  is  to  obey  the  commands  of  the 

heart."     The  clearest  and  completest  statement  of  the 

theory  may  be  thus  condensed : 

This  internal  cause  [the  taste]  by  its  operation  produces  every 

volition  Between  this  cause  and  volition,  God  has  established 

an  infallible  connection.  ....  Hence  the  reason  why  the  liberty  of  the 
will  [in  the  sense  of  a  liberty  of  willing  according  to  our  pleasure] 

can  never  be  abridged  This  connection  is  moral  necessity,  and 

this  necessity  renders  liberty  of  will  absolutely  sure  and  certain. 

We  are  thus  left  by  Burton  still  in  the  toils  of  Edwards' 
necessity.  He  has  corrected,  one  by  one,  the  minor  errors 
of  his  predecessors,  having  rejected  the  position  of  Hop- 
kins, that  freedom  consists  in  voluntariness;  of  Emmons, 
that  our  mind  is  a  chain  of  exercises  (the  extremest  result 
of  the  hereditary  Berkeleianism),  and  that  our  volitions  are 
"created"  by  God.  He  has  distinguished  between  the  ne- 
cessity of  the  operation  of  the  intellect  and  that  of  the  will. 
But  still  the  will  remains  necessitated  through  its  depend- 
ence upon  the  taste.  Hence,  so  far  as  the  theory  of  the 
will  is  concerned,  he  has  given  but  little  relief.  It  seems 
the  fate  of  all  sound  theological  progress  to  move  with  ex- 
ceeding slowness,  by  almost  infinitesimal  incremucnts.  It 
is  as  in  animal  development,  where  the  "variation"  is  gen- 
erally minute.  But,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  by  the  distinction 
established  between  the  taste  and  the  will  he  has  prepared 
the  way  for  an  altogether  new  conception,  which  he  did 
not  himself  attain,  and  which  introduces  ultimately  the  idea 
of  freedom  in  its  true  form.  There  was  need  of  still 
another  laborer  before  the  wide-reaching  consequences  of 
Burton's  new  truth  could  be  brought  out. 

This  successor  to  Burton's  labors  and  completer  of  his 

5°  p.  126. 


246         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


work  was  Nathaniel  W.  Taylor,^^  the  most  original,  pow- 
erful, and  widely  influential  mind  which  New  England 
theology  ever  possessed.  He  derived  his  impulse  to  pro- 
ductive work  upon  the  will  from  Burton,  and  alone  proved 
able  to  effect  anything  in  the  further  development  of  the 
doctrine.  But  he  was  not  solely  dependent  upon  Burton 
for  he  stood  in  the  succession  of  Yale  teachers,  and  had 
been  brought  by  his  predecessors  in  this  great  school  to  a 
new  philosophical  position — to  the  final  abandonment  of  the 
Berkeleianism  which  had  been  so  influential,  and  so  bale- 
fully  so,  up  to  this  time.  Dwight  had  been  familiar  with 
English  and  Scotch  philosophy,  and  the  great  master  Reid, 
and  had  laid  the  foundation  of  the  philosophy  of  common- 
sense,  which  Taylor  adopted,  and  which  became  the  great 
offensive  weapon  of  New  England  apology  as  well  as  its 
great  instrument  of  constructive  reasoning.  Day,^^  Fitch, 
and  Goodrich  had  taken  part  in  the  discussion  of  the  will, 
and  had  cleared  the  ground  somewhat  for  Taylor.  With 
all  the  advantage  derived  from  a  new  philosophy  and  a 
new  method,  Taylor,  having  once  seen  the  wide-reaching 
consequences  of  Burton's  discoveries,  was  able  to  draw 

60  Born  in  New  Milford,  Conn.,  1786;  died  in  New  Haven,  March  10,  1858; 
graduated  at  Yale,  1807;  studied  theology  with  President  Dwight;  pastor  of  the 
First  Church,  New  Haven,  1812;  transferred  to  the  chair  of  theology  when  the 
department  of  theology  was  organized  in  Yale  College,  1822. 

«^  President  Noah  Porter  says  (American  edition  of  Ueberweg's  History  of 
Philosophy,  Vol.  II,  p.  449) :  "Dr.  Dwight  was,  in  the  main,  a  disciple  of 
Edwards.  ....  He   was   familiar   with   the  works  of  the  leading   English  and 

Scotch  philosophers,  and  discussed  their  opinions  in  a  popular  style  He 

was  also  more  or  less  familiar  with  the  rational  and  ethical  English  divines  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  and  was  influenced  to  some  degree  at  least  by  the  modes 
of  reasoning  and  statements  with  which  he  became  familiar  in  Berkeley,  Butler, 
and  George  Campbell." 

Dr.  Jeremiah  Day,  president  of  Yale  College,  who  contributed  two  brief 
discussions  to  the  controversy,  both  of  them  substantially  Edwardean,  though 
manifesting  something  of  the  traditional  apologetic  interpretation,  but  full  of 
acute  and  useful  discriminations:  Inquiry  respecting  the  Self-determining  Power 
of  the  Will,  etc.  (New  Haven,  1838)  and  An  Examination  of  President  Ed- 
wards' Inquiry  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  (New  Haven,  1841). 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


247 


them  without  embarrassment  and  apply  them  courageously 
both  in  theory  and  in  practice.^^ 

Taylor  followed  Burton  in  adopting  the  threefold  divi- 
sion of  the  mind.  There  must  be  something  in  the  mind 
of  the  sinner  to  which  the  gospel  could  appeal,  some  neu- 
tral point  not  thoroughly  corrupted  with  the  corruption  of 
his  moral  nature,  though  that  corruption,  in  respect  to  the 
will,  was  entire.  Such  a  neutral  point  Taylor  found  in  the 
sensibility,  whence  the  will  might  be  reached.  This  was  a 
position  which  commended  itself  to  him  because  he  was 
profoundly  interested  in  the  work  of  converting  men,  in 
which  as  a  pastor  and  evangelist  of  great  power  and  elo- 
quence he  had  long  been  variously  engaged. 

Prepared  thus  to  perceive  and  escape  the  fundamental 
fallacy  of  Edwards,  Taylor  was  ready  for  various  improve- 
ments upon  his  predecessors.  He  corrected  the  tendency 
which  had  done  so  much  to  make  theology  impossible,  by 
pronouncing  for  human  efficiency.  ''Moral  agents,"  he 
says,  "are  the  proximate  efficient  causes  of  their  own 
acts."  He  does  not  hold  them  to  be  the  sole  efficient 
agents,  or  the  ultimate,  but  the  proximate,  having  a  true 
agency.  The  same  efficiency  he  also  ascribes  to  material 
objects.  ''My  mind  inclines  to  the  belief  of  the  efficiency 
of  second  causes."  An  argument  in  favor  of  this  is 
"our  consciousness  of  the  existence  of  created  agents  of 
one  sort,"  viz.,  ourselves. 

In  possessing  this  agency,  the  soul  possesses  "power  to 
the  contrary,"  or,  in  any  definite  choice  which  it  makes, 
acts  under  no  necessity  but  with  power  to  make  the  con- 
trary choice  equally  with  the  choice  actually  made,  the  cir- 

For  a  valuable  article  upon  Taylor  see  G.  P.  Fisher's  Discussions 
in  History  and  Theology  (pp.  285-354),  to  which  I  am  happy  to  acknowledge  my 
indebtedness  for  much  of  what  follows,  and  for  my  general  view  of  Taylor's 
theology. 

^*  Moral  Government,  Vol.  I,  p.  309.  Ibid.,   Vol.   II,  p.  311. 


248         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

cumstances  of  the  choice  remaining  unaltered.^^  Taylor 

said,  in  order  to  avoid  the  evasions  of  Edwards :    "A  man 

not  only  can  if  he  will,  but  he  can  if  he  won't."    He  says : 

Moral  agency  implies  free  agency — the  power  of  choice — the  power 
to  choose  morally  wrong  as  well  as  morally  right  under  every  possible 
influence  to  prevent  such  choice  or  action  I  now  speak  of  pre- 
venting sin  in  moral  beings,  free  moral  agents,  who  can  sin  under  every 
possible  influence  from  God  to  prevent  their  sinning. ^^'^ 

At  the  same  time,  Dr.  Taylor  does  not  deny  the  in- 
fluence of  motives.  The  system  under  which  we  live  is  a 
system  of  moral  influence,  of  law  possessing  authority  and 
uttering  commands  designed  to  influence  men.  In  some 
way  also,  however  impossible  to  understand  or  explain,  the 
moral  system,  including  free  moral  agency,  with  its  "power 
to  the  contrary,"  secures  certainty  as  to  future  moral  events. 
Moral  government  "is  an  influence  which  is  designed  and 
fitted  to  give,  not  the  necessity,  but  merely  the  certainty  of 
its  effect."  How  this  is  secured  Dr.  Taylor  does  not  say. 
He  objects  to  the  theory  that  it  is  produced  through  mo- 
tives, and  prefers  to  say,  "through  the  constitution  of  man 
and  the  circumstances  in  which  he  acts."  To  these 
sources  we  ourselves  refer  all  our  actions.  How  the  consti- 
tution and  circumstances  of  man  are  managed  to  secure  a 
definite  volition  in  every  case  is  the  point  left  unexplained. 
The  theory,  as  a  theory,  is  therefore  still  defective,  the  idea 
of  freedom,  so  clearly  and  decidedly  advanced,  being  left 
altogether  unadjusted  to  the  sovereignty  and  foreknowl- 
edge of  God.  The  crux  of  the  New  England  theology 
begins  therefore  to  appear  in  this  hitherto  unequaled 
thinker.  Will  he  be  able  to  resolve  the  difficulty,  or  will 
the  lion,  now  grown  greater  and  more  powerful,  still  prove 
himself  unable  to  escape  the  net  in  which  he  is  enmeshed? 

Meantime  Taylor  holds  to  the  old  distinction  between 

80  Fisher,  op.  cit.,  p.  312.  Moral  Government,  Vol.  I,  p.  307. 

Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  8.  0^  Ibid.,  Vol.  II,  p.  312. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


249 


natural  and  moral  ability.  The  natural  ability  is  the  true 
power;  the  moral  ability,  the  condition  of  the  will.  A 
man  is  morally  unable  to  will  one  thing,  such  as  to  love 
God,  while  he  is  at  the  same  time  willing  the  opposite 
thing,  such  as  to  love  himself  supremely.  The  real  diffi- 
culty in  spiritual  struggles  consists  in  the  obstinacy  of  the 
will,  or  the  actual  preference  of  other  things  to  the  service 
and  glory  of  God. 

Taylor  has  thus  seized  upon  the  great  advance  made  by 
Burton,  in  adopting  the  threefold  division  of  the  mind,  and 
has  at  the  same  time  freed  himself  from  the  necessitarian- 
ism in  which  Burton  had  remained,  by  breaking  the  bond 
which  in  Burton's  scheme  still  connected  the  action  of  the 
will  with  the  condition  of  the  sensibility.  While  still  a 
most  intense  admirer  of  Edwards,  he  has  broken  with  his 
distinctive  idea  also — with  the  infallible  connection  be- 
tween the  greatest  apparent  good  and  the  volition.  He 
stands  for  a  true  freedom,  upon  the  basis  of  consciousness, 
and  will  allow  nothing  to  interfere  with  its  reality.  But 
he  stands  at  the  same  time,  upon  quite  other  grounds,  for 
the  previous  certainty  of  all  human  actions. 

Another  writer,  more  a  psychologist  than  a  theologian, 
who  accepted  Burton's  new  division  of  the  faculties  of  the 
mind,"^^  and  contributed  to  liberate  our  philosophy  and  the- 
ology from  thraldom  to-  Edwards,  was  Thomas  C.  Up- 
ham,"^^  professor  for  many  years  in  Bowdoin  College.  In 
his  Philosophical  and  Practical  Treatise  on  the  Will  (1834) 
he  issued  one  of  the  first  original  and  comprehensive  con- 
tributions of  American  scholarship  to  modern  psychology. 
It  embraced  descriptions  of  the  phenomena  of  the  mind 

Quoting  him  on  p.  29  of  The  Will. 
'^^  Born  in  Deerfield,  N.  H.,  January  30,  1799;  died  in  New  York,  April  i, 
1872;  graduated  at  Dartmouth,  18 18;  Andover,  1821;  pastor  in  Rochester,  N. 
H.,  1823-24;  professor  of  mental  and  moral  philosophy  in  Bowdoin  College, 
1824-67;  published  also  Elements  of  Mental  Philosophy  (1827),  which  was  widely 
used. 


250         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


drawn  from  a  wide  range  of  reading,  and  was  not  written 
with  a  view  of  sustaining  some  preconceived  theory. 
Though  not  without  a  purpose,  it  was  not  so  occupied  with 
its  purpose  as  to  select  its  material  with  reference  to  that 
alone,  and  confine  itself  to  a  single  and  narrow  line  of  in- 
quiry. It  was  more  largely  influenced  than  many  later  pro- 
ductions by  the  conception  of  psychology  which  is  now 
controlling,  viz.,  that  it  is  a  chapter  in  the  natural  history 
of  the  soul. 

Upham  begins  with  the  ^'General  Nature  of  the  Will," 
in  which  he  sets  forth  the  existence  and  general  relations 
of  the  three  faculties  of  the  mind,  intellect,  sensibility,  and 
will.  All  parts  and  powers  of  the  mind  are  connected.  The 
intellectual  part  is  the  foundation  of  the  others.  The  intel- 
lect reaches  the  will  through  the  sensibilities.  When  an 
object  is  perceived,  the  emotions  are  excited,  upon  which 
follow  the  desires,  and  then  the  will  acts.  It  is  an  exam- 
ple of  the  breadth  of  Upham's  view  that  he  pauses  here, 
in  the  onward  movement  of  his  theme,  to  note  that,  while 
the  intellect  acts  on  the  sensibility,  this  reacts  upon  the  in- 
tellect. The  will  itself  is  the  controlling  power  of  the  mind 
which  maintains  the  harmony  of  the  mind.  It  "is  not 
meant  to  express  anything  separate  from  the  mind,"  and 
may  be  defined  as  "the  mental  power  or  susceptibility  by 
which  we  put  forth  volitions."  The  term  "volition,"  desig- 
nating a  "simple  state  of  the  mind,"  admits  of  no  defini- 
tion. 

After  a  concluding  chapter  on  the  distinction  between 
the  desires  and  the  volitions,  necessary  in  those  times,  Up- 
ham advanced  to  his  second  part,  in  which,  by  a  long  dis- 
cussion of  the  universality  of  law,  and  of  various  specific 
laws,  he  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that  there  are  laws  of  the 
will.  This  view  is  contrasted  in  his  mind  with  the  view 
that  the  actions  of  the  will  are  "without  respect  to  anteced- 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


ent,  and  regulated  by  no  conditions."  The  laws  consid- 
ered are  those  of  causality,  those  found  in  moral  govern- 
ment, those  implied  in  the  prescience  of  the  Deity  and  the 
foresight  of  men,  in  the  sciences  relating  to  human  con- 
duct, and  those  intimated  by  consciousness,  and  the  influ- 
ence of  motives.  In  all  this  wide  range  of  discussion  the 
central  idea  is  that  brought  out  in  the  following  extract : 

Every  moral  government  implies,  in  the  first  place,  a  ruler,  a  gov- 
ernor, some  species  of  supreme  authority.  The  term  government  it- 
self, separate  from  any  qualifying  epithet,  obviously  expresses  the 
fact  that  there  are  some  beings  governed,  which  is  inconceivable  with- 
out the  correlative  of  a  higher  and  governing  power.  And  what  is 
true  of  all  other  government  is  certainly  not  less  so  of  that  species  of 
government  which  is  denominated  moral.  In  all  moral  government, 
therefore,  there  must  undoubtedly  be  some  supreme  authority  to  which 
those  who  are  governed  are  amenable. 

Now  if  men  are  under  government,  they  are  under  law.  To  be 
governed  is  obviously  to  be  regulated,  guided,  or  controlled,  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree.  To  say  that  men  are  governed  and  are  at  the 
same  time  exempt  from  law,  is  but  little  short  of  a  verbal  contradic- 
tion, and  is  certainly  a  real  one.  But  when  we  speak  of  men  as  being 
under  laws,  we  do  not  mean  to  assert  a  mere  abstraction.  We  mean 
to  express  something  actually  existing;  in  other  words,  we  intend  to 
assert  the  fact,  that  the  actions  of  men,  whatever  may  be  true  of  their 
freedom,  are  in  some  way  or  other  reached  by  an  effective  supervision. 
But  when  we  consider  the  undenied  and  undoubted  dependence  of 
the  outward  act  on  the  inward  volition,  we  very  naturally  and  properly 
conclude  that  the  supervision  of  the  outward  act  is  the  result  of  the 
antecedent  supervision  of  the  inward  principle  of  will;  in  other  words, 
the  will  has  its  lazvsJ^ 

With  this  principle  copiously  proved  and  definitely  laid 
down,  but  zvithont  attempt  to  enumerate  or  describe  the 
laws  themselves,  Upham  passes  to  the  topic  of  the  freedom 
of  the  will.  Freedom,  he  says,  is  the  name  of  a  simple  idea 
(here  recurring  tO'  Locke's  phraseology),  and  therefore  is 
indefinable.  But  it  is  not  impossible  to  gain  a  tolerably 
correct  view  of  what  Upham  meant  by  freedom.  Although 

"  The  Will,  p.  133- 
''^  Ibid.,  p.  150. 


252 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


he  wanders  off  into  a  discussion  of  ''mental  harmony," 
by  which  he  means  what  the  Germans  designate  by  their 
term  reale  Freiheit,  in  which  the  powers  all  co-operate  un- 
der the  guidance  of  conscience  in  perfect  union  with  one 
another,  and  declares  this  the  only  condition  in  which  true 
freedom  can  be  realized,  it  is  evident  on  the  whole  that  he 
means  by  freedom  a  true  power  of  causality.  He  proves 
it  by  man's  moral  nature,  gaining  evidence  of  it  from  the 
feelings  of  approval  and  disapproval,  those  of  remorse, 
the  mere  existence  of  the  abstract  ideas  of  right  and  wrong, 
the  feeling  of  moral  obligation,  and  men's  views  of  crimes 
and  punishments.  He  adduces  to  the  same  end  evidence 
from  language,  from  occasional  suspension  of  the  will's 
acts,  from  our  control  over  our  own  motives,  from  our 
attempts  to  influence  other  men,  and  from  the  language  of 
the  Scriptures.  And  at  a  later  point  he  also  employs  the 
word  ''self-determining"  power  to  express  his  doctrine, 
though  he  objects  to  that  use  of  the  word  against  which 
Edwards  had  argued.  And,  while  he  defers  the  whole 
matter  of  the  consistency  of  the  will's  subjection  to  law 
with  the  fact  of  freedom,  he  affirms  that  they  are  consist- 
ent, using  Emmons'  appeal  to  reason  for  the  idea  of  law, 
and  to  consciousness  for  the  knowledge  of  freedom.  An 
interesting  Part  IV  on  the  "Power  of  the  Will"  closes  the 
work. 

The  ideas  of  Taylor  were  taken  up  at  Oberlin  by  Presi- 
dent Finney.'^^  He  adopted  the  division  of  the  mind  into 
intellect,  sensibility,  and  will.  He  criticized  Edwards'  dis- 
tinction between  natural  and  moral  ability,  and  reduced 

Loc.  cit.,  p.  341. 

Charles  G.  Finney,  born  in  Warren,  Conn.,  August  29,  1792;  died  in 
Oberlin,  O.,  August  16,  1875.  A  revivalist,  pastor  of  Broadway  Tabernacle,  New 
York,  he  was  called  to  Oberlin  as  professor  of  theology  in  1835.  In  1837  he 
became  pastor  of  the  First  Church.  In  1848  he  went  to  England  and  spent 
three  years  there,  reissuing  his  Systematic  Theology  in  that  country.  From  1852 
to  1866  he  was  president  of  Oberlin  College. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


253 


them,  upon  the  basis  of  Edwards'  philosophy,  to  one  and 

the  same  thing.    His  definition  of  freedom  was  as  follows : 

Free  will  implies  the  power  of  originating  and  deciding  our  own 
choices,  and  of  exercising  our  own  sovereignty  in  every  instance  of 
choice  upon  moral  questions  The  sequences  of  choice  or  voli- 
tion are  always  under  the  law  of  necessity,  and  unless  the  will  is 
free,  man  has  no  freedom ;  and  if  he  has  no  freedom,  he  is  not  a  moral 
agent.'^^ 

The  argument  from  consciousness  for  freedom  had  not 
escaped  the  attention  even  of  the  Berkeleian  period;  and 
we  have  had  occasion  to  note  in  Stephen  West  close  dis- 
tinctions relative  to  consciousness  O'f  power.  Now  that  our 
theology  had  passed  over  to  the  new  basis  of  the  Scotch 
school,  fresh  discussions  of  consciousness  might  be  ex- 
pected. Finney  occupied  himself  with  them  somewhat,  but 
gives  a  rather  uncertain  answer  to  the  question  whether  we 
are  actually  conscious  of  freedom.  He  says:  ''Conscious- 
ness gives  us  the  reasons  of  the  affirmation  that  liberty  is 
an  attribute  of  the  actions  of  the  will."  This  is  probably 
the  phrase  by  which  we  gain  the  true  interpretation  of  an- 
other phrase  of  Finney's :  "Man  is  conscious  of  possess- 
ing the  powers  of  a  moral  agent."  "''^  The  freedom  of  the 
will  is  an  affirmation  of  the  reason  upon  consciousness  of 
the  phenomena  which  pass  on  within  us. 

Finney  also  maintained  the  perfect  certainty  of  all  fu- 
ture volitions,  which  are  embraced  in  the  purposes  of  God, 
so  that  God's  foreknowledge  of  what  will  be  done  depends 
upon  his  purposes  as  to  what  he  will  himself  do.  In  respect 
to  all  these  subjects,  however,  there  is  no  philosophical  dis- 
cussion; but  Finney  contents  himself  with  the  affirmation 
of  what  he  regards  simple  and  indisputable  truth. 

Finney's  successor.  President  Fairchild,  presented  the 
same  doctrine,  but  with  new  and  juster  emphasis  upon  the 

System,  Fairchild's  edition,  p.  15. 
'''^  Ibid.,  p.  19. 


254 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


testimony  of  consciousness.  The  intellect  and  the  sensibil- 
ity are  marked  in  their  action  by  the  law  of  necessity.  But 
in  the  case  of  the  will,  in  view  of  at  least  two  courses, 

we  consciously  determine  for  ourselves,  by  a  free  choice  between  the 

two,  upon  which  of  these  courses  we  shall  enter  In  this  decision 

we  are  conscious  of  the  fact  of  freedom,  or  liberty.  We  know  that 
we  can  will  to  take  either  of  the  attitudes,  or  pursue  either  of  the 
courses  open  to  us;  this  is  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  our  free- 
dom The  proof  of  our  freedom  is  found  only  in  our  con- 
sciousness, and  can  be  found  nowhere  else.  We  know  that  we  are 
free,  and  that  is  the  end  of  the  argument;  it  is  a  fact  of  conscious- 
ness The  argument  for  freedom  derived  from  our  moral  con- 
sciousness, the  fact  that  we  hold  ourselves  bound  by  duty  or  obliga- 
tion to  a  certain  course  of  action,  is  a  good  argument  for  the  freedom 
of  the  will.  But  the  perception  or  conviction  of  the  obligation  pre- 
supposes the  consciousness  of  freedom.  The  view  is  sometimes  pre- 
sented that  we  infer  our  freedom  from  our  consciousness  of  obligation. 
But  it  is  not  merely  a  logical  inference.  The  consciousness  of  free- 
dom is  doubtless  involved  in  our  perception  or  conviction  of  obliga- 
tion. The  fact  of  freedom  is  the  logical  antecedent  of  that  of  obHga- 
tion,  and  the  thought  of  freedom  must  come  before,  or  with,  the  thought 
of  obligation. '^^ 

Fairchild  attempted  to  make  the  possibility  of  freedom  a 
little  clearer  by  dividing,  as  Samuel  West  had  done,  be- 
tween the  two  classes  of  motives — those  which  appeal  to 
the  intelligence,  and  those  which  appeal  to  the  desires.  All 
motives  reduce  to  these  two  classes.  Between  the  two  the 
will  chooses  in  perfect  freedom.  In  fact,  freedom  is  made 
possible  by  the  fact  that  the  two  are  incomparable  as  to 
their  strength,  since  they  appeal  to  the  personality  in  two 
completely  different  ways. 

How  do  we  measure  strength  of  motive  ?  There  are  two  ways — by 
the  judgment  or  reason,  and  by  the  sensibility  or  feeling.  The  two 
standards  are  entirely  different,  but  the  will  is  not  always  as  the 
strongest  motive,  tested  by  either  standard.  It  is  not  always  as  the 
best  judgment;  for  the  sinner  always  acts  against  the  true  reason  as 
presented  by  his  judgment.  Nor  is  it  always  as  the  strongest  feel- 
ing; the  good  man  often  obeys  his  judgment,  against  his  feeling. 

"^^  Elements  of  Theology,  Natural  and  Revealed  (Oberlin,  1892),  pp.  37  ff. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


255 


This  is  more  illuminating  than  anything  that  had  yet  been 
said.   Yet  Fairchild  did  not  quite  rise  to  the  true  height  of 

freedom,  for  he  said : 

If  motive  acts  only  in  the  shape  of  desire,  then  there  is  but  one 
kind  of  motive  acting  upon  us,  and  no  alternative  in  action;  only  one 
course  open  to  us,  and  hence  no  choice,  no  freedom.  The  strongest 
desire,  or  the  resultant  of  the  desires,  must  control  the  will.  There  is 
nothing  possible  in  action  but  to  obey  the  feeling. 

This  is  entirely  to  surrender  freedom;  for  the  fact  is  that 
the  strength  of  desires  does  not  touch  freedom.  Action 
must,  to  be  sure,  ''obey  the  feeling;"  but  which,  of  several 
feelings?  It  erects  the  authority  which  it  obeys  into  an 
authority  in  the  act  of  obeying  it.  Fairchild  further  held 
the  certainty  of  all  future  events,  because  he  maintained 
God's  perfect  foreknowledge.  But  foreknowledge  was 
mysterious.  God  must  be  supposed  to  have  ''some  direct 
beholding  of  the  future,  a  power  which  we  cannot  explain 
or  understand." 

The  Oberlin  school  thus  attained  the  best  statement  of 
the  meaning  of  freedom  which  had  yet  been  given  in  the 
New  England  theology.  But  its  atomistic  theory  of  the 
will's  action  prevented  it  from  accepting  Taylor's  idea  of 
a  "primary  predominant  choice,"  with  all  which  that  in- 
volves for  the  idea  of  character.  For  the  highest  point 
reached  in  this  development  we  must  turn  to  Samuel  Har- 
ris, who  in  his  Philosophical  Basis  of  Theism  gave  a  new 
statement  to  freedom  and  rendered  many  of  the  old  dis- 
putations forever  unnecessary. 

Harris  begins  his  treatment  of  the  will  with  definitions. 
To  summarize: 

The  will  is  the  power  of  a  person,  in  the  light  of  reason  and  with 
susceptibility  to  the  influence  of  rational  motives,  to  determine  the  end 
or  objects  to  which  he  will  direct  his  energy,  and  the  exertion  of  his 
energy  with  reference  to  the  determined  end  or  object.  The  will  is  a 
person's  power  of  self-determination.    It  is  his  power  of  determ.ining 

78  See  Chapter  XVI,  on  the  Oberlin  theology. 


256 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


the  exercise  of  his  own  causal  efficiency  or  energy.  He  has  the  power 
of  self-directioih,  self-exertion,  and  self-restraint  The  determina- 
tions of  the  will  are  of  two  kinds — Choice  and  Volition.  In  choice  a 
person  determines  the  object  or  end  to  which  he  will  direct  his  ener- 
gies. In  volition  a  person  exerts  his  energies  or  calls  them  into  action; 
or  he  refuses  to  do  so  Choice  is  self-direction.  Volition  is  self- 
exertion  or  self-restraint.    Both  are  self-determinations.^^ 

The  distinction  here  made  between  choice  and  voHtion  is 
vital  to  Harris'  understanding  of  the  subject.  It 

is  essential  to  the  reality  of  free-will  and  moral  responsibility.  If  will 
is  merely  the  volitional  power  of  calling  the  energies  into  action,  then 
we  no  longer  determine  by  free-will  the  ends  or  objects  of  action; 
and  these  are  determined  by  the  constitutional  impulses  or  motives 
which  are  at  the  time  the  strongest.  And  thus  all  freedom  both  of 
choice  and  volition  disappears,  since  the  man  has  no  power  of  self- 
direction  and  can  exert  his  energies  only  in  the  direction  already 
determined  for  him  by  the  unreasoning  impulses  of  nature. 

Choice  "presupposes  a  comparison  of  objects  in  the 

light  of  reason  After  the  comparison  follows  the 

choice,  which  is  the  simple,  indefinable  determination  of  the 
will." 

A  choice  is  an  abiding  determination  of  the  will.  It  may  abide 
for  an  hour  or  a  day;  it  may  be  a  life-long  choice  or  preference. 
....  Choices  may  be  distinguished  by  their  objects  as  supreme  and 
subordinate.  A  subordinate  choice  is  the  choice  of  an  object  as  sub- 
ordinate to  an  ulterior  end;  as  when  one  chooses  wealth  as  an  object 
of  pursuit,  but  chooses  it  simply  as  a  means  of  political  preferment. 
The  supreme  choice  is  the  choice  of  the  supreme  end  of  action,  to 
which  all  other  ends  are  subordinate  and  which  itself  is  subordinate 
to  no  ulterior  end.  Because  man  is  rational  he  must  choose  some 
supreme  end ;  for  he  recognizes  reason  as  supreme.^^ 

With  these  definitions  the  afiirmation  of  freedom  is 
closely  connected. ''The  definition  of  will  is  in  itself  the 
definition  of  free-will."  "The  freedom  of  the  will  consists 
in  the  fact  that  the  will  is  a  will."  "Freedom  is  inherent 
in  rationality."  Edwards  was  wrong  in  considering  the 
will  "from  the  point  of  view  of  efiicient  causation,"  and 

80  op.  cit.,  p.  349.  81  Ibid.,  p.  354. 

Ibid.,  p.  361. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


257 


forgetting  that  it  might  be  exercised  (in  choice)  prior  to 
all  causation.  The  threefold  division  of  the  mind,  separat- 
ing sharply  between  the  determinations  of  the  sensibilities 
and  those  of  the  will,  is  of  essential  help  in  maintaining  the 
correct  view.  "Man's  knowledge  of  his  free-will  is  of  the 
highest  certainty."  The  proof  is  derived  from  the  im- 
mediate affirmations  of  consciousness,  from  the  conscious- 
ness of  moral  responsibility  which  involves  freedom,  from 
the  fact  that  it  "sustains  the  tests  of  primitive  knowledge," 
and  from  human  history.  The  "implication  of  man  in 
nature,"  which  proves  that  he  is  above  nature,  is  consid- 
ered at  length;  and  then  the  old  historic  struggle  is  taken 
up  in  a  section  upon  "the  influence  of  motives."  The 
motive  is  not  the  efficient  cause  of  the  will's  determina- 
tions; nor  does  it  determine  it  to  choose  this  rather  than 
that.  The  various  formulas  which  have  been  suggested — 
The  will  always  is  as  the  strongest  motive;  as  the  greatest 
apparent  good;  as  the  last  dictate  of  the  understanding — 
are  all  aside  from  the  true  point.  This  portion  of  the  sub- 
ject is  summed  up  in  the  following  paragraph,  which  also 
anticipates  the  substance  of  a  valuable  section  upon  "Soci- 
ology and  Free-Will :" 

The  uniformity  of  human  action  cannot  be  explained  by  any  law 
of  the  uniform  influence  of  motives  on  the  will.  Another  factor  is 
concerned  in  this  uniformity;  it  is  the  character  in  the  will.  By  its 
choice  the  will  forms  in  itself  a  character;  and  by  action  in  accordance 
with  the  choice,  it  confirms  and  develops  the  character.  This  must 
be  recognized  in  explaining  the  uniformity  of  human  action.  The 
attempt  to  explain  it  by  some  law  of  the  uniform  influence  of  motives 
assumes  that  the  will  is  always  characterless.  Writers  on  the  will 
who  attempt  to  explain  the  uniformity  of  human  action  in  this  way, 
have  much  to  say  about  the  necessity  of  finding  the  laws  of  the  will. 
But  in  fact  they  are  seeking  for  a  law  of  the  will  which  shall  be  only 
a  necessary  uniform  sequence  of  nature;  should  they  succeed  they 
would  only  prove  that  the  determinations  of  the  will  are  a  part  of  the 

83  Ibid.,   p.   365.  84  7^j^_^    p_  376, 

»^  Ibid.,  p.  389. 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


course  of  nature  and  subject  to  the  dictum  necessitatis.  This  would 
prove  that  personal  beings  do  not  exist  and  that  nature  is  all.  The 
real  law  to  the  determinations  of  the  will  is  the  moral  law  which  de- 
clares the  ends  to  which  rational  beings  ought  to  direct  their  ener- 
gies and  the  principles  which  ought  to  guide  them  in  their  actions. 
If  personal  beings  exist  they  must  at  some  point  rise  above  the  fixed 
course  and  uniform  sequences  of  nature  and  find  themselves  under 
obligation  to  conform  their  free  action  to  the  truths,  laws,  ideals,  and 
ends  of  reason. ^'^ 

But  this  is  a  disgression.  We  are  here  engaged  with  a 
theologian  who  represents  a  later  stage  in  the  history  of 
theology,  when  the  homogeneous  and  self-centered  New 
England  school  was  giving  way  to  the  introduction  of  a 
still  ''newer"  theology.  We  revert,  therefore,  to  Taylor  as 
the  propounder  of  a  real  freedom,  and  ask  what  the  effect 
of  this  proposal  is  to  be  within  the  strict  Nevv^  England 
school,  of  which  Taylor  certainly  was  a  member,  both  by 
training  and  by  his  hearty  acceptance  of  its  leading  posi- 
tions.  What  would  be  done  with  it  in  our  oldest  and  then 
principal  school  of  theology,  in  Andover,  and  by  the  great- 
est  representative  of  the  unmodified  New  England  strain, 
Professor  Park? 

The  real  question  for  New  England  theology,  after 
Taylor  had  led  the  way  in  so  large  a  revision  of  Edwards' 
positions  as  substantially  to  reverse  them,  was  whether  the 
departure  from  Edwards  should  be  frankly  acknowledged, 
and  the  development  of  theological  thought  be  allowed  to 
go  unhampered  on  its  way,  or  whether  the  overshadowing 
influence  of  Edwards  should  be  maintained  to  the  great 
damage  of  the  constructive  processes  so  actively  proceed- 
ing. Should  the  dogmatic  or  the  historic  spirit  prevail? 
It  was  Park's  peculiar  fate  to  guide  in  the  latter  direction, 
and  to  maintain  the  historic  attitude  at  the  expense  of  per- 
fect clearness  and  dogmatic  success.  He  so  admired  and 
reverenced  Edwards  that  he  believed  himself  at  every  point 

Loc.  cit.,  p.  396. 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


259 


a  follower  of  the  master.  Why  he  thought  so  is  one  of  the 
mysteries  of  the  subject.  He  was  himself  a  greater  mind 
than  Edwards.  He  must  have  known  Edwards'  entire  de- 
pendence upon  Locke  for  both  doctrine  and  arguments. 
But  Park's  admiration  of  the  acuteness,  elaboration,  com- 
prehensiveness, and  mercilessness  in  the  pursuit  of  error, 
which  mark  Edwards'  work,  and  of  the  great  service  ren- 
dered by  the  perfect  timeliness  of  his  writings  to  evangeli- 
cal theology,  was  so  great  that  it  blinded  him  to  every  other 
aspect  of  the  matter.  This  was  the  easier  on  account  of 
that  subtle  ambiguity  in  Edwards'  phraseology  which  we 
have  already  marked,  and  which  gave  rise  to  the  interpre- 
tation of  his  father  made  by  the  younger  Edwards.  Park 
seized  this  interpretation  and  declared  it  the  true  interpre- 
tation, and  thus  concealed  from  himself  his  greatest  diver- 
gence from  Edwards.  His  further  divergences  could  then 
the  more  easily  remain  hid  from  his  own  eyes. 
These  divergences  pertained  to  three  points: 

1.  Edwards  followed  the  old  division  of  the  mind  into 
the  understanding  and  affections,  and  subsumed  the  will 
under  the  latter  head.  He  hence  confounded  the  affections 
and  the  will,  and  made  a  hundred  times  the  fallacy  of  glid- 
ing from  "inclination"  considered  as  a  desire  to  inclination 
as  a  volition,  without  being  conscious  of  it;  which,  of 
course,  was  the  fallacy  of  "ambiguous  term."  Park,  on 
the  contrary,  followed  the  threefold  division  into  intellect, 
sensibility,  and  will,  and  was  always  consistent  in  the  dis- 
tinction. 

2.  Park  denied  the  causal  connection  between  motives 
and  choices.  Hence  he  interpreted  the  maxim,  which  he 
himself  preserved,  "The  will  always  is  as  the  greatest  ap- 
parent good,"  as  embodying  the  usage,  not  the  necessitated 
action,  of  the  will.    It  might  at  any  moment  choose  the 


26o         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


least  apparent  good;  but  it  never  does,  and  it  never  will. 
This  was  the  younger  Edwards'  interpretation  oi  his  father. 

3.  Park  gave  a  new  meaning,  and  above  all  a  new  force, 
to  the  idea  of  natural  ability  to  choose,  which  he  would 
have  made  a  real  freedom  but  for  the  shackles  laid  upon 
him  by  that  maxim,  which  he  thought  he  had  evacuated  of 
its  mischief,  but  which,  like  a  tamed  cobra,  possessed  both 
the  power  and  the  will  to  poison  the  theory,  if  not  the  prac- 
tical application,  of  any  theology  cherishing  it.^^ 

These  divergences  were  of  the  utmost  importance  for 
subsequent  thinkers,  but  it  v/as  chiefly  because  of  their  ex- 
tension and  enlargement  on  account  of  practical  considera- 
tions. We  now  concern  ourselves  with  the  question  of  the 
theoretical  adjustment  of  the  idea  of  freedom,  and  of  the 
success  of  Park  in  maintaining  a  true  freedom. 

Park  maintains  that  the  will  always  is  as  the  greatest 
apparent  good.  Take  any  human  being,  from  Adam  down, 
and  he  comes  into  a  world  of  goods,  already  fixed  inde- 
pendently of  his  volitional  action.  His  own  balance  of  de- 
sires and  tendencies  (subjective  natural  motives,  in  Park's 
terminology),  previous  to  his  first  choice,  is  also  fixed  in- 
dependently of  himself.  Now  he  chooses — puts  forth  his 
Urst  choice.  It  is  as  the  greatest  apparent  good.  What 
that  good  presented  to  him  is,  is  independent  of  himself. 
What  there  is  about  it,  or  about  him,  that  renders  it  appar- 
ently good  is  independent  of  him.  The  "greatest  apparent 
good"  is  absolutely  objective  to  him  considered  as  a  free, 
choosing  being;  and  his  will  is  as  that  good.  The  same  is 
true  of  every  subsequent  choice,  for  if  the  will,  the  previous 
choice,  is  at  any  moment  operative  in  determining  what  he 

Shedd  {Dogmatic  Theology,  Vol.  II,  p.  219)  reveals  this  inner  contra- 
diction in  Edwards  thus:  "These  positions  [bondage  of  the  will  not  "natural 
inability;"  "moral  inability"  not  "inability  proper"]  bring  Edwards  into  con- 
tradiction with  himself  and  open  the  way  for  a  different  anthropology  from  that 
contained  in  his  writings  generally,  and  particularly  in  his  treatise  on  Original 
Sin." 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


261 


desires  and  thus  modifies  the  "appearance,"  it  was  itself 
not  his,  but  was  as  the  (previously)  apparent  good.  Hence 
two  things  follow: 

I.  Such  a  connection  between  motives  and  will  is  causa- 
tive; and  hence  Park  has  not  avoided  the  abyss  of  Ed- 
wards' necessity — nor  that  of  Spencer  or  even  Spinoza. 

What  is  a  causative  connection  between  phenomena?  I 
see  a  spark  applied  to  powder  and  then  I  see  an  explosion. 
This  is  the  uniform  fact.  The  explosion  always  is  as  the 
application  of  the  spark.  I  apply  heat  to  ice  and  it  melts. 
Whenever  I  see  invariable  connection  of  antecedents  and 
certain  consequents,  I  say  the  former  are  the  cause  of  the 
latter.  Professor  Park  elsewhere  reasons  in  this  way.  He 
is  thoroughly  opposed  to  John  Stuart  Mill's  theory  of 
causation.  He  says  that  whenever  we  see  the  invariability 
which  Mill  affirms,  we  go  farther  than  Mill,  and  declare 
that  there  is  pozver  there;  and  we  thus  arrive  for  the  first 
time  at  the  true  idea  of  causation.  Apply  the  same  reason- 
ing to  his  own  maxim;  and  whenever  we  perceive  that  the 
"will  always  is  as  the  greatest  apparent  good,"  we  say: 
"The  good  is  the  cause  of  the  action  of  the  will;"  and  we 
cannot  say  anything  else  while  we  have  the  powers  of  hu^ 
man  reasoning  left. 

Park,  of  course,  perceived  that  this  objection  would  be 
made  to  him,  and  his  answer  was  ready.  This  uniformity 
is  uniformity  of  usage.  The  will  can  choose  the  greatest 
apparent  good  freely — as  freely  as  it  could  a  lesser  appar- 
ent good.  And  it  always  does  freely  choose  the  greatest 
apparent  good.  That  it  always  does  it  freely,  however  so 
many  times,  is  evident  from  consciousness;  for  conscious- 
ness declares  of  every  choice  that  it  is  free. 

We  may  rejoin  that  we  are  not  conscious  that  every 
choice  is  free,  for  many  are  not ;  as,  for  example,  my  choice 
this  morning  to  brush  my  hair  with  my  brush.    But  of  free 


262         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

choices — for  man  does  make  such,  and  of  these  only,  is  our 
discussion  here — consciousness  not  only  declares  that  the 
choice  is  free,  but  it  often  declares  also  that  the  choice  is 
not  one  of  "the  greatest  apparent  good."  It  is  an  abuse 
of  language  as  well  as  of  morals  to  declare  that  the  drunk- 
ard choosing  the  cup  believes  or  feels  it  in  any  sense 
"good!"  So  that  consciousness,  if  it  is  for  freedom,  as  it 
is,  is  against  the  uniformity  of  the  Edwardean  maxim ! 

It  is  the  more  strange  that  Park  did  not  see  this  because, 
if  the  will  always  is  as  the  greatest  apparent  good,  then,  on 
his  theory  of  virtue,  there  can  never  he  any  sin.  Sin  is  the 
choice  of  the  lower  instead  of  the  higher  or  greater  good. 
If  a  man  chooses  the  greatest  apparent  good — that  is,  the 
thing  which  on  the  whole  seems  best  to  him — that  act  is  a 
virtuous  act.  And  as  every  act  is  such  a  choice,  according 
to  Edwards,  every  act  is  virtuous.  This  argument  can  be 
met  only  by  saying  that  the  "greatest  apparent  good"  is 
that  which  appeals  most  to  the  man,  affords  the  greatest 
total  present  gratification,  is  the  easiest  to  choose,  has  the 
most  desire  for  itself.  But  if  it  is  these,  it  is  truly  the 
greatest  good,  unless  the  man  knows  all  the  time  that  to 
choose  it  he  must  forsake  duty  for  it,  and  that  the  desire  it 
will  gratify  is  an  evil  desire  which  he  ought  never  to  har- 
bor. But  then  it  is  neither  good  nor  apparently  good !  It 
is  bad,  and  nothing  but  bad. 

In  fact,  the  term  "greatest  apparent  good"  is  another 
example  of  the  "ambiguous  middle"  in  Edwards'  reasoning 
of  which  "inclination"  is  the  first  and  principal.  Now  it 
means  the  preponderating  object  of  the  sensibility,  and  now 
that  of  the  conscience  or  of  the  whole  harmonious  man. 
No  one  can  tell  when  it  oscillates  from  one  to  the  other; 
and  hence  any  argument  may  be  vitiated  by  it,  and  most 
are. 

2.  This  theory  is  essentially  supralapsarianism.    The  de- 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


263 


crees  of  God  are  eternal.  They  surround  the  first,  equally 
with  every,  act  of  the  will.  There  is  never  a  moment  of 
freedom,  of  action  not  predetermined.  Augustine  made 
man  free  in  his  fall ;  Edwards  and  Park  made  him  no  more 
free  there  than  anywhere  else.  In  view  of  this,  all  ques- 
tions of  the  order  of  the  decrees  are  trivial.  Was  the  de- 
cree to  make  man  sin  prior  or  subsequent  to  the  decree  to 
damn  him?  Who  cares?  The  main  fact  is  that  all  of 
every  man's  action  and  of  all  men's  is  decreed — his  fall,  his 
sin,  as  well  as  his  punishment  for  sin.  God's  decree  em- 
braces everything.  It  was  not  that  God  foresaw  man's  sin, 
and  then  decreed  to  punish  him.  He  did  not  foresee,  he 
decreed  man's  sin.  There  is  not  one  atom  of  freedom,  one 
moment  of  personal  responsibility,  deliberation,  individual 
and  uncaused  action  on  the  part  of  man,  anyv/here.  All  is 
necessitated. 

Professor  Park-  of  course,  elaborately  denies  these  posi- 
tions, and,  as  we  are  about  to  show,  escapes  them — but  not 
consistently.  We  are  now  holding  him  strictly  to  his  theo- 
ries as  they  must  be  interpreted,  if  he  consistently  main- 
tain c  the  Edwardean  theory  of  the  will,  as  he  says  he  does. 
He  says :  God  does  not  positively  decree  the  sin  of  Adam  or 
of  any  other  man.  But  he  "circumstances  and  places"  man 
so  that  he  "will  certainly  sin,"  and  Adam  as  much  as  any 
son  of  his.  Now  that  is,  in  plain  words,  surrounding  him 
with  motives  leading  to  sin — and  motives  are  causes  pro- 
ducing sinful  action.  The  distinctions  utterly  evaporate  as 
soon  as  the  maxim,  "always  is  as  the  greatest  apparent 
good,"  is  remembered.  That  is  causation.  Thus  Park  was 
a  supralapsarian,  forced  to  that  position  against  his  choice 
by  his  theory  of  the  will.  True,  he  treats  supralapsarianism 
in  a  special  section,  and  rejects  it  by  saying  of  it  that  it  is 
"unreasonable  and  arbitrary;"  but  he  does  not  give  any 
reason  for  this  condemnation.    This  is  the  stranger  because 


264 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


he  had  in  his  theory  of  virtue  the  means  of  pulverizing  it  as 
no  theologian  before  him  had  been  able  to  do.  He  might 
have  said :  "Supralapsarianism  is  the  theory  that,  irrespec- 
tive of  the  fall,  and  without  prevision  of  the  same,  God,  from 
all  eternity,  for  the  glory  of  his  mercy  and  the  praise  of  his 
justice,  separated  men  intO'  twO'  classes,  and  foreordained  the 
one  unto  eternal  life  and  the  other  untO'  eternal  death.  This 
theory  is  impossible;  for  (i)  it  regards  men,  antecedent  to 
all  sin,  either  as  mere  mathematical  units,  or  as  merely  senti- 
ent beings,  their  moral  nature  and  questions  of  desert  being 
disregarded.  (2)  As  mere  mathematical  units  they  can  be 
the  object  of  no  moral  judgment,  and  so  neither  condemned 
nor  acquitted.  (3)  As  merely  sentient,  they  must  become 
the  objects  of  the  divine  benevolence,  by  which  God  must 
choose  to  do  them  good,  and  good  only,  and  hence  none 
of  them  can  be  reprobated.  (4)  Hence  in  neither  case  can 
there  be  the  separation  described."  But  Park  does  not  say 
this.  Why?  The  answer,  I  believe,  is  to  be  found  in  his 
determinism,  which  made  substantial  supralapsarianism  ne- 
cessary to  him,  however  unwelcome.  This  discord  between 
the  nature  of  virtue  and  the  theory  of  the  will  is  the  great 
defect  of  Park's  system,  and  zvould  have  been  fatal  to  it  had 
there  not  been  a  corresponding  inconsistency  in  the  theory  of 
the  ivill  itself.  We  are,  accordingly,  approaching  rapidly  to 
the  deepest  secret  of  Park's  theology.   It  is  his  crux. 

The  charm  of  such  a  view  of  the  will's  action,  by  which 
this  grim  and  inhuman  theory  of  absolute  predestination 
retained  its  hold  upon  the  minds  of  Edwards  and  Park,  is 
to  be  found  in  its  relation  to  the  concept  of  God.  God  was 
viewed  by  them  both  as  unchangeable  in  all  his  perfections, 
m  his  wisdom,  knowledge,  blessedness,  etc.  His  govern- 
ment was  perfect  also.  Now,  if  there  had  been  any  true 
grief  in  God,  his  eternal  blessedness  would  have  been  im- 
paired; if  any  ignorance,  even  the  slightest,  of  the  future 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


265 


free  acts  of  man,  his  infinite  knowledge  would  have  disap- 
peared; if  any  failure  to  control  any,  even  the  least  act  of 
man,  even  so  little  an  act  as  putting  the  finger  at  random 
on  any  square  of  a  checker  board  (which  example  Edwards 
elaborately  discussed),  then  there  would  be  no  divine  gov- 
ernment left  whatever!  The  perfection  of  the  logician,  of 
the  systematician — a  geometrical  perfection — was  thus  de- 
manded in  respect  to  life,  even  the  life  of  God;  and  these 
great  men  continued  to  demand  it  in  entire  obliviousness  of 
the  fact  that  they  were  now  discussing,  not  the  Living  God, 
but  an  intellectual  abstraction,  as  cold  as  an  iceberg,  and  as 
unreal  as  the  Olympian  Zeus.  A  colossal  blunder  cer- 
tainly,  but  one  of  which  "only  colossal  minds  could  be 
guilty." 

The  third  peculiarity  by  which  Park  departed  from  Ed- 
wards undid,  however,  most  of  the  harm  of  these  supralap- 
sarian  positions.  Following  Bellamy,  Hopkins,  and  Tay- 
lor, he  gave  a  new  meaning  to  "natural  ability."  This  he 
defined  as  real  ability,  the  ability  to  choose  freely  either 
right  or  wrong.  "Moral  ability"  is  not  properly  ability  at 
all,  since  it  is  mere  willingness.  But  natural  ability  is  true, 
spontaneous,  primal,  causality.  A  man  has  natural  ability 
to  repent,  always,  everywhere,  without  the  influence  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  without  church  or  Bible;  but  he  never  will  so 
repent.  He  hasn't  "moral  ability ;"  that  is,  he  won't.  But 
he  can. 

Now,  Park  himself  may  have  been  perfectly  consistent 
here  with  his  Edwardean  positions.  He  may  have  main- 
tained that  "natural  ability,"  while  complete,  was  never 
exercised,  even  in  so  small  a  matter  as  lifting  the  finger  to 
brush  away  a  fly,  without  "moral  ability"  conjoined — that 
is,  without  a  balance  of  motives  for  such  an  action.  His 
emphasis  on  certain  positions,  however,  and  the  elaborate- 
ness with  which  he  defined  and  removed  objections  when 


266 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


discussing  the  subject  of  decrees,  would  imply  not.  The 
toil  would  have  been  so  futile  unless  the  pupil,  and  the  mas- 
ter, got  for  the  time  out  from  under  the  burden  of  Edwards' 
"certainty!''  His  pupils  made  an  adjustment,  even  if  Park 
did  not,  and  the  impression  and  total  outcome  of  the  sys- 
tem for  them  at  this  point  were  something  as  follows : 

L  The  will  of  man  is  free.  He  can,  at  any  moment, 
choose  right  or  wrong.  This  is  the  emphasis  which  Park 
constantly  threw  upon  "natural  ability."  His  statements 
were  as  extreme  as  the  most  ardent  devotee  of  free  will 
could  desire.  "Man  can  perfectly  obey  the  law  of  God, 
because  he  can  love  God  supremely  and  his  neighbor  as 
himself,  and  can  maintain  such  a  love,  and  exemplify  it  in 
every  individual  choice."  "He  can  do  right  just  as  easily 
as  he  can  do  wrong."  "He  can  break  every  decree  of  God 
relating  to  his  own  conduct."  "He  can  repent  at  any  mo- 
ment without  any  aid  from  the  Holy  Spirit."  Such  were 
forms  of  expression  Park  constantly  used.  And  out  of 
them  his  pupils  drew  the  doctrine  that  the  will  has  a  true, 
unchanged,  primal  causality,  by  which  man  truly  origi- 
nates action,  and  is  himself  the  one,  and  the  only,  cause  of 
his  own  action. 

2.  Motives,  however,  have  a  real  influence  on  man ;  that 
is,  a  real  tendency  to  move  the  will  in  this  direction  or  that. 

3.  God's  moral  government  is  exercised  through  mo- 
tives,  influencing  human  wills.  The  action  of  a  man  can 
be  determined,  v/ithin  reasonable  limits,  by  his  fellow- 
creatures,  as  they  plan  to  bring  such  or  such  other  motives 
to  bear  upon  him.  God  can  in  a  far  greater  sense  control 
men's  action  by  the  same  method,  because  he  has  fax 
greater  knowledge  of  all  the  conditions,  internal  and  exter- 
nal, which  affect  the  operation  of  those  motives. 

4.  The  scope  of  this  government  thus  includes  the  voli- 
tions of  men,  and  extends  far  beyond  the  reach  of  finite 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


267 


comprehension.  Has  it  any  limits?  Only  such,  whatever 
they  may  be,  as  God  himself  has  given. 

5.  God  set  in  motion  a  universe  resulting  in  some  de- 
gree of  sin.  Of  course,  he  purposed  to  permit  that  sin. 
The  explanation  of  that  permission  Park  had  already 
given.  Sin  entered  by  the  free  act  of  man;  and  that  man 
was  as  able  not  to  commit  the  sin  he  did  commit,  as  he  was 
to  commit  it.  But  God  foresaw  that  man  would  sin;  and 
he  prepared  for  it. 

6.  The  condition  of  things  now  is  such  that,  left  to 
themselves,  men  will  sin.  This  is  not  a  necessity,  but  it 
is  a  fact. 

7.  God  interferes  with  the  course  of  sin  as  largely  as  he 
can  consistently,  and  calls  some  men  unto  salvation.  This 
is  election.  It  is  not  absolute  in  the  sense  that  it  renders 
faith  necessary,  for  any  elected  man  can  persist  in  sin  and 
be  lost;  and  he  can  be  saved  only  by  exerting  this  same 
power  of  freedom  in  the  way  of  repentance,  faith,  and  ref- 
ormation. Are  any  elect  thus  lost?  Park  would  say, 
"No!"    His  pupils  would  say:    "Possibly  some  are." 

8.  Those  whom  God  must,  to  be  consistent  with  the 
best  interests  of  all,  leave  without  such  influence  as  will 
actually  bring  them  to  repentance,  he  so  leaves.  This  is 
"praeterition,"  passing  over,  not  "reprobation."  But  there 
is  no  absolute  or  complete  praeterition.  Men  have  grace 
enough  to  be  saved,  everyone.  And  they  have  "natural 
power,"  true  freedom,  to  repent  and  be  saved  without  any 
grace. 

9.  God  never  lets  the  world  get  out  of  his  control.  No 
"permissive  decree,"  no  "praeterition,"  ever  implies  that 
he  stands  by  as  a  silent  and  helpless  spectator,  and  sees  the 
world  going  evil  ways  which  he  cannot  hinder.  He  so 
guides  and  controls,  even  in  the  darkest  times,  as  to  bring 


268         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


all  out  eventually  to  his  own  glory.  This  is  his  perfection, 
but  it  is  a  living  and  not  a  mere  geometrical  perfection. 

Park  thus  never  accepted  for  himself  fully  an  idea  v^hich 
is  essential  to  his  defense  of  the  benevolence  of  God  in  the 
permission  of  sin — the  idea  of  the  divine  self-limitation. 
He  admitted  it  in  respect  to  the  permission  of  sin,  for  he 
taught  that  God,  having  made  man  as  he  did  and  given 
him  the  faculty  of  free  will,  could  not  then  consistently  do 
so  and  so.  He  never  explicitly  recognized  the  fact  that 
God  limits  himself  even  when  he  creates  matter;  for  he 
cannot  thereafter  proceed  in  the  universe,  matter  having 
its  fixed  qualities,  forces,  and  laws,  exactly  as  he  otherwise 
could.  He  expressly  rejected  the  suggestion  of  Julius  Miil- 
ler  and  other  Kenotics,  that  the  divine  Logos  limited  itself 
in  the  incarnation.  He  really  wanted  a  ^self-limitation 
which  should  be  at  the  same  time  no  limitation;  which 
should  explain  the  permission  of  sin,  and  yet  not  infringe 
the  absoluteness  of  God's  control,  foreknowledge,  and 
eternal  decree,  which  with  differences  was  to  cover  every- 
thing alike.  He  erred  here  in  maintaining  a  doctrine  of 
the  Absolute — the  truly  Unconditioned — which  is  impos- 
sible when  once  sin,  incarnation,  atonement,  and  forgive- 
ness are  introduced.  He  should  have  listened  here  to 
Kahnis,  with  whom  he  once  studied,  and  to  the  great 
Thomasius. 

This,  then,  may  be  said  to  be  the  outcome  of  the  New 
England  theology  in  respect  to  the  doctrine  of  the  will. 
The  great  idea  of  a  true  freedom,  born  of  the  revival  ef- 
forts of  the  great  leaders  of  the  school,  struggled  in  the 
minds  of  the  successive  thinkers  as  they  labored  at  mak- 
ing the  system  of  theology  more  true  and  more  consistent, 
but  was  not  able  to  attain  clearness  of  statement  even  from 
the  greatest  of  them — from  him  who  was  in  most  respects 
the  representative  and  consummation  of  the  whole  move- 


THEORY  OF  THE  WILL 


269 


ment.  Here,  then,  the  theology  resulted  in  handing  down 
to  its  successors  the  imperative  problem  of  a  better  settle- 
ment of  this  pivotal  doctrine — -a  settlement  which  should 
take  the  doctrine  for  itself,  and  discuss  it  upon  its  own  evi- 
dences, and,  having  developed  it  in  accordance  with  the 
facts  of  a  sound  psychology,  should  then  give  it  its  place, 
and  its  due  influence  in  determining  the  other  doctrines  of 
the  Christian  system.  New  England  theology,  to  the  end, 
sacrificed  the  doctrine  of  freedom  to  that  of  the  divine 
perfections.  It  hence  failed  at  getting  a  true  doctrine; 
and  this  was  its  crux.^^ 

88  In  default  of  any  published  system  from  the  hands  of  Professor  Park, 
I  am  compelled  to  present  his  system  as  I  find  it  in  my  own  stenographic  notes 
of  the  year  1875-76.  I  have  often  compared  these  with  those  of  Rev.  Henry 
M.  Tenney,  of  the  year  1865-66.  While  the  lack  of  an  authoritative  final 
statement  from  Professor  Park's  own  hand  is  greatly  to  be  deplored,  I  have 
not  thought  that  posterity  ought  to  be  deprived  of  the  illumination  which  is 
thrown  upon  this  history  by  his  work,  when  hundreds  of  authentic  reports  of 
his  lectures  are  still  in  existence.  In  fact,  this  history,  but  for  the  light  which 
Professor  Park's  work  throws  upon  it,  could  not  have  been  written.  It  is 
his  completing  work  which  shows  the  meaning  of  the  course  of  the  whole 
school. 


THE  GREAT  CONTROVERSIES 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 

From  the  digression  which  we  have  made  in  the  last 
chapters,  we  must  now  return  to  the  regular  progress  of 
our  history.  We  had  been  brought  to  the  year  1795,  or 
thereabout,  by  which  time  the  new  doctrine  of  the  atone- 
ment had  been  set  forth,  and  the  first  system  of  theology, 
Hopkins',  had  appeared.  It  was  a  time  of  great  theologi- 
cal ferment.  The  Unitarian  controversy  was  impending, 
and  already  monitions  of  its  outbreak  had  been  frequent. 
In  this  year  Timothy  Dwight  came  to  Yale  as  its  president, 
to  find  the  college  honeycombed  with  French  infidelity, 
the  legacy  of  French  co-operation  in  the  War  of  the  Revo- 
lution. We  are  therefore  called  next  to  the  study  of  this 
great  crisis  in  the  history  both  of  the  theology  and  of  the  or- 
ganization of  the  New  England  churches.  Was  the  new  the- 
ology, which  had  sought  to  prepare  the  way  for  more 
effective  evangelistic  work,  to  go  down  before  the  attacks 
of  English  rationalism  within  its  own  fold  and  of  French 
materiahistic  infidelity  from  without?  So  it  seemed  for 
a  time.  But  the  stress  into  which  it  was  brought  served 
only  to  show  the  stuff  of  which  it  was  made. 

The  Unitarian  movement  in  Massachusetts  can  be  un- 
derstood only  by  a  careful  review  of  a  long  history.  Its 
roots  stretch  back  to  the  very  beginning  of  English  Pro- 
testantism. In  the  milder  tendencies  of  the  English 
Reformation  is  to  be  found  in  part  the  explanation  of  the 
Arminianism  which,  under  the  influence  of  the  powerful  re- 
action from  the  high  Calvinism  of  the  Commonwealth, 
culminated  in  various  forms  of  heterodoxy  after  the  Res- 
toration.   Arminianism  developed  into  Latitudinarianism, 

273 


274         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

and  Latitudinarianism  into'  Arianism  and  Unitarianism. 
Samuel  Clarke,  a  powerful  writer  upon  apologetics,  was  an 
Arminian  with  a  strong  leaning  to  high  Arianism,  to  say 
the  least.  Daniel  Whitby  was  first  an  evangelical  Armin- 
ian, and  then  a  Unitarian.  And  then  came  a  number  of 
lesser  writers,  such  as  John  Taylor,  of  Norwich,  whose 
treatise  on  Original  Sin,  it  is  interesting  to  observe,  was 
answered  by  both  Jonathan  Edwards,  the  Calvinistic  re- 
vivalist of  America,  and  John  Wesley,  the  Arminian  re- 
vivalist of  England;  and  such  as  Emlyn,  the  author  of  the 
Humble  Inquiry  i/ito  the  Scripture  Account  of  Jesus  Christ, 
etc.,  etc.  Meantime  also  Deism  beginning  with  Herbert 
of  Cherbury  away  back  in  the  time  of  James  and  Chailes 
I,  was  running  its  course.  By  the  time  of  Wesley  there 
was  desperate  need  of  an  evangelical  revival,  if  English 
theology  or  the  English  church  was  to  be  saved  from  com- 
plete destruction. 

Long  before  this  final  stage  of  degeneration  was  reached 
in  England,  a  parallel  history  of  decline  had  begun  in  New 
England.  The  history  of  this,  so  far  as  it  was  the  result 
of  purely  indigenous  causes,  has  been  already  traced.  In- 
cidentally we  have  also  repeatedly  seen  the  influence  which 
English  writers  constantly  exercised  in  New  England,  and 
how  Clarke,  Whitby,  Taylor,  and  others  were  read.  Theo- 
logical degeneration  followed  upon  religious  and  moral 
decline.  The  steps  of  it,  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible, 
to  follow.  The  principal  writers  remained  still  orthodox. 
The  dissenters  said  little  and  wrote  less.  Still,  dissent 
existed.  We  have  seen  that  Arminianism  became  "prevail- 
ing," in  the  opinion  of  Edwards.  But  there  was  deeper 
divergence  than  mere  Arminianism.  Unitarianism  was 
not  professed,  or  publicly  advocated,  in  New  England  cir- 
cles during  the  eighteenth  century;  but,  if  we  may  judge 
from  the  writings  of  orthodox  divines,  there  must  have 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


275 


been  a  good  deal  of  favor  shown  it  in  private,  for,  begin- 
ning with  Samuel  Mather's  tract  on  the  Necessity  of  Be- 
lieving the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  in  17 18,  there  was  a 
considerable  series  of  defenses  of  the  doctrine  by  divines 
little  known,  such  as  Kent,  Burr,  Barnard,  and  Alexander,^ 
the  last  of  whom  wrote  in  1791.  The  leaders  of  New  Eng- 
land opinion  were  no  less  concerned,  for  Edwards  once 
wrote  to  Wigglesworth,  professor  of  divinity  in  Harvard 
College,  warning  him  against  the  rise  of  an  alien  system 
of  thought,  but  to  no  purpose.  In  1758  Bellamy  printed 
a  Treatise  on  the  Divinity  of  Christ^  exclusively  exeget- 
ical.^  In  1768  Hopkins  preached  in  Boston  a  sermon  upon 
the  divinity  of  Christ,  "under  a  conviction,"  as  he  says, 
'^that  the  doctrine  was  much  neglected,  if  not  disbelieved, 
by  a  number  of  ministers  in  Boston."  ^  There  were  some 
open  signs  of  this  fact,  for  in  1756  "a  layman"  had  caused 
to  be  printed  in  Boston  extracts  from  the  Humble  Inquiry 
of  Emlyn,  above  mentioned,  which  gained  an  astonishing 
influence.  The  book  is  so  essentially  weak  that  it  provokes 
examination  to  discover,  if  possible,  why  it  seemed  so  con- 
vincing to  many. 

The  argument  of  the  first  chapter  is  **that  the  term 
God  is  used  in  the  Scriptures  in  different  senses,  supreme 
and  subordinate;"  and  "that  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  speaks 
of  another  as  God,  distinct  from  him,  and  owns  this  God 
to  be  above  or  over  him."  The  reasoning  has  no  points  of 
novelty  to  one  acquainted  with  discussions  upon  the  Trin- 
ity. Emlyn  lays  special  stress  upon  the  passage  which 
speaks  of  the  subjection  of  the  Son,  "that  God  may  be  all 

^  A  pretty  good  bibliography  of  this  minor  controversy  may  be  had  in 
Dexter's  Congregationalism,  Bibliography,  Nos.  2908,  2958,  2962,  2964,  3123, 
3232,  3350,  3421,  3525,  3642,  3786,  3815,  3867,  3954,  3973. 

2  Works,  Vol.  I,  pp.  417-41. 

2  Rev.  John  Barnard,  of  Marblehead,  preached  a  "public  lecture"  in  Boston, 
July  16,  1 76 1,  on  "The  True  Divinity  of  Jesus  Christ." 

*  Reviewed  in  Spirit  of  the  Pilgrims,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  582-91. 


276 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


in  all"  (I  Cor.  15:24-28).  The  texts  he  quotes  to  show 
that  there  are  different  senses  of  the  word  "God"  in  the 
Scriptures  are:  Ps.  8:5;  Ex.  4:16;  Eph.  1:3,  17;  that 
Jesus  speaks  of  another  God:  Matt.  27:46;  John  7:17; 
that  the  Father  is  superior  to  Jesus:  John  14:28;  10:29; 
5:20;  6:38. 

All  this  contained  nothing  novel  or  in  any  way  convin- 
cing toi  a  theologian.  The  influence  of  the  work  must  have 
largely  depended  upon  the  representations  of  the  second 
chapter.  Emlyn  here  argues  that  "our  Lord  Jesus  Christ 
disclaims  those  infinite  perfections  which  belong  only  to 
the  supreme  God,  underived  power,  absolute  goodness,  un- 
limited knowledge."  For  this  assertion  he  refers  to  the 
texts:  John  5:30;  Matt.  19:17;  Mark  13:32.  He  then 
asks :  What  evidence  is  there  of  these  "two  natures"  which 
are  brought  in  to  explain  the  difficulties  presented  by  the 
passages  cited : 

Our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  if  himself  was  the  supreme  God  in  any 
nature,  could  not  have  said  such  things  as  that  he  "did  not  know  the 

day  nor  the  hour"  etc  He    puts  not  the  distinction  of  two 

natures  between  the  Son  of  Man  and  the  Eternal  Word,  but  between 
the  Son  and  the  Father,  "not  the  Son  knows,  but  only  the  Father."  ^ 

Eml3'^n  then  dwells  upon  the  necessity  of  taking  Scripture 
in  its  obvious  meaning,  etc.,  etc.  He  thus  sharply  brought 
forward  the  question  whether  the  orthodox  party  could 
maintain  its  ground  in  the  forum  of  ratiocination.  Was 
the  theory  of  the  two  natures  correct?  Was  it  so  managed 
as  to  meet  the  difficulties  raised  by  the  evident  limitations 
laid  upon  the  attributes  of  Christ?  He  thus  smote  the 
weak  point  of  the  historic  Calvinism,  which  had  been  open, 
from  the  time  of  Calvin  down,  to  the  charge  of  substantial 
Nestorianism — not  a  Nestorianism  of  profession  or  inten- 

5  Emlyn  himself  gathered  together  in  1719  twelve  of  his  own  tracts,  reach- 
ing from  the  Humble  Inquiry  of  1702  to  1710.  He  discussed,  among  other 
things,  the  text  I  John  5:7,  and  showed  good  critical  ability.  Dependent  upon 
Mill. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


277 


tion,  but  of  inability  to  bring  the  two  natures  of  Christ  into 
anything  more  than  a  formal  union.  Calvinism  held  to 
"the  unity  of  the  person"  which  Chalcedon  had  declared, 
but  it  treated  the  divinity  and  humanity  so  as  to  render 
any  true  unity  impossible.  The  demand  was  now  sharply 
thrust  upon  the  Calvinism  of  New  England  either  to  jus- 
tify her  exegesis  by  a  satisfactory  theology,  or  to  surrender 
her  doctrine  of  the  trinity.  This  was  the  significance  of 
Emlyn's  book,  and,  I  think,  the  secret  of  its  influence. 

The  confusion  caused  by  the  Revolutionary  War  put  a 
stop  to  the  open  discussion  of  the  subject,  and  the  general 
unpopularity  of  Unitarian  views  led,  by  a  natural  tendency, 
to  pass  them  over  with  little  mention.  But  soon  after  the 
close  of  the  war,  King's  Chapel  in  Boston,  the  original 
Episcopal  church  of  Massachusetts,  became  Unitarian 
under  the  lead  of  its  pastor,  James  Freeman  (1785).  The 
liturgy  was  modified  to  omit  all  passages  objectionable  to 
Unitarians.  In  1786  Mr.  Freeman  sought  ordination  from 
Bishop  Seabury  in  Connecticut.  At  an  examination  which 
he  sustained  before  the  convocation,  he  declared  his  belief 
in  the  unity  of  God  and  the  entire  distinction  of  Christ 
from  God,  and  explained  the  divine  attributes  of  Christ — 
omnipotence,  omniscience,  etc. — as  derived  from  the  Fa- 
ther.^ He  was  accordingly  refused  ordination,  and  subse- 
quently ordained  by  his  own  church,  congregationally. 
He  remained  in  the  pastorate  of  King's  Chapel  till  his 
death,  exercising  a  wide  influence.  His  preaching  was  at- 
tractive, polished,  plain,  and  practical.  That  he  never 
rose  to  the  height  of  the  sublimest  themes  of  the  gospel 
may  easily  be  seen  from  the  volume  of  sermons  published 
in  1 82 1.  Upon  Good  Friday  he  preached  upon/'The  Ten- 
derness of  Jesus,"  at  Christmas  upon  "Jesus  Christ  the 

*  I  depend  here  upon  Sprague's  Annals,  Unitarian.  Freeman  does  not  seem 
to  have  been  specially  influenced  by  the  peculiar  trend  of  Emlyn's  book. 


278 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Prince  of  Peace,"  in  which  sermon,  after  mentioning  the 
work  of  Christ  as  consisting  in  two  particulars — that  God 
in  him  reconciles  us  to  himself,  and  that  the  Savior  is  the 
author  of  inward  peace,  or  tranquility  of  heart — he  goes 
on  to  discuss  the  latter  under  the  heads  that  Christ  (i) 
teaches  us  the  value  of  true  humility,  (2)  creates  true  piety, 
and  (3)  teaches  us  to  practice  true  benevolence.  Under 
(2)  he  incidentally  gives  us  his  view  of  the  character  of 
God,  which  is  a  kind  of  abridgment  of  his  whole  theology. 
He  says: 

He  came  ....  to  reveal  to  the  whole  of  the  human  race  the 
most  important  of  all  truths,  which  was  before  known  to  one  favored 
nation  only, — that  there  is  one  God,  who  has  always  existed  and 
always  will  exist;  whose  power  is  unlimited,  and  who  is  everywhere 
present;  who  is  not  blind  and  insensible  like  fate,  but  who  possesses 
moral  attributes,  and  can  be  adored  and  feared  and  loved;  who  is 
wise,  just,  and  good;  v/ho  created  the  heavens,  the  earth,  everything 
which  we  behold,  and  which  we  can  even  conceive;  who  gives  us 
every  blessing  which  we  enjoy;  who  never  sports  with  the  miseries 
of  his  creatures,  but  who  delights  in  making  us  happy,  and  whenever 
he  afflicts  us,  has  a  wise  and  gracious  design;  who  is  not  only  our 
maker  and  governor,  but  our  friend;  who  has  compassion  on  our 
infirmities,  is  ready  to  pardon  our  sins  as  soon  as  we  repent,  and 
pities  us  as  a  father  pities  his  own  children;  and  who  in  particular 
so  loved  the  world  as  to  send  his  son  to  reveal  these  consolatory 
truths.  We  need  hear  no  more.  If  there  is  such  a  being,  our  hearts 
are  at  rest.   The  prince  of  peace  has  expelled  every  doubt  and  terrour. 

Thus  Unitarianism  in  its  essential  features — in  its  de- 
nial of  the  divinity  of  Christ,  of  total  depravity,  of  the  ex- 
piatory nature  of  the  atonement  — and  in  the  character- 
istic style  of  its  preaching,  was  established  in  Boston  before 
the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century,  though  not  yet  in  any 
of  the  original  Congregational  churches,  at  least  profess- 
edly. 

In  Connecticut  two  clergymen  were  removed  from  their 
parishes  by  council  about  the  beginning  of  the  century, 

'  See  Ellis,  Fifty  Years,  p.  46. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY  279 

one  of  whom,  Rev.  John  Sherman,  published  at  Worcester, 
in  1805,  a  work  defending  Unitarianism,  entitled  One  God 
in  One  Person  Only  and  Jesiis  Christ  a  Being  Distinct 
from  God,  etc.,  in  which  he  went  over  the  entire  argument 
for  the  Trinity  and  attempted  to  overthrow  it  at  every 
point,  principally  by  exegetical  arguments.  He  was  some- 
what dependent  upon  Emlyn. 

In  1795  Timothy  D wight  had  been  called  to  the  presi- 
dency of  Yale  College,  to  find  that  institution  thoroughly 
permeated  with  the  spirit  of  French  infidelity.^  He  grap- 
pled with  the  situation  at  once,  and  by  the  strength  of  his 
character  as  well  as  his  mind  soon  produced  a  great  revul- 
sion of  sentiment  and  a  general  return  to  evangelical  re- 
ligion. About  the  year  1800,  largely  in  consequence  of 
influences  emanating  from  New  Haven,  a  revival  of  religion 
spread  over  southern  New  England,  resulting  in  a  new 
period  in  the  religion  and  theology  of  America.  Massa- 
chusetts and  Harvard  had  suffered  in  like  manner  with 
Yale,  although  the  theological  tendency  was  quite  another, 
as  our  history  has  detailed.  The  revival  seems  to  have  had 
little  or  no  influence  here,  and  no  such  man  as  Dwight  ap- 
peared who  could  reverse  the  current;  and  soon  a  decisive 
step  was  taken  which  confirmed  the  influence  of  Unitarian- 
ism for  long  years. 

The  chief  position  of  theological  influence  in  Massachu- 
setts was  the  professorship  of  divinity  in  Harvard  College, 
founded  in  the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth  century  by 
Thomas  Hollis,  an  English  Baptist.  This  professorship 
fell  vacant  in  1803,  and  was  filled  in  1805,  after  a  sharp 
contest,  by  the  appointment  of  Henry  Ware.  It  was  gen- 
erally understood,  and  soon  became  certain,  that  he  was 
a  Unitarian.    Some  discussion  of  the  propriety  of  this  step 

8  For  some  of  the  reasons  of  this  see  I.  W.  Riley,  "The  Rise  of  Deism  in 
Yale  College,"  American  Journal  of  Theology,  Vol.  IX  (1905),  pp.  474  ff. 


28o 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


followed,  and  a  good  many  fugitive  tracts  were  published 
upon  the  main  question,  but  no  general  controversy  arose. 
It  was,  however,  felt  that  Harvard  would  no  longer  be  a 
suitable  place  for  the  education  of  orthodox  ministers,  and 
a  theological  seminary  was  founded  in  Phillips  Academy 
at  Andover  (1808).^ 

In  1 810  appeared  Noah  Worcester's  Bible  News,  one  of 
the  most  original  and  respectable  of  these  earlier  discus- 
sions, the  unsophisticated  boldness  of  which  was  perhaps 
the  chief  reason  why  it  seemed  to  have  little  influence  on 
the  Unitarian  side.  His  doctrine  is  "that  the  self-existent 
God  is  only  one  person  ....  that  Jesus  Christ  is  God's 
own  Son  ....  that  by  the  Holy  Ghost  is  intended  the 
fullness  of  God,  or  the  efficient,  productive  emanations  of 
the  divine  fullness."^^  'Terson"  he  defines  as  "intelligent 
being,"  and  therefore  denies  three  persons  in  one  God  as 
being  a  contradiction. 

The  most  important  portion  of  the  book  is  that  occu- 
pied with  the  person  of  Christ. 

Two  ideas  are  naturally  suggested  by  the  title,  the  Son  of  God,  viz., 
divine  origin  and  divine  dignity.  By  divine  origin  I  do  not  mean  that 
the  Son  of  God  is  a  created  intelligent  being;  but  a  being  who  properly 

derived  his  existence  and  his  nature  from  God  Adam  was  a 

created  being;  Seth  derived  his  existence  from  the  created  nature  of 

Adam  So  it  is  believed  that  the  only  begotten  Son  of  the 

Father  derived  his  existence  from  the  self-existent  nature  of  God.^^ 

His  argument  for  this  position  is  the  plain  meaning  of  the 
term  "Son."   The  divine  dignity  of  the  Son  came  from  his 

®  See  Professor  Leonard  Woods,  History  of  the  Andover  Theological  Sem- 
inary (Boston,  1885),  p.  58.  There  was,  however,  another  distinct  line  of  in- 
fluences, arising  from  the  necessity  of  further  instruction  for  the  ministry, 
such  as  had  been  furnished  by  Bellamy,  Emmons,  Backus,  and  a  number  of 
others,  before  any  doubt  had  been  thrown  upon  the  character  of  the  Hollis 
professorship,  and  from  the  wish  of  the  Hopkinsians  to  maintain  what  they 
regarded  as  genuine  Calvinism,  which  would  have  led  to  the  formation  of  a 
seniinary  without  regard  to  the  events  at  Harvard.  This  is  brought  out  in 
Wood's  History  with  great  fulness. 

10  Op.  cit.,  p.  26. 

1^  Ibid.,  p.  57. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


281 


divine  origin  and  from  the  communication  to  him  of  the 
divine  fulness,  whereby  he  did  divine  works,  creation,  etc. 
This  pre-existent  Son  of  God  ''became  the  Son  of  man  by 
becoming  himself  the  soul  of  a  human  body."  Incident- 
ally Worcester  brings  out  many  suggestions  as  to  the  unity 
of  the  person  of  Christ  to  which  the  orthodox  should  have 
paid  more  attention,  as  when  he  speaks  of  the  ''identity  of 
the  Son  of  God  and  the  Son  of  man."^^  The  possibility 
of  the  suffering  of  Christ  in  his  divine  nature  he  grounds 
in  his  difference  from  the  underived  and  self-existent  God, 
who  is  impassible.  To  this  Son  are  due  divine  honors  be- 
cause of  "the  will  of  God." 

With  such  discussions  as  these Unitarianism  pro- 
gressed slowly.  But  without  exciting  much  attention,  till  in 
181 5  there  was  republished  in  Boston  a  part  of  a  life  of 
Lindsley  by  Belsham,  both  English  Unitarians,  in  which 
the  progress  of  Unitarianism  in  America  was  described  to 
Lindsley  by  letters  from  Unitarians  in  this  country.  The 
work  was  reviewed  by  the  Panoplist,  and  a  sharp  contro- 
versy arose  upon  the  necessity  of  a  separation  between  the 
orthodox  and  the  Unitarians.  Channing  wrote  upon  this 
topic;  but  the  beginning  of  the  theological  controversy 
was  made  by  him  in  a  sermon  preached  at  the  ordination 
of  Jared  Sparks,  subsequently  president  of  Harvard  Col- 
lege, in  the  year  1819. 

Upon  the  eve  of  this  controversy,  by  far  the  most  im- 
portant event  in  the  history  of  Congregational  theology, 

Ibid.,  p.  102.  Ibid.,  p.  108. 

Ibid.,  p.  35.  In  1814  Worcester  published  an  Appeal  to  the  Candid, 
chiefly  controversial. 

Rev.  J.  S.  J.  Gardiner,  rector  of  Trinity  church,  Boston,  joined  in  the 
discussion  with  a  sermon  on  A  Preservative  Against  Unitarianism  (Boston,  181 1). 
So  did  Thomas  Baldwin,  D.D.,  pastor  of  the  Second  Baptist  Church,  Supreme 
Deity  of  Christ,  Illustrated  (Boston,  1812).  Also  G.  B.  English,  Grounds  of 
Christianity  Examined  (Boston,  1813),  which  took  the  ground  that  Jesus  was 
not  the  Messiah,  and  attacked  the  character  of  Paul. 

The  System  of  Exclusion  and  Denunciation  in  Religion  Considered. 


282 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


it  is  necessary  that  we  pause  to  review  briefly  the  leading 
positions  which  New  England  theology  had  gained.  We 
have  now  followed  it  to  a  point  of  high  development,  from 
its  very  beginning.  We  have  seen  that  the  occasion  of 
modification  in  every  case  was  the  presence  of  some  real 
danger  to  the  faith:  with  Edwards,  of  Arminianism;  with 
the  younger  Edwards  and  his  associates  upon  the  doctrine 
of  the  atonement,  of  Universalism :  or  else  it  was  the  in- 
herent power  of  a  new  principle ;  with  Hopkins,  that  of  dis- 
interested benevolence;  with  Emmons,  that  of  agency  as 
exercise.  In  their  own  conception  the  New  England 
fathers  were  always  defending  the  truth,  not  by  giving  it 
up,  but  rather  by  stating  it  better.  Thus  they  remained 
in  conscious  sympathy  with  their  Calvinistic  fathers,  and 
thus  called  themselves  Calvinists,  and  quoted  and  taught 
the  Westminster  Catechism,  though  in  fact  they  had  sub- 
stantially abandoned  the  philosophy  and  many  of  the  minor 
doctrines  of  the  Westminster  scheme.  For  the  arbitrary 
will  of  God  they  had  substituted  his  character,  love;  for  a 
sinful  nature,  a  nature  occasioning  sin;  for  imputation,  a 
strict  personal  responsibility ;  for  a  limited,  a  general 
atonement;  for  a  bound,  a  free  will;  for  a  satisfaction  to 
justice  in  the  atonement,  a  governmental  example;  for  ir- 
resistible grace,  unresisted.  Not  all  points  were  clear;  not 
all  antitheses  as  sharp  as  later;  not  all  necessary  details 
worked  out.  Hence  their  reply,  when  they  were  first  at- 
tacked, was  bungling,  confused,  and  largely  ineffective. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  assailant,  Channing,  was  a  product 
of  advanced  orthodox  thinking.  At  first  himself  substan- 
tially orthodox,  he  had  followed  out  certain  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  new  divinity  far  beyond  their  logical  con- 
clusions into  an  extreme  which,  while  false,  was  so  clear 
and  comprehensible,  as  extreme  positions  when  superficially 
considered  often  are,  that  it  was  rendered  easy  for  him  to 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


283 


avail  himself  of  his  great  power  of  luminous  and  trenchant 
discourse  to  give  plausibility,  attractiveness,  and  large  in- 
fluence to  his  views.  We  shall  see  that  the  natural  result 
followed,  that  the  favorable  moment  of  acknowledging 
what  was  good,  of  pointing  out  what  was  extreme  in  the 
positions  of  the  Unitarians,  and  thus  of  winning  them  back 
to  the  evangelical  theology,  was  lost,  while  only  slowly 
did  the  orthodox  learn  what  the  controversy  had  to  teach 
them,  and  that  at  the  expense  of  costly  contentions  among 
themselves. 

Channing's  sermon,  preached  upon  the  occasion  of  the 
ordination  of  a  professed  Unitarian,  in  a  city,  Baltimore, 
where  such  views  were  novel  and  regarded  with  the  great- 
est suspicion,  left  the  usual  path  of  ordination  discourses 
for  an  elaborate  exposition  and  defense  of  Unitarianism.^^ 
It  treated  its  subject  under  two  heads:  principles  adopted 
in  interpreting  the  Scriptures,  and  the  doctrines  drawn  by 
this  interpretation  from  the  Scriptures.  Under  the  first 
head  the  principles  of  interpretation  generally  recognized 
by  sound  exegesis  were  detailed,  such  as  the  necessity  of 
attention  to  the  context,  the  subject  discussed,  the  purpose, 
etc.,  of  the  writer,  and  the  genius  of  the  language  em- 
ployed. In  all  this  there  was  little  to  be  criticized,  except 
some  indications  of  the  manner  in  which  the  principles 
enumerated  would  be  applied.  A  defense  of  human  reason 
is  also  introduced,  denying  its  depravation  so  as  to  be  un- 
worthy of  our  confidence,  emphasizing  our  responsibility 
for  a  right  use  of  it,  and  rejecting  the  possibility  of  be- 
lieving manifest  contradictions  under  the  guise  of  truths 
above  reason. 

We  ought,  indeed,  to  expect  occasional  obscurity  in  such  a  book 
as  the  Bible,  which  was  written  for  past  and  future  ages  as  well  as  the 

IT  It  may  be  found  in  the  popular  edition  of  Channing's  works,  published 
by  the  American  Unitarian  Association  in  1875,  and  widely  distributed  (pp. 
367-84). 


284 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


present.  But  God's  wisdom  is  a  pledge  that  whatever  is  necessary 
for  uSj  and  necessary  for  salvation,  is  revealed  too  plainly  to  be  mis- 
taken, and  too  consistently  to  be  questioned,  by  a  sound  and  upright 
mind.  It  is  not  the  mark  of  wisdom  to  use  an  unintelligible  phrase- 
ology, to  communicate  what  is  above  our  capacities,  to  confuse  and 
unsettle  the  intellect  by  appearances  of  contradiction.  We  honor  our 
Heavenly  Teacher  too  much  to  ascribe  to  him  such  a  revelation.  A 
revelation  is  a  gift  of  light.  It  cannot  thicken  our  darkness  and 
multiply  our  perplexities.^^ 

Under  the  second  head  the  first  doctrine  considered  was 

the  unity  of  God,  "or  that  there  is  one  God,  and  one  only." 

We  understand  by  it  that  there  is  one  being,  one  mind,  one  per- 
son, one  intelligent  agent,  and  one  only,  to  whom  underived  and 
infinite  perfection  and  dominion  belong.  ....  We  find  no  intimation 
that  this  language  was  to  be  taken  in  an  unusual  sense,  or  that  God's 
unity  was  a  quite  different  thing  from  the  oneness  of  other  intelligent 
beings. 

He  continues : 

We  object  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  that,  whilst  acknowledg- 
ing in  words,  it  subverts  in  effect,  the  unity  of  God.  According  to  this 
doctrine,  there  are  three  infinite  and  equal  persons,  possessing  supreme 
divinity,  called  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost.  Each  of  these  three 
persons,  as  described  by  theologians,  has  his  own  particular  con- 
sciousness, will  and  perceptions.  They  love  each  other,  converse  with 
each  other,  and  delight  in  each  other's  society.  They  perform  differ- 
ent parts  in  man's  redemption,  each  having  his  appropriate  office,  and 
neither  doing  the  work  of  the  other.  The  Son  is  mediator,  and  not 
the  Father.  The  Father  sends  the  Son,  and  is  not  himself  sent;  nor 
is  he  conscious,  like  the  Son,  of  taking  flesh.  Here,  then,  we  have 
three  intelligent  agents,  possessed  of  different  consciousnesses,  differ- 
ent wills,  and  different  perceptions,  performing  differents  acts,  and 
sustaining  different  relations;  and  if  these  things  do  not  imply  and 
constitute  three  minds  or  beings,  we  are  utterly  at  a  loss  to  know 
how  three  minds  or  beings  are  to  be  formed.  It  is  difference  of  prop- 
erties, and  acts,  and  consciousness,  which  leads  to  the  belief  of  differ- 
ent intelligent  beings,  and,  if  this  mark  fails  us,  our  whole  knowledge 
falls;  we  have  no  proof  that  all  the  agents  and  persons  in  the  universe 
are  not  one  and  the  same  mind.  When  we  attempt  to  conceive  of 
three  Gods,  we  can  do  nothing  more  than  represent  to  ourselves  three 
agents,  distinguished  from  each  other  by  similar  marks  and  peculiari- 
ties to  those  which  separate  the  persons  of  the  Trinity;  and  when 

18  Edit,  ext.,  p.  370. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


28s 


common  Christians  hear  these  persons  spoken  of  as  conversing  with 
each  other,  loving  each  other,  and  performing  different  acts,  how  can 
they  help  regarding  them  as  different  beings,  different  minds  ? 

This  is  the  principal  argument,  though  the  usage  of  the 
New  Testament  is  variously  urged.  "We  challenge  our 
opponents  to  adduce  one  passage  in  the  New  Testament 
where  the  word  God  means  three  persons,  where  it  is  not 
limited  to  one  person,  and  where,  unless  turned  from  its 
usual  sense  by  the  connection,  it  does  not  mean  the  Fa- 
ther." The  impossibility  of  stating  the  doctrine  in  scrip- 
tural language  is  urged.  The  injury  of  the  doctrine  to 
devotion,  "not  only  by  joining  to  the  Father  other  objects 
of  worship,  but  by  taking  from  the  Father  the  supreme 
affection  which  is  his  due  and  transferring  it  to  the  Son,'' 
is  commented  upon.  "The  worship  of  a  bleeding,  suffering 
God  ....  awakens  human  transport  rather  than  that 
deep  veneration  of  the  moral  perfections  of  God  which  is 
the  essence  of  piety." 

The  second  doctrine  considered  is  the  unity  of  Christ. 
Channing  delivers  his  objection  to  the  orthodox  doctrine 
in  the  following  terms: 

According  to  this  doctrine,  Jesus  Christ,  instead  of  being  one 
mind,  one  conscious,  intelligent  principle,  whom  we  can  understand, 
consists  of  two  souls,  two  minds;  the  one  divine,  the  other  human; 
the  one  weak,  the  other  almighty;  the  one  ignorant,  the  other  omni- 
scient. Now  we  maintain  that  this  is  to  make  Christ  two  beings.  To 
denominate  him  one  person,  one  being,  and  yet  to  suppose  him  made 
up  of  two  minds,  infinitely  different  from  each  other,  is  to  abuse  and 
confound  language,  and  to  throw  darkness  over  all  our  conceptions  of 
intelligent  natures.  According  to  the  common  doctrine,  each  of  these 
two  minds  in  Christ  has  its  own  consciousness,  its  own  will,  its  own 
perceptions.  They  have,  in  fact,  no  common  properties.  The  divine 
mind  feels  none  of  the  wants  and  sorrows  of  the  human,  and  the 
human  is  infinitely  removed  from  the  perfection  and  happiness  of  the 
divine.    Can  you  conceive  of  two  beings  in  the  universe  more  distinct? 


i»  Ibid.,  p.  371. 

21  Ibid.,  p.  372. 


2°  Ibid.,  p.  371. 
22  Ibid.,  p.  373. 


286 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


We  have  always  thought  that  one  person  was  constituted  and  dis- 
tinguished by  one  consciousness.  The  doctrine  that  one  and  the  same 
person  should  have  two  consciousnesses,  two  wills,  two  souls,  in- 
finitely dif¥erent  from  each  other,  this  we  think  an  enormous  tax  on 
human  credulity.^s 

He  objects  to  the  orthodox  doctrine,  therefore,  prin- 
cipally in  the  name  of  simplicity  and  clearness  of  thought, 
but  he  also  urges  against  it  the  teaching  of  the  New  Tes- 
tament. 

Other  Christians,  indeed,  tell  us  that  this  doctrine  is  necessary  to 
the  harmony  of  the  Scriptures,  that  some  texts  ascribe  to  Jesus  human, 
and  others  divine  properties,  and  that  to  reconcile  these  we  must  sup- 
pose two  minds,  to  which  these  properties  may  be  referred.  In  other 
words,  for  the  purpose  of  reconciling  certain  difficult  passages,  which 
a  just  criticism  can  in  a  great  degree,  if  not  wholly,  explain,  we  must 
invent  an  hypothesis  vastly  more  difficult,  and  involving  gross  ab- 
surdity. We  are  to  find  our  way  out  of  a  labyrinth  by  a  clue  which 
conducts  us  into  mazes  infinitely  more  inextricable.^* 

In  opposition  to  this  he  propounded  the  doctrine  that 

Christ  was  "one  mind,  one  being,  and  a  being  distinct  from 

the  one  God."   The  Scripture  argument  may  be  compressed 

in  the  single  paragraph: 

He  is  continually  spoken  of  as  the  Son  of  God,  sent  of  God,  re- 
ceiving all  his  powers  from  God,  working  miracles  because  God  was 
with  him;  judging  justly  because  God  taught  him,  having  claims 
on  our  belief  becau3e  he  was  anointed  and  sealed  by  God,  and  as  able 
of  himself  to  do  nothing.  The  New  Testament  is  filled  with  this 
language.  Now  we  ask  what  impression  this  language  was  fitted  and 
intended  to  make  ?  Could  any  who  heard  it  have  imagined  that  Jesus 
was  the  very  God  to  whom  he  was  so  industriously  declared  to  be  in- 
ferior? 25 

The  argument  from  the  relations  of  the  doctrine  to  the 
atonement  is  also  considered,  and  the  infinity  of  the  atone- 
ment denied  because  only  the  human  nature  could  have 
suffered.  Indeed,  this  fact  reduces,  according  to  Channing, 
the  whole  humiliation  to  a  fiction,  since  the  God,  who  was 


23  Loc.  cit.,  p.  373. 
26  Ibia.,  p.  374- 


2*  Ibid.,  pp.  373  f. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


287 


the  real  Christ,  "was  infinitely  happy  at  the  very  moment 
of  the  suffering  of  his  humanity." 

What  exactly  Christ  was,  whether  mere  man  or  angelic 
being,  Channing  does  not  at  all  attempt  to  say. 

Up  to  this  point  Channing  had  said  little  to  betray  his 
own  connection  with  the  New  England  school.  His  vindi- 
cation of  the  reason  was,  indeed,  the  position  which  any- 
one who  had  at  all  imbibed  the  spirit  of  the  bold  specu- 
lation of  these  theologians  from  Edwards  down  must  take. 
He  is  presenting  a  new  issue,  and  forcing  it  upon  the  atten- 
tion of  his  contemporaries.  It  is  the  same  great  objection 
which  Emlyn  had  made — the  call  for  a  justification  or  a 
surrender  of  an  unintelligible  doctrine  of  God  and  Christ. 
What  had  been  done  in  public  consideration  of  that  objec- 
tion as  yet  was  entirely  inadequate.  Channing  not  only 
demanded,  he  secured  a  new  consideration.  This  was  his 
position  and  service  in  the  controversy. 

He  advances  next  in  the  Baltimore  sermon  to  the  "moral 
perfection  of  God." 

We  believe  that  God  is  infinitely  good,  kind,  benevolent,  in  the 
prcper  sense  of  thess  words, — good  in  disposition  as  well  as  in  act; 
good  not  to  a  few  but  to  all ;  good  to  every  individual,  as  well  as  to 
the  general  system.^s 

He  maintains  also  God's  justice,  but  it  is  a  justice  con- 
sistent with  the  benevolence  of  God,  which  he  defines  as 
"God's  infinite  regard  to  virtue  or  moral  worth  expressed 
in  a  moral  government;  that  is  in  giving  excellent  and 
equitable  laws  and  conferring  such  rewards  and  inflicting 
such  punishments  as  are  best  fitted  to  secure  their  observ- 
ance." All  this  is  in  entire  agreement  with  Hopkins, 
from  whom  Channing  cordially  acknowledged  that  he  had 
received  many  ideas.  But  the  application  of  the  principle 
was  entirely  different  from  that  of  Channing's  New  Eng- 


2«JbiJ.,    p.  376. 


2'  Ibid. 


288 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


land  predecessors.  The  two  doctrines  of  total  depravit>, 
both  in  its  original  Calvinistic  form,  and  in  the  form  which 
it  had  taken  under  the  modification  of  Edwards,  and  of 
election,  are  declared  inconsistent  with  God's  moral  perfec- 
tion, and  to  be  rejected. 

According  to  the  plainest  principles  of  morality,  we  maintain  that 
a  natural  constitution  of  the  mind,  unfailingly  disposing  it  to  evil,  and 
to  evil  alone,  would  absolve  it  from  guilt;  that  to  give  existence  under 
this  condition  would  argue  unspeakable  cruelty;  and  that  to  punish 
the  sin  of  this  unhappily  constituted  child  with  endless  ruin  would  be 
a  wrong  unparalleled  by  the  most  merciless  despotism. 28 

The  next  doctrine  considered  is  the  atonement.  Jesus 
came  to  effect  "a  moral  or  spiritual  deliverance  of  mankind." 
He  accomplishes  this  by  a  variety  of  methods,  by  his  instruc- 
tions and  example,  and  by  his  death.  As  to  the  force 
of  his  death,  Channing  says  that  Unitarians  are  not  agreed. 
Some  think  "that  we  ought  to  consider  this  event  as  hav- 
ing a  special  influence  in  removing  punishment,  though 
the  Scriptures  may  not  reveal  the  way  in  which  it  con- 
tributes to  this  end."  He  strongly  objects  to  all  views, 
as  dishonorable  to  God,  which  maintain  that  his  disposi- 
tion toward  men  is  changed  by  the  death  of  Christ;  and, 
particularly,  the  doctrine  of  satisfaction  to  justice,  even 
in  the  form  that  the  death  of  Christ  is  in  any  sense  an 
equivalent  for  the  punishment  of  men,  is  unbiblical  and 
impossible.  "According  to  this  doctrine,  God,  instead  of 
being  plenteous  in  forgiveness,  never  forgives." 

The  sermon  closes  with  a  head  upon  the  nature  of 
Christian  virtue,  in  which  the  positive  doctrine  is  Edward- 
ean,  but  the  negative  part  consists  in  objections  to  irresist- 
ible grace  and  infused  character,  with  remarks  upon  the 
duty  of  charity  and  love,  against  which  nothing  is  to  be 
said,  except  that  possibly  a  subtle  plea  for  latitudinarianism 
was  hidden  under  the  phraseology  employed. 

28  Loc.  cit.,  p.  377.  29  /^j-^.^      378_  30  p_  375, 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY  289 


Channing  engaged  again  in  the  controversy,  but,  ex- 
cept in  form,  or  in  greater  fulness  at  certain  points,  he 
added  Httle  to  the  contribution  which  he  made  in  this  his- 
toric sermon.  In  the  sermon  upon  "Unitarian  Christian- 
ity Most  Favorable  to  Piety"  (1826)  he  objects  very 
strongly  to  the  doctrine  of  the  incarnation  as  infringing 
upon  the  spirituality  of  God,  and  renewed  his  objections 
to  the  doctrine  of  an  infinite  satisfaction  for  sin,  comparing 
the  cross  to  ''a  gallows  in  the  center  of  the  universe,"  and 
terming  the  idea  of  a  satisfaction  "wholly  delusion."  No- 
where is  his  power  of  felicitous  statement  more  conspic- 
uous than  in  this  sermon,  and  nowhere  is  his  fundamental 
objection  tot  ail  Calvinism  more  evident.  He  rejects  it 
because  it  is,  as  he  thinks,  a  contradiction  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  divine  love. 

Thus  we  see  that  Channing  was  intimately  acquainted 
with  the  teachings  of  our  New  England  leaders,  especially 
with  those  of  Hopkins,^^  and  that  in  some  respects  his  posi- 
tions had  grown  out  of  theirs  and  represented  the  extreme 
to  which  those  positions  could  be  pushed.  It  was  there- 
fore incumbent  upon  New  England  orthodoxy,  not  only 
because  of  the  force  with  which  he  had  presented  it  with 
a  new  issue,  vital  to  itself  in  common  with  all  evangelical 
theology,  but  because  its  own  essential  character  and  the 
validity  of  its  own  positions  and  their  evangelical  sound- 
ness were  all  put  to  the  question,  to  answer  Channing  thor- 
oughly. 

The  challenge  of  Channing  was  taken  up  by  Moses 
Stuart,^^  professor  of  sacred  literature  in  Andover  Sem- 
inary, in  Letters  published  at  Andover  (181 9).    He  ac- 

31  He  has  a  very  interesting  passage  on  Hopkins  in  his  sermon  on  "Chris- 
tian Worship." 

32  Moses  Stuart,  born  at  Wilton,  Conn.,  March  26,  1780;  died  at  Andover, 
January  4,  1852;  graduated  at  Yale,  1799;  admitted  to  the  bar,  1802;  ordained 
and  settled  in  New  Haven,  1806;  called  to  Andover,  1810;  served  as  professor 
till  1848.    "The  father  of  biblical  learning  in  this  country." 


290 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


cepted  with  some  slight  criticisms  Channing's  general  dis- 
cussion of  the  principles  of  interpretation,  and  then  passed 
to  the  treatment  of  the  main  doctrines  discussed. 

On  the  Trinity  he  began  the  discussion  with  the 
words : 

Admitting  that  you  have  given  a  fair  account  of  our  belief,  I 
cannot  see,  indeed,  why  we  are  not  virtually  guilty  of  tritheism,  or 
at  least  of  something  which  approximates  so  near  to  it  that  I  ac- 
knowledge myself  unable  to  distinguish  it  from  tritheism.  But  I 
cannot  help  feeling  that  you  have  made  neither  an  impartial  nor  a  cor- 
rect statement  of  what  we  believe  and  what  we  are  accustomed  to 
teach  and  defend. 

But  it  is  evident  that  some  justification  for  his  under- 
standing of  current  orthodoxy  might  have  been  urged  by 
Channing,  as  even  Stuart  was  ready  to  admit.  Emmons, 
for  example,  who  had  been,  ten  years  before,  the  most 
prominent  figure  among  the  New  England  leaders,  uses 
the  following  language  in  his  sermons  upon  the  Trinity: 

The  Scripture  represents  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost  as  dis- 
tinctly possessed  of  personal  properties.  The  Father  is  represented  as 
being  able  to  understand,  to  will,  and  to  act  of  himself.  The  Son  is 
represented  as  being  able  to  understand,  to  will,  and  to  act  of  himself. 
And  the  Holy  Ghost  is  represented  as  being  able  to  understand,  to  will, 
and  to  act  of  himself.  According  to  these  representations,  the  Father, 
Son,  and  Holy  Ghost  are  three  distinct  persons  or  agents.^* 

He  speaks  also  of  "society"  in  the  Godhead,  of  the 
different  persons  making  a  "covenant  of  redemption,"  and 
teaches  that  there  are  three  persons,  not  in  one  person,  but 
in  one  being.^^  This  is  a  denial  of  the  uni-personality  of 
God.  In  a  word,  almost  all  the  phrases  to  which  Channing 
objects  are  to  be  found  in  Emmons,  as  well  as  in  many  a 
lesser  light  of  orthodoxy. 

I  employ,  at  the  present  writing,  the  reprint  by  Stuart  himself,  of  1846. 
See  p.  15. 

Emmons'  Works,  Vol.  II,  p.  134. 
Ibid.,  p.  142. 
Ibid.,  pp.  132  f. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


291 


Stuart's  positive  reply  to  Charming  consisted  in  em- 
phasizing, first,  the  numerical  unity  of  the  Godhead. 

I  am  now  prepared  to  say  that  I  believe  that  God  is  one, 
numerically  one,  in  essence  and  attributes.  In  other  words,  the  in- 
finitely perfect  Spirit,  the  Creator  and  Preserver  of  all  things,  the 
Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost,  has  numerically  the  same  essence,  and 
the  same  perfections,  so  far  as  they  are  known  to  us.  To  particular- 
ize; the  Son  possesses  not  simply  a  similar  or  equal  essence  and  per- 
fections, but  numerically  the  same  as  the  Father,  without  division,  and 
without  multiplication.^'' 

He  next  affirms  that  "the  Son  (and  also  the  Holy 
Spirit)  does,  in  some  respect  truly  and  really,  not  merely 
nominally  or  logically,  differ  from  the  Father."  The  ob- 
jection of  Channing  had  been,  however,  that  this  differ- 
ence was  so  conceived  as  to  destroy  the  unity  which  Stuart 
had  just  now  reasserted.  He  consequently  felt  himself 
compelled  to  adjust  the  two  ideas,  which  he  attempted  to 
do  by  a  discussion  of  the  word  "person." 

The  common  language  of  the  Trinitarian  symbols  is,  that  "there 
are  three  persons  in  the  Godhead."  In  your  comments  upon  this,  you 
have  all  along  explained  the  word  person,  just  as  though  it  were  an 
established  point,  that  Trinitarians  use  this  word  in  such  a  connection, 
in  its  ordinary  acceptation  as  applied  to  men.  But  can  you  satisfy 
yourself  that  this  is  doing  us  justice?  What  fact  is  plainer  from 
church  history,  than  that  the  word  person  was  introduced  into  the 
creeds  of  ancient  times,  merely  as  a  term  which  would  somewhat 
strongly  express  the  disagreement  of  Christians  in  general  with  the 
reputed  errors  of  the  Sabellians,  and  others  of  similar  sentiments,  who 
denied  the  existence  of  any  real  distinction  in  the  Godhead,  and  as- 
serted that  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost,  v/ere  merely  attributes 
of  God,  or  the  names  of  different  ways  in  which  he  revealed  himself 
to  mankind,  or  of  different  relations  which  he  bore  to  them,  and 
in  which  he  acted?  The  Nicene  fathers  meant  to  deny  the  cor- 
rectness of  such  views,  when  they  used  the  word  person.  They 
designed  to  imply  by  it,  that  there  was  some  real,  not  merely 
nominal,  distinction  in  the  Godhead;  and  that  something  more 
than  a  mere  diversity  of  relation  or  action  of  the  Godhead  in 
respect  to  us,  was  intended.  They  used  the  word  person,  because 
they  supposed  it  approximated  nearer  to  expressing  the  existence  of  a 

S7  Letters,  p.  18, 


292         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


distinction,  than  any  other  which  they  could  choose.  Most  cer- 
tainly, neither  they,  nor  any  intelligent  Trinitarian,  could  use  this 
term  in  such  a  latitude  as  you  represent  us  as  employing  it,  and  as  you 
attach  to  it.  We  profess  to  use  it  merely  because  of  the  poverty  of 
language;  merely  to  designate  our  belief  of  a  real  distinction  in  the 
Godhead;  but  not  to  describe  independent,  conscious  beings,  possessing 
separate  and  equal  essences  and  perfections.  Why  should  we  be 
obliged  so  often  to  explain  ourselves  on  this  point?  Is  there  any 
more  difficulty  here,  or  anything  more  obnoxious,  than  when  you  say: 
"God  is  angry  with  the  wicked  every  day"?  You  defend  yourself  in 
the  use  of  such  an  expression,  by  saying,  that  it  is  only  the  language 
of  rhetoric  and  figure;  that  it  is  merely  intended  to  describe  that  in 
the  mind  of  the  Deity,  or  in  his  actions,  which  corresponds  in  some 
measure,  or  in  some  respect,  to  anger  and  its  consequences  in  men; 
not  that  God  is  really  affected  with  the  passion  of  anger.  Why  will 
you  not  permit  me,  then,  to  say  that  we  speak  of  persons  in  the  God- 
head, in  order  to  express  that  which  in  some  respect  or  other  corre- 
sponds to  persons  as  applied  to  men,  i.  e.,  some  distinction :  not  that  we 
attach  to  it  the  meaning  of  three  beings,  with  a  separate  consciousness, 
will,  omnipotence,  omniscience,  etc.?  Where,  then,  considering  the 
poverty  of  language  in  respect  to  expressing  what  belongs  to  the  Deity, 
is  our  inconsistency  in  this,  or  how  is  there  any  absurdity  in  our  lan- 
guage, providing  there  is  a  real  foundation  in  the  Scriptures  on  which 
we  may  rest  the  fact  of  a  distinction,  which  we  believe  to  exist? 

He  says  further: 

I  receive  the  fact  that  it  exists,  simply  because  I  believe  that  the 
Scriptures  reveal  the  fact.  And  if  the  Scriptures  do  reveal  the  fact 
that  there  are  three  persons  in  the  Godhead  (in  the  sense  explained)  ; 
that  there  is  a  distinction,  which  affords  grounds  for  the  respective 
appellations  of  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost;  which  lays  the  founda- 
tion for  the  application  of  the  personal  pronouns,  /,  Thou,  He;  which 
renders  it  proper  to  speak  of  sending  and  being  sent;  to  speak  of 
Christ  as  being  zvith  God,  being  in  his  bosom,  and  of  other  things  of 
the  like  nature  in  the  like  way,  and  yet  to  hold  that  the  divine  nature 
belongs  equally  to  each;  then  it  is,  like  every  other  fact  revealed,  to  be 
received  simply  on  the  credit  of  divine  revelation.^^ 

This  was,  in  a  sense,  the  reduction  of  the  Trinity  to 
its  lowest  terms — to  a  form  of  statement  in  which  there 
could  be  nothing  to  quarrel  about  because  it  was  so  low 

Loc.  cit.,  p.  20. 
2^  Ibid.,  p.  23. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


293 


and  indistinct.    Yet  some  elements  of  definiteness  were 

left.    He  continues : 

In  regard  to  this  distinction,  we  say:  It  is  not  a  mere  distmction 
of  attributes,  of  relation  to  us,  of  modes  of  action,  or  of  relation  be- 
tween attributes  and  substance  or  essence,  so  far  as  they  are  known  to 
us.  We  believe  the  Scriptures  justify  us  in  these  negations.  But  here 
we  leave  the  subject.  We  undertake  (at  least  the  Trinitarians  of  our 
country  with  whom  I  am  acquainted  undertake)  not  at  all  to  describe 
affirmatively  the  distinction  in  the  Godhead.  When  you  will  give  me 
an  affirmative  description  of  underived  existence,  I  may  safely  engage 
to  furnish  you  with  one  of  person  in  the  trinity.  You  do  not  reject 
the  belief  of  the  divine  self-existence,  merely  because  you  cannot 
affirmatively  define  it;  neither  do  we  of  a  distinction  in  the  Godhead, 
because  we  cannot  affirmatively  define  it. 

And  he  warns  Channing  against  confounding  ''terms 
which  are  unintelligible,  and  things  which  arc  undefin- 
ahle." 

Stuart  then  brings  forward  a  number  of  examples  from 
church  history  to  show  that  early  writers,  particularly  Ter- 
tullian,  had  not  succeeded  very  well  in  presenting  clear 
affirmative  definitions  of  the  distinction  between  the  differ- 
ent ''persons"  of  the  Trinity.  He  does  not  find  the  Nicene 
Fathers  themselves  to  have  been  more  successful.  The 
doctrine  of  "eternal  generation"  which  they  presented 
Stuart  did  not  find  to  possess  any  "definite  meaning"  to 
his  mind.  Any  intimation  of  the  derivation  of  the  divine 
nature  of  the  Son  he  regards  as  trenching  upon  his  su- 
preme divinity,  which,  if  it  is  divinity  at  all,  must  be  un- 
derived. "The  Nicene  creed  then  is  not,  I  must  confess, 
sufficiently  orthodox  for  me,"  he  says.^^  He  thus  briefly 
indicated  as  a  part  of  his  reply  to  Channing  the  elimina- 
tion from  the  theology  of  the  Trinity  of  the  doctrine  of 
eternal  generation.  He  later  expanded  these  ideas  in  letters 
to  Dr.  Miller  on  his  Eternal  Generation.  His  position, 
as  more  clearly  expressed  there,  was  as  follows : 


*°  Ibid.,  pp.  24,  25. 


Ibid.,  p.  31. 


294 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


The  subject  necessitated  "two  inquiries,  viz.,  Is  the  gen- 
eration of  the  Son  eternal?  and,  Is  that  generation  volun- 
tary or  necessary?  ....  In  other  words,  Did  the  early 
Fathers  believe  that  the  Logos  was  not  only  eternal,  but 
that  he  was  Son  eternally  ?"  Stuart  believed  that  the 
Logos  was  "truly  eternal,"  but  he  questioned  whether  he 
was  "eternally  the  Son  of  God."  He  was  thus  led  into  an 
elaborate  examination  of  the  Fathers  and  of  the  various 
definitions  of  eternal  generation  which  have  been  given, 
with  the  general  result  that  they  are  full  of  contradictions 
both  of  expression  and  of  thought.  The  "generic  idea  of 
eternal  generation"  he  finds  to  lie  in  the  "general  idea  of 
derivation  and  dependence,  in  some  respect  or  other,  of 
the  Logos  upon  the  Father."  This  idea  he  conceives 
to  be  inconsistent  with  self-existence,  and  sO'  to  be  impos- 
sible of  application  to  the  Logos,  who  is  God,  and  therefore 
self-existent.^^ 

The  following  passage  expresses  his  fundamental  objec- 
tion to  the  doctrine: 

Any  theory,  then,  respecting  the  person  of  the  Son  of  God  which 
makes  the  Logos  a  derived  being,  destroys  the  radical  principle — an 
elementary  ingredient,  of  his  true  and  proper  divinity.  I  believe  that 
the  Logos  is  really  and  verily  divine — self-existent,  uncaused,  inde- 
pendent, immutable  in  himself.  Derivation  in  any  shape  or  in  any 
measure;  as  to  all  or  part  of  his  essential  predicates  as  God — whether 
you  apply  to  it  the  name  generation,  emanation,  creation,  procession, 
or  any  other  term  which  has  been  used^ — derivation,  I  say,  appears 
essentially  incompatible  with  proper  divinity.  And  so  plain  does  this 
appear  to  my  mind  that,  if  I  once  admit  the  proper  derivation  of  the 
Logos  (be  the  derivation  eternal  or  in  time),  the  idea  of  the  supreme 
divinity  vanishes  in  a  moment;  and  the  Logos  ranks  with  those  who 
are  called  God  only  from  some  resemblance,  either  of  station  or  of 
office,  or  of  moral  or  intellectual  qualities,  to  the  self-existent  deity.*^ 

His  own  doctrine  of  the  sonship  is  as  follows:  (i) 
"Christ  is  called  the  Son  of  God  because,  in  respect  to  his 

*2  Letters  (Andover,  1822),  pp.  17  fif.        *^  Ibid.,  pp.  88,  90. 
Ibid.,  pp.  91,  92.  Ibid.,  pp.  92  f. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


295 


human  nature,  he  is  derived  from  God."  He  refers  at 
this  point  to  Luke  i  :35.  '']ohn  says  not  a  word  concern- 
ing the  Son  until  he  has  mentioned  the  incarnation  of  the 
Logos."      (2)  As  Messiah.^' 

This  thoroughgoing  rejection  of  the  "eternal  sonship," 
which  is  an  essential  part  of  the  New  England  answer  to 
Unitarianism,  as  formulated  by  Stuart,  though  not  tech- 
nically belonging  to  the  reply  to  Channing,  relieved  some- 
what the  difficulties  raised  by  him.  But  Stuart  had  more 
fundamental  answers  to  make.  He  declared  that  Unitar- 
ians were  as  incompetent  to  define  the  unity  of  God  as  the 
orthodox  were  his  trinity.  He  thus  anticipated  in  every- 
thing but  sharpness  of  form  N.  W.  Taylor's  exposure  of 
the  fundamental  fallacy  of  Unitarianism,  which  consisted, 
as  he  said,  in  the  assumption,  totally  unwarranted,  that  the 
unity  of  God  is  like  our  unity,  and,  because  this  is  a  per- 
fect simplicity,  that  of  God's  must  also  be. 

Familiar  as  the  assertion  is,  in  your  conversation  and  in  your 
sermons,  that  God  is  one,  can  you  give  me  any  other  definition  of  this 
oneness,  except  a  negative  one?  You  deny  pluraHty  of  it;  you  say 
God  is  but  one,  and  not  two,  nor  more.  All  this  is  mere  negation.  In 
what,  I  ask,  does  the  divine  unity  actually  and  positively  consist?  God 
surely  has  different  and  various  faculties  and  powers.  Is  he  not  al- 
mighty, omniscient,  omnipresent,  holy,  just,  good?  Does  he  not  act 
differently,  i.  e.  variously,  both  in  the  natural  and  in  the  moral  world? 
Unity,  therefore,  is  not  an  universal  sameness  of  attribute  or  of  action. 
Does  it  consist,  then,  appropriately  in  his  essence?  ....  Is  it  possible 
to  show  what  it  is,  which  constitutes  the  internal  nature  of  the  divine 
nature  or  attributes?  To  show  how  these  are  related  to  each  other,  or 
what  internal  distinctions  exist?  ....  The  assertion  that  God  is  one 
means,  when  fairly  and  intelligently  understood,  nothing  more  positively 

than  that  he  is  numerically  one,  i.  e.  it  simply  denies  polytheism  

That  God  is  one,  does  not  mean  that  there  is  but  one  simple  element 
in  his  nature    (for  this  we  do  not  and  cannot  know),  but  that  there 

Ibid.,  p.  III. 

Ibid.,  p.  115.  Stuart  expressed  some  surprise  that  his  treatment  of  the 
sonship  of  Christ  had  met  with  so  sharp  criticism,  and  declared  that  his  views 
were  those  common  in  New  England.  In  this  statement  he  is  confirmed  by 
Noah  Worcester,  Bible  News,  pp.  169,  170. 


296 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


is  in  him  only  one  intelligent  agent  In  respect  to  principle,  then, 

what  more  difficulty  lies  in  the  way  of  believing  in  the  threefold  dis- 
tinction of  the  Godhead,  than  in  believing  in  the  divine  unity?  *8 

He  closes  this  portion  of  the  discussion  by  an  ingenious 

answer  to  the  brief  and  common  argument  of  Unitarians: 

"How  can  three  be  one,  and  one  three?" 

In  no  way,  I  readily  answer,  provided  the  one  and  the  three  both 
relate  to  the  same  specific  thing,  and  in  the  same  respect.  "How  then 
is  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  in  Unity  to  be  vindicated?"  In  a  way, 
I  would  reply,  which  is  not  at  all  embarrassed  by  these,  or  by  any  of 

the  like,  questions  Supposed  I  should  affirm  that  two  subjects 

A  and  B  are  numerically  identical  in  regard  to  what  may  be  called  X, 
but  diverse  or  distinct  in  regard  to  something  else  called  Y ;  is  there  any 
absurdity  or  contradiction  in  this  affirmation?  ....  We  do  not  main- 
tain that  the  Godhead  is  three  in  the  same  respects  that  it  is  one,  but  the 
reverse.  In  regard  to  X,  we  maintain  a  numerical  unity;  in  regard  to 
Y  we  maintain  a  threefold  distinction.*^ 

Stuart  now  advanced  to  Channing's  second  and  more 
vital  point — his  objection  to  the  orthodox  doctrine  as  de- 
structive of  the  unity  of  Christ.  The  reply  is  all  summed 
up  in  the  one  sentence  that  the  doctrine  of  the  two  natures 
in  Christ  is  "a  fact  with  which  natural  religion  has  no  con- 
cern; at  least,  of  which  it  has  no  knowledge."  The  de- 
termination of  the  dispute  must  therefore  lie  exclusively 
in  the  sphere  of  exegesis.  But  rational  elements  could  not, 
of  course,  be  wholly  excluded,  and  Stuart  recognizes  the 
difficulty  which  Channing  had  formulated  afresh,  which 
was  the  old  difficulty  handed  down  from  Chalcedon  un- 
solved :  how  to  conceive  of  Christ,  while  both  divine  and 
human,  as  truly  one  person,  possessed  of  a  single  con- 
sciousness. Chalcedon  itself  had  so  balanced  the  two 
natures  over  against  one  another  as  almost  to  render  a  true 
unity  impocsible  Calvinistic  theology  since  had  empha- 
sized the  twofoldness  at  the  expense  of  the  unity.  Stuart 
did  the  same.    He  intended  to  maintain  the  unity,  for  he 

48  Loc.  cit.,  p.  41.  Ibid.,  p.  43. 

0°  Ibid.,  p.  49. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


297 


says  that  we  "recognize  and  distinguish,  in  this  complex 
being,  but  one  person^  and  therefore  speak  of  but  one." 
He  even  went  so  far  as  to  make  some  suggestions  as  to 
how  this  union  was  effected. 

God  cannot  divest  himself  of  his  essential  perfections  In 

whatever  way,  then,  the  union  of  the  two  natures  was  effected,  it  was 
so  brought  about  that  it  neither  destroyed  nor  essentially  changed, 

either  the  divine  or  human  nature  One  person  in  the  sense  in 

which  each  of  us  is  one,  Christ  could  not  be. 

The  last  sentence  might  seem  to  deny  the  unity  of  the  per- 
son of  Christ;  but  the  context  shows  that  Stuart  meant  one 
person,  made  up  in  the  same  manner  as  we^  Christ  could 
not  be.    He  continues: 

One  person  in  the  sense  in  which  each  of  us  is  one,  Christ  could 
not  be.  If  we,  with  some  of  the  fathers,  make  God  the  soul  and  Jesus 
of  Nazareth  the  body  of  Christ,  then  we  take  away  his  human  nature, 
and  deny  the  imperfection  of  his  knowledge.  But  may  not  God  have 
been,  in  a  manner  altogether  peculiar  and  mysterious,  united  to  Jesus, 
without  displaying  at  once  his  whole  power  in  him,  or  necessarily  ren- 
dering him,  as  a  man,  supremely  perfect?  In  the  act  of  creation,  God 
does  not  put  forth  all  his  power;  nor  in  the  preservation  of  created 
things;  nor  in  sanctification;  nor  does  he  bring  all  his  knowledge  into 
action,  when  he  inspires  prophets  and  ppostles.  Was  it  necessary  that 
he  should  exert  all  his  attributes  to  the  full,  when  he  was  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  human  nature  of  Christ?  In  governing  the  world  from 
day  to  day,  God  does  not  surely  exhaust  his  omnipotence,  or  his 
wisdom.  He  employs  only  so  much  as  is  necessary  to  accomplish  the 
design  which  he  has  in  view.  In  his  union  with  Jesus  of  Nazareth,  the 
divine  Logos  could  not,  of  course,  be  necessitated  at  once  to  put  forth 
all  his  energy,  or  exhibit  all  his  knowledge  and  wisdom.  Just  so  much 
of  it,  and  no  more,  was  manifested,  as  was  requisite  to  constitute  the 
character  of  an  all-sufficient  and  incarnate  Mediator  and  Redeemer. 
When  necessary,  power  and  authority  infinitely  above  human  were  dis- 
played;  when  otherwise,  the  humcn  n-^ture  sympathized  and  suffered 
like  that  of  other  men. 

This  passage  contains  suggestions  which  Stuart  never 
expands  and  which  received  scanty  attention  from  his  con- 
temporaries.   It  is  a  little  uncertain  what  he  meant.  He 

^1  Ibid.,  p.  50. 


298         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


may  have  foreshadowed  the  same  ideas  which  were  later 
embraced  in  the  theory  of  the  "kenosis;"  or,  more  prob- 
ably, he  was  echoing  the  Lutheran  theory  that  Christ  "sur- 
rendered, during  the  period  of  his  humiliation,  the  use  of 
the  divine  attributes."  But  though  he  intended  to  main- 
tain the  unity  of  Christ's  person,  he  repeatedly  surrendered 
it  in  this  brief  passage.  "God  ....  united  to  Jesus:" 
consistent  maintenance  of  Christ's  unity  would  put  it,  "God 
united  with  humanity,"  for  there  was  no  Jesus  till  that 
union  was  complete,  and  Jesus  was  that  one  person  who 
was  both  God  and  man.  "Rendering  him  as  a  man  su- 
premely perfect:"  here  you  have  the  division  of  the  one 
personality  so  that  some  things  are  to  be  true  of  his  con- 
sciousness as  man  which  are  not  true  of  that  same  and  un- 
divided consciousness  as  God;  which  is  rending  the  unity. 
And  then  that  word  "conjunction,"  what  does  that  mean? 
The  divine  and  human  were  not  in  conjunction,  but  in  union. 
Neither  was  the  divine  Logos  in  "union  with  Jesus  of  Naza- 
reth." And  his  later  and  more  formal  definition  is  equally 
defective:  "When  we  say  that  the  two  natures  of  Christ 
are  united  in  one  person,  we  mean  to  say  that  divinity  and 
humanity  are  brought  into  such  a  connection  in  this  case, 
that  we  cannot  separate  them,  so  as  to  make  two  entirely 
distinct  and  separate  agents."  How  far  short  that  falls 
of  maintaining  two  natures  in  the  unity  of  a  single  con- 
sciousness. 

Inasmuch  as  this  is  all  of  the  rationale  of  the  matter 
which  Stuart  presents,  confining  himself  hereafter  to  prov- 
ing from  the  Bible  the  reality  of  each  of  the  two  natures 
in  Christ,  he  must  be  judged  to  have  failed  in  answering 
the  sharp  demand  of  Unitarianism  since  the  days  of  Emlyn 
for  an  intellectual  justification  of  the  doctrine  of  the  per- 
son of  Christ.    To  this  extent  the  orthodox  reply  upon  the 

^~  Loc.  cit.,  p.  52. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY  299 

whole  was  a  failure,  for  others  did  no  better  than  Stuart 
did.  No  one  in  this  period,  except  the  Unitarians,  made 
a  reality  of  the  unity  of  the  Redeemer's  person.  Hence 
there  was  no  advance  in  the  doctrine  of  Christology.  The 
Unitarians  surrendered  the  divinity  to  maintain  the  unity, 
and  their  opponents  surrendered  the  unity,  in  all  but  words, 
for  the  sake  of  maintaining  the  two  natures.  The  con- 
troversy at  this  point  only  serves  to  illustrate  the  nature 
and  urgency  of  the  problem.  It  is  at  least  doubtful 
whether  the  orthodox  even  saw  what  the  problem  was,  - 
The  real  strength  of  Stuart's  reply,  and  the  element 
which  enabled  the  evangelical  churches  to  maintain  them- 
selves and  cast  off  the  Unitarian  attack,  lay  therefore  else- 
where. In  the  battles  of  thought,  as  of  those  of  arms,  the 
precise  gage  thrown  down  is  seldom  taken  up.  Stuart  had 
the  larger  justification  of  his  method  in  the  fact  that  he  was 
an  exegete  and  not  a  dogmatician.  In  him,  for  the  first 
time  in  the  history  of  New  England  theology,  a  thoroughly 
scholarly  critic  of  the  New  Testament  appears  upon  the 
stage.  The  meaning  and  importance  of  a  genuine  theo- 
logical seminary  were  beginning  to  be  seen.  Emmons  had 
taken  for  his  text,  when  about  to  preach  his  initial  sermon 
upon  the  Trinity,  the  spurious  text  of  the  three  heavenly 
witnesses  (I  John  5:7).  Stuart  fell  into  no  like  mistake, 
but  with  scholarly  accuracy,  and  with  an  amplitude  of 
learning  which  had  had  no  precursor  and  had  no  rival,  he 
set  forth  the  biblical  argument  for  the  divinity  of  Christ 
in  the  forms  which  it  has  since  maintained  in  New  Eng- 
land. Christ  is  called  God ;  there  are  ascribed  to  him  divine 
attributes  and  works — omniscience,  omnipotence,  eternity; 
and  divine  honors  are  paid  to  him.  The  true  humanity  is 
also  treated  at  considerable  length.  Channing,  as  Stuart 
remarks  with  surprise,  had  never  maintained  clearly  that 
Christ  was  truly  and  properly  a  man.    But  Stuart  left  no 


300         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

doubt  upon  this  subject.  In  all  this  we  may  the  more  con- 
fidently judge  that  Stuart  was,  in  general,  right,  that  the 
standard  exegesis  seems  now  to  have  accepted  the  biblical 
argument  as  conclusive,  if  the  investigator  accepts  biblical 
authority  at  all.  The  position  of  modern  opposers  of  the 
Trinity  is  curiously  different  from  that  of  the  early  Massa- 
chusetts Unitarians.  Instead  of  denying  that  John,  for  ex- 
ample, taught  the  divinity  of  Christ,  in  order  to  obtain  sup- 
port for  their  own  rejection  of  it,  they  at  once  and  most 
cordially  admit  that  he  did  and  then  proceed  to  get  rid  of 
this  fact  by  taking  it  as  a  proof  that  "John"  was  not  writ- 
ten by  John,  but  is  the  product  of  a  much  later  period.  As 
that  eminent  Unitarian  scholar.  Dr.  George  E.  Ellis,  once 
said,  upon  the  basis  of  the  view  of  the  inspiration  and  au- 
thority of  the  Scriptures  which  was  common  to  orthodox 
and  Unitarian  at  this  time,  the  orthodox  certainly  had  the 
best  of  the  argument. 

The  total  effect,  however,  of  Stuart's  method  of  reply 
was  in  one  respect  damaging  to  evangelical  theology.  Or- 
thodoxy came  out  of  the  battle  victorious,  but  maimed. 
The  doctrine  of  the  divinity  of  Christ  was  rescued  so  as  to 
become  a  practical  portion  of  the  faith  of  our  churches, 
and  the  real  basis  of  its  worship  and  spiritual  life.  But 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  viewed  as  a  mere  fact,  totally 
inexplicable,  and  reduced  to  the  simple  matter  of  "dis- 
tinctions" within  the  Godhead,  lost  its  place  as  the  great 
fundamental  doctrine  of  the  system.  Men  did  not  know 
what  to  do  with  it.  It  has  almost  been  regarded  as  a  bur- 
den upon  the  system  of  Christianity.  Its  apologetic  value, 
especially  in  the  defense  of  the  eternity  of  God  and  the 
doctrine  of  the  creation  of  matter;  its  relation  to-  Christian 
consciousness,  as  a  consciousness  of  sin  and  redemption; 
and  its  constructive  part  in  the  erection  of  Christian  theol- 
ogy, incarnation,  atonement,  and  the  rest — have  all  been 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY  301 

largely  forgotten.  The  fear  of  tritheism  has  led  many  a 
thinker  to  occupy  at  times  a  position  scarcely  distinguish- 
able from  unitarianism.  Rationalism  can  be  defeated  only 
by  rationalism;  and  when  the  false  rationalism  of  the 
Unitarians  was  met  only  by  a  biblical  argument,  and  not 
by  a  true  rationalism,  the  poison  of  that  false  rationalism 
entered  to  a  considerable  degree  into  the  theological  man 
and  made  him  too  often,  in  the  later  days  of  the  school, 
himself  a  rationalist. 

Stuart's  vigorous  book  brought  out  soon  a  sharp  answer 
from  a  writer  who  was  afterward  to  be  famous  as  a  pro- 
fessor of  theology  at  Cambridge — Andrews  Norton,  in  his 
Statement  of  Reasons  for  Not  Believing  the  Doctrines  of 
Trinitarians  respecting  the  Nature  of  God  and  the  Per- 
son of  Christ  (1819).  It  seems  to  have  been  regarded 
as  conclusive  by  the  Unitarians,  for  they  left  it  to  stand 
as  their  only  serious  attempt  at  an  answer.  It  was,  how- 
ever, comparatively  weak  upon  the  exegetical  side,  where 
Stuart  was  strong,  and  only  strong  upon  the  dogmatical 
side,  where  he  had  been  weak. 

Norton's  fundamental  objection  to  the  Trinity  is  that 
it  is  incredible.    Thus  he  says :    'Three  persons  ....  are 

three  Gods.    A  person  is  a  being  The  doctrine  of 

the  trinity,  then,  affirms  that  there  are  three  Gods." 
And  this  is  a  contradiction  to  the  doctrine  of  one  God  also 
affirmed  by  Trinitarians.  After  some  just  criticism  upon 
the  phrase  ''fountain  of  divinity"  used  in  the  ancient  church 
of  the  Father,  who,  if  the  Trinity  is  eternal  and  necessary, 
can  be  no  more  underived  than  the  Son  or  the  Spirit,  Nor- 
ton declares  that  Stuart's  doctrine  of  three  "distinctions" 
is  "a  mere  evasion  introduced  ....  for  the  purpose  of 
rescuing  it  from  the  charge  of  absurdity/' and  then 
charges  him,  with  less  justice,  with  immediately  relapsing 

63  op.    Cit.,    p.    4.  54  7^ 


302 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


into  the  common  belief.  If  he  were  consistent,  Stuart 
would  teach  a  merely  nominal  Trinity.^^  He  affirms,  says 
Norton, 

that  there  is  a  threefold  distinction  in  the  divine  nature,  that  is  in  the 
nature  of  this  one  person.  But  of  the  nature  of  any  being  we  can  know- 
nothing  but  by  the  attributes  or  properties  of  that  being.  We  con- 
ceive that  this  is  at  the  present  day  a  fundamental  and  undisputed  prin- 
ciple in  metaphysics.  Abstract  all  the  attributes  or  properties  of  any 
being,  and  nothing  remains  of  which  you  can  form  even  an  imagina- 
tion. These  are  all  which  is  cognizable  by  the  human  mind.  When 
you  say  therefore  that  there  is  a  threefold  distinction  in  the  nature  of 
any  being,  the  only  meaning  which  the  words  will  admit  (in  relation 
to  the  present  subject)  is  that  the  attributes  or  properties  of  this 
being  may  be  divided  into  three  distinct  classes,  which  may  be  consid- 
ered separately  from  each  other  But  this  is  nothing  more  than 

a  modal  or  nominal  trinity. 

Norton  then  passes  to  Christology,  where  he  adds  nothing 
to  Channing  but  certain  forcible  statements  of  the 
argument.  He  shows,  however,  distinctly  that  Christ  was 
a  true  man;  and  then  puts  his  argument  briefly:  Because 
he  was  a  man,  he  Was  not  God.  One  new  argument  as  to 
the  Trinity  which  lay  outside  of  the  province  of  a  sermon 
like  Channing's,  he  introduced,  viz.,  a  review  of  the  history 
of  the  doctrine,  in  which  he  traced  it  to  Greek  philosophy, 
and  presented  "its  gradual  introduction,  its  slow  growth  to 
its  present  form,  the  strong  opposition  which  it  encoun- 
tered, and  its  tardy  reception  among  the  great  body  of  com- 
mon Christians'^  as  conclusive  proofs  of  its  falsity.  He 
had,  naturally,  no  conception  of  a  development  of  doctrine, 
and  demanded  of  the  primitive  church  a  nineteenth-century 
philosophic  statement  of  every  doctrine  which  she  might 
legitimately  hold,  as  he  did  of  the  Scriptures  a  perfect  dog- 
matic statement  of  every  position  which  they  should  be 
permitted  to  teach.  His  exegesis  was  by  no  means  com- 
petent to  meet  such  a  scholar  as  Stuart.   Unitarianism  was 

Loc.  cii.,  p.  9. 
Ibid.,  p.  35- 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


too  clearly  the  truth,  in  his  mind,  to  admit  of  the  plodding 
and  exact  studies  of  words  and  constructions  which  was 
characteristic  of  the  new  learning  as  Stuart  managed  it. 
His  easy  treatment  of  Phil.  2:5  is  an  illustration  of  his  ex- 
egetical  defects.^^  "It  is  now  conceded  that  the  passage  is 
incorrectly  rendered.  But  Professor  Stuart,  though  he 
allows  this,  still  thinks  the  text  of  too  much  value  to  be 
given  up;  and  by  retaining  a  part  of  the  old  mistranslation 
(supposing  Lcra  to  denote  equality  instead  of  likeness)  and 
substituting  a  new  one  instead  of  that  which  is  lost  (under- 
standing fiop^ri  to  mean  being  or  nature)  he  has  contrived 
to  press  it  again  into  service."  Norton  himself  says: 
"lo-o?  is  used  sometimes  to  denote  equality,  and  some- 
times likeness.  The  reasons  which  determine  us  to  adopt 
the  latter  signification  in  the  present  passage  are  sufficiently 
obvious/'    They  are! 

We  conclude  our  review  of  Norton  with  his  brief  state- 
ment of  the  Unitarian  position  at  this  time : 

Christianity,  we  believe,  has  taught  the  Unity  of  God,  and  revealed 
him  as  the  Father  of  his  creatures.  It  has  made  known  his  infinite 
perfections,  his  providence,  and  his  moral  government.  It  has  directed 
us  to  look  up  to  him  as  the  Being  on  whom  we  and  all  things  are  en- 
tirely dependent,  and  to  look  up  to  him  with  perfect  confidence  and 
love.  It  has  made  known  to  us  that  we  are  to  live  forever;  it  has 
brought  life  and  immortality  to  light.  Man  was  a  creature  of  this 
earth,  and  it  has  raised  him  to  a  far  nobler  rank,  and  taught  him  to  re- 
gard himself  as  an  immortal  being,  and  the  child  of  God.  It  has  opened 
to  the  sinner  the  path  of  penitence  and  hope.  It  has  afforded  to  vir- 
tue the  highest  possible  sanctions.  It  gives  to  sorrow  its  best  and 
often  its  only  consolation.  It  has  presented  us,  in  the  life  of  our  great 
Master  with  an  example  of  that  moral  perfection  which  is  to  be  the 
constant  object  of  our  exertions.  It  has  established  the  truths  which 
it  teaches  upon  evidence  the  most  satisfactory.  It  is  a  most  glorious 
display  of  the  benevolence  of  God  and  of  his  care  for  his  creatures  of 
this  earth. 

Stuart  had  replied  only  to  those  portions  of  Channing's 


Ibid.,  p.  49. 


68  Ibid.,  pp.  61  f. 


304         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


sermon  which  dealt  with  the  Trinity  and  Christology. 
Unable  to  continue  the  work,  he  requested  his  colleague, 
Leonard  Woods,^^  to  review  the  remaining  topics  of  the 
sermon.  This  he  did  in  his  Letters  to  Unitarians  (1820).^^ 
We  shall  be  the  briefer  in  our  review  of  this  tract  because 
it  does  not  further  the  development  of  New  England  theol- 
ogy particularly,  since  it  is  a  defense  rather  than  a  piece 
of  constructive  work.  To  a  considerable  extent  it  is  en- 
gaged with  showing  that  many  of  the  positions  which 
Channing  had  imphed  belonged  to  the  Unitarians,  were 
equally  maintained  by  the  orthodox. 

After  some  preliminary  remarks.  Woods  therefore  be- 
gins his  reply  with  the  topic  of  the  moral  perfection  of 
God.  He  accepts,  as  Channing  had  done,  the  Hopkinsian 
theory  that  love  expresses  the  whole  moral  character  of 
God,  but  passes  immediately  to  the  moral  government  of 
God  as  growing  out  of  his  love.  God  promotes  the  hap- 
piness of  his  kingdom  by  laws,  accompanied  with  promises 
and  threats.  These  are  good,  and  so  is  their  execution. 
The  fatherhood  of  God  is  next  touched  upon,  and  necessary 
qualifications  in  the  analogy  between  divine  and  human 
paternity  drawn.  And  then  Woods  passes  over  to  the  con- 
sideration of  total  depravity,  against  which  Channing  had 
objected,  and  which  was  to  become  the  principal  subject 
of  discussion,  as  it,  indeed,  lay  at  the  foundation  of  the 
whole  controversy.  The  reply  consisted  in  defining  the 
doctrine  in  the  following  terms :  "That  men  are  by  nature 
destitute  of  holiness;  or  that  they  are  subjects  of  an  innate 
moral  depravity;  or,  in  other  words,  that  they  are  from  the 
first  inclined  to  evil,  and  that,  while  unrenewed,  their  moral 

Born  June  19,  1774;  died  August  24,  1854;  graduated  at  Harvard,  1796; 
pastor  at  Newbury,  Mass.,  179S-1808;  professor  of  Christian  theology  at  An- 
dover,  1808-46.  A  man  of  the  largest  practical  services,  in  the  founding  of 
the  seminary  and  of  numerous  benevolent  organizations,  he  vi^as  characterized 
as  a  theologian  by  moderation  and  sense,  as  well  as  by  competent  learning. 

80  I  employ  at  the  present  writing  the  reprint  in  the  Works,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  i  ff. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY  305 


affections  and  actions  are  wholly  wrong."  This  prop- 
osition he  established  by  a  long  Scripture  argument,  in 
which  his  endeavor  is  simply  to  show  that  the  depravity 
mentioned  is  a  fact.  Incidentally  he  takes  occasion  to  ex- 
press his  rejection  of  the  doctrine  of  imputation. 

It  should  be  remarked  that  Woods's  ideas  upon  the  in- 
ductive nature  of  theology  are  strongly  and  excellently  ex- 
pressed.^^ He  did  not  prevent  the  discussion,  however, 
from  passing  into  the  sphere  of  the  rational. 

Woods  then  takes  up  the  subject  of  election.  He  ad- 
mits in  the  beginning that  there  is  some  justification  from 
Channing's  objections  in  the  form  of  expression  often  em- 
ployed by  the  orthodox.  In  reply  to  his  opponent,  he 
first  considers  the  Scripture  argument  for  election,  and 
then  criticizes  certain  incorrect  views  and  representations 
of  the  doctrine,  such  as  that  election  is  "arbitrary,"  "un- 
conditional," when  it  is  meant  that  there  is  no  condition 
of  atonement  and  repentance.  The  charge  of  injustice  in 
election  is  then  strongly  refuted  by  pointing  out  that  "sal- 
vation is  in  all  instances  of  grace."  He  suggests  that 
the  reasons  for  election  are  "reasons  of  state."  He  also 
endeavors  to  justify  the  consistency  of  election  with  free 
agency  in  the  following  manner,  in  which  no  theoretical  ex- 
planation is  attempted: 

As  I  am  a  creature  of  God,  I  exist  as  I  am,  namely,  a  moral  agent, 
according  to  his  pUx  )ose.  And  if  God's  purpose,  determining  my 
existence  as  a  moral  rgent,  is  consistent  with  my  actually  existing  as 
such ;  why  may  not  his  purpose,  determining  the  exercises  of  my  moral 
agency,  be  consistent  with  the  existence  of  such  moral  exercises.  The 
following  positions,  which  I  think  conformable  to  sound  reason  and 
philosophy,  express  my  views  in  brief.  God  first  determines  that  man 
shall  be  a  moral  agerj,  and  that  in  all  the  circumstances  of  his  exist- 
ence he  shall  possess  and  exercise  all  his  moral  powers.  And  then 
God  determines  that,  in  the  perfect  exercise  of  all  his  moral  powers, 

«i  Edit,  cit.,  p.  23.  62  jtiJ.,  p.  20. 

«3  Ihid.,  pp.  39,  47.  64  Ihid.,  pp.  48  ff. 

6«  Ibid.,  p.  54. 


3o6         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


he  shall  act  in  a  certain  manner,  and  form  a  certain  character.  The 
determination  of  God,  thus  understood,  instead  of  being  inconsistent 
with  moral  agency,  does  in  fact  secure  moral  agency.  In  regard  to  this 
subject,  it  aims  at  nothing  and  tends  to  produce  nothing  but  the  unin- 
terrupted exercise  of  all  our  moral  powers.^® 

The  reply  to  the  following  points  was  less  important. 
Woods  insisted  upon  the  origin  of  the  atonement  in  the 
love  of  God,  and  hints,  while  explaining  away  certain  objec- 
tionable expressions,  at  his  own  theory  of  the  atonement, 
the  governmental.  Still,  the  immediate  connection  of  the 
love  of  God  with  every  feature  of  the  atonement  is  not 
brought  out.  The  failure  to  state  the  theory  upon  its  ideal 
side  was  the  relative  justification  of  Channing's  objections; 
but  Woods  could  not  supply  this  defect  in  his  predeces- 
sors. Divine  influence  is  then  taken  up.  The  leading  objec- 
tion of  Channing,  that  it  was  irresistible,  was  answered  by 
saying  *'that  the  Holy  Spirit  operates  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
offer  no  violence  to  any  of  the  principles  of  an  intelligent 
and  moral  nature;  that  it  always  produces  its  effects  in 
the  understanding  according  to  the  essential  properties  and 
laws  which  belong  to  the  understanding,  and  in  the  will 
and  affections  without  interfering  with  any  of  the  prop- 
erties and  laws  which  belong  to  them."  The  influence 
is  efficacious,  but  not  overpowering. 

After  some  other  topics  had  been  discussed,  the  tract  was 
brought  to  an  end  with  an  estimate  of  the  practical  in- 
fluence of  the  two  systems — an  argument  essentially  invid- 
ious and  therefore  improper  in  such  a  discussion. 

Professor  Henry  Ware,^^  who  since  his  appointment  as 
Hollis  professor  had  not  engaged  in  public  controversy, 
now  addressed  Letters  to  Trinitarians  and  Calvinists  (Cam- 

88  Loc.  cit.,  p.  58. 
Ibid.,  p.  82. 

88  Born  at  Sherburne,  Mass.,  April  i,  1764;  died  at  Cambridge,  July  12, 
1845;  graduated  at  Harvard,  1785;  pastor  at  Hingham,  1 787-1805;  professor  at 
Cambridge,  1805-45. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY  3^7 


bridge,  1820).  Upon  the  unity  of  God,  he  said  that,  al- 
though the  orthodox  professed  a  behef  in  the  Divine  Unity, 
Unitarians  held  that  orthodox  theories  rendered  it  an  im- 
possibility.^^ Stuart's  mode  of  stating  the  doctrine  reduced 
*'the  trinity  to^  a  mere  unmeaning  name,  and  were  it  not 
an  abuse  of  language  of  mischievous  tendency,  would  leave 
nothing  on  the  subject  that  need  be  thought  worth  contend- 
ing about."  Woods,  he  says,  makes  no  attempt  to  show 
the  consistency  of  the  doctrine  of  depravity  with  the  moral 
perfection  of  God,  but  simply  tries  to  show  that  it  is  a  fact, 
whereas  its  consistency  with  God's  character  is  a  part  of 
the  evidence,  whether  it  is  a  fact  or  not.  He  therefore 
charges  Woods  with  failure.  He  then  passes  to  the  natural 
character  of  man,  which,  he  declares,  is  the  main  question  at 
issue  between  the  orthodox  and  the  Unitarians.  His  own 
view  he  thus  expresses : 

Man  is  by  nature,  by  which  is  to  be  understood  as  he  is  born  into 
the  world,  as  he  comes  from  the  hands  of  the  Creator,  innocent  and 
pure;  free  from  all  moral  corruption,  as  well  as  destitute  of  aU  positive 
holiness;  and  until  he  has,  by  the  exercise  of  his  faculties,  actually 
formed  a  character  either  good  or  bad,  an  object  of  the  divine  com- 
placency and  favor.  The  complacency  and  favor  of  the  Creator  are 
expressed  in  all  the  kind  provisions  that  are  made  by  the  constitution 
of  things  for  his  improvement  and  happiness.  He  is  by  nature  no 
more  inclined  or  disposed  to  vice  than  to  virtue,  and  is  equally  capable 
in  the  ordinary  use  of  his  faculties  and  with  the  common  assistance 
afforded  him,  of  either.  He  derives  from  his  ancestors  a  frail  and 
mortal  nature ;  is  made  with  appetites  which  fit  him  for  the  condition 
of  being  in  which  God  has  placed  him;  but  in  order  for  them  to 
answer  all  the  purposes  intended,  they  are  so  strong  as  to  be  very 
liable  to  abuse  by  excess.  He  has  passions  implanted  in  him  which  are 
of  great  importance  in  the  conduct  of  life,  but  which  are  equally 
capable  of  impelling  him  into  a  wrong  or  a  right  course.  He  has 
natural  affections,  all  of  them  originally  good,  but  liable  by  a  wrong 
direction  to  be  the  occasion  of  error  and  sin.  He  has  reason  and  con- 
science to  direct  the  conduct  of  life,  and  enable  him  to  choose  aright, 
which  reason  may  yet  be  neglected  or  perverted,  and  conscience  mis- 

«°  Op.  cit.,  p.  10. 
''o  Ibid.,  p.  II. 


3o8 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


guided.  The  whole  of  these  together  make  up  what  constitutes  his 
trial  and  probation.  They  make  him  an  accountable  being,  a  proper 
subject  to  be  treated  according  as  he  shall  make  a  right  or  wrong 
choice,  being  equally  capable  of  either,  and  as  free  to  the  one  as  to  the 
other."^! 

It  subsequently  appears  that  he  beHeves  in  the  universal- 
ity of  sin,  in  the  sense  that  all  men  sin,  and  he  even  says 
that  the  "all  have  sinned"  of  Rom.  5:12  means  "all  who 
are  capable  of  sinning,  all  as  soon  as  they  are  capable  of  it, 
all  as  soon  as  they  are  moral  agents"  '^^ — which  is  just 
what  Woods  had  said.  But  he  rejects  total  depravity, 
maintaining  that  "there  is  much  of  good  as  well  as  of  evil 
in  the  human  character  and  in  the  conduct  of  man;" 
that  "as  much  as  there  is  of  wickedness  and  vice, 
there  is  far  more  of  virtue  and  goodness  ....  and  that 
even  in  the  worst  of  men  good  feelings  and  principles  are 
predominant,  and  they  probably  perform  in  the  course  of 
their  lives  many  more  good  than  bad  actions."  '^^  The 
proof  of  these  statements  is  chiefly  from  the  results  of  "ob- 
servation." With  a  short  proof  of  the  inconsistency  of  de- 
pravity with  the  character  of  God,  Ware  closes  this  part  of 
his  letters.''^^ 

Loc.  cit.,  pp.  20  f.  ^"  Ibid.,  p.  43.  ''^  Ibid.,  p.  24. 

Edward  Beecher,  in  his  Conflict  of  Ages,  a  book  devoted  to  the  problem 
of  original  sin,  particularly  to  the  origination  of  that  native  bias  to  evil  with 
which  men  are  born,  lets  fall  many  valuable  historical  and  critical  remarks.  He 
traces  the  repudiation  of  old-school  theories  in  New  England  to  the  necessity  of 
asserting  in  reference  to  the  action  of  God  "the  divine  principles  of  equity  and 
honor."  He  rightly  places  the  true  starting-point  of  Unitarianism  in  this  neces- 
sity. "The  strength  of  the  feelings  of  Unitarians  against  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity  seems  to  be  chiefly  owing  to  its  connection  with  the  orthodox  doctrine 
of  depravity"  (p.  121).  Of  the  argument  of  Channing,  quoted  above,  he  says: 
"This  statement  is  fully  justified  by  all  the  orthodox  authorities  to  whom  I 
have  referred."  Unitarianism  was  thus  simply  attempting  in  a  new  way  what  all 
the  rest  of  New  England  was  attempling  by  the  "New  England"  theology.  The 
Unitarian  explanation  was,  however,  a  complete  failure  according  to  Beecher, 
even  in  the  eyes  of  the  Unitarians  themselves  Their  scheme  was  followed  by  a 
"reaction"  which  arose  from  "facts,  from  Scripture,  and  from  Christian  con- 
sciousness" (p.  131).  Descriptions  of  the  prevalence  and  depth  of  sin  in  the 
world,  found  in  Dewey,  Norton,  and  Channing,  do  not  fall  short  in  intensity 
of  similar  passages  in  the  orthodox  writers.  As  time  went  on  the  bright  hopes 
which  the  Unitarian  leaders  had  of  great  improvement  from  the  spread  of  Uni- 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


309 


Ware,  though  thus  presenting  the  barest  Pelagianism 
himself,  had  somewhat  the  better  of  Woods  because  he  had 
indentified  Wood's  doctrine  with  that  of  the  Westmin- 
ster Confession.  This  he  had  a  perfect  right  to  do,  for 
Woods  had  signed  the  Confession  upon  entering  upon 
his  professorship;  and  more,  his  view  of  the  facts  of  hu- 
man nature  was  precisely  that  of  Westminster,  though  he 
had  already  begun  to  modify  the  underlying  philosophy  in 
connection  with  the  other  New  England  divines.  Individ- 
ual expressions,  such  as  "penal  evils"  applied  to  the  con- 
sequences among  his  descendants  of  Adam's  sin,  were  a 
sufficient  warrant  for  Ware's  method  of  conducting  the  dis- 
cussion. Woods  was  indeed  in  an  unfortunate  position, 
and  the  root  of  his  difficulty  was  that  he  still  retained  the 
old  twofold  division  of  the  mind — the  causative  nature  of 
motives,  and  the  Edw^ardean  idea  of  freedom.  He  was  not, 
therefore,  in  fact  entirely  free  from  the  supralapsarianism 
which  tinges  the  Confession,  and  had  survived  even  in 
Hopkins.    Hence  Ware  opened  the  subject  of  election  by 

tarianism  gave  rise  to  gloomy  forebodings  (p.  136).  "Sincere,  earnest,  and  inde- 
fatigable, as  were  the  efforts  of  Dr.  Channing,  the  force  of  the  radical  and  origi- 
nating causes  of  such  wide-spread  actual  human  depravity  was  deeper  and  greater 
than  his  system  would  allow  him  to  understand  and  consistently  to  believe." 
Neither  was  the  new  school  explanation  able  to  escape  a  reaction.  Its  two  views, 
of  "an  innocent  nature  so  affected  by  the  frll  of  Adam  as  always  to  lead  to  sin," 
and  the  other,  of  a  divine  efficiency  directly  producing  our  volitions,  sinful  as 
well  as  holy,  were  neither  of  them  satisfactory  to  the  cdvocates  of  depravity  or 
the  Unitarian  defenders  of  the  divine  honor.  Neither  did  it  satisfy  the  new 
school  itself,  for  they  resorted  in  their  defense  of  it  to  the  same  arguments  from 
the  inscrutability  of  the  ways  of  God,  or  else  fell  off  into  a  degradation  of  the 
idea  of  free  agency,  taking  "the  ground  that  the  moral  constitutions  of  men  are 
as  good  as  the  nature  of  free  agency  will  allow"  (p.  181). 

Beecher's  own  solution,  as  is  well  known,  was  that  men  are  not  at  birth  new- 
created  spirits,  but  have  pre-existed,  and  in  this  pre-existent  state  have  fallen 
into  sin,  and  acquired  by  their  own  acts  the  "habit  of  sin"  which  is  the  striking 
characteristic  of  the  disposition  of  man  to  evil.  They  are  sent  into  this  world 
as  a  "hospital" — that  is,  as  a  sphere  of  redemption — and  hence  as  a  great  ex- 
ample of  the  goodness  of  God.  Thus  their  tendency  to  evil  is  not  against  the 
honor  and  equity  of  God,  but  has  been  brought  upon  them  by  their  own  act,  and 
the  fact  that  they  are  in  this  world  at  all  is  a  new  proof  and  exemplification  of 
his  equity,  or  rather  of  his  more  than  equity,  his  long-suffering  love. 


3IO         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


indentifying  the  doctrine  of  Woods  with  that  of  Westmin- 
ster.   He  states  it: 

That,  without  any  foreseen  difference  of  character  and  desert  in 
men,  before  he  had  brought  them  into  being,  he  should  regard  some 
with  complacency  and  love,  and  the  rest  with  disapprobation,  and 
hatred,  and  wrath;  and,  without  any  reference  to  the  future  use  or 
abuse  of  their  nature,  should  appoint  some  to  everlasting  happiness, 
and  the  rest  to  everlasting  misery;  and  that  this  appointment,  entirely 
arbitrary,  for  which  no  reason  is  to  be  assigned,  but  his  sovereign  will, 
should  be  the  cause  and  not  the  consequence  of  the  holiness  of  the  one 
and  of  the  defect  of  holiness  of  the  otherJ^ 

He  then  brings  in  objections  which  were  as  keenly  felt 
by  the  orthodox  as  by  himself,  and  so  has  an  easy  victory 
over  his  supposed  antagonist.  But  in  all  this  he  had  not 
sharply  stated  and  thoroughly  argued  the  true  question. 
Woods  had  clearly  declared  that  he  believed  in  reasons  for 
the  electing  purpose  of  God.  Other  New  England  divines 
had  also  made  them  to  reside  in  the  wisdom  and  goodness 
of  God.  There  was  no  objection  in  any  New  Englander's 
mind  to  making  them  to  consist  partly  in  the  foreknowledge 
of  what  the  man  would  be;  only  it  must  be  the  foreknowl- 
edge of  his  natural  aptitudes,  his  probable  usefulness,  the 
certainty  that  he  would  yield  to  such  influences  as  God 
could  consistently  bring  to  bear  upon  him,  etc.  Did  God 
elect  upon  foreknowledge  of  faith?  Or  is  the  holy  influ- 
ence of  God  the  occasioning  cause  of  faith?  That  was  the 
real  question;  but  Ware  gives  it  little  attention.  In  fact, 
he  confounded  throughout  the  love  of  complacency  and 
that  of  benevolence  as  he  does  in  the  passage  just  quoted. 
No  Calvinist  ever  held  that  God  "without  any  foreseen 
difference  in  character"  regarded  some  "with  compla- 
cency." Benevolence  comes  first;  upon  it  election  is 
founded;  out  of  election  comes  the  foreknowledge  of  holy 
character;  and  then  first,  in  view  of  this  holy  character, 
comes  complacency. 

Loc.  cit.,  p.  59. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY 


It  will  not  be  necessary  to  delay  over  the  remaining  por- 
tion of  Ware's  Letters.  His  method  is  the  same  in  treat- 
ing of  the  atonement  and  of  divine  influence.  Upon  the 
atonement  he  sharply  demanded  a  new  rationale  of  the 
doctrine. 

According  to  orthodoxy  "it  was  the  same  God,  the  same  being, 
who  sent  and  was  sent,  who  made  the  atonement  and  whose  anger 
was  appeased  by  the  atonement,  who  made  satisfaction  to  offended 
justice  and  whose  justice  was  satisfied.  It  is  not  enough  to  as- 
sert that  'the  Father  and  Son  are  two  as  really  as  Moses  and 
Aaron,  though  not  in  the  same  sense,  nor  in  any  sense  inconsistent 
with  their  being  one.'  It  belongs  to  him  who  asserts  this  to  state 
intelligibly  what  is  the  nature  and  import  of  the  distinction  here  in- 
tended ;  to  explain  in  what  sense  two,  and  in  what  sense  one.  No 
man  knows  better  than  Dr.  Woods  that  until  he  has  done  this,  he  has 
done  nothing  to  the  purpose.  He  uses  words  without  meaning,  and 
merely  casts  a  mist  where  he  is  bound  to  shed  light.  "^^ 

His  own  view  may  be  condensed  in  that  statement  that 
the  efficacy  of  the  sufferings  and  death  of  Christ  consist 
''not  in  their  appeasing  the  anger  of  God  and  disposing 
him  to  be  merciful,  but  in  their  moral  influence  on  men, 
in  bringing  them  to  repentance,  holiness,  and  an  obedient 
life,  and  thus  rendering  them  fit  subjects  of  forgiveness  and 
the  divine  favor."  "^^  **The  salvation  of  the  best  men  is 
of  Grace,  not  of  debt,  what  they  cannot  demand  as  a  right, 
yet  may  claim  on  the  ground  of  the  divine  promise."  '^^  In 
this  connection  he  once  more  makes  the  yet  unanswered 
Unitarian  demand  for  a  rationale. 

It  is  admitted  that  if  the  premises  are  true,  the  conclusion  does 
follow  [that  the  sufferings  of  Christ  derived  their  worth  from  the 
dignity  of  his  divine  nature]  ;  if  Jesus  Christ  is  both  perfect  God  and 
perfect  man  in  one  individual  person,  the  defence  is  complete.  But, 
in  the  first  place,  I  remark  that  the  possibility  of  two  distinct  intelli- 
gent natures  making  but  one  person,  has  never  been  shown  to  the 
smallest  degree  of  satisfaction;  especially  of  two  natures  so  distinct 
and  distant  as  the  divine  and  human,  a  finite  and  an  infinite  mind. 

78  Ibid.,  p.  83.  "  Ihid.,  p.  97- 

78  Ibid.,  p.  106. 


312         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


....  But  this  is  not  all.  The  identity  of  person  is  not  only  shown 
to  be  impossible  upon  the  trinitarian  hypothesis.  The  only  ground 
upon  which  some  of  the  strongest  objections  to  the  trinitarian  doc- 
trine, that  part  of  it  which  consists  in  the  supreme  deity  of  Jesus 
Christ,  can  be  evaded  is  by  the  assumption  of  two  distinct  persons 

in  Jesus  Christ  "Of  this  indeed  he  was  ignorant  as  a  man, 

but  he  knew  it  as  GDd,  and  this  he  might  truly  say  he  was  unable 
to  do  as  man,  though  as  God  he  could  do  all  things."  ....  With 
these  brief  hints  I  r  n  willing  to  leave  the  reader  to  make  up  his 
judgn  ert  "hew  fjr  the  v'ews  of  the  orthodox  in  this  case  are  capable 
of  being  defended  in  a  satisfactory  manner."  '^^ 

Ware  rejected  not  only  the  doctrine  of  irresistible  grace, 
which  he  must  do  and  did  upon  the  same  principles  as  he 
urged  against  election,^^  but  also  all  special  grace  tending 
to  conversion. 

The  influence  and  agency  of  the  Spirit  of  God  is  to  be  acknowl- 
edged in  the  whole  of  that  discipline  which  is  intended  to  improve, 
exalt,  and  perfect  our  nature,  or  to  correct  any  wrong  tendencies  it 
may  have  acquired,  ar  d  restore  it  to  a  right  direction  and  its  previous 

purity  Not  a  direct  and  immediate  agency,  but  such  as  we 

see  exercised  in  everything  else  through  the  universe;  God  bringing 
about  his  ends  by  a  variety  of  means  and  employing  in  them  the  sub- 
ordinate agency  and  instrumentality  of  his  creatures.^^ 

The  Letters  close  with  a  defense  of  the  practical  influ- 
ence of  Unitarianism. 

Woods  replied  to  Ware  in  the  following  year  in  a  pam- 
phlet entitled  A  Reply,  and  incidentally  did  something  to 
help  on  the  discussion.  He  brought  out  the  fact  that  Ware 
judged  the  character  of  men  by  a  wrong  standard,^^  view- 
ing them  too  much  in  the  aspect  of  their  individual  deeds, 
as  if  these  were  to  be  considered  each  by  itself,  whereas 
men  are  subjects  of  the  moral  government  of  God,  and  the 
question  as  to  their  character  is  the  question  of  their  funda- 
mental relation  to  God's  law  and  will.  He  distinguishes 
clearly  between  the  natural  affections  and  true  moral  pur- 
pose, between  kindliness  and  holiness.    But  nothing  sub- 

''^  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  99  ff.  *°  Ibid.,  p.  120. 

Ibid.,  pp.   122,   123.  ^2  Woods'  Works,  Vol.   IV,  p.  130. 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY  313 


stantial  was  added  to  the  argument,  nor  by  the  Answer, 
Remarks,  and  Postscript,  which  were  still  to  come. 

With  these  works  the  controversy,  as  a  formal  inter- 
change of  arguments,  came  to  an  end.  There  was  a  long 
series  of  more  or  less  popular  discussions,  in  which  many 
preachers,  not  inconsiderable  theologians,  engaged.^ ^  The 
full  answer  of  New  England  theology  was  not  rendered, 
however,  till  one  more  writer,  N.  W.  Taylor,  of  New 
Haven,  had  presented  his  reply. 

Taylor  did  not  deem  Stuart's  answer  to  Channing  very 
effective,  thinking  it  quite  as  possible  for  a  theologian  to 
say  too  little  as  to  say  too  much.  He  vindicated  the  right 
of  Trinitarians  to  declare  that  they  meant  no  contradiction 
by  affirming  a  Trinity.  He  then  defined  the  Trinity  thus : 
"God  is  one  Being  in  such  a  sense  as  to  involve  three  Per- 
sons in  such  a  sense  that  by  his  tripersonality  he  is  quali- 
fied for  three  distinct,  personal,  divine  forms  of  phenom- 
enal action."  He  thus  gave  a  personality  to  each  of 
Stuart's  ''distinctions,^  yet  not  an  independent  personality. 
That  there  may  be  a  being  having  such  a  tripersonality 
Taylor  endeavors  to  show  by  considering  the  possibility  of 
Spinoza's  conception  of  the  universe  as  one  being,  with 
the  result  that  this  conception  cannot  be  declared  a  priori 
an  impossibility.    The  fundamental  error  of  the  Unitarians 

83  This  is  a  convenient  point  for  referring  to  several  books  which  ought 
not  to  be  overlooked.  Dean  Abbadie's  Trait e  de  la  divinite  de  notre  Seigneur 
(1689)  was  republished  at  Burlington  in  1802.  D.  Dana  published  in  1810  a 
sermon  on  Th£  Deity  of  Christ,  almost  wholly  biblical  in  aigument.  E.  D. 
Griffin  preached  a  series  of  Park  Street  Lectures  on  total  depravity,  regeneration, 
election,  and  perseverance  in  1813.  Thomas  Robbins  published  in  1820  a  series 
of  sermons  preached  in  East  Windsor  on  The  Divinity  of  Christ,  chiefly  exegetical. 
The  veteran  Stephen  W:Et  came  out  in  1816  with  his  Evidence  of  the  Divinity 
^f  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  Collected  from  the  Holy  Scriptures.  Wardlaw's  Dis- 
courses were  reprinted  at  Andover  in  181 5,  and  Yates's  Vindication  at  Boston 
in  1816,  to  be  followed  by  Wardlaw's  Reply  ,  also  reprinted  at  Andover  (18 17). 
These  books  were  much  read,  and  in  this  way  entered  into  the  current  of  New 
England  theology.  The  atonement  was  often  discussed,  one  of  the  best  books  upon 
the  Unitarian  side  being  Noah  Worcester's  Atoning  Sacrifice  (1829).  For  an 
excellent,  though  by  no  means  complete,  list  of  the  polemical  essays  of  this 
period,  see  the  bibliography  of  Dexter's  Congregationalism. 


314         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


consists,  he  declares,  in  their  pretending  to  be  able  to  decide 
positively  that  such  conceptions  are  impossible  a  priori. 
They  take  the  common  phenomenal  conception  of  being,  de- 
rived from  our  own  consciousness,  as  the  only  and  uni- 
versal conception;  and  then  affirm  that  it  excludes  triper- 
sonality.  When  they  reflect  upon  the  unity  of  God,  they 
declare  that  the  utter  want  of  all  evidence  from  the  unity 
of  God  for  his  tripersonality  is  decisive  proof  that  he  is  not 
tripersonal.  He  then  discusses  the  presumption  in  favor  of 
the  Trinity  from  the  work  of  Christ,  and  thus  incidentally 
touches  upon  Christology,  without,  however,  contributing 
anything  to  meet  the  repeated  demand  of  the  Unitarians 
for  a  rationale.  He  finally  discusses  the  interpretation  of  the 
Scriptures  upon  these  doctrines,  and  maintains,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  the  Unitarians  acknowledge  that  there  is  some- 
thing peculiar  in  the  language  of  the  Bible  requiring  special 
interpretation,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  older  Trini- 
tarians, in  their  doctrines  of  generation  and  procession, 
have  not  shown  that  the  modified  use  of  language  which 
they  demand  for  the  expression  of  their  position  is  de  usu 
loquendi. 

The  position  in  which  New  England  theology  was  left 
by  this  controversy  may  be  summarily  expressed  by  the 
following  heads: 

1.  The  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  itself  was  more  firmly 
than  ever  believed  to  be  grounded  in  the  teachings  of  the 
Scriptures,  though  it  had  taken  a  depotentiated  form  from 
which  it  did  not  recover  during  the  career  of  the  school. 

2.  The  divinity  of  Christ  was  established  afresh  as  a 
biblical  doctrine,  and  its  practical  effects  upon  life  and  wor- 
ship were  well  secured;  but  the  doctrine  of  his  person  was 
thrown  into  even  greater  confusion  than  it  had  previously 
been  in,  the  unity  of  his  person,  still  nominally  maintained, 


THE  UNITARIAN  CONTROVERSY  315 

being  almost  lost  in  consequence  of  the  style  of  argument 
adopted  to  maintain  his  divinity. 

3.  In  the  anthropological  portion  of  the  debate  the 
New  Englanders  had  found  themselves  greatly  hampered 
by  the  unsatisfactory  condition  of  their  theory  of  the  will. 
But  they  took  practically  the  position  that  man  is  truly 
free  and  an  uncaused  agent  in  his  own  volitions.  Thus 
maintaining  the  corruption  of  human  nature  and  the  tmi- 
versality  of  sin,  they  affirmed,  though  without  successful 
adjustment,  both  the  freedom  of  man  and  his  voluntariness 
in  all  sin,  and  the  certainty  of  his  future  sinful  actions. 
The  priority  of  grace,  and  the  foundation  of  gifts  of  grace 
in  the  divine  purpose,  they  maintained  with  as  great  con- 
stancy. 

4.  The  benevolence  of  God  in  respect  to  both  of  these 
elements — both  the  entrance  of  sin  into  the  world  with  its 
resulting  corruption  of  our  nature,  and  the  election  of 
men  with  its  consequent  "praeterition"  of  some — was  de- 
fended with  a  success  only  modified  by  the  weak  spot  in 
the  theory  of  freedom,  and  became  tenfold  stronger  as  an 
inalienable  component  of  the  system. 

5.  Something  was  done,  though  not  much  as  yet,  to  ex- 
hibit the  connection  of  the  atonement  with  the  love  of  God, 
as  its  consummate  and  necessary  expression. 


CHAPTER  XI 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY  CONCLUDED 

The  real  interest  of  the  UniversaHst  controversy  to  the 
New  England  theologians  ceased  when  the  Unitarian  move- 
ment began  to  absorb  their  attention.  The  one  was  a  move- 
ment among  the  obscure,  and  was  comparatively  unim- 
portant, since  it  attracted  to  itself  but  few;  the  other  had 
its  source  in  the  high  places  of  the  land,  seemed  about  to 
sweep  away  everything  in  its  irresistible  course,  and  dealt 
with  the  most  vital  portions  of  the  faith.  And,  further, 
Universalism  soon  became  Unitarian  in  its  theology,  and 
resistance  to  the  one  movement  was  resistance  to  the 
other.  Hence,  for  a  long  time,  little  mention  is  made  of 
the  lesser  innovation,  and  few  books  are  devoted  to  it. 

The  progress  of  Universalism  from  the  high  Calvinism 
of  Relly  to  Unitarianism  is,  however,  not  without  interest 
to  the  critical  student  of  theological  movements. 

Elhanan  Winchester,  originally  a  Baptist,  is  the  next 
great  UniversaHst  leader  after  Murray.  He  founded  his 
proof  of  Universalism  upon  orthodox  premises.  He  de- 
fended the  Trinity.^  His  statements  as  to  the  ruined  con- 
dition of  man  without  a  Redeemer  are  as  satisfactory  as 
those  of  his  opponents.  The  absolute  need  of  repentance 
to  forgiveness  was  a  foundation  stone  of  his  system.  None 
could  be  forgiven  who  did  not  repent.  But  his  funda- 
mental idea  was  that  all  will  finally  repent — some  before 
death,  in  which  case  they  will  be  received  immediately  to 
glory;  others  during  the  intermediate  state  before  the  judg- 
ment; but  finally,  under  the  long  and  serious  discipline  of 
the  ''aionian"  punishment,  all  who  may  have  remained  in- 

1  The  Divinity  of  Christ  Prove'^  from  the  Scriptures  (undated). 

316 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY  317 


corrigible  by  the  means  that  have  been  used  for  their 

recoivery  before. 

He  justifies  the  belief  that  the  punishment  of  the  ages 

after  the  judgment  will  issue  in  the  repentance  of  all  souls, 

upon  the  following  grounds : 

Punishment  to  a  certain  degree  inflames  and  enrages  in  a  most 
amazing  manner;  but  continued  longer  and  heavier,  produces  a  con- 
trary effect — softens,  humbles,  and  subdues  Some  sins  are  so 

daring  and  presumptuous  as  to  provoke  God  to  threaten  that  they  shall 
not  be  purged  away  in  this  life;  and  perhaps  their  malignancy  may 
be  so  great  that  nothing  that  can  be  used  here  is  able  to  subdue 

them  Thus  punishments  are  designed  for  the  humbling  of  the 

proud :  but  if  they  fail  of  answering  that  purpose  as  administered  in 
the  present  state,  they  will  be  continued  and  increased  in  future 
periods  to  such  a  degree  as  shall  bring  all  down  in  due  time.^ 

Winchester  received,  however,  comparatively  little  atten- 
tion from  the  New  England  divines.  He  was  too  soon 
superseded  by  Hosea  Ballou,  who,  first  publishing  in  1804, 
had  speedily  gained  the  highest  influence  among  his  denom- 
ination and  effected  its  transfer  from  the  Trinitarian  to  the 
Unitarian  basis.  On  account  of  his  determinative  in- 
fluence, he  deserves  a  fuller  consideration.^ 

The  book  in  which  the  revolutionary  change  wrought  by 
Ballou  was  effected  was  his  treatise  on  the  atonement.  We 
shall  restrict  ourselves  at  this  time  to  a  sketch  of  this 
work.^ 

Ballou's  decisive,  and  among  the  Universalists  epoch- 
making,  work  sought  to  go  to  the  foundation  of  the  sub- 
ject. Its  title  intimates  as  much  as  this;  for,  though  it  was 
intended  as  a  means  of  propagating  the  Uriversalist  faith, 
and  had  its  sufficient  raison  d'etre  therein,  it  dealt  pro- 

2  Dialogues,  p.  i8o. 

^  The  remaining  portions  of  this  chapter  first  appeared  in  the  Bibliotheca 
Sacra  for  October,  1888,  and  January,  1889. 

*  The  edition  before  us  is  that  of  Dr.  Miner.  The  title  run«:  A  Treatise 
on  Atonement,  by  Hosea  Ballou;  with  an  Introduction  by  A.  A.  Miner.  (Fourth 
edition,  Boston,  1882.) 


3i8         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


fessedly  with  the  atonement.  It  purposed  to  root  out  all 
the  old  theories  and  doctrines  which  were  the  foundation 
of  the  orthodox  scheme,  and  thus  lead  to  the  positions 
where  Universalism  was  the  only  consistent  conclusion.  It 
is  a  system  of  doctrine  culminating  in  Universalism.  It  is 
divided  into  three  parts,  which  deal  respectively  with  sin, 
atonement,  and  the  consequences  of  atonement.  In  gen- 
eral, the  argument  is  straightforward,  does  not  inten- 
tionally beg  the  question  or  misrepresent  opponents,  and 
seeks  to  remove  objections  before  they  shall  occur,  rather 
than  answer  them  when  they  are  forced  upon  the  writer. 
Still,  the  limitations  of  Mr.  Ballou's  mind  in  the  depart- 
ment of  metaphysical  and  exact  thinking  are  often  very 
manifest. 

The  definition  of  sin  with  which  he  begins  is  this :  "Sin 
is  the  violation  of  a  law  which  exists  in  the  mind,  which  law 
is  the  imperfect  knowledge  men  have  of  moral  good."^ 
The  ''legislature"  which  prescribed  the  law  to  all  moral 
beings  is  ''the  capacity  to  understand."  Since  this  is  finite, 
"sin  in  its  nature  ought  to  be  considered  finite  and  limited, 
rather  than  infinite  and  unlimited,  as  has  by  many  been 
supposed."  ^  To  the  proof  of  the  proposition  that  sin  is  a 
finite  evil  Ballou  devotes  considerable  space.  He  thus  de- 
signed to  meet  squarely  one  of  the  strong  positions  of  his 
opponents.  He  directly  opposes  Edwards'  arguments  in 
fact,  though  he  does  not  mention  him  by  name  when  he 
sets  up  against  the  idea  of  obligation  measured  by  the 
being  to  whom  it  is  due — viz.,  God — this  idea  of  a  finite 
"legislature,"  the  mind  of  man.  How  important  he  deemed 
this  point  may  be  seen  by  the  frequency  with  which  he  re- 
turns to  the  topic.    And  yet  he  did  not  thereby  rise  to  the 


^  Loc.  cit.,  p.  41. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  39. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  40.    Cf.  Bibliotheca  Sacra,  Vol.  XLIII,  pp.  8,  9. 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY  319 

height  which  the  New  England  divines  had  themselves 

already  attained. 

But  certain  of  Ballou's  fundamental  assumptions  appear 

also  in  these  opening  pages.    He  says : 

Now  to  reason  justly,  we  must  conclude  that,  if  God  possess  in- 
finite wisdom,  he  could  never  intend  anything  to  take  place  or  be, 
that  will  not  take  place  or  be;  nor  that  which  is  or  will  be,  not  to  be 
at  the  time  when  it  is.  And  it  must  be  considered  erroneous  to  sup- 
pose that  the  Allwise  ever  desired  anything  to  take  place  which  by 
his  wisdom  he  knew  would  not;  as  such  a  supposition  must  in  effect 
suppose  a  degree  of  misery  in  the  eternal  mind  equal  to  the  strength 
of  his  fruitless  desire !  ^ 

The  root  of  this  conception,  as  we  shall  see,  is  a  denial  of 
all  true  freedom  on  the  part  of  man,  which  makes  God's 
will  all  in  all,  and  leads  to  the  express  denial  of  those  dis- 
tinctions between  the  secret  and  revealed  will  of  God  which 
are  introduced  into  Calvinistic  systems  to  save  human  re- 
sponsibility.^ 

By  a  strange  coincidence,  ideas  also  appear  here  as  to 
the  nature  of  evil  which  agree  in  form  of  expression  strik- 
ingly with  Samuel  Hopkins.  Ballou  says :  ''If  by  the  real 
evil  be  meant  something  that  ought  not  to  be  in  respect  to 
all  the  consequences  which  attend  it,  I  cannot  admit  of  its 
existence."  He  also'  maintains  that  ''the  consequences  of 
an  act  do  not  determine  whether  the  act  be  good  or  evil." 

Passing  now  from  the  nature  of  sin  to  its  origm,  Mr. 
Ballou  refers  the  entire  theory  of  the  fall  to  the  "chi- 
merical story  of  the  bard  Milton."  Viewing  the  whole  as 
an  attempted  explanation  of  the  introduction  of  sin  into  the 
universe,  Ballou  propounds  the  crucial  difficulty  in  saying 
that  it  does  not  account  for  the  case  of  Satan  himself. 

Was  not  the  angel  holy  in  every  faculty?  Was  not  the  command 
for  him  to  worship  the  Son  holy  and  just?  All  answer.  Yes.  Then 
from  such  causes,  how  was  sin  produced?  The  reader  will  easily 
see,  the  question  cannot  be  answered. ^2 

»  Ibid.,  p.  41.  »  E.g.,  ibid.,  p.  250.  i»  Ibid.,  p.  48. 

11  Ibid.,  pp.  44-48.  12  p.  53. 


320 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Our  author's  own  solution  of  .le  problem  is  as  follows: 
God  had  a  design  in  making  us,  the  whole  of  which  "must 
be  carried  into  effect  and  nothing  more,  admitting  him  to  be 
an  infinite  person."  Sin  is  therefore  in  the  plan  of  God. 
To  arrive  at  a  satisfactory  account  of  the  entrance  of  evil 
into  the  world,  we  must  begin  with  natural  evil.  This  is  a 
natural  result  of  our  physical  organization.  In  the  combi- 
nation of  the  various  elemeuLS  entering  intO'  the  composi- 
tion of  our  bodies,  there  is  provision  for  the  rise  of  rll  man- 
ner of  disorders.  Tne  same  feature  is  found  in  our  senses, 
which  are  at  the  same  time  the  "origin  of  our  thoughts  and 
volitions."  Hence  physical  evil  is  the  source  of  moral  evil. 
"Want  unsatisfied  is  an  evil ;  and  unsatisfied  want  is  the  first 
movement  to  action  or  volition."  Let  now  the  element  of 
confusion  enter  into  our  desires,  and  the  introduction  of 
sin  is  explained.  "From  our  natural  constitution,  com- 
posed of  our  bodily  elements,  we  are  led  to  act  in  obedience 
to  carnal  appetites,  which  justifies  the  conclusion  that  sin  is 
the  work  of  the  flesh."  This  language,  derived  from  an 
earlier  edition,  conveys  the  thoughts  of  the  later  one  before 
us  in  simpler  form.  Ballou  subsequently  clothed  his  theory 
in  an  expository  form,  but  without  much  gain  in  clear- 
ness.^^ 

But,  says  the  objector,  this  is  to  make  God  the  author  of 
sin.  No,  says  Mr.  Ballou,  it  is  to  make  God  the  author  of 
that  which  is  in  a  limited  sense  sin.^^ 

In  this  connection  comes  in  the  discussion  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  will.  As  Mr.  Ballou's  great  doctrinal  argument 
for  universal  salvation  is  that  the  plans  of  God  will  cer- 
tainly be  carried  out,  he  is  compelled  from  his  standpoint 
to  remove  the  objection  that  the  will  of  man  may  inter- 
pose to  persist  in  sin.    He  does  it  by  denying  that  the  will 

I'P.  57.  '*Pp-  57-63. 

i»  Ibid.,  pp.  64  ff. 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY  321 


has  freedom.  "In  order  for  a  choice  to  take  place,  the 
mind  must  have  the  perception  of  two  or  more  objects;  and 
that  object  which  has  the  most  influence  on  the  judgment 
and  passions  will  be  the  chosen  object;  and  choice  in  this 
instance  has  not  even  the  shadow  of  liberty."  Other  ex- 
pressions which  he  employs  show  that  Mr.  Ballou  believes 
in  strict  determinism.^^ 

In  treating  of  the  consequences  of  sin,  our  writer  rejects 
the  doctrine  that  they  are  spiritual,  temporal,  and  eternal 
death.  Temporal  death  is  incidental  to  our  constitution, 
since  we  are  by  nature  mortal.  As  for  eternal  death,  the 
whole  discussion  pertains  to  this;  but  Mr.  Ballou  puts  in  a 
disclaimer  here,  that  the  effects  of  sin  are  limited  to  the 
state  in  which  they  are  committed.^  ^ 

In  treating  the  subject  of  the  atonement,  to  which  he 
now  comes,  Mr.  Ballou  transgresses  the  proprieties  of  a 
sober  discussion  by  the  bitterness  of  his  expressions  against 
orthodox  theories.  Or,  waiving  this,  he  shows  too  little 
sympathy  for,  or  understanding  of,  what  his  opponents 
meant  to  say,  to  inspire  us  with  much  confidence  that  he 
will  contribute  to  the  theme.^^  We  shall  not  delay  upon  his 
criticisms  of  other  theories,  but  shall  content  ourselves  with 
reproducing  Ballou's  own.  It  is  substantially  as  follows: 
Jesus  Christ  was  not  God.  To  suppose  this  is  to  involve 
one's  self  in  inextricable  difficulties.  "To  say  of  two  per- 
sons, exactly  of  the  same  age,  that  one  of  them  is  a  real  son 
of  the  other,  is  to  confound  good  sense."  "If  the  Godhead 
consists  of  three  distinct  persons,  and  each  of  these  persons 
be  infinite,  the  whole  Godhead  amounts  to  the  amazing 
sum  of  infinity  multiplied  by  three."  It  will  be  noted 
that  it  is  necessary  thus  to  diminish  the  dignity  of  Christ 

Ibid.,  pp.  65,  66,  71,  especially  95  ff.     See  also  Select  Sermons  (Boston, 
1832),  pp.  306  f¥. 

17   Ibid.,     p.  ^8  IJyid.^     pp.      103  ff. 

i»  Ibid.,  p.  134. 


322  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


to  establish  the  view  of  atonement  which  is  to  follow.  The 
dissatisfied  party  needing  reconciliation  is  man,  not  God.^^ 
The  sin  of  Eden  produced  two  errors  in  Adam's  mind, 
which  have  remained  in  the  mind  of  man  ever  since:  (a) 
He  believed  God  to  be  his  enemy,  (b)  He  believed  that  he 
could  reconcile  his  Maker  by  works  which  he  could  him- 
self do.  But,  on  the  contrary,  God  loved  Adam  after  his 
sin  as  much  as  before.  He  did  not  regard  himself  as  the 
injured  party,  for  the  only  party  injured  by  the  sin  of  man 
was  man  himself.  His  love  for  his  Creator  was  interrupted, 
and  his  views  of  him  were  corrupted.  The  atonement 
was  necessary  to  renew  man's  love  to  God.  God  himself 
sought  to  effect  this,  and  so  the  atonement  did  not  produce 
love  in  God  toward  man,  but  was  the  result  of  that  uninter- 
rupted love.  And  so  the  atonement  consists  in  manifesting 
God's  love  to  us,  and  so  in  causing  us  to  love  him.  The 
temporal  death  and  the  literal  blood  of  Christ  did  not  make 
the  atonement.  Apparently  Mr.  Ballou  did  not  have  any 
clear  place  for  the  death  of  Christ  in  his  system.^^ 

Incidentally  the  writer  has  introduced  a  discussion  at 
this  point  of  endless  punishment  as  the  penalty  of  the  law.^^ 
It  is  not  necessary  (a)  to  maintain  the  law  and  secure  the 
government  of  God,  since  he  is  almighty;  nor  (b)  to  re- 
claim the  delinquent,  for  of  course  it  is  especially  calculated 
not  to  reclaim  him,  since  it  is  endless;  nor  (c)  is  it  neces- 
sary to  deter  others  from  crime,  for  through  the  sin  of 
Adam  the  entire  race  would  be  involved  in  endless  pun- 
ishment, and  there  w^ould  be  no  one  to  deter.  And  (d) 
endless  punishment  involves  endless  sin;  but  to  inflict  end- 
less sin  is  against  the  law  which  requires  endless  holiness. 

We  now  enter  upon  the  closing  portion  of  the  work,  the 
most  important  from  the  author's  point  of  view — the  con- 

20  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  140  ff.  21  cf_  i}jid.,  pp.  167,  233. 

^~  Ibid.,  p.  126. 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY  323 

sequences  of  the  atonement  to  mankind.  These  are,  in 
general,  the  universal  holiness  and  happiness  of  the  race. 

This  statement  has  no  sooner  been  made  than  the  influ- 
ences of  Mr.  Ballou's  surroundings  become  evident  in  his 
pausing  to  discuss  the  supposition  that  eternal  punishment 
is  necessary  to  the  greatest  final  amount  of  happiness.  The 
speculations  of  the  Hopkinsians  were  before  his  mind  here, 
though  the  statements  which  Mr.  Ballou  makes  of  their 
positions  are  very  objectionable.  His  great  answer  is  de- 
rived from  the  conception  that  what  is  meant  by  these  rea- 
soners  is  that  pain  is  an  object  oi  enjoyment  in  and  of  itself. 
We  may  therefore  pass,  without  stopping  on  this  topic,  to 
the  positive  arguments  which  Mr.  Ballou  now  begins  to 
propose  for  universal  salvation. 

Certain  objections  are  first  noticed.^ ^  That  derived 
from  Rev.  14:10,  11,  he  answers  by  referring  to  the  present 
time  as  the  period  of  punishment.  But  it  is  objected  that 
millions  go  out  of  this  world  unreconciled,  and  therefore 
shall  remain  so  to  all  eternity.  But,  says  Ballou,  this  im- 
plies that  there  will  be  no  change  after  death,  and,  if  this 
is  so,  saints  will  not  increase  in  holiness,  which  is  too 
absurd  to  need  refutation.  The  answer  to  the  objection 
from  moral  agency  consists  in  repeating  the  denial  of  the 
freedom  of  the  will.^^  Or,  on  the  ground  of  the  objector, 
which  Ballou  always  tries  to  take,  it  gives  men  an  oppor- 
tunity of  repentance  and  salvation,  and  thus  is  no  obstacle 
to  universal  salvation.  Again,  the  word  "everlasting"  does 
not  mean  endless.  If  the  "day  of  judgment"  of  the  Scrip- 
tures be  an  objection  to  universal  salvation,  the  proper  un- 
derstanding, according  to  Mr.  Ballou,  substantiated  by  a 
long  exegetical  discussion,  is  that  the  "coming  of  the  Lord," 
and  the  'Vlay  of  judgment"  were  accomplished  by  the  de- 

Ibid.,  pp.  187  ff.;  formally  from  p.  193, 
3*  Ibid.,  p.  190, 


324 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


struction  of  Jerusalem.^^  The  account  of  Dives  and  Lazarus 
is  not  literal.  In  Matt  12:31,  32  (neither  in  this  world 
nor  in  that  which  is  to  come),  "world"  means  dispensation; 
"this"  world,  the  legal  priestly  dispensation;  and  "that 
which  is  to  come,"  the  gospel.-^  And,  finally,  Mr.  Ballou 
thinks  that  endless  misery  demands  a  principle  to  support 
such  misery,  in  the  divine  nature. 

The  treatise  closes  with  the  reasons  for  believing  in  uni- 
versal salvation,  and  with  them  our  review  shall  close. 
They  open  with  the  argument  from  the  goodness  of  God, 
with  which  we  are  already  familiar.  Further  arguments 
are:-^  (a)  There  is  an  immortal  desire  in  every  soul  for 
future  existence  and  happiness.  "Why  should  the  Al- 
mighty implant  this  desire  in  us  if  he  never  intended  to 
satisfy  it?"  (b)  All  wise,  good,  and  exemplary  men  wish 
for  the  truth  of  the  doctrine.  "If  it  be  God's  spirit  in  us 
which  causes  us  to  pray  for  the  destruction  of  sin,  is  it 
reasonable  to  say  that  this  same  spirit  has  determined  that 
sin  shall  always  exist?"  (c)  If  any  of  the  human  race  are 
endlessly  miserable,  the  whole  must  be,  provided  they  know 
it,  on  the  principle  of  sympathy,  (d)  The  world  is  a  place 
of  education.  Sin  is  a  mistake,  and  is  it  conceivable  that 
men  should  never  find  this  out,  unless  the  school  is  to  be  a 
failure?  (e)  Mankind  in  their  moral  existence  originated 
in  God.  They  must  finally  be  assimilated  with  the  fountain 
from  which  they  sprang.  (/)  Finally,  the  Scripture  proof. 
This  is  to  be  of  the  plainest  sort.  "I  am  determined  to 
admit  no  Scripture  as  evidence  in  this  case  that  needs  any 
interpretation  to  cause  it  to  mean  what  I  wish  to  prove: 
therefore  I  shall  produce  but  a  small  part  of  the  Scriptures 
which  I  conceive  have  a  direct  meaning  in  favor  of  Univer- 
salism."   We  are  relieved  by  this  fact  from  the  necessity  of 


25  Loc.  cit.,  p.  224. 
27  Ibid.,  p.  227. 


Ibid.,  p.  225. 
28  Ibid.,  pp.  229  ff. 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY 


entering  into  the  discussion  of  the  separate  passages.  The 
most  obvious  meaning  which  will  tell  in  favor  of  the  doc- 
trine of  Universalism  is  the  one  which  Mr.  Ballou  has  in 
mind.  We  therefore  append  a  list  of  the  passages  and  leave 
the  reader  tO'  make  the  examination  for  himself.^^ 

It  may  be  said  that  in  a  large  degree  the  Universalism 
of  Ballou  was  a  reply  to  itself.  Not  many  books  were  writ- 
ten especially  against  Ballou,  and  the  reason  is  not  far  to 
seek.  So  long  as  the  Universalist  movement  was  favored 
by  leading  men  like  Chauncy,  who  in  general  maintained 
their  reputation  for  orthodoxy  and  their  position  in  the 
churches,  or  appeared  unexpectedly  among  obscurer  men 
like  Huntington,  whose  defection  was  not  known  till  re- 
vealed by  a  posthumous  publication,  it  alarmed  the  ortho- 
dox and  earnest  men  who  formulated  the  New  England 
theology,  for  the  safety  of  their  churches  and  the  truth. 
But  when  it  became  identified  with  Unitarianism,  and  that 
at  the  moment  when  the  large  prevalence  of  the  Unitarian 
movement  was  being  revealed,  in  181 5,  by  the  publication  of 
the  Belsham  letters,  it  was  no  longer  an  object  of  special 
apprehension.  What  answered  the  one  movement  an- 
swered the  other.  The  churches  were  coming  gradually 
into  the  right  position  as  to  the  Unitarian  movement,  and 
they  might  be  safely  left  to  reject  a  Unitarian  Universalism. 
It  is  evident  from  contemporaneous  accounts  that  the  vul- 
garity of  many  Universalist  ministers  and  of  much  of  the 

2^  These  occur  upon  pp.  240  ff.  They  are:  Acts  3:20,  21;  Col.  1:20;  Eph. 
1:10;  Gen.  12:3;  49:10;  Ps.  72:11;  37:10;  22\2T,  2:7,  8;  Col.  1:19;  Isa.  25:6,  7, 
8;  I  Cor.  15:54;  Rev.  21:4;  Jer.  33:20;  Ezek.  17:22-24;  I  Tim.  2:4;  Eph.  i:ii. 
Especially  I  Cor.,  chap.  15;  Rev.  5:11,  12,  13,  14;  John  5:22,  23;  Isa.  45:22-25; 
Rom.  8:22,  23;  II  Cor.  5:14. 

Ballou,  in  a  sermon  entitled  "Commendation  and  Reproof  of  Unitarians" 
(Select  Sermons  [Boston,  i860],  p.  321),  declared  that  the  Unitarians  were 
Universalists  and  yet  would  not  confess  it.  In  the  Spirit  of  the  Pilgrims  for 
1830  (p.  205)  is  a  review  of  this  sermon,  the  object  of  which  is  to  show  that 
Mr.  Ballou's  declaration  is  correct.  It  was  not  long  after  this,  perhaps  in 
consequence  of  it,  that  the  Unitarians  came  boldly  out  upon  the  side  of 
restorationism. 


326 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Universalist  preaching  excited  disgust,  and  assisted  in  nulli- 
fying their  influence.^^  Ballou  himself  receded  more  and 
more  from  reason  and  common-sense,  and  hence  removed 
more  and  more  all  necessity  for  special  efforts  against  him. 
In  1817  he  ''becam_e  entirely  satisfied  that  the  Scriptures 
begin  and  end  the  history  of  sin  in  flesh  and  blood ;  and  that 
beyond  this  mortal  existence,  the  Bible  teaches  no  other 
sentient  state  but  that  which  is  called  by  the  blessed  name  of 
life  and  immortality."^^  The  doctrine  of  no  future  pun- 
ishment whatever  was  so  manifestly  contrary  to  the  Bible, 
as  well  as  to  the  teachings  of  former  leaders  among  the 
Universalists  themselves,  that  it  needed  no  reply  until  it 
was  presented  under  a  professedly  exegetical  form.  This 
was  soon  given  to  it,  but  not  by  .Ballou.  The  honor,  if  it  be 
such,  of  supplying  this  place  in  the  Universalists'  argument, 
and  of  presenting  their  theory  with  learned  apparatus  and 
in  a  series  of  volumes,  belongs  tO'  Walter  Balfour. 

^1  See,  for  example,  the  testimony  of  Matthew  Hale  Smith  in  his  instruc- 
tive book,  Universalism  Examined,  Renounced,  and  Exposed  (Boston,  1844). 

^2  See  Eddy,  op.  cit..  Vol.  II,  p.  265,  where  a  sketch  of  the  progress  of 
Ballou's  opinions  may  be  found. 

3^  Ballou  preached  much  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  and  received 
transient  attention  from  the  local  ministry.  Of  such  a  character  was  the 
amusing  episode  at  West  Rutland,  when  Lemuel  Haynes,  the  minister  of 
the  church,  replied  to  Ballou  at  the  close  of  the  latter's  sermon.  Dr.  Eddy 
has  not  quite  apprehended  the  circumstances  of  the  case  in  his  account 
(Vol.  II,  p.  no).  The  church  was  Mr.  Haynes's  own.  He  had  been  intend- 
ing to  be  absent  on  a  pastoral  expedition  to  another  part  of  the  parish,  but 
remained  to  please  the  people.  After  the  sermon,  as  he  had  been  urged  to 
speak  by  Mr.  Ballou,  who  was  fond  of  controversy,  like  all  Universalist  min- 
isters of  that  day,  Haynes  arose  and  delivered  a  discourse  upon  the  first 
Universalist  preacher,  from  Gen.  3:4.  It  was  satirical,  and  offended  Mr. 
Ballou  deeply;  but  Mr.  Haynes  intended  doubtless  to  say  to  his  people,  as 
forcibly  as  possible,  that  he  deemed  the  doctrine  of  Mr.  Ballou  hazardous 
to  their  souls.  As  their  pastor  such  was  his  duty.  He  knew  best  how  to  reach 
them  and  counteract  the  effect  of  what  they  had  just  heard;  and  the  fact  that 
he  carried  them  with  him  is  the  best  proof  that  his  judgment  was  correct. 
Though  Dr.  Eddy  calls  it  "low-witted,"  the  Panoplist  said  that  its  satire  "was 
managed  with  Christian  sobriety."  The  whole  affair  and  the  subsequent  con- 
troversy of  Haynes  with  Ballou  may  be  examined  in  the  pages  of  Dr.  Cooley's 
Sketches  of  the  Life  and  Character  of  the  Rev.  Lemuel  Haynes,  A.  M.  (New 
York,  1839). 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY  327 


Balfour's  first  work  was  his  Inquiry,  published  in  1824.^* 
As  we  learn  from  the  preface  of  the  third  edition, the 
author's  attention  was  directed  in  this  work  exclusively 
to  the  endless  duration  of  future  punishment,  since  he  was 
not  then  prepared  to  deny  limited  future  punishment.  His 
object  was  to  investigate  the  supposition  "that  a  place  called 
Hell  in  a  future  state  is  prepared  for  the  punishment  of 
the  wicked."       He  says  that 

all  the  principal  writers  on  both  sides  of  this  question  proceed  on  this 
ground  that  there  is  a  place  of  future  punishment  and  that  the 
name  of  it  is  Hell,  Winchester,  Murray,  Chauncy,  Huntington,  and 
others  all  admit  that  Hell  is  a  place  of  future  punishment.  Edwards, 
Strong,  and  others  who  oppose  them,  had  no  occasion  to  prove  this, 
but  only  to  show  that  it  was  to  be  endless  in  its  duration. 

The  place  Balfour  occupies  in  the  discussion  is  thus  de- 
fined by  himself.  He  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is 
no  place  of  eternal  punishment. 

Balfour  first  takes  up  the  word  "Sheol."  Following  the 
lead  of  a  certain  Dr.  Campbell,  he  brings  out  by  various 
quotations  and  discussions  the  fact  that  Sheol  properly  sig- 
nifies the  state  of  the  dead,  or  the  place  of  the  departed. 
Hence,  the  argument  is,  it  never  signifies  the  place  of  pun- 
ishment. Even  Ps.  9:17  ("The  wicked  shall  be  turned  into 
hell  and  all  the  nations  that  forget  God")  is  thus  explained. 
"The  Psalm  in  which  the  words  stand  is  treating  of  God's 
temporal  judgments  upon  the  heathen  nations."  He  con- 
tinues :  "Surely,  no  one  who  has  attended  to  all  the  above 
texts  in  which  Sheol  occurs,  can  continue  to^  believe  that 

Sheol  here  has  such  a  meaning  It  is  the  same  hell  in 

which  the  Savior's  soul  was  not  left,"  etc.    In  conclusion 

An  Inquiry  into  the  Scriptural  Import  of  the  Words  Sheol,  Hades, 
Tartarus,  and  Gehenna,  all  translated  Hell  in  the  common  English  Version 
(Charleston,  1824;  large  8vo,  448  pages).  It  was  issued  in  several  subsequent 
editions. 

3^  Boston,  1832,  p.  V. 

2®  First  edition  (from  which  all  subsequent  quotations  are  made),  p.  v. 
^'^  Ibid.,  p.  24. 


328         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


he  affirms  that  the  Old  Testament  writers  and  Christians 
of  this  day  are  "hardly  agreed  in  a  single  idea  about  hell." 
He  then  takes  up  the  word  "Hades."  The  reasoning  and 
conclusion  are  the  same.  The  account  of  Dives  in  Luke  is 
a  parable.  Whatever  Hades  is,  it  shall  finally  be  destroyed. 
Tartarus,  a  portion  of  Hades,  shall  share  its  fate,  and  hence 
none  of  these  terms  denote  the  place  of  endless  punishment. 
In  fact,  Balfour  suggests  very  strongly  that  the  idea  of  Tar- 
tarus was  imported  into  Christianity  by  heathen  converts 
from  the  Greek  religions. 

To  this  point  the  difficulties  in  Balfour's  way  have  been 
comparatively  slight.  He  puts  forth  greater  exertions  in 
overcoming  the  force  of  the  word  "Gehenna,"  but  arrives 
successfully  at  the  same  goal.  He  objects  strongly  to  the 
transfer  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  from  "the  valley  of 
Hinnom"  to  "hell."  The  Old  Testament,  he  thinks,  makes 
it  an  emblem  of  the  "future  temporal  punishment  to  the 
Jews  as  a  nation."  This  interpretation  he  derives  from 
Jer.,  chap.  19,  and  7:29  to  end.  With  this  clue  he  comes  to 
the  New  Testament  and  interprets  all  such  passages  as 
Matt.  23  :33  ("Ye  generation  of  vipers,  how  shall  ye  escape 
the  damnrtion  of  hell?")  of  the  temporal  calamities  con- 
nected with  the  fall  of  Jerusalem.^*^  A  long  and  labored 
distinction  between  the  Greek  terms  irvxv  and  Trvevfia  led 
to  the  conclusion  that  even  if  Gehenna  should  be  a  place  of 
future  punishment,  the  spirit  never  enters  it,  and  this  dis- 
covery prepared  the  way  for  his  later  essays  upon  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul. 

Balfour's  general  conclusion  to  his  first  inquiry  is  there- 
fore that  there  is  no  word  used  in  the  Bible  to  designate  the 
place  of  endless  future  punishment,  and  hence  that  there  is 
no  such  punishment.  The  work  made  the  greatest  possible 


38  Loc.  cit.,  p.  88. 
*0  7bicf.,  p.  134. 


Ibid.,  p.  no. 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY  329 


impression  upon  the  Universalists.  They  had  had  hitherto 
only  comparatively  uneducated  men  who  had  been  able  to 
appeal  only  to  the  English  Bible  in  substantiation  of  their 
position;  but  here  was  a  scholar  who  freely  handled  the 
original  tongues  of  the  Scriptures.  The  popularity  of  his 
writings  was  so  great  that  Balfour  issued  in  1826  a  second 
Inqiiiry,^'^  in  which  he  arrived  at  the  similar  result,  that 
there  is  no  really  existent  devil,  and  that  the  opinion  that 
he  exists  is  derived  from  heathenism.  The  last  154  pagch 
of  the  book  are  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  the  terms  olim 
[for  olam\,  aion,  and  aionios.  Into  the  details  of  this  argu- 
ment we  cannot  follow  him.  Enough  to  say  that  the  argu- 
mentation is  in  principle  that,  because  these  words  do  not 
always  mean  strictly  "everlasting,"  it  can  never  be  suc- 
cessfully maintained  that  they  do  in  respect  to  future  pun- 
ishment. Notions  derived  from  the  investigation  as  to 
Gehenna  reappear,  and  numerous  cases  of  ^'everlasting  pun- 
ishment" are  referred  tO'  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem.^^  A 
substantial  summary  of  his  position  is  made  in  the  follow- 
ing passage: 

I  conceive  that  ail  the  everlastings  of  which  the  Scriptures  speak 
stand  in  some  shape  or  other  connected  with  God's  dispensation  of 
love  and  mercy  to  man  through  Jesus  Christ.  The  ages  or  everlastings 
began  with  him,  and  shall  temiinate  when  Christ  hath  subdued  all 
things,  and  the  last  enemy  death  is  destroyed.  Hence  the  state  after 
this  does  not  appear  to  me  to  be  described  in  Scriptures  by  the  ex- 
pression "everlasting  life,"  but  by  other  words  and  phrases.  For  ex- 
ample— the  dead  are  said  to  put  on  incorruption  or  immortality.  Mor- 

*^  We  have  before  us  only  the  second  edition:  An  Inquiry  into  the 
Scriptural  Doctrine  concerning  the  Devil  and  Satan,  and  into  the  Extent  of 
Duration  expressed  hy  the  terms  olim,  aion,  aionios,  rendered  everlasting^ 
forever,  etc.,  in  the  common  version,  and  especially  when  applied  to  pun- 
ishment, etc.    (Charlestown,  1827;  8vo,  359  pages.) 

The  witty  Parsons  Cooke,  in  his  Modern  Universalism  Exposed,  took 
the  pains  to  count  up  the  discourses  of  our  Lord  which  are  recorded  in  the 
Gospel  of  Matthew  and  refer  to  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem  according  to 
Balfour,  and  found  that  they  exceeded  by  one  chapter  his  entire  preaching  upon 
all  other  subjects.  Cooke  suggested  that  the  name  of  the  New  Testament  should 
be  changed  to  "The  Destruction  of  Jerusalem  Foretold"  as  more  appropriate  to 
its  contents. 


330         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


tality  is  then  said  to  be  swallowed  up  of  life.  They  cannot  die  any 
more,  but  are  equal  unto  the  angels,  being  sons  of  the  resurrection, 
their  inheritance  is  incorruptible,  and  fadeth  not  away,  and  they  are 
to  be  forever  (pantote)  with  the  Lord.*^ 

The  last  sentence  of  this  extract  suggests  the  final  con- 
tribution of  Balfour  to  his  system,  which  was  made  in  1828 
in  his  Three  Essays.^'^  Here  he  promulgated  the  doctrine 
that  the  souls  of  men  are  not  immortal;  that  the  spirit  re- 
turns unto  God  who  gave  it,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  laid  up 
with  Christ  in  God,  unconscious,  to  be  restored  to  man  in 
the  resurrection  at  the  last  day,  at  which  time  all  men  shall 
be  immediately  admitted  without  judgment  into  felicity, 
from  which  they  shall  never  depart.^^ 

All  these  gradual  discoveries  and  communications  to  the 
public  only  made  the  Balfourean  system  more  popular  with 
the  Universalists.  It  spread  rapidly,  was  eagerly  read,  and 
learned  by  heart  by  multitudes  of  the  people,  and  filled  the 
air  with  the  clamor  of  controversy.  Doubtless  the  New 
England  teachers  were  not  idle,  and  there  were  m.any  faith- 
ful parish  sermons  like  one  of  Emmons  upon  ''The  Plea  of 
Sinners  against  Endless  Punishment."  There  are  five 
principles,  he  says,  upon  which  the  Universalists  argue  in 
favor  of  their  doctrine.  These  are:  "The  universal  good- 
ness of  God;  the  universal  atonement  of  Christ;  the  uni- 
versal offers  of  salvation;  the  universal  goodness  of  man- 
kind; their  universal  punishment  in  this  life."  The  argu- 
ments of  the  first  four  heads  are  those  with  which  we  have 
already  become  familiar.    Under  the  last  he  intends  evi- 

*3  Inquiry,  p.  354. 

Three  Essays  on  the  intermediate  State  of  the  dead,  the  Resurrection 
from  the  dead,  and  on  the  Greek  terms  rendered  judge,  judgment,  condemned, 
condemnation,  damned,  damnation,  etc.,  in  the  New  Testament,  etc.  (Charles- 
town,  1828;  8vo,  359  pages.) 

See  p.  205.  It  is  noteworthy  that  this  theory  drove  Balfour  back  to  the 
orthodox  interpretation  of  I  Peter  3:18  ff.,  that  "the  time  of  the  preaching  of 
Christ  by  the  spirit  and  their  disobedience  was  one  and  the  same  time"  (p.  45). 
*8  Works,  Vol.  V,  pp.  592  ff. 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY 


dently  to  meet  the  form  of  Universalism  before  us.  He 
says : 

They  affirm  that  there  is  not  a  threatening  in  the  Bible  respecting 
any  future  and  eterrr^  punishment  of  sinners.  But  all  men  of  plain 
common  sense  who  have  read  the  Bible  and  whose  understanding 
has  not  been  darkened  by  the  blindness  of  the  heart  and  by  the  soph- 
istry of  deceivers,  know  that  God  has  plainly  threatened  future  and 
eternal  punishment  to  the  finally  impenitent  and  unbelievers.*^ 

And  thus,  with  the  most  summary  quotation  of  certain 
passages,  he  dismisses  their  position.  In  a  sermon  there 
is  Httle  room  for  prolonged  discussion,  and  yet  Emmons 
desired  to  strike  at  the  root  of  the  exegesis  by  which  Bal- 
four had  now  attempted  to  support  Universalism.  So  he 
declares  that  the  method  of  the  Universalists  is  wrong. 
They  come  to  each  passage  of  Scripture  which  they  quote, 
determined  to  make  it  support  their  own  false  principles. 
Single  texts  should  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  whole 
Bible. 

No  doctrine  can  be  proved  or  refuted  by  merely  marshalling  one 
class  of  texts  against  another  without  explaining  them  according  to 
some  sound  and  accepted  principle.  Texts  ought  never  to  be  ad- 
duced to  explain  and  establish  any  first  principles;  but  first  prin- 
ciples are  to  be  adduced  to  explain  and  establish  the  sense  of  every 
text  of  Scripture.*^ 

This  sounds  like  a  plea  for  the  most  pronounced  sort  of 
dogmatic  exegesis.  But  such  is  not  Emmons'  intent.  He 
is  complaining  of  the  dogmatic  exegesis  of  the  Univer- 
salists. What  he  means  is  determined  by  the  significance  he 
attaches  to  the  phrase  ''first  principles,"  and  this  he  has  ex* 
plained  by  pointing  to  those  great  and  fundamental  doc- 
trines which  constitute  the  substance  of  the  Christian  re- 
ligion, and  which  are  derived  from  the  Bible  itself.  He 
mentions  "the  true  meaning  of  God's  universal  goodness 
as  consisting  in  universal  benevolence  and  limited  com- 

Ibid.,  p.  598- 
*^  Ibid.,  p.  599. 


332 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


placence"  and  the  "true  sense  of  the  universal  atonement 
of  Christ."  Reason  was  to  have  its  place,  though  not  the 
supreme  place,  in  interpretation.  He  complains  of  the  Uni- 
versalists  that 

they  never  lay  down  principles  and  explain  them,  nor  construe  Scrip- 
ture according  to  the  dictates  of  reason.    But  those  who  hold  to  a 

limited  salvation  lay  down  principles  and  explain  them  They 

do  not  set  one  text  of  Scripture  against  another,  but  explain  every 
text  agreeably  to  the  great  principles  which  they  have  established 
and  explained.*^ 

But  opposition  to  Ballou's  and  Balfour's  views  arose 
among  those  Universalists  who  were  still  inclined  to  favor 
the  doctrine  of  Restoration.  Among  these,  Charles  Hud- 
son, pastor  of  a  Universalist  church  in  Westminster,  Mass., 
published  A  Series  of  Letters  addressed  to  Mr.  Ballou  in 
which,  from  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  Universalist  lit- 
erature, he  brought  materials  to  set  forth  fully  the  doc- 
trines he  wished  to  refute.  As  is  well  known,  this  dis- 
agreement with  Ballou  ripened  into  a  movement  which  sep- 
arated from  the  Universalist  denomination  in  1831,  and 
maintained,  under  the  name  of  the  "Restorationist  Asso- 
ciation," a  separate  existence  till  1841.^^  Hudson  was  a 
sharp  and  witty  antagonist,  and  when  he  turned  his  weap- 
ons against  Balfour,  the  latter  could  not  endure  his  sar- 
casm. He  summed  up  the  first  Inquiry  very  well  in  the 
following  words: 

In  order  to  ascertain  whether  Mr.  B.  has  succeeded  in  refuting 
future  or  eternal  punishment,  it  is  proper  to  leave  all  that  he  has 
said  upon  Sheol,  Hades,  and  Tartarus  out  of  the  question;  for  surely, 
if  they  do  not  mean  misery  at  all,  as  Mr.  Ballou  contends,  they  -1c 
not  have  the  least  bearing  in  deciding  the  question  whether  misery 

Loc.  cit.,  p.  601. 

A  Series  of  Letters  addressed  to  Rev.  Hosea  Ballou  of  Boston,  being  a 
Vindication  of  the  Doctrine  of  a  Future  Retribution  against  the  Principal  Ar- 
guments used  by  him,  Mr.  Balfour  and  others,  etc.  (Woodstock,  1827;  8vo,  Vol. 
II,  308  pages.)  For  a  complete  review  of  Mr.  Hudson's  literary  activity  see 
Eddy,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  321. 

^1  Eddy,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  chap.  iv.  , 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY 


333 


be  endless  The  only  word  he  allows  to  signify  misery  is  Ge- 
henna; and  wherever  it  occurs  in  the  New  Testament,  it  is,  he  says, 
applied  to  the  Jews,  and  expresses  those  judgments,  and  those  only, 

which  fell  upon  that  nation  at  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem  

So  the  whole  of  Mr.  Balfour's  labors  comes  precisely  to  this : — 
If  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem  does  not  mean  endless  misery,  that 
doctrine  is  not  taught  in  the  Scriptures !  He  has  written  more  than 
four  hundred  pages  to  show  that  there  can  be  no  punishment  in  a 
future  state  because  Jerusalem  was  captured  in  this!^^ 

Hudson  complains  also  repeatedly  of  Balfour's  apparent  de- 
sire to  "pull  down  and  not  build  up" — a  fundamental  and 
just  criticism. 

Hudson's  remarks  irritated  Balfour  extremely,  as  was 
usually  the  case,  for  he  did  not  seem  to  be  able  to  bear  criti- 
cism with  equanimity,  and  in  some  remarks  upon  Hudson's 
Letters,  which  he  attached  to  his  Three  Essays,  he  indulged 
in  petty  personalities.  One  good  argument  refuting  Hud- 
son's own  theories  is,  however,  found  here.  Punishment 
arising  from 

"the  internal  state  of  mind"  alone,  and  not  from  any  external  appli- 
cation, he  says,  leaves  the  abandoned  sinner  with  nothing  to  fear  in 
the  future  world.    "The  more  hardened  he  dies,  so  much  the  better 

for  him  in  the  world  to  which  he  goes  H  he  can  only  contrive 

to  keep  himself  hardened  in  hell,  what  in  God's  universe  can  dis- 
tress him,  upon  Mr.  Hudson's  system  of  future  punishment? 

Hudson  replied  in  a  small  book,^^  in  which,  among  other 
things,  he  pricked  the  fallacy  of  Balfour's  methods  of  exe- 
gesis, but  he  succeeded  in  setting  up  no  sufficient  method 
for  himself. 

Less  noted  orthodox  ministers  did  not  neglect  the  sub- 
ject in  their  parish  sermons.  Edward  R.  Tyler,  of  Middle- 
town,  Conn.,  delivered  a  series  of  Lectures  on  Future  Pun- 
ishment to  his  church  which  he  afterward  published. 

Series  of  Letters,  p.  167.  Three  Essays,  p.  321. 

A  Reply  to  Mr.  Balfour's  Essays,  etc.  (Woodstock,  1829;  i2mo,  209  pages). 

Ihid.,  pp.  37  fif. 

5«  Middletown,  1829;  8vo,  180  pages.  It  was  reviewed  in  the  Christian  Ex- 
aminer, New  Series,  Vol.  Ill   (1830),  pp.  392  ff.,  by  a  writer  who  only  men- 


334         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Direct  referaice  is  made  to  Balfoiir's  ideas  in  the  discus- 
sion of  Gehenna.  The  book  was  a  faithful  and  useful  dis- 
cussion of  the  whole  theme.  It  shows  how  the  ministry 
of  that  day  overcame  the  danger  from  Universalism — by 
openly  combating  it  in  the  pulpit. 

But  now  a  more  formidable  antagonist  of  Univer- 
salism appeared  upon  the  scene  in  the  person  of  Moses 
Stuart.  The  success  with  which  Balfour  had  met  among 
his  coreligionists  had  induced  him  tO'  call  loudly  for  a  ref- 
utation. Stuart  had  been  frequently  mentioned  as  the  man 
who  should  undertake  it,  and  probably  it  was  in  response 
to  direct  solicitations  that  he  finally  published,  first  in  the 
Panoplist,  and  then  in  a  separate  form,  his  book  entitled 
Exegetical  Essays  on  Several  Words  Relating  to  Future 
Punishment. It  was  not  formally  a  reply  tO'  Balfour,  and 
for  the  sake  of  avoiding  ''a  polemic  attitude"  mentioned  but 
one  writer  of  opposing  teaching,  and  him  only  in  a  short 
appendix.  Yet  it  was  Balfour's  works  which  drew  out  the 
treatise,  and  his  first  Inquiry,  and  that  portion  of  the  second 
which  referred  to  the  words  aion,  etc.,  were  substantially 
met. 

The  work  opens  with  remarks  upon  the  importance  of 
the  subject  and  the  impossibility  of  answering  inquiries  as 
to  the  future  state  by  the  light  of  reason.  Ancient  philos- 
ophy failed  even  to  establish  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 
Our  appeal  must  then  be  to  the  Bible,  which  must  be  exam- 

tioned  the  book  and  then  devoted  himself  to  a  statement  of  his  own  views. 
According  to  the  Unitaii:n  policy  of  his  day,  he  is  not  very  explicit.  He 
teaches  that  we  have  "the  power  of  form-ing  character  for  heaven"  (p.  293). 
The  implication  of  the  whole  is  that  the  character  formed  here  determines  the 
reward  there.  There  is  no  proper  punishment,  for  all  unhappiness  which  follows 
upDu  wickedness  works  itself  out.  There  seems  to  be  no  opportunity  in  the 
next  world  to  form  character  (p.  398).  He  does  not  state  explicitly  that  there 
is  no  opportunity  for  a  change  of  character  in  the  next  world,  but  seems  to 
hint  that  the  result  will  be  the  annihilation  of  the  wicked  (p.  399). 

See,  for  example,  pp.  17,  22. 

^8  Andover,  1830;  8vo,  156  pages. 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY  335 


ined  without  prepossessions,  candidly,  and  impartially. 
Such  an  examination  Stuart  sets  himself  to  make. 

The  words  a^w^  and  alcovio^  are  first  examined.  Their 
classical  use  is  presented,  and  then  in  various  classes  the 
cases  quoted  in  which  they  appear  in  the  New  Testament, 
and  the  meaning  exhibited  in  each  case.  The  presentation 
is  fair,  the  summing-up  convincing,  and  the  conclusion  is 
expressed  with  force  in  these  words:  "Whenever  alcop  is 
employed  for  the  purpose  merely  of  designating  future 
time,  as  a  period  of  duration,  it  designates  an  indefinite,  un- 
limited time  in  all  cases;  those  of  future  punishment  being 
for  the  present  excepted."  "In  regard  to  all  the  cases 
of  aldivio^  which  have  a  relation  to  future  time,  it  is  quite 
plain  and  certain  that  they  designate  an  endless  period,  an 
unlimited  duration"  (the  cases  referring  to  future  punish- 
ment being  excepted ).^^  He  examines  the  Hebrew  olam, 
and  the  Greek  words  alwv  and  alcovco^  in  the  LXX,  with 
the  same  result. 

With  this  general  preparation  he  comes  to  consider  those 

cases,  already  quoted  in  the  investigation,  in  which  these 

words  are  applied  to  future  punishment.    He  finds  these 

parallel  in  all  philological  respects  to  the  cases  in  which 

the  future  blessedness  of  the  righteous  is  stated,  and  he 

sums  up  his  conclusion  in  the  following  words : 

It  does  most  plainly  and  indubitably  follow  that,  if  the  Scrip- 
tures have  not  asserted  the  endless  punishment  of  the  wicked,  neither 
have  they  asserted  the  endless  happ'ness  of  the  righteous,  nor  the 
endless  glory  and  existence  of  the  Godhead.  The  one  is  equally 
certain  with  the  other.  Both  are  laid  in  the  same  balance.  They 
must  be  tried  by  the  same  tests.  And  if  we  give  up  the  one, 
we  must,  in  order  to  be  consistent,  give  up  the  other  also.^^ 

The  bearing  of  this  will  be  seen  when  we  recall  that  Stuart 
rested  all  these  truths  on  revelation  alone,  since  the  powers 

50  Op.  cit.,  p.  37.  «o  Ibid.,  p.  46. 

«i  Ibid.,  p.  57. 


33^         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


of  our  reason  had  never  discovered  them  to  heathen  nations, 
nor  ever  could.  He  adds  farther  on :  "I  have  long 
searched  with  anxious  solicitude  for  a  text  in  the  Bible 
which  should  even  seem  to  favor  the  idea  of  a  future  proba- 
tion.   I  cannot  find  it." 

This  part  of  the  discussion  ended,  Stuart  goes  over  to 
the  consideration  of  Sheol,  Hades,  Tartarus,  and  Gehenna. 
The  exposition  is  temperate  and  fair.  He  acknowledges 
all  that  Balfour  says  (though  not  mentioning  him  by  name) 
in  respect  to  the  meaning  of  "Sheol"  in  many  passages.  He 
then  introduces  a  discussion  of  the  figurative  use  of  lan- 
guage, which  sets  forth  the  fundamental  principles  upon 
which  such  a  word  is  to  be  interpreted,  in  any  kind  of  liter- 
ature. The  figurative  use  of  every  word  representing  in- 
tangible and  invisible  objects  must  be  derived  from  the  lit- 
eral uses  by  which  it  was  originally  restricted  to  objects  ac- 
cessible to  the  observation  of  the  senses.  Paradise  was  a 
pleasure  garden  literally;  but  figuratively  it  is  the  state  of 
the  blessed  in  the  eternal  world.  Hence  the  question  as  to 
the  meaning  of  "Sheol"  and  like  words  is  not  to  be  deter- 
mined by  their  literal  uses  (as  Balfour  had  sought  to  do)  ; 
but  the  question  still  remains :  Are  they  "ever  employed  in 
the  figurative  or  secondary  sense  in  the  Old  Testament?" 
The  determination  of  this  question,  Stuart  confesses,  "de- 
pends perhaps  in  great  measure  on  the  state  of  knowledge 
among  the  Hebrews  with  regard  to  future  rewards  and 
punishments."  That  they  were  entirely  ignorant  of  such 
things,  the  acknowledged  belief  of  the  Egyptians  as  to  the 

"2  Loc.  cit.,  p.  60.  On  pp.  72  ff.  Stuart  notices  the  supposition  that  the  mean- 
ing of  aitavio?  is  "spiritual."  This  was  a  phase  of  the  meaning  suggested  by 
Winchester  in  his  "aionian,"  and  resembles  the  modern  notion  that  the  word 
is  "qualitative"  rather  than  quantitative. 

^3  Ibid.,  p.  94. 

'^^  Ibid.,  p.  98. 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY  337 


future  forbids  us  to  suppose.   Many  texts  are  evacuated  of 

their  meaning  on  such  a  supposition.^^ 

The  sum  of  the  evidence  from  the  Old  Testament  in  regard  to 
Sheol  is  that  the  Hebrews  did  probably  in  some  cases  connect  with 
the  use  of  this  word  the  idea  of  misery  subsequent  to  the  death  of 
the  body.  It  seems  to  me  that  we  can  safely  believe  this;  and  to 
aver  more  than  this  would  be  somewhat  hazardous,  when  all  the  ex- 
amples of  the  word  are  duly  considered. '^'^ 

A  like  discussion  of  Hades  follows.  The  Hades  of  Luke 
1 6 :23,  he  says,  has  the  significance  of  Tartarus,  the  place  of 
future  and  endless  punishment.  As  to  Gehenna,  the  discus- 
sion is  shorter,  but  equally  explicit.  Of  Balfour's  notion 
that  its  punishment  meant  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem, 
Stuart  does  not  think  it  worth  while  to  take  notice. 

This  treatise  practically  closed  the  controversy  on  the 
side  of  the  New  England  divines.^^  The  dogmatic  answer 
to  Universalism  was  already  made,  and  the  exegetical  an- 
swer, which  only  remained  in  some  little  doubt  after  the 
appearance  of  Balfour,  was  now  in.^^  It  is  a  curious  illus- 
tration of  the  relentlessness  of  the  logic  of  facts,  and  of  the 

Such  are  Prov.  5:5;  9:18;  Heb.  21:13;  Ps.  9:17;  Prov.  7:27;  15:24;  Num. 
16:30,  33;  Deut.  z^\22\  I  Kings  2:6,  9;  Ps.  49:14,  15;  Isa.  5:14. 
Ihid.,  p.  114. 

^"^  Space  forbids  us  to  notice  at  length  the  admirable  volume  of  Parsons 
Cooke,  of  Ware,  Mass.,  Modern  Universalism  Exposed:  In  an  Examination  of 
the  Writings  of  the  Rev.  Walter  Balfour.  (Lowell,  1834;  8vo,  248  pages.)  The 
several  chapters  were  originally  parish  sermons  designed  to  counteract  the  efforts 
of  the  Universalists  among  his  own  flock,  and  were  accompanied  with  success. 
The  work  rests  largely  upon  Stuart,  but  has  an  independent  value  of  its  own, 
and  is  another  proof  of  the  well-known  clearness  of  mind  and  cogency  of  reason- 
ing of  its  writer.  It  is  marked  by  the  spice  of  wit  and  often  sarcasm.  His  ex- 
posure of  the  "credulity"  of  the  followers  of  Balfour  is  keen  and  not  without 
apologetic  value.  In  the  same  way  there  grew  up  a  little  book  by  Andrew 
Royce,  of  Wilmington,  Vt.,  Universalism  a  Modern  Invention,  and  Not  according 
to  Godliness.  (Windsor,  Vt.,  1839;  i2mo,  207  pages.)  A.  W.  McClure  {Lectures 
on  Ultra- Universalism  [Boston,  1838;  i2mo,  126  pages])  fairly  laughed  Univer- 
salism down — a  style  of  argument  not  always  and  everywhere  fitted  for  success, 
but  appropriate  to  the  Balfourean  type  of  doctrine. 

®^  Public  discussion  between  orthodox  ministers  and  Universalists  continued 
to  form  a  feature  of  the  times.  See  the  "Danvers  Discussion"  between  Braman 
and  Thomas  Whittemore,  which  lasted  an  entire  day,  an  account  of  which  was 
published  by  Whittemore  in  a  pamphlet  (1833). 


338 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


impotence  of  the  opinions  of  men  to  withstand  their  progress, 
that  Balfour,  whose  theology  and  influence,  both  among  the 
general  body  of  the  New  England  churches  and  even  among 
his  own  denomination,  had  been  annihilated  by  Stuart's 
Essays,  had  not  the  slightest  thought  that  such  a  fate  had 
befallen  him.  He  published  a  Reply,  in  1831,  which  was 
full  of  personalities,  but  contained  no  substantial  addition 
to  the  discussion. In  the  following  year  he  published  the 
third  (largely  rewritten)  edition  of  his  Inquiry.  In  the 
Introduction  he  uses  the  following  language.  After  having 
denominated  Professor  Stuart's  Essays  an  attempt  to  re- 
fute the  Inquiry,  he  says: 

We  have  too  high  an  opinion  of  Mr,  Stuart's  understanding  to 
think  that  he  considers  his  essays  deserving  the  name  of  an  answer 
to  the  Inquiry.  We  have  never  heard  of  a  single  intelligent  man, 
orthodox  or  otherwise,  who  thinks  his  essays  a  reply  to  it.  But  we 
have  heard  several  express  a  contrary  opinion.  If  the  book  [viz.,  the 
Inquiry]  then  is  not  unanswerable,  we  may  say,  it  yet  remains  un- 
answered Without  these  attacks,  I  might  have  gone  down  to 

my  grave  doubting  whether  I  might  not  after  all  be  mistaken  in  my 
views.  It  would  be  almost  sinful  in  me  now  to  doubt  their  correct- 
ness, considering  the  character,  talents,  and  standing  of  the  men,  who 
have  tried  but  failed  to  point  out  my  error.™ 

And  yet  in  1840  Thomas  Wliittemore,  who  had  been  a 
Balfourean,  issued  his  Plain  Guide  to  Universalism — a  kind 
of  Universalist  dogmatics — which  leaned  decidedly  toward 
Restorationism ;  in  1841  the  Universalists  as  a  whole  had 
become  so  favorable  to  restoration  that  the  Restorationist 
Association  could  dissolve;  and  in  1878  the  Universalist 
ministers  of  Boston  and  vicinity,  by  a  vote  of  thirty-three 
to  two,  adopted  a  statement  of  belief  which,  while  strongly 
Unitarian,  and  so  far  in  accord  with  Ballou's  theology,  was 

6^  Reply  to  Prof.  Stuart's  Exegetical  Essays  on  Several  Words  Relating  to 
Future  Punishment.    (Boston,  1831;  8vo,  238  pages.) 

''^  Inquiry,  pp.  ix,  x.  Paul  Dean  was  preaching  in  the  same  year  a  Course 
of  Lectures  in  Defence  of  the  Final  Restoration  (1832,  large  8vo,  190  pages), 
which  was  much  more  in  the  line  of  the  future  than  Balfour  would  have  sup- 
posed. 


THE  UNIVERSALIST  CONTROVERSY 


339 


decidedly  restorationist,  and  marked  the  complete  down- 
fall of  Balfour's  system.'^^ 

Eddy,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  pp.  339  ff.  Discussion  upon  the  topic  was  con- 
tinued with  intermissions  and  sudden  resumptions  for  many  years  after  this.  A 
pretty  full  bibliography  may  be  found  in  Dexter's  Congregationalism.  Dexter 
himself  took  frequent  part  in  the  controversy.  Later,  particularly  in  connection 
with  C.  F.  Hudson,  the  question  of  annihilation  was  broached  and  had  a  long 
discussion.  Nothing  very  substantial  was  added  to  the  case,  however,  by  the 
later  writers. 


CHAPTER  XII 


THE  SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY,  1800-1840 

The  attention  of  the  student  of  New  England  theology, 
though  it  is  occupied  again  and  again  with  the  strife  of 
public  controversy,  is  ever  recalled  from  the  noise  of  debate 
and  the  glare  of  publicity  to  the  quiet  of  some  retired  study 
in  which  an  obscure  minister,  a  laborious  professor,  or  a 
peaceful  thinker  is  doing  the  real  work  of  promoting  the 
progress  of  the  school.  We  must  now  retrace  our  steps, 
go  back  again  to  about  the  beginning  of  the  century  into 
whose  struggles  we  have  so  far  penetrated,  and  study  the 
quiet  labor  which  was  embodied  in  the  systems  of  theology 
which  were  created  in  those  early  years,  and  which  may  be 
called  the  second  generation  of  such  creations  in  New  Eng- 
land. They  were  systems,  or  the  products  of  consistent 
and  comprehensive  thought;  they  were  remarkably  inde- 
pendent in  their  character;  but  they  were  prepared  in  full 
knowledge  of  what  men  were  disputing  upon,  and  register 
the  matured  conclusions  of  their  authors  upon  the  contro- 
verted topics.  They  are  in  this  sense  conditioned  upon  the 
controversies,  even  where  they  give  little  definite  evidence 
of  such  a  connection.  They  could  not  well  be  understood 
at  an  earlier  point,  but  they  must  now  be  introduced,  for 
without  them  the  later  controversies  will  also  be  unintelli- 
gible. 

The  first  of  these  systems  in  the  historical  order  of  its 
origination  is  that  of  Nathaniel  Emmons.^  It  was  not  put 
forth  by  its  author;  it  was  never  written  in  the  literary 
form  of  a  treatise,  and  has  been  given  to  us  in  the  original 
sermons  preached  by  its  author  in  his  ordinary  labors  as  a 

1  The  best  edition  of  Emmons'  Works  is  that  of  the  year  i860  (Boston), 
with  a  "Memoir"  by  Professor  E.  A.  Park. 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY 


341 


parish  minister;  it  has  thus  the  defects  of  repetition,  of  in- 
complete statement  at  many  points,  of  limitation  to  the 
necessities  of  popular  address,  incident  to  the  sermonic 
form.  But  it  is,  nevertheless,  sufficiently  complete;  and  so 
far  as  specimens  of  logical  and  powerful  reasoning  are  con- 
cerned it  could  not  be  improved  if  it  had  been  prepared  in 
a  more  ideal  way.  As  it  appears,  it  is  a  system  almost  en- 
tirely rationalistic  in  its  tone  and  method,  though  in  his 
own  mind  it  was  a  biblical  system.  But  little  reading  of  it 
is  required  to  show  that  a  true  inductive  method  of  exegesis 
was  unknown  to  Emmons,  and  that,  when  he  had  got 
clearly  in  his  mind  what  he  thought  to  be  the  meaning  of 
the  Bible  in  general,  and  had  adjusted  it  to  other  truths 
in  a  way  that  seemed  reasonable,  no  single  text  had  any 
chance  for  an  objective  interpretation  from  him.  The  gen- 
eral effect  of  his  style  of  presenting  truth  is  to  make 
the  hearer  boldly  and  exclusively  rationalistic. 

One  marked  defect  of  the  system  as  a  system  might  have 
been  remedied  if  Emmons  had  v/ritten  a  systematic  treatise, 
though  this  is  perhaps  doubtful.  This  is  the  absence  of  a  clear 
statement  of  his  philosophic  position.  On  some  points  he 
seems  to  have  had  no  philosophy,  for  he  evidently  had  a 
profound  horror  of  ontology,  in  this  respect  quite  antici- 
pating the  attitude  characteristic  of  the  last  half  of  the  last 
century.  Did  he  believe  in  a  substantial  soul?  His  lan- 
guage is  here  and  there  against  it.  Did  he  even  believe 
in  the  reality  of  the  external  world,  or  was  he  a  thorough- 
going Berkeleian?  A  clear  word  upon  such  points  would 
scarcely  have  failed  us,  had  he  been  writing  for  more  than 
the  exigency  of  a  present  moment.  Now  and  then  the  sus- 
picion assails  us  that  he  had  really  resolved  all  things  into 
the  present  thought  of  the  divine  Being.    He  has  not  said. 

Professor  Park,  in  the  remarkable  "Memoir"  which  he 
prefixed  to  the  last  edition  of  Emmons'  works,  in  which  he 


342 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


writes  as  a  friend,  admirer,  and  defender,  but  not  as  a 
blind  partisan,  has  done  much  to  clear  up  these  questions. 
He  recognizes  the  phenomenological  dress  in  which  the 
theology  appears,  when  he  vindicates  Emmons  from  the 
charge  of  having  taught  the  mode  in  which  God  secures 
the  fulfilment  of  his  decrees.-  Dr.  Jacob  Ide,  the  original 
editor  of  Emmons'  works,  and  his  son-in-law,  quoting  from 
Rev.  Thomas  Williams,  long  and  intimate  friend  of  Em- 
mons, says  that  Williams  said  ''he  conversed  with  the  doc- 
tor particularly  on  this  subject  [Berkeleianism]  and  was 
told  by  him  that  he  read  the  work  of  Berkeley  and  was  at 
first  much  perplexed  with  it,  but  when  he  read  it  a  second 
time,  he  saw  its  fallacy  and  thought  he  could  answer  it."  ^ 
He  thus  broke  away  from  the  Berkeleianism  which  had 
hitherto  characterized  the  New  England  school,  and  we 
should  scarcely  suppose  that  he  could  hold  the  idea  that 
the  soul  is  a  mere  series  of  exercises.  The  truth  seems  to 
be  that  his  forms  of  expression  are  designed  to  emphasize 
the  spirituality  of  the  soul,  its  activity  as  essential  to  its 
nature,  and  the  fact  that  moral  character  consists  in  activity 
and  voluntariness.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  not  lacking 
passages  which  speak  of  the  soul  distinctly  as  an  agent, 
possessing  powers,  and  itself  a  substance.^  Upon  the  whole, 
we  are  justified  in  assuming  that  Emmons  held  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  unsophisticated  man  upon  such  points,  and 
the  more  because  we  know  him  to  have  been  familiar  with 
the  early  leaders  of  the  Scotch  school — Reid,  Stewart,  and 
Brown.^  The  time  had  not  come,  however,  for  the  distinct 
transfer  of  our  theology  to  the  new  philosophical  basis.^ 
Emmons  regarded  himself  as  a  Hopkinsian;  and  with 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  417.  2  Ibid  ,  p.  414, 

*  Ibid.,  p.  412.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  70. 

^  Professor  H.  B.  Smith  (Faith  and  Philosophy,  pp.  239  flf.)  maintains  that 
Professor  Park's  interpretation  is  apologetic  and  false;  and  that  Emmons  was  a 
Berkeleian  of  an   advanced  type,   and   denied  the  substantial  soul. 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY 


343 


this  statement  we  may  dismiss  the  consideration  of  a  con- 
siderable portion  of  his  system„  The  leading  idea  is  the  sole 
causality  of  God,  which  is  pushed  to  such  an  extreme  that, 
though  room  is  made  for  freedom  by  a  bold  adherence  to 
it  as  a  fact  of  consciousness,  consistency  would  lead  rather 
to  a  denial  of  all  freedom.  A  very  prominent  topic  is 
"moral  agency,"  in  which  agency  is  made  to  consist  in 
''exercises,"  and  this  point  of  view,  with  the  divine  causality 
kept  constantly  in  mind,  determines  most  that  is  striking  in 
the  system.  Like  Hopkins,  he  maintains  the  historic  faith 
of  the  church  in  the  divine  Trinity;  in  the  two  natures  of 
Christ,  human  and  divine;  in  the  inspiration  of  the  Scrip- 
tures; in  human  depravity;  in  atonement,  justification,  sanc- 
tification ;  and  in  the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked.  Fur- 
thermore, as  tO'  the  leading  explanatory,  systematizing  posi- 
tions and  theories  of  Hopkins,  he  demonstrably  is,  or  may 
safely  be  assumed  to  be,  in  accord  with  his  predecessor.  He 
himself  regarded  the  peculiarities  of  his  system  as  ''evolved 
from  Hopkins'  system  rather  than  as  added  to  it."  Yet  he 
is  individual  where  he  agrees,  and  cannot  always  be  dis- 
patched with  a  mere  reference  to  his  master. 

Emmons  did  much  service  in  the  earlier  stages  of  many 
of  the  great  controversies  which  have  already  passed  under 
our  review.  Settled  in  the  ministry  in  the  year  1773,  he 
was  in  the  full  height  of  his  power  when  the  infidel  tenden- 
cies which  originated  with  the  influence  of  the  French  in 
the  War  of  the  Revolution  became  evident  in  the  last  de- 
cade of  the  eighteenth  century.  In  1793  he  was  printing 
against  Hume.  The  Antinomianism  of  an  earlier  period 
had  also  attracted  his  attention  and  roused  his  efforts.  In 
1789  he  had  published  against  the  antagonism  to  creeds  al- 
ready manifesting  itself,  and  had  tersely  said :  Men  do  not 
"object  against  creeds  because  they  do  not  understand 

'  Article  "Emmons"  in  Schaff-Herzog,  by  Professor  Park. 


344 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


them,  but  because  they  do''  And  two  years  before  West, 
Edwards,  and  Smalley  had  published  against  Universal- 
ism,  Emmons  had  issued  his  first  sermon  (1783)  against 
that  error.^ 

Nevertheless,  we  must  keep  distinctly  in  mind  that  in 
respect  to  the  Trinity  and  Christology  Emmons  belongs  en- 
tirely to  the  generation  which  preceded  the  formal  Unita- 
rian controversy,  and  contributed  nothing  to  its  settlement. 
He  was  already  seventy  years  of  age  when  the  controversy 
openly  broke  out  in  181 5.  We  may,  indeed,  say  that  his 
modes  of  represer  cation  of  the  Trinity  had  had  something 
to  do  with  provoking  the  controversy,  as  elsewhere  shown. 
He  belonged  to  that  class  of  theologians  who  put  the 
mystery  of  the  Trinity,  not  in  the  threeness,  but  in  the  one- 
ness. This,  as  Professor  Park  was  in  the  habit  of  saying, 
is  a  legitimate  form  of  the  doctrine ;  but  it  generally  leads  to 
the  charge  of  tritheism.  His  Christology  was  equally  in- 
capable of  preventing  such  a  movement  as  the  Unitarian 
from  arising,  and  of  meeting  it  when  it  had  arisen;  for  it 
had  no  helpful  word  to  justify  the  doctrine  of  the  personal 
union  of  the  two  natures.    In  fact,  he  gives  it  utterly  up. 

The  question  still  recurs,  what  is  meant  by  Christ's  being  one 
person  in  two  natures?  I  answer,  the  man  Jesus,  who  had  a  true  body 
and  a  reasonable  soul,  was  united  with  the  second  person  in  the  Trin- 
ity, in  such  a  manner  as  laid  a  foundation  for  him  to  say  with 
propriety  that  he  was  man,  that  he  was  God,  and  that  he  was  both  God 
and  man ;  and  as  laid  a  foundation  also  to  ascribe  what  he  did  as  God 
and  suffered  as  man,  to  one  and  the  selfsame  person.  If  any  should 
here  ask,  how  could  his  two  natures  be  thus  personally  united?  We 
can  only  say,  it  is  a  mystery.  And  there  is  no  avoiding  a  mys- 
tery with  respect  to  Christ.  His  conception  was  a  mystery.  And 
if  we  admit  the  mystery  of  his  conception,  why  should  we  hesitate  to 
admit  the  mystery  of  the  personal  union  between  his  two  natures? 
H  we  only  admit  this,  all  Christ  said  concerning  himself  is  easy  and 
intelligible.  Being  a  man,  he  might  with  propriety  make  himself 
God.9 


^  Park's  Memoir,  pp.  362  ff. 


»  Works  (i860),  Vol.  II,  p.  745. 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY 


345 


The  italicized  words  show  how  essentially  Nestodan 
Emmons'  doctrine  was. 

The  doctrine  of  inspiration  advocated  is  that  of  sug- 
gestion. ''God  ....  not  only  directed  them  to  write,  but 
at  the  same  time  suggested  what  to  write ;  so  that  according 
to  the  literal  sense  of  the  text,  they  wrote  exactly  as  they 
were  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost."  The  argumentation  in 
support  of  this  position  is  exclusively  rational  and  a  priori. 
Not  a  particle  of  attention  seems  to  have  been  paid  to  the 
facts  pertaining  to  the  theme. 

Passing,  now,  to  the  distinctive  tenets  of  Emmons,  we 
have  the  great  advantage  of  possessing  an  enumeration  of 
them  by  Emmons  himself,^ ^  which  we  shall  follow  in  the 
ensuing  pages.    They  are  eight  in  number. 

I.  ''Holiness  and  sin  consist  in  free  voluntary  exer- 
cises." We  have  already  seen  that  Emmons  belonged  to 
the  tendency  in  our  theology  which  emphasized  the  sole 
agency  of  God  till  it  had  excluded  any  proper  agency  in 
man.  True,  Emmons  affirmed  a  real  agency  in  man,  and 
said  that  it  was  as  real  and  perfect  as  if  the  agency  of  God 
had  nothing  to  do  with  it ;  but  he  really  removed  it  when  he 
spoke  of  God's  "creating"  our  volitions.  Be  that,  however, 
as  it  may,  we  are  to  note  now  that  he  made  holiness  and  sin 
to  consist  in  "exercises."  Hence  he  consistently  rejected 
the  doctrine  of  a  sinful  nature,  for  "there  is  no  morally  cor- 
rupt nature  distinct  from  free,  voluntary,  sinful  exer- 
cises;"^^ as  well  as  the  doctrine  of  our  union  with  Adam 
in  his  sin,  and  every  imputation  of  his  guilt  to  us.  "Adam 

^°  In  Park's  SchafF-Herzog  article  on  Emmons. 

11  Works,  Vol.  II,  p.  592.  Professor  Park,  Memoir  of  Hopkins,  p.  200, 
traces  this  position  to  a  "germ"  found  in  Hopkins'  Two  DisQOurses  of  the  year 
1768.  Hopkins  wrote:  "It  is  difficult,  and  perhaps  impossible,  to  form  any 
distinct  and  clear  idea  of  that  in  the  mind  or  heart,  which  is  antecedent  to  all 
thought,  and  exercise  of  the  will,  or  action,  which  we  call  principle,  taste,  tem- 
per, disposition,  habit,  etc.,  by  which  we  mean  nothing  properly  active 
and  suggests  that  possibly  it  "is  wholly  to  be  resolved  into  divine  constitution  or 
law  of  nature." 


346 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


was  the  only  person  who  committed  and  who  was  guilty  of 
original  sin."  In  all  this  he  was  only  somewhat  more 
clear  and  positive  in  his  statements  than  other  New  Eng- 
land divines.^  ^ 

With  the  word  ''exercises,"  however,  is  connected  a  con- 
troversy which  this  is  the  most  convenient  place  to  notice, 
that  about  the  "exercise"  and  the  "taste"  schemes. 

The  process  of  regeneration  will  be  understood  differ- 
ently according  to  the  different  theories  which  are  held  as 
to  the  nature  of  mind  and  of  moral  action.  The  exercise 
controversy  arose  from  these  differences;  but,  strange  as 
it  may  seem,  both  parties  agreed  for  a  considerable  time  in 
respect  to  the  element  of  the  controversy  which  was  more 
important  than  those  upon  which  they  differed,  and  which 
had  to  be  modified  before  a  conclusion  could  be  reached; 
viz.,  as  to  the  agency  of  God.  Both  held  that  this  was  im- 
mediate, and  an  act  of  his  almighty  power. 

Hopkins  himself,  in  accordance  with  the  somewhat  un- 
defined theory  of  the  will  which  he  held,  distinguished  be- 
tween regeneration  and  conversion,  as  between  the  divine 
and  the  human  action.^ ^  The  Holy  Spirit  puts  forth  a 
causative  activity,  the  effect  of  which  is  the  "exercises  of 
the  regenerate  in  which  they  are  active  and  agents."  The 
Spirit  works  immediately  upon  the  heart,  without  means, 
and  produces  an  instantaneous  change  in  it.  The  word 
"heart"  here  is  used  in  the  sense  of  will.  The  understand- 
ing, considered  as  distinct  from  the  will,  is  not  the  seat  of 
this  operation,  because  it  is  not  disordered,  or  only  so  as  the 
disorder  of  the  will  is  the  cause  of  the  disorder  in  it.  Re- 
generation is  not  by  light  or  truth,  but  the  light  appears 

12  Loc.  ext.,  p.  596. 

18  Henry  B.  Smith  (.Faith  and  Philosophy,  p.  225)  says:  "The  divine  efB- 
ciency  is  the  constructive  idea,  and  the  theory  of  exercises  is  the  regulative  factor, 
of  the  distinctive  theology  of  Emmons." 

1*  Works,  Vol.  I,  pp.  367  ff. 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY 


347 


and  the  truth  is  perceived  by  the  mind  after  regeneration. 
It  is  a  change  in  which  the  subject  is  not  conscious  of  the 
divine  operation;  and  it  is  perfectly  consistent  with  human 
Hberty,  ''leaving  men  in  the  exercise  of  all  desirable  or  pos- 
sible freedom."  'The  right  exercises  of  the  new  heart 
.  .  ,  .  are  as  much  their  own  and  as  free  as  if  they  had 
taken  place  without  any  divine  influences,  were  this  pos- 
sible." Upon  regeneration  conversion  follows.  It  is 
"turning  from  sin  to  God  ....  holy  exercise  which  is 
true  love  to  God  ....  which  implies  sight  and  belief  of 
the  truth,  repentance,  faith  in  Christ,  and  submission  to 
him." 

The  meaning  of  Hopkins  is  sufficiently  clear  in  the  main, 
but  it  was  not  stated  with  that  crystalline  clearness  and  posi- 
tiveness  with  which  Emmons  loved  to  see  every  theological 
proposition  enunciated.  Hopkins  had  implied  there  was  a 
holy  act  of  the  will  before  repentance.  He  proceeded  there- 
fore to  "evolve"  Hopkins'  true  meaning.  There  is,  accord- 
ing to  Emmons,  no  true  difference  between  regeneration, 
conversion,  and  sanctification.^^  They  are  all  the  produc- 
tion of  holy  exercises  in  the  hearts  of  sinners  in  the  same 
way.  This  God  does  by  an  immediate  act  of  power.^^ 
Sometimes  he  strives  with  sinners,  and  produces  convic- 
tion, etc.,  uses  means.^"^  But  all  this  does  not  effect  re- 
generation. In  this  God  produces  holy  love.  He  makes 
the  heart  willing.^  ^  This  is  the  first  act  of  the  regenerated 
will.  It  is  repentance,  not  some  mysterious  thing  on  which 
repentance  follows.  Emmons  also  combats  the  idea  that 
there  is  planted  in  the  heart  a  new  taste,  disposition,  or 
principle  which  is  prior  to  all  holy  exercises  and  the  foun- 
dation of  them.  The  heart  that  is  renovated  is  the  will. 
Hence  the  sinner  is  not  passive  in  regeneration  at  all.  He 

15  Works  (ed.  i860),  Vol.  Ill,  p.  96.  Ibid.,  p.  79. 

Ibid.,  p.  131.  Ibid.,  pp.  91,  92. 


348 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


is  indeed  as  active  in  this  as  in  any  other  exercise,  for 
God  "always  works  in  [men]  both  to  will  and  to  do  in  all 
their  free  voluntary  exercises,"  ^®  religion  constituting  no 
special  sphere  by  itself  in  this  matter,  since  men's  "activity 
in  all  cases  is  owing  to  a  divine  operation  upon  their 
minds."  Thus  he  follows  out  logically  the  division  of  the 
mind  into  two  faculties,  intellect  and  will,  and  the  doctrine 
of  the  sole  divine  causality.  His  answer  to  the  supposition 
that  the  taste  is  affected  before  conversion,  and  that  the 
latter  is  caused  thereby,  is,  in  fact,  that  there  is  no  such 
taste,  independent  of  the  will,  tO'  be  thus  affected.^^ 

Such  a  view  of  regeneration  was  as  certain  to  be  op- 
posed as  the  theory,  or  lack  of  theory,  of  the  will  upon 
which  it  was  based.  The  "taste  scheme"  received  a  power- 
ful reinforcement  when  Asa  Burton  came  on  with  those  im- 
provements in  the  classification  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind 
which  were  ultimately  to  work  so  great  a  revolution  in  the 
theory  of  the  will.  In  his  twenty-ninth  Essay,  "On  Regen- 
eration," he  dwells  first  upon  the  necessity  of  regenera- 
tion. This  he  derives  from  the  fact  that  unregenerated 
men  are  not  fit  for  heaven,  having  no  relish  for  its  delights. 
Christians  must  have  benevolent  love  as  God  has  it,  and, 
since  it  is  no  mere  exercise  in  him,  but  a  principle,  so  men 
must  have  a  principle,  appetite,  relish,  or  disposition  for 
happiness  as  an  absolute  good.  Burton  then  passes  on  to 
the  nature  of  regeneration.  "It  is  a  new  creation."  That 
which  is  created  is  the  "appetite,  relish,  or  disposition  to  be 
pleased  with  divine  objects."    This  work  is  effected  by  the 

Loc.  cit.,  p.  1 10. 

He  thus  explains  the  necessity  of  Hopkins'  "divine  illumination:"  "It 
is  not  possible,  perhaps,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  the  love  of  complacence 
should  take  place  in  the  heart  of  any  man  before  the  love  of  benevolence; 
because  he  cannot  see  the  divine  beauty  and  excellence  of  benevolence  before 
he  has  felt  it  in  his  own  breast."  Hence  God  first  produces  benevolence  in  man, 
and  this  is  regeneration.  But  it  is,  of  course,  not  followed  by  conversion:  it  is 
conversion. 

^'^  Essays,  etc.  (1824),  pp.  314  ff-  Ibid.,  p.  317- 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY 


349 


Holy  Spirit  instantaneously.  It  is  immediately  wrought  in 
the  "taste"  or  sensibility  alone,  and  affects  the  other  facul- 
ties mediately.  From  the  new  appetites  proceeds  a  new 
train  of  volitions  according  to  the  necessary  connection  of 
the  volitions  with  the  taste.  It  would  seem  as  if  Burton 
agreed  with  the  rest  of  his  cotemporaries  in  teaching  that 
God  wrought  this  change  by  an  exercise  of  his  divine 
power.  It  should  be  added  that  he  does  not  lay  much  stress 
upon  the  volitions,  but  speaks  at  considerable  length  of  the 
effect  of  renewal  upon  the  heart  or  taste  itself.  This  is  the 
more  natural  because  he  makes  the  taste  the  "spring  of 
action"  and  the  "principle  of  virtue."  He  thus  presents 
apparently  a  polar  opposition  to  Emmons. 

According  tO'  Smalley,^*  regeneration  is  not  necessary 
to  confer  new  faculties  upon  men  or  to  restore  old  ones,  to 
confer  the  power  of  will,  or  to  produce  a  sufficient  con- 
science ;  but  it  is  necessary  to  give  a  good  divSposition.  It  is 
immediate  and  supernatural.  Like  Hopkins,  he  rejected 
the  idea  of  a  special  illumination  which  should  lead  to  re- 
generation. 

Emmons  made  what  he  deemed  a  conclusive  reply  to 
these  considerations.^^  The  relish  for  good,  he  said  to  his 
opponents,  which  you  demand  as  a  condition  of  repentance 
is  a  feeling  of  complacence  in  holiness.  But  a  being  cannot 
"see  the  divine  beauty  and  excellence  of  benevolence  before 
he  has  felt  it  in  his  own  breast."  "Hence  benevolence 
will  produce  complacence,  but  complacence  will  not  produce 
benevolence."  He  elsewhere  says:  Sin  is  hating  God. 
Can  a  man  have  a  relish  for  the  holiness  of  God  while  he 
hates  him  ?  The  hate  must  first  be  put  away,  and  then  the 
relish  will  follow;  or  the  change  in  the  will  must  precede 

2*  Emmons:  "Such  a  principle  appears  to  be  a  mere  creature  of  the  imagin- 
ation."— Works,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  105,  122. 

Sermons  (Hartford,  1803),  pp.  282  ff. 
26  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  93. 


350 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


a  change  in  the  affections.  He  also  objects  to  the  scheme 
that  it  makes  a  man  unable  to  repent  until  this  new  taste 
be  given  him,  which  relieves  him  of  moral  obligation  till 
that  time.^^  And  he  adds  that  the  law  does  not  require 
this  change  in  the  taste,  though  it  does  require  that  change 
which  shall  make  us  holy.^''' 

The  time  was  not  come  for  the  conclusion  of  this  con- 
troversy; and  we  dismiss  it  for  the  present.  Enough  has 
now  been  said  to  show  what  Emmons  meant  by  ''free  vol- 
untary exercises." 

2.  "Men  act  freely  under  the  divine  agency."  What 
Emmons  meant  by  ''freely"  we  have  now  seen.  He  de- 
voted considerable  attention  tO'  the  discussion  of  the  recon- 
ciliation of  divine  agency  with  human  freedom,  and  an  en- 
tire division  of  his  theology  was  allotted  by  the  editor  to 
this  theme.^^  His  doctrine  may  be  condensed  in  his  own 
forms  of  speech  by  saying  that  men  both  act  and  are 
acted  upon  by  a  divine  operation,  in  all  their  voluntary 
exercises  of  whatsoever  kind.  Man  cannot  act  without  the 
divine  agency,  any  more  than  a  stone  can  move  of  itself. 
Hence  in  the  acting  of  man  God  also  acts.  Second  causes 
have  no  true  causality.  It  is  impossible  that  God  should 
sustain  moral  agents  in  the  possession  of  their  active  pow- 
ers so  that  they  should  act  themselves  without  him. 

The  meaning  of  this  proposition  will  be  clearer  as  we 
proceed.  But  meantime  it  may  be  observed  that  Emmons 
did  not  hold  a  very  complimentary  opinion  of  the  treat- 
ment of  this  topic  by  theologians  in  general.  "The  fatalists 
give  up  activity  for  the  sake  of  dependence." 

The  Arminians,  on  the  other  hand,  give  up  dependence  for  the 

sake  of  activity  Many  of  the  Calvinists  endeavor  to  steer  a 

middle  course  between  these  two  extremes,  and  first  give  up  activity 
and  then  dependence,  in  order  to  maintain  both.^s 

28  Loc.  cit.,  p.  136.  ^'^  Ibid.,  p.  182. 

28  Ibid.,  Vol.  II,  pp.  403  ff.  I^id.,  p.  410. 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY 


He  was  thus  led  to  inquire  why  activity  and  dependence 
are  so  generally  thought  inconsistent.  It  is  not  because  of 
experience. 

To  believers  we  make  the  appeal.  Did  you  ever  feel  the  least 
inconsistency  between  activity  and  dependence?  Did  you  ever  per- 
ceive the  divine  agency  to  obstruct  your  own?  Did  you  ever  find  your 
moral  powers  suspended  in  regeneration,  in  love  to  God,  in  repent- 
ance, in  faith,  or  in  any  other  holy  affection?  Were  you  ever  con- 
scious of  being  less  able  to  grow  in  grace  and  to  work  out  your  own 
salvation  with  fear  and  trembling  because  God  wrought  in  you  both 
to  will  and  to  do  of  his  good  pleasure?  Should  you  all  speak  the 
language  of  your  own  experience  upon  this  subject,  we  presume  you 
would  with  one  voice  declare  that  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord  never 
destroyed,  nor  even  obstructed,  your  liberty.^" 

It  may  be  said  that  he  does  not  attempt  to  reconcile  the 

two  elements,  the  reality  of  which  he  is  maintaining;  but  he 

gives  some  suggestive  hints,  if  not  more  than  these,  in  his 

discussion  of  the  relation  of  consciousness  to  the  question. 

Some  may  suppose  that  dependence  cannot  be  reconciled  with 
activity  because  they  are  conscious  of  being  active,  but  not  of  being 

dependent  They  appeal  to  common  sense  as  an  infallible  proof 

that  men  act  freely  and  voluntarily,  without  feeling  the  least  compul- 
sion or  influence  from  the  hand  of  God.  ....  But  to  what  does  this 
dictate  of  common  sense  amount?  Does  it  prove  that  we  are  not 
dependent  upon  the  Supreme  Being  for  all  our  moral  exercises?  For 
supposing  that  God  does  leally  work  in  us  both  to  will  and  to  do, 
we  cannot  be  conscious  of  his  agency,  but  only  of  our  own,  in  willing 
and  doing. 

Though  activity  and  dependence  are  perfectly  consistent,  yet  they 
are  totally  distinct;  and  of  course  fall  under  the  notice  of  distinct 
faculties  of  the  mind.  Dependence  falls  under  the  cognizance  of 
reason;  but  activity  falls  under  the  cognizance  of  common  sense. 
It  is  the  part  of  reason  to  demonstrate  our  dependence  upon  God, 
in  whom,  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being.  But  it  is  the  part 
of  common  sense  to  afford  us  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  our  activity 
and  moral  freedom.  We  must  therefore  consult  both  reason  and  com- 
mon sense  in  order  to  discover  the  consistency  between  activity  and 
dependence.    Nor  is  this  a  singular  case.    There  are  many  other  ob- 

2"  Ibid.,  p.  412. 

31  By  "common  sense"  he  means  consciousness,  as  is  evident  from  the  next 
sentences. 


352         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


jects  upon  which  we  can  form  no  proper  judgment  without  the  united 

aid  of  reason  and  common  sense  

If  all  this  is  true,  you  must  acknowledge  that  you  have  the  evi- 
dence of  reason  that  you  act  dependently,  that  you  have  the  evidence 
of  common  sense  that  you  act  freely,  and  that  you  have  the  evidence 
of  constant  experience  that  your  activity  and  dependence  are  entirely 
consistent.  You  are  therefore  as  certain  of  the  truth  and  consistency 
of  your  activity  and  dependence  as  you  can  be  of  any  other  truth, 
whose  evidence  depends  upon  the  united  testimony  of  reason  and 
common  sense. 

Having  thus  taught  the  coexistence  of  the  divine  and 
human  agency,  it  was  only  necessary  for  Emmons  to  add 
that  it  extended  to  every  action  of  man  to  complete  his 
doctrine.  This  he  does,  among  other  passages,  in  the  fol- 
lowing: 

If  God  always  works  in  men  both  to  will  and  to  do,  then  they 
are  as  able  to  work  out  their  own  salvation  as  to  perform  the  com- 
mon actions  of  life.  The  only  reason  why  sinners  suppose  they  are 
less  able  to  work  out  their  own  salvation  than  to  do  the  common 
actions  of  life  is  because  they  imagine  that  they  need  more  divine 
assistance   in   working  out  their  own   salvation   than   in  anything 

else  But  there  is  no  just  ground  for  this  conclusion.  They 

never  do  act  of  themselves.  They  live  and  move  and  have  their  being 
in  God,  who  constantly  works  in  them  both  to  will  and  to  do  in  every 
instance  of  their  conduct.  They  are  as  able,  therefore,  to  do  right  as 
to  do  wrong;  and  to  do  their  duty  as  to  neglect  their  duty;  to  love 
God  as  to  hate  God;  to  choose  life  as  to  choose  death;  to  walk  in  the 
narrow  way  to  heaven  as  to  walk  in  the  broad  way  to  hell;  and  to 
turn  from  sin  to  holiness  as  to  perfect  holiness  in  the  fear  of  the 
Lord.33 

Yet,  after  all  has  been  said,  the  divine  causality  so  over- 
shadows the  human  as  to  absorb  it.  There  is  no  true  effi- 
cient agency  in  man.  God  determines  what  man  shall  do, 
presents  motives  to  him,  and  excites  him  to  act  in  view  of 
them.  Man's  freedom  must  therefore  consist  in  something 
different  from  God's,  since  God  originates  and  man  does 
not.    No  amount  of  assertion  and  no  appeals  to  conscious- 

32  Loc.  cit.,  p.  413. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  426. 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY 


353 


ness  can  break  the  force  of  these  assertions,  which  are 
Emmons'  own. 

It  would  be  a  curious  investigation  to  inquire  whether 
determinist  views  of  the  action  of  the  will  are  ever  con- 
sistent with  clear  and  correct  views  of  v/hat  guilt  is,  as  per- 
sonal responsibility  for  broken  law  tO'  God,  and  repentance, 
as  the  confession  of  guilt.  Usually  determinists  make  guilt 
consist  in  liability  to  punishment,  and  do  not  distinguish  be- 
tween it  and  moral  deformity.  By  the  same  process  of  de- 
potentiatio-n  and  obscuration  of  moral  ideas  they  make  re- 
pentance nothing  more  than  self-loathing.  A  deformed  per- 
son may  loathe  himself  for  his  ugliness;  but  when  a  man 
who  has  sinfully  incurred  his  deformity,  like  an  abandoned 
drunkard,  loathes  himself,  he  adds  an  element  which  the  in- 
nocent cripple  could  not — the  element  of  self-condemnation, 
of  the  acknowledgment  of  guilt,  which  is  compressed  into 
the  phrase :  did  it,  /  brought  it  upon  myself.''  Perhaps 
nothing  can  more  clearly  reveal  the  true  nature  of  a  man's 
ethical  theories  than  this  question :  Does  he  distinguish 
between  deformity  and  guilt?  When  tried  by  this  test 
Emmons  fails.  In  spite  of  all  his  claim,  he  does  not  rise 
to  the  height  of  a  true  ''free,  voluntary,  moral  agency;" 
for  guilt,  as  he  describes  it,^^  is  nothing  but  disorder  or  de- 
formity, and  repentance  nothing  but  self-loathing.  He  ex- 
pressly claims  to  be  loyal  to  the  facts  upon  both  sides  of 
this  subject;  but  he  unconsciously  abridges  the  freedom 
of  man. 

3.  ''The  least  transgression  of  the  divine  law  deserves 
eternal  punishment." 

We  have  already  seen  the  part  our  divines  took  in  the 
discussion  of  future  punishment  in  connection  with  the 
introduction  of  Universalism  into  New  England.  Emmons 
regarded  this  element  of  the  argument  as  his  own  special 

3*  Works  (Ide's  ed.),  Vol.  IV,  pp.  325,  375;  cf.  pp.  343,  344. 


354 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


contribution.  What  he  meant  may  be  seen  by  the  follow- 
ing extract: 

Many  imagine  that  no  transient,  momentary  act  of  a  finite  creature 
can  contain  such  malignity  and  guilt  as  to  deserve  an  eternal  punishment. 
....  Sin  and  guilt  are  inseparably  connected.  Guilt  can  no  more 
be  separated  from  sin  than  criminality.  There  is  no  sin  without  crim- 
inality, and  no  criminality  without  guilt  or  desert  of  punishment. 
Therefore  both  the  criminality  and  guilt  of  a  crime  must  continue 
as  long  as  the  crime  continues,  or  till  it  ceases  to  be  a  crime  and 
becomes  an  innocent  action.  But  can  murder,  for  instance,  which  is 
a  crime  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  ever  become  a  virtue?  Can 
time,  or  obedience,  or  sufferings,  or  even  a  divine  declaration,  alter 
its  nature,  and  render  it  an  innocent  action?  Virtue  and  vice,  sin 
and  holiness,  are  founded  in  the  nature  of  things,  and  so  must  for- 
ever remain  immutable.  Hence  that  which  was  once  virtuous  will 
forever  be  virtuous ;  that  which  was  once  vicious,  will  forever  be 
vicious;  that  which  was  once  praiseworthy,  will  forever  be  praise- 
worthy; that  which  was  once  blameworthy,  will  forever  be  blame- 
worthy ;  and  that  which  once  deserved  punishment,  will  forever  deserve 
punishment.  Now,  if  neither  the  nature  of  sin  can  be  changed,  nor 
the  guilt  of  it  taken  away,  then  the  damned,  who  have  once  deserved 
punishment,  will  forever  deserve  it,  and  consequently  God  may,  in 
point  of  justice,  punish  them  to  all  eternity.^^ 

4.  "Right  and  wrong  are  founded  in  the  nature  of 
things."  Emmons  was  here  only  restoring  the  position  of 
Edwards  in  his  Nature  of  Virtue,  which  Hopkins  had  in  a 
measure  obscured  by  his  more  practical  method  of  treat- 
ment, but  which  he  had  not  forsaken.  Edwards  founded 
everything  in  the  ultimate  idea  of  the  harmony  of  the  uni- 
verse; and  Hopkins  had  asserted  the  agreement  of  the  law 
of  holiness  with  the  highest  reason.  Calvinism  had  often 
developed  its  idea  of  the  sovereignty  of  God  by  applying 
that  sovereignty  even  to  right  and  wrong,  and  made  these 
to  depend  upon  the  will  of  God,  sometimes  upon  his  "arbi- 
trary"— that  is,  his  sovereign — will  uncontrolled  from 
without  himself.  Emmons  said :  They  do  not  depend  upon 
his  will  at  all,  but  are  what  they  are  in  the  nature  of 
things.^^ 

35  Works  (Boston  ed.),  Vol.  Ill,  p.  766.        3«  Works,  Vol.  II,  pp.  176  ff. 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY 


355 


God  cannot  destroy  this  difference  without  destroying  the  nature 
of  things.  If  he  should  make  a  law  on  purpose  to  destroy  the  dis- 
tinction between  virtue  and  vice,  it  would  have  no  tendency  to  de- 
stroy it.  Or  if  he  should  make  a  law  which  should  forbid  us  to  love 
him  with  all  our  hearts,  and  our  neighbors  as  ourselves,  it  would 
not  destroy  the  obligation  of  his  first  and  great  command. 

To  supX-)ort  this  position,  he  evidently  appeals  imme- 
diately to  the  moral  intuitions  of  his  hearers,  for  he  says : 

No  possible  alteration  in  the  nature  of  things  can  make  it  our 
duty  to  lie,  or  steal,  or  murder,  or  exercise  the  least  malevolence  to- 
wards our  fellow-creatures.  This  must  always  be  sinful  in  our 
world,  and  in  any  other  world  of  moral  agents. 

The  importance  which  he  attaches  to  this  principle  may 
be  seen  from  his  inferences.  The  right  of  private  judg- 
ment, the  possibility  of  arriving  at  absolute  certainty  in 
morals,  the  impossibility  of  thorough  skepticism,  the  im- 
portance of  correct  sentiments,  the  propriety  of  a  day  of 
judgment,  and  "that  all  who  go  to  Heaven  will  go  there 
by  the  tmanimous  voice  of  the  whole  universe'^  are  cer- 
tainly most  great  and  important  deductions. 

5.  "God  exercises  mere  grace  in  pardoning  or  justify- 
ing penitent  believers  through  the  atonement  of  Christ, 
and  mere  goodness  in  rewarding  them  for  their  good 
wo-rks."  Hopkins  had  not  fully  brought  out  this  idea  be- 
cause his  presentation  of  the  atonement,  while  fully  iden- 
tifying him  with  the  Grotian  school,  had  been  incomplete, 
and  his  application  of  it  to  the  system  partial.  In  con- 
temporaries of  Emmons  we  read  repeatedly  that  the  atone- 
ment makes  forgiveness  "consistent"  with  the  honor  of 
God,  etc.    Emmons  put  it: 

If  the  sole  design  of  Christ's  atonement  was  to  satisfy  the  justice 
of  God  toward  himself,  then  he  exercises  the  sam^e  free  grace  in  par- 
doning sinners  through  the  atonement  as  if  no  atonement  had  been 
made.  It  has  been  considered  as  a  great  difficulty  to  reconcile  free 
pardon  with  full  satisfaction  to  divine  justice.  The  difficulty  has 
arisen  from  a  supposition  that  the  atonement  of  Christ  was  designed 
to  pay  the  debt  of  sufferings  which  sinners  owed  to  God.    If  this  were 


356         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


the  design  of  the  atonement,  it  would  be  difficult  to  see  the  grace  of 
God  in  pardoning  sinners  on  that  account.  For  there  is  no  grace  in 
forgiving  a  debtor  after  his  debt  is  paid,  whether  by  himself  or  by 
another.  But  sin  is  not  a  debt  and  cannot  be  paid  by  sufYering. 
Christ's  suffering  in  the  room  of  sinners  did  not  alter  the  nature  of 

their  sin  nor  take  away  their  just  deserts-  of  punishment  None 

will  deny  that  it  was  grace  in  God  to  send  Christ  into  the  world  to 
make  atonement  for  sin,  or  that  it  was  grace  in  Christ  to  come  into 
the  world  and  suffer  and  die  to  make  atonement  for  sin;  and  it  is 
certain  that  the  atonement  he  made  did  not  lay  God  under  obliga- 
tion, in  point  of  justice,  to  pardon  sinners  on  account  of  his  atone- 
ment ;  it  therefore  plainly  follows  that  God  exercises  as  real  grace 
in  pardoning  sinners  through  the  atonement  of  Christ,  as  in  sending 
him  to  make  atonement.  Free  pardon  therefore  is  perfectly  consistent 
with  free  grace. 

6.  ''Notwithstanding  the  total  depravity  of  sinners,  God 
has  a  right  to  require  them  to  turn  from  sin  to  holiness." 
Emmons  here  touches  upon  the  subject  with  which  the 
two  remaining  peculiarities  are  connected,  the  practical 
matter  of  conversion  and  the  labors  of  the  evangelist.  We 
must,  therefore,  add  these  at  once. 

7.  "Preachers  of  the  gospel  ought  to  exhort  sinners  to 
love  God,  repent  of  sin,  and  believe  in  Christ  immediately." 

8.  ''Men  are  active,  not  passive,  in  regeneration." 
Emmons'  meaning  is  that  the  depravity  of  sinners  is  a 

depravity  of  act,  and,  since  it  is  moral,  lies  wholly  in  the 
act.  Hence,  if  God  can  ever  require  any  act  of  them,  he 
can  require  their  turning  from  sin  to  holiness,  which  con- 
sists simply  in  beginning  holy  acts.  Hence  preachers  ought 
to  require  the  same,  and  nothing  else — nothing  which  is  in 
any  way  substituted  for  the  one  essential  and  primal  act 
of  repentance.  And  since  regeneration  does  not  take  place 
till  men  act,  and  consists  in  creating  their  holy  acts,  they, 
when  they  are  regenerated,  act,  and  only  act.  He  is  here 
but  uttering  concisely  the  contention  which  he  had  made  in 
opposing  the  "taste  scheme." 

Such  were  the  leading  positions  of  Emmons,  and  these 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY  357 

the  claims  which  he  would  himself  have  made  to  the  grati- 
tude of  posterity.  To  have  sharpened  somewhat  the  state- 
ment of  important  truths,  to  have  brought  them  thus  into 
clearer  light,  to  have  made  more  consistent  and  effective 
the  practical  labors  of  ministers  in  converting  men,  was 
to  him  a  source  of  satisfaction  as  an  adequate  aim  in  life 
and  a  sufficient  performance. 

The  "Theological  Lectures"  of  Leonard  Woods,^^  first 
professor  of  systematic  theology  at  Andover,  are  remark- 
able as  being  the  first  example  of  strictly  academic  lec- 
tures in  theology  issued  by  the  New  England  divines.  An- 
dover Seminary  was  formed  in  1808  by  the  union  of  two 
parties  in  the  evangelical  wing  of  Congregationalism — the 
"old"  or  "moderate"  Calvinists,  and  the  Hopkinsians,  of 
whom  Dr.  Emmons  was  the  most  eminent  representative, 
and  the  efficient  leader.  In  deference  to  the  first  party,  the 
Westminster  Confession  was  made  the  credal  foundation 
of  the  school,  and  the  second  party,  not  for  the  sake  of 
weakening  the  authority  of  the  Confession,  but  to  secure 
its  permanent  interpretation  in  a  truly  orthodox  and  evan- 
gelical sense,  added  a  special  creed  of  their  own.  To  both 
of  these  creeds  the  professor  of  systematic  theology  was 
bound;  and  the  success  of  the  new  institution  depended 
upon  finding  a  man  for  the  first  professor  who  could  sup- 
pose himself  to  be  true  to  the  original  creed  of  the  Puri- 
tans, while  a  member  of  a  school  of  thinkers  who  had 
essentially  modified  it  in  the  process  of  defending  and  im- 
proving it.  Such  a  man  was  found  in  Leonard  Woods, 
who  was  one  of  the  chief  agents  in  bringing  about  the 
establishment  of  the  seminary,  and  served  it  with  great  ap- 
plause and  success  till  1846.  His  position  was  essentially 
self-contradictory.  He  held  the  main  doctrines  of  West- 
minster, while  rejecting  the  unde. dying  philosophy  of  that 

«7  Included  in  his  Works  (5  vols.,  Andover,  1851). 


358 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Confession;  and  the  change  in  philosophy  brought  about 
many  a  change  in  details,  and  many  a  one  which  uncom- 
promising supporters  of  Westminster,  like  the  school  at 
Princeton,  must  regard  as  destructive  of  the  system.  But 
this  ambiguous  position,  which  perhaps  itself  rose  from 
the  nature  of  the  man — for  he  created  it  for  himself — 
made  him  what  Professor  H.  B.  Smith  called  "emphati- 
cally the  'judicious'  divine  of  the  later  New  England  theol- 
ogy/'  38  j^jg  "Lectures"  are  marked  by  comprehensive- 
ness, discussing  the  whole  round  of  theology,  and  by  a 
successful  avoidance  of  extremes.  They  are  discursive  and 
explanatory  rather  than  strongly  argumentative,  and  con- 
fine themselves  to  the  facts  of  doctrine,  often  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  explanation.  They  avoid  ontology.  In  the  sense  in 
which  Hegel  sought  to  ground  theology  in  the  profound 
truths  of  spirit  and  the  world,  they  know  nothing  of  spec- 
ulation. They  are  Hopkinsian,  and  show  strong  marks  of 
the  influence  of  Emmons ;  but  they  do  not  follow  this  master 
into  all  his  peculiarities.  They  give  no  evidence  of  any  pow- 
erful original  thinking,  and  if  they  contain  new  matter,  it 
originated  in  every  case  with  others.  They  instructed  young 
men  well  and  prepared  them  to  meet  the  questions  of  the 
day  and  do  their  evangelical  work  with  success.  Thus  they 
rendered  good  service  in  their  generation.  But  they  con- 
tributed nothing  to  the  progress  of  theology,  and  have 
therefore  a  very  small  place  in  this  history. 

In  respect  to  the  great  principles  of  his  system,  Woods 
built  it  upon  the  foundation  of  the  Scriptures,  which  were 
given  by  inspiration.^^  Inspiration  so  operated  as  to  make 
the  Bible  a  book  free  from  all  error.  Thus  his  doctrine  of 
inspiration  is  "plenary."  The  argument  is  wholly  from 
the  claims  of  the  Bible  itself,  and  this  never  seems  to 
Woods  to  be,  what  it  is,  a  begging  of  the  whole  question. 

88  Faith  and  Philosophy,  p.  258.  ^'^  Works,  Vol.  I,  pp.  95  ff. 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY 


359 


In  fact,  his  argument  is  substantially  this,  that  the  pro- 
posed theory  is  necessary  to  justify  our  idea  of  the  Bible. 
But  is  that  idea  correct?  Woods  neither  answers  nor  con- 
siders this  question.^^  The  placing  of  the  Bible  at  the 
head  of  the  system  would  have  enabled  him  to  draw  out 
a  more  complete  doctrine  of  God,  one  more  permeated  with 
the  biblical  spirit  than  was  becoming  customary  in  the 
school ;  but  this  advantage  he  does  not  utilize.  In  the  Trin- 
ity he  agrees  with  his  school,  laying  an  Emmonian  em- 
phasis upon  the  separateness  of  the  persons,^^  thus  depart- 
ing from  Stuart,  whose  favorite  word  "distinction"  he  re- 
jects as  inadequate.  He  agrees  with  Stuart  in  the  rejection 
of  ''eternal  generation."  The  doctrine  of  decrees — or, 
as  he  prefers  to  call  it,  God's  purposes — is  treated  with 
constant  reference  to  methods  of  popular  presentation  of 
it  as  an  obnoxious  doctrine.  The  characteristic  of  the 
school  to  give  a  large  place  to  the  topic  of  anthropology  re- 
appears here,  the  theory  of  the  will  being  Burtonian,  or  a 
modified  Edwardean  theory.^  ^  The  atonement  is  squarely 
governmental  in  its  statement  and  theoretical  basis,^^  the 
theory  of  virtue.^^  But  it  is  stated  in  the  terminology  of 
the  older  theory,  by  the  device  of  giving  the  terms  surrep- 
titiously a  new  meaning.  Thus  justice  is  by  no  means  to 
Woods  what  it  was  to  Princeton;  but  this  fact  must  be  in- 
ferred, for  Woods  does  not  frankly  state  it.^^  The  system 
is  brought  to  its  close  by  discussions  of  regeneration,  jus- 
tification, eschatology,  etc.,  as  to  some  of  which  his  posi- 
tions will  come  up  better  in  other  connections. 

As  Woods  may  be  called  the  immediate  official  successor 
of  Emmons  as  a  theologian  and  theological  teacher — for 
Andover  was  the  outcome  of  an  endeavor  to  perpetuate  the 

Ibid.,  pp.  157  ff.  Ibid.,  p.  431. 

*2  Ibid.,  p.  393.  *3  Vol,  II,  p.  95. 

Ibid.,  p.  468.  *5  Vol.  Ill,  p.  56. 

Ibid.,  Vol.  II,  p.  469. 


360 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


influence  of  Emmons  in  a  Hopkinsian  theological  school — 
it  will  be  well  to  compare  his  positions  explicitly  with  Em- 
mons' own  statement  of  his  distinctive  principles  given 
above.  As  to  the  first  (^'holiness  and  sin  consist  in  free, 
voluntary  exercises")  Woods  demurred. 

Holiness  or  unholiness  belong  primarily  and  essentially  to  man 
himself,  as  an  intelligent,  moral  being,  and  to  his  actions  secondarily 
and  consequentially.  You  may  ask  whether  there  is  anything  back 
of  right  moral  action,  that  is  prior  to  it.  I  answer,  yes;  there  is  an 
agent,  endued  with  all  necessary  moral  powers  and  faculties.  And 
there  is  something  more  than  an  agent,  and  something  more  than  a 
moral  agent.  If  the  actions  are  holy,  there  is  a  holy  moral  agent, 
and  if  the  actions  are  unholy,  there  is  an  unholy  agent.  It  is  in  refer- 
ence to  this  subject  that  Christ  says,  'The  tree  is  known  by  its  fruit." 
.  .  .  .  The  connection  between  the  character  of  the  actions  and  the 
character  of  the  agent  is  invariable.  Take  an  unrenewed  sinner,  who, 
according  to  Scripture,  is  an  enemy  to  God.  What  now  is  necessary 
in  order  that  he  may  love  God?  It  is  necessary  that  he  should  be 
born  again.  He,  the  man,  must  be  created  anew ;  and  if  he  is  created 
anew,  it  will  be  unto  good  works: — not  that  good  zvorks  must  be 
created,  he  himself  remaining  unchanged;  but  that  he  must  be  created 
anew,  and  then,  as  a  matter  of  course,  good  works  will  be  performed. 
If  a  man  is  regenerated,  or  made  holy,  holy  affections  and  acts  will 

follow — he  will  love  and  obey  God  To  say  that  regeneration 

consists  in  good  moral  exercises,  that  is,  in  loving  God  and  obeying 
his  commands,  seems  to  me  to  be  an  abuse  of  language.  It  is  as  un- 
philosophical  and  strange  as  to  say  that  the  birth  of  a  child  consists 
in  his  breathing,  or  that  the  creation  of  the  sun  consists  in  his  shin- 
ing.*7 

Thus  he  went  wholly  over  to  the  Burtonian  scheme,  the 
''taste"  scheme,  and  taught  that  God  immediately  creates 
in  the  sinner  a  new  taste  for  holy  things,  consequent  upon 
which  he  wills  to  do  them. 

As  to  the  second  (''men  act  freely  under  the  divine 
agency").  Woods,  while  necessarily  differing,  in  conse- 
quence of  his  position  as  to  the  taste,  in  the  definition  of 
the  divine  agency  in  relation  to  ours,  on  the  whole  adopted 
a  decidedly  Emmonian  way  of  defending  this  position, 

*7  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  537  f. 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY 


361 


proving  the  divine  agency  from  the  divine  attributes, 
works,  and  word,  and  human  freedom  from  conscious- 
ness.^^ As  to  the  third  ("the  least  transgression  of  the 
divine  law  deserves  eternal  punishment"),  Woods,  in  reply 
to  John  Foster,  lays  emphasis  upon  our  inability  to  deter- 
mine what  is  a  just  punishment  for  sin,  thus  substantially 
rejecting  Emmons'  position;  while  he  makes  the  chief  force 
of  his  own  reply,  outside  of  the  scriptural  argument  (his 
ultimate  proof),  to  consist  in  the  affirmation  that  sin  will 
be  eternal,  and  consequently  eternal  punishment  is  appro- 
priate.'*^ As  to  the  remaining  positions,  Woods  was  in 
substantial  agreement  with  Emmons,  the  differences  only 
excepted  which  follow  immediately  from  the  difference  as 
to  the  will  already  developed. 

Chronologically  the  remaining  system,  that  of  Timothy 
Dwight,^^  president  of  Yale  College,  preceded  that  of 
Woods,  and  the  latter  writer  frequently  quotes  from 
Dwight.  It  was  presented  to  the  public  in  the  form  in 
which  it  was  delivered,  viz.,  that  of  sermons,  which  were 
preached  before  the  college  audience  each  Sunday  of  the 
college  year,  the  complete  course  occupying  four  years  in 
delivery.  It  was  therefore  begun  about  the  year  1795,  was 
committed  to  writing  in  1809,  and  published  in  1818.^^ 
But  in  a  peculiar  degree  it  represented  no  special  school  in 
the  New  England  divinity,  and  did  not  lie  in  the  line,  pro- 

Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  514,  518. 
<i»  Ibid.,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  28s  ff. 

Timothy  Dwight,  born  at  Northampton,  Mass.,  May  14,  1752;  died  at  New 
Haven,  Conn.,  January  11,  1817;  graduated  from  Yale  in  1769,  at  a  little  more 
than  seventeen  years  of  age;  tutor  there,  1771,  etc.;  joined  the  army  at  West 
Point  as  chaplain,  1777;  served  in  the  Massachusetts  legislature  for  Northamp- 
ton in  1781  and  1782;  settled  in  Greenfield,  Conn.,  in  the  ministry,  in  1783; 
D.D.  from  Princeton  in  1787;  president  of  Yale  College,  1795-1817.  He  was  a 
grandson  of  Jonathan  Edwards,  and  his  own  grandson,  Timothy  Dwight,  was 
president  of  Yale  1886-98. 

Theology  Explained  and  Defended  in  a  Series  of  Sermons  (Middletowi*,, 
18 18),  and  many  times  thereafter,  the  last  current  editions  being  from  the  press 
of  Harper  Brothers. 


362         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

ceeding  through  Hopkins  and  Emmons,  in  which  we  are 
to  place  Woods.  It  stands  largely  by  itself,  and  may  be 
appropriately  considered  by  itself,  at  the  close  of  this  col- 
lection of  early  systems. 

The  position  of  the  author,  at  the  head  of  the  strongest 
religious  institution  of  the  country,  in  which  he  had  the 
opportunity  of  presenting  his  system  to  successive  genera- 
tions of  students  who  furnished  the  most  numerous  single 
group  of  Congregational  ministers,  gave  him  a  very  wide 
influence  as  a  theologian.  The  lectures  deserved  their  rep- 
utation and  their  influence,  for  their  learning  was  ample, 
their  grace  of  manner  considerable,  their  practical  char- 
acter marked,  and  their  chiefest  characteristic  their  strong 
common-sense.  Free  from  vagaries  of  every  sort,  they 
often  stopped  to  rebuke  vagaries  with  emphasis.  They 
held  strongly  to  their  course,  reviewed  the  great  doctrines 
with  comprehensiveness  and  completeness,  and,  without  the 
intermixture  of  much  metaphysics,  defended  the  standard 
positions  of  Calvinistic  orthodoxy  as  it  had  been  developed 
in  New  England  by  the  year  1800.  If  they  contributed 
little  to  the  further  development  of  the  system  of  New 
England  theology,  they  did  much  to  hold  that  development 
to  sound  lines;  and  it  was  from  the  sermons  of  Dwight 
that  Lyman  Beecher  obtained  his  theology,  as  well  as  one 
still  greater,  not  only  as  a  defender  of  the  past  but  as  an 
original  mind — N.  W.  Taylor. 

Lacking  the  creative  element,  these  sermons  do  not 
claim  a  large  place  in  a  genetic  history  of  New  England 
theology.  They  are  strongly  argumentative  so  far  as  the 
discussion  of  single  doctrines  is  concerned,  but  they  do  not 
build  the  whole  system  from  its  beginnings,  step  by  step, 
till  all  is  erected  one  substantial  and  linked  structure.  They 
begin,  it  is  true,  with  the  existence  of  God,  and  go  back  to 
the  ultimate  principle  of  causality  as  the  foundaton  of  the 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY 


363 


proof ;  but  though  they  employed  the  Scriptures  both  in  this 
argument  and  later  as  the  source  of  much  proof,  and  in 
fact  of  the  principal,  and  at  times  of  the  exclusive  proof 
of  doctrines  of  the  first  importance,  the  Scriptures  are 
themselves  nowhere  proved — that  is,  their  inspiration  and 
authority  established  by  appropriate  and  cogent  argumen- 
tation. This  topic  was  probably  remanded  to  the  author's 
lectures  upon  the  evidences  of  Christianity,  which  have 
never  been  published. 

Dwight's  general  conformity  to  the  New  England  school 
might  be  shown  by  illustrating  his  adherence  to  the  elder 
Edwards  in  the  outlines  of  the  theory  of  the  will  and  of 
the  nature  of  virtue,  by  showing  that  he  held  the  govern- 
mental theory  of  the  atonement  with  the  younger  Edwards, 
and  by  exhibiting  his  tendency  to  reject  the  more  marked 
excrescences  of  the  Calvinistic  scholasticism,  like  imputa- 
tion.   It  will  be  enough  here  to  mention  these  facts. 

One  of  the  chief  services  rendered  by  this  work  was  its 
steady  and  broad  antagonism  to  that  tendency  in  our  theol- 
ogy which  seemed  at  one  time  about  toi  triumph,  and  to 
put  all  agency  in  God,  to  the  real  destruction  of  human 
agency.  The  predecessor  and  teacher  of  Taylor,  who  was 
to  vindicate  a  true  place  for  man  as  an  agent,  ranged  him- 
self with  Burton  and  other  advocates  of  the  "taste  scheme," 
and  rejected  both  of  Emmons'  main  points,  his  "exercises" 
and  his  exclusive  divine  agency.  He  has  hardly  got  fairly 
into  the  swing  of  his  discourse  before  he  stops  to  put  in  the 
caveat  that  "God  cannot  be  proved  to  be  the  efficient  cause 
of  sin,"  and  in  the  first  volume  has  a  sermon  on  "exer- 
cises." He  argues  vigorously  that  the  soul  is  not  a  "mere 
succession,  or  chain,  of  ideas  and  exercises."  This  view 
is  contrary  to  those  natural  conceptions  of  mankind  by 
which  every  man  regards  himself  as  "a  being,  a  sub- 

52  Sermon  VIII.  "  Sermon  XXIV. 


364         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


stance,  an  agent,  immediately  the  subject  of  his  own 
thoughts,  and  the  cause  and  author  of  his  voHtions  and 
actions."  ''Attributes  cannot  be  conceived  to  exist  inde- 
pendently of  substances,  or  of  something  in  which,  they  in- 
here." He  objects  to  the  view  as  "destroying  personal 
identity." 

An  idea  is  a  mere  event,  having  a  momentary  existence  and  then 
perishing  forever.  Should  another  idea  afterwards  exist,  exactly- 
resembling  it  in  everything  but  the  period  in  which  it  exists,  it  would 

not  and  could  not  be  the  same  On  this  plan,  therefore,  the 

soul  of  man  has  no  continued  existence,  except  for  an  indivisible 
moment,  and  is  not  the  same  thing  which  it  was  the  preceding  hour, 
day,  or  year,  but  has  varied  and  become  an  absolutely  new  soul 
through  every  moment  which  has  passed  since  it  was  created,  and 
will  continue  to  be  a  new  thing  every  moment  throughout  eternity. 

There  is,  then,  nothing  which  can  be  rewarded  or  punished 
by  God.  Neither  guilt  nor  virtue  can  exist.  The  influence 
of  motives  is  forever  gone,  being  replaced  by  the  "imme- 
diate creation"  of  every  volition.  And  it  is  rendered  im- 
possible for  one  human  being  to  receive  impressions  from 
any  other,  since  to  give  an  impression  is  to  act,  and  an 
idea,  "a  thing,  merely  passive,"  cannot  act.^*  Regenera- 
tion therefore  consisted  to  Dwight  in  a  change  of  heart 
which  "consists  in  a  relish  for  spiritual  objects  communi- 
cated to  it  by  the  power  of  the  Holy  Ghost."  This  is  like 
Burton;  but,  whereas  Burton  was  perfectly  sure  about  the 
connection  of  this  change  with  the  new  volitions,  Dwight 
said :  "Of  the  metaphysical  nature  of  this  cause  [of  voli- 
tions] I  am  ignorant."  But  virtuous  volitions  as  truly  and 
certainly  followed  this  communication  of  relish  as  if  they 
were  created.  Then  follow  new  views  of  truth,  or  Hop- 
kins' "illumination." 

^*  Professor  H.  B.  Smith  {Faith  and  Philosophy,  p.  241)  suggests  that  this 
sermon  was  not  directed  against  Emmons,  but  against  Jonathan  Edwards  the 
Younger.  This  is  very  doubtful,  for  Edwards  had  no  influence  in  New  Haven, 
having  in  fact  died  at  Schenectady  in  1801,  while  the  sermons  were  not  put  in 
writing  till  1809.  Emmons  was,  however,  still  living  in  the  full  tide  of  his  in- 
fluence. 


SYSTEMS  OF  THEOLOGY  365 

But  there  was  a  new  element  in  this  system  which  de- 
mands more  careful  attention,  in  the  presentation  of  which 
Dwight  had  been  anticipated  by  none  of  his  New  England 
predecessors.  He  added  to  the  "system  of  doctrines"  a 
"system  of  duties"  which  occupies  seventy-two  out  of  the 
one  hundred  and  seventy-three  sermons  of  the  series.  It  is 
a  complete  system  of  practical  ethics. 

The  general  outline  of  the  system  of  duties  is  simple.  It 
begins  with  referring  all  virtue  to  the  two  great  command- 
ments upon  which  all  others  are  dependent,  the  command- 
ments to  love  God  with  all  the  soul,  and  one's  neighbor  as 
oneself.  The  Ten  Commandments  of  the  Decalogue  are 
next  taken  up,  and  all  the  various  Christian  virtues  derived 
from  these  by  a  process  of  inference  or  of  logical  extension 
of  the  literal  meaning  of  the  specific  commands.  Thus,  in 
discussing  the  "first  great  commandment,"  the  duties  of 
reverence  for  God,  humility,  and  resignation  are  added  to 
the  literal  obligation  to  "love"  God.  The  second  great 
commandment  leads  him  to  treat  of  the  effects  of  benev- 
olence upon  personal  happiness  and  on  public  happiness. 
He  then  inserts  the  somewhat  r'^.markable  proposition :  "that 
Virtue  is  founded  in  Utility."  No  wonder  that  he  was 
called  a  Utilitarian,  since  he  took  the  name  himself,  and 
that  the  charge  of  Utilitarianism  long  attached  to  the  New 
Haven  school.  But  in  the  sense  in  which  he  used  the  term 
he  was  entirely  right  when  judged  by  the  principles  of  the 
"Rightarians,"  as  they  have  sometimes  been  called.  He 
meant,  in  his  own  words,  that  "a  tendency  to  produce  hap- 
piness constitutes  the  excellence  and  value  of  virtue." 
There  was  to  Dwight,  as  well  as  to  the  other  New  Eng- 
land theologians,  an  ultimate  good  which  it  was  the  in- 
tuitive obligation  of  every  man  to  seek  to  attain.  That 
good  he  made  "happiness."    This  was  the  only  "ultimate 

55  Sermon  XCIX. 


366 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


good;"  and  the  only  "original  cause"  of  happiness  was  vir- 
tue. Had  he  defined  happiness  as  the  full  and  normal  exer- 
cise of  all  our  powers,  he  would  have  seen  that  holiness,  as 
the  exercise  of  the  moral  powers,  was  itself  happiness;  and 
as  the  exercise  of  the  noblest  of  those  powers,  the  high- 
est form  of  happiness.  But  he  never  would  have  admitted 
for  an  instant  that  any  result  of  malevolence,  arising  from 
any  new  perversity  of  things,  whereby  it  produced  happi- 
ness, could  justify  hating  any  creature,  or  constitute  such  a 
hate  into  virtue! 

So  general  is  the  acceptance  with  which  Dwight's  views 
on  practical  subjects  have  met  that  it  is  not  necessary  to 
follow  his  discussions  into  their  details.  We  may  there- 
fore leave  this  majestic  figure  in  our  middle  history,  who 
was  all  the  greater  because  he  left  so  little  that  was  peculiar 
to  himself.  He  powerfully  sustained  the  general  work  of 
our  theology,  and  transmitted  it  buttressed  and  defended 
at  essential  points.  That  he  did  this  so  well  as  to  relieve 
his  successors  of  the  necessity  of  doing  it  again  gave  them 
the  opportunity,  which  he  scarcely  had,  of  exercising  the 
critical  and  originating  faculty  and  of  asking  what  further 
errors  might  be  corrected  and  what  further  truths  intro- 
duced. 


THE  RIPENED  PRODUCT 


CHAPTER  XIII 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 

This  great  thinker  has  ah-eady  been  brought  before  the 
reader  in  connection  with  the  discussions  upon  the  will  and 
with  the  Unitarian  controversy.  It  may  be  said  that  the 
latter  controversy  determined  his  whole  theological  career 
for  it  was  his  purpose  to  refute  the  Unitarian  reasoning 
thoroughly,  and  for  this  end  to  explore  completely  the 
whole  subject  of  anthropology,  that  led  him  to  the  theo- 
logical positions  which  he  took  and  which  have  received 
the  name  of  Taylorism.  Yet  it  was  his  fate  to  wage  his 
controversies  with  his  brethren  rather  than  with  the  com- 
mon adversary ;  for  he  assumed  the  aspect  to  many  of  them 
of  the  theological  innovator,  and  they  felt  called  upon  to 
oppose  him  in  the  interests  of  the  very  orthodoxy  which 
he  was  trying  to  defend  in  a  more  fundamental  and  con- 
clusive way.  It  is  not  the  first  example  in  the  history  of 
theology  of  men's  confounding  defending  a  doctrine  in  a 
new  way  with  subverting  that  doctrine. 

What  has  been  already  said  of  Taylor's  doctrine  of  the 
will  must  therefore  be  constantly  kept  in  mind  in  our 
further  studies.  And  it  must  also.be  noticed  that  the  full 
measure  of  his  departure  from  Edwards  remained  con- 
cealed from  Taylor  himself.  Neither  his  opponents  nor 
he  had  a  fine  historical  sense,  nor  perceived  that  they  were 
in  the  midst  of  a  great  theological  development,  and  them- 
selves the  actors  in  it.  To  agree  with  Edwards  was  still 
the  high  ambition  of  them  all;  and  when  they  consciously 
disagreed,  as  did  Taylor,  they  thought  they  were  only  ex- 
pressing better  Edwards'  true  meaning. 

The  great  controversies  of  Taylor  began  with  a  sermon 

369 


370 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


delivered  in  New  Haven,  in  1828,  upon  moral  depravity, 
the  famous  Concio  ad  Clerum.  The  proposition  main- 
tained in  this  sermon  was  ''that  the  entire  moral  depravity 
of  mankind  is  by  nature."  In  it  Taylor  successively  main- 
tained, among  others,  the  positions  that  moral  depravity  is 
sinfulness;  that  this  is  not  created  in  man,  nor  does  it  con- 
sist in  acting  Adam's  act;  that  it  is  not  a  disposition  or  ten- 
dency to  sin  which  is  the  cause  of  all  sin;  that  it  is  "man's 
own  act,  consisting  in  a  free  choice  of  some  object  rather 
than  God,  as  his  chief  good; — or  a  free  preference  of  the 
world  and  of  worldly  good,  to  the  will  and  glory  of  God."  ^ 
He  then  advances  to  the  proposition  that  this  depravity  is 
by  nature.  He  defines  it :  "that  such  is  their  [men's]  na- 
ture that  they  will  sin  and  only  sin  in  all  the  appropriate 
circumstances  of  their  being."  ^  Men's  nature  is  not  it- 
self sinful,  nor  is  it  the  physical  or  efficient  cause  of  their 
sinning,  but  it  is  the  occasion  of  their  sinning.  In  the  ap- 
plicatory  "remarks"  of  the  sermon  he  said  again  that  "guilt 
pertains  exclusively  to  voluntary  action."  ^ 

In  these  positions,  while  supposing  himself  to  hold  the 
essence  of  the  doctrine  of  his  predecessors,  Taylor  had 
consciously  modified  its  form.  He  had,  in  fact,  only 
brought  out  more  clearly  than  they  the  positions  toward 
which  Hopkins,  Emmons,  and  Dwight  were  historically 
tending.  But  the  full  meaning  of  his  teaching  depended 
upon  his  new  conception  of  the  will,  upon  the  new  and  real 
freedom  which  he  had  at  last  succeeded  in  giving  it.  This 
constituted  the  strange  element,  and  was  the  true  occasion 
of  the  opposition  which  he  aroused. 

This  opposition  was,  however,  more  directly  excited  by 
a  position  taken  in  the  sermon  quite  incidentally  to  its  main 
purpose.    Taylor  suggested  a  new  idea  upon  the  prevention 


1  Concio,  p.  8. 
^Ihid..  p.  25. 


2  Ibid.;  p.  13. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


of  sin.  In  defending  the  proposition  that  universal  moral 
depravity  was  not  inconsistent  with  the  moral  perfections 
of  God  (thus  intentionally  meeting  the  grand  objection  of 
Channing  and  other  Unitarians),  he  opposed  the  doctrine 
which,  under  the  influence  of  Bellamy,  had  been  prevalent 
in  New  England,  that  sin  was  the  necessary  means  of  the 
greatest  good,  and  sought  to  substitute  for  it  the  supposi- 
tion (for  it  was  not  presented  as  a  matter  susceptible  of 
exact  proof)  that,  owing  to  the  nature  of  moral  agency, 
God  could  not  prevent  sin,  or  at  least  the  present  degree  of 
sin,  in  a  moral  system. 

It  is  exceedingly  important  for  a  comprehension  of  the 
following  discussions  that  Taylor's  meaning  be  fully  under- 
stood. He  took  the  words  of  the  old  proposition  in  their 
obvious  meaning.  By  "necessary"  he  understood  indis- 
pensable; and  by  "means,"  that  directly  employed  to  effect 
a  given  purpose.  The  only  means  of  good  to  Taylor  was 
good  itself;  and  since  the  greatest  good,  which  is  the  per- 
manent prevalence  of  the  highest  holiness,  might  be  pro- 
cured by  the  unvarying  holy  choices  of  all  moral  agents,  if 
they  only  would  thus  choose,  he  could  not  call  evil  "neces- 
sary" to  that  good.  He  believed  that  God  gave  man  free 
agency  because  he  could  thereby  make  him  a  being  cap- 
able of  holiness^  which  consists  in  free  choices.  He  gave  it 
to  him  for  this  positive  purpose  only.  Incidentally,  it  in- 
volved the  possibility  of  sin,  which  actually  followed  in 
the  history  of  the  human  race.  Perhaps  God,  having  given, 
and  maintaining  free  agency  among  men,  could  not  prevent 
all  sin.  But  he  chose,  not  the  sin,  in  any  sense,  but  holi- 
ness, and  free  agency  as  the  condition  thereof;  neither  did 
he  prefer  sin  even,  in  the  words  of  some,  "all  things  con- 
sidered," or  that  degree  of  sin  actually  existing,  but  always 
holiness.  He  did  prefer  moral  agency,  though  it  would  in- 
volve sin;  and  hence  he  never  preferred  or  decreed  sin 


372 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


directly.  It  is  involved  in  his  decrees,  but  not  as  itself  a 
thing  decreed. 

To  let  Taylor  speak  for  himself : 

Is  it  more  honorable  to  God  to  suppose  that  such  is  the  nature 
of  sin  that  he  could  not  accomplish  the  highest  good  without  it, 
than  to  suppose  that  such  is  the  nature  of  free  agency  that  God  could 
not  wholly  prevent  its  perversion?  ....  The  prevention  of  sin  by 
any  influence  that  destroys  the  power  to  sin  destroys  moral  agency. 
Moral  agents  must  then  possess  the  power  to  sin.  Who  then  can 
prove  a  priori,  or  from  the  nature  of  the  subject,  that  a  being  who 
can  sin  will  not  sin?  How  can  it  be  proved  a  priori,  or  from  the 
nature  of  the  subject,  that  a  thing  will  not  be,  when  for  aught  that 
appears  it  may  be?* 

It  will  be  noted  here  that  the  fundamental  thought  un- 
derlying all  the  discussion  is  the  new  idea  of  freedom. 
God  has  given  man  the  power  of  acting  as  a  true  first 
cause,  and  has  thus  placed  him  beyond  the  reach  of  true 
power,  even  the  divine  power,  as  a  determining  cause  of 
his  volitions. 

Three  controversies  followed  the  appearance  of  this  ser- 
mon, of  which  two  sprang  directly  and  solely  from  it,  the 
third  partially. 

I.   THE  CONTROVERSY  WITH  HARVEY 

The  year  following  (1829),  Joseph  Harvey,  pastor  of 
the  church  at  Westchester,  Conn.,  reviewed  Taylor's  ser- 
mon in  a  pamphlet  of  forty  pages.  The  review  begins  with 
discussing  the  proposition  that  moral  depravity  is  man's 
own  act.  As  soon  as  he  has  finished  his  review  of  Tay- 
lor's citations  of  authorities,  he  affirms  that  the  theory  is 
"irrational  and  unbiblical.  It  alleges  an  effect  without  a 
cause."  ^  He  thus  shows  at  the  outset  that  he  has  not  fol- 
lowed Taylor  in  the  adoption  of  the  new  position  as  to 
the  will,  and  cannot  conceive  of  the  cause  of  any  volition 
lying  entirely  in  the  causing  agent.    He  is  still  upon  the 

*  Loc.  cit.,  p.  32. 

s  A  Review  of  a  Sermon,  etc.  (Hartford,  1829),  p.  14. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


373 


old  Edwardean  basis.  Such  criticism  is  not  likely  to  help. 
Hence  he  goes  on  to  maintain,  by  a  variety  of  arguments, 
that  the  corrupt  nature  of  man  is  itself  sinful,  though  even 
Edwards  had  taught  that  all  sin  was  voluntary.  The  great 
proof  is  that  God  regards  and  treats  infants  as  sinners. 
The  fundamental  objection  to  Taylor  he  states  in  these 
words : 

If  then  Dr.  Taylor  means,  as  he  says  he  does,  that  nature  is  not 
the  efficient  cause  of  sin,  but  the  occasion  or  reason  of  it,  he  relin- 
quishes the  certainty  of  efYect  and  admits  that  its  actual  occurrence 
depends  upon  circumstances.  And  this,  according  to  his  own  defini- 
tion, is  Arminianism.6 

In  other  words,  Harvey  cannot  understand  the  new 
theory  of  the  will. 

The  last  division  of  the  criticism,  considers  Taylor's 
views  upon  the  permission  of  sin.  Harvey  begins  with  a 
complete  misunderstanding  of  Taylor.  He  summarizes  his 
opponent  thus  :  "Sin  is  on  the  whole  an  evil  in  the  govern- 
ment of  God  which  he  did  not  choose  to  permit,  but  which 
he  could  not  prevent."  Nothing  is  clearer  than  that  Tay- 
lor taught  that  God  did,  on  the  whole,  "choose  to-  permit" 
sin.  He  said  in  the  Concio  "that  the  providential  purposes 
or  decrees  of  God  extend  to  all  actual  events,  sin  not  ex- 
cepted." God  ordained  "the  system"  with  a  full  knowl- 
edge of  what  it  involved,  and  therefore  he,  on  the  whole, 
chose  to  permit  what  was  involved.  Harvey,  in  reply  tG 
what  he  has  stated  as  Taylor's  position,  maintains  tnat 
God  can  prevent  sin,  and  cites  the  angels  as  a  proof  of  this 
fact;  but  he  does  not  touch  Taylor's  argument  by  this 
objection,  since  Taylor  would  include  the  angels  in  the  sys- 
tem in  which  we  are,  would  also  cite  the  fallen  angels,  and 
even  now  had  in  mind  a  thought,  which  he  brought  out 
more  clearly  later,  that  God  was  limited  by  the  best  good 

«  Ibid.,  p.  28. 
'  Concio,  p.  34. 


374 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


of  all  considered,  or  could  not  consistently  prevent  sin  in  a 
moral  system.  So  completely  had  he  failed  to  understand 
Taylor.  The  idea  of  any  self-limitation  upon  the  part  of 
the  Deity  was  thoroughly  abhorrent  to  his  thinking. 

The  following  June  (1829)  both  these  pamphlets,  the 
Concio  and  Harvey's  Review,  were  discussed  in  the  Quar- 
terly CJmstian  Spectator^  published  in  New  Haven,  and 
serving  as  the  medium  for  the  extension  of  the  influence 
of  the  Divinity  School  and  its  leading  professor.  The  posi- 
tion of  Mr.  Harvey,  as  lingering  upon  the  untenable 
ground  of  Edwards,  where  he  had  remained  after  reject- 
ing imputation,  by  an  ''utter  confusion  of  personal  iden- 
tity," ^  is  exhibited,  and  it  is  declared  necessary  either  to 
go  back  to  imputation  or  forward  to  the  position  that  all 
sin  is  actual.  Harvey's  argument  from  sin  to  a  sinful 
cause  is  shown  to  rest  upon  the  groundless  supposition  that 
"the  cause  of  a  given  effort  must  have  the  same  properties 
or  attributes  as  the  effect  itself."  ^  The  defects  of  his 
theory  of  the  will  are  reduced  to  his  failure  to  distinguish 
between  the  three  faculties  of  the  mind.^^  A  discussion  of 
efficient  and  occasional  causes  is  added,  in  which  the  former 
kind  of  cause  is  reserved  for  the  acting  agent.  Pains  are 
also  taken  in  this  review  to  present  again  Dr.  Taylor's 
theories  as  to  the  prevention  of  sin,  and  to  show  how  the 
theory  that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good 
was,  in  Taylor's  mind,  an  excess  of  speculation  from  which 
he  desired  to  recall  theology.  The  reviewer  strikes  again 
the  keynote  of  the  discussion  in  the  following  words : 

The  moral  government  of  God,  in  distinction  from  his  providen- 
tial dominion,  has  been  a  subject  of  but  little  discussion.  The  views 
of  men  concerning  it  are  apt  to  be  loose  and  indefinite.  Almost  every- 
thing pertaining  to  the  government  of  God  has  been  referred  to  his 
physical  agency.    Hence  it  has  been  inferred  from  his  omnipotence, 

®  Spectator,  loc.  cit.,  p.  349. 
»  Ihid.,  p.  352. 
10  Ihid.,  p.  362. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


375 


as  a  kind  of  axiom,  that  God  could,  in  a  moral  system,  have  pre- 
vented all  sin.  This  has  been  supposed  to  result  so  directly  from  his 
power  that  a  doubt  respecting  it  has  seemed  to  involve  a  question  re- 
specting his  perfection.  Yet  it  is  not  a  limitation  of  his  power  to 
say  that  what  in  the  nature  of  the  case  is  impossible,  could  not  have 
been  done.  And  do  we  know  that,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  all  sin, 
or  the  present  amount  of  sin,  could  have  been  prevented  and  yet  a 
moral  government  have  existed  at  all?  Plain  it  is  that,  if  sin  be  pre- 
vented, this  must  be  done  not  by  force  alone  but  by  a  moral  influence 
exerted  upon  created  minds.  Moral  beings  are  voluntary  beings. 
They  act  under  the  influence  of  motives.  If  they  are  kept  from  sinning, 
it  is  not  because  they  cannot  sin,  but  because  obedience  is  their 
choice. 1^ 

Mr.  Harvey  himself  (it  would  seem)  replied  to  this  re- 
view in  an  Examination  (1829).^^  He  tries,  with  little 
success,  to  turn  the  objections  which  had  been  made  to  his 
positions.  For  instance,  he  tries  to  modify  the  position 
that  a  cause  must  have  the  attributes  and  properties  of  the 
effect;  but  he  ends  by  saying  that  "in  the  case  supposed 
....  they  are  in  respect  to  each  other  invariably  the  same, 
like  a  stream  to  a  fountain."  He  puts  the  question  in 
dispute  in  this  form:  "Are  men  sinners  from  their 
birth?"  Harvey  answers  this  question  in  the  affirmative 
because  he  does  not  acknowledge  that  the  knowledge  of 
law  is  necessary  to  sin.^^  He  thinks  that  there  may  be 
moral  action,  which  is  sinful,  from  birth,  even  before 
knowledge  of  law  can  be  had,  and  this  condition  of  sinful 
moral  action  is  what  he  means  by  nature  when  he  says  that 
man  is  a  sinner  by  nature. 

Ineffective  as  all  this  was,  Harvey  nevertheless  rendered 
some  service  in  the  dispute  by  pressing  Taylor  upon  points 
which  he  had  scarcely  considered  sufficiently.  Thus  he 
demands  to  know  how  Dr.  Taylor  accounts  for  the  cer- 
tainty of  sin  and  for  its  certain  universality  upon  his  theory 

11  Ibid.,  pp.  379  f. 

12  Published  at  Hartford;  8vo,  53  pages.  In  Oberlin  College  Library,  No. 
204  R  2721.  ^^Examination,  p.  10. 

1*  Ibid.j  p.  13.  Ibid.,  p.  30. 


376         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


of  freedom.^  ^  Taylor  had  been  quite  indistinct  as  to  this 
crucial  point,  and  needed  to  be  sharply  called  to  a  definite 
answer.  But  no*  such  answer  was  forthcoming.  And  then 
Taylor  had  propounded  an  explanation  of  the  way  that  sin 
rises  historically  in  the  developing  life  of  an  infant.  He 
had  said : 

A  child  enters  the  world  with  a  variety  of  appetites  and  desires 
which  are  generally  acknowledged  to  be  neither  sinful  nor  holy. 
Committed  in  a  state  of  utter  helplessness  to  the  assiduity  of  parental 
fondness,  it  commences  existence  the  object  of  unceasing  care,  watch- 
fulness, and  concession,  to  those  around  it.  Under  such  circumstances 
it  is  that  the  natural  appetites  are  first  developed;  and  each  advan- 
cing month  brings  them  new  objects  of  gratification.  The  obvious  con- 
sequence is  that  self-indulgence  becomes  the  master  principle  in  the 
soul  of  every  child  long  before  it  can  understand  that  this  self-in- 
dulgence will  ever  interfere  with  the  rights,  or  entrench  on  the  hap- 
piness, of  others.  Thus  by  repetition  is  the  force  of  constitutional 
propensities  accumulating  a  bias  towards  self-gratification,  which  be- 
comes incredibly  strong  before  a  knowledge  of  duty  or  a  sense  of 
right  and  wrong  can  possibly  have  entered  the  mind.  That  moment — 
the  commencement  of  moral  agency,  at  length  arrives.  Does  the 
child  now  come  in  a  state  of  perfect  neutrality  to  the  question  whether 
it  will  obey  or  disobey  the  command  which  cuts  it  off  from  some 
favorite  gratification?  If  the  temptation  presented  to  constitutional 
propensities  could  be  so  strong  in  the  case  of  Adam,  as  to  overpower 
the  force  of  established  habits  of  virtue  in  the  maturity  of  his  reason, 
how  absolute  is  the  certainty  that  every  child  will  yield  to  the  urgency 
of  those  propensities  under  the  redoubled  impulse  of  long  cherished 
self-gratification  and  in  the  dawn  of  intellectual  existence !  Could 
the  uniform  certainty  of  this  event  be  greater  if  the  hand  of  Omni- 
potence were  laid  upon  the  child  to  secure  the  result 

Evidently,  this  is  an  explanation  of  the  case  by  "circum- 
stances," as  Harvey  points  out,  and  by  circumstances  which 
differ  greatly  in  different  cases.  And  though  Harvey  does 
not  avoid  forms  of  expression  that  lay  him  open  to  a  sharp 
verbal  reply,  he  is  right  in  urging  the  necessity  of  explain- 
ing how  universal  sin  results  from  such  a  condition  of 

Loc.  cit.,  p.  36. 

^'  Spectator,  June,  1829,  p.  366.  This  suggestion  had  been  considered  by 
Edwards  in  his  Original  Sin;  cf.  above  p.  86. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


377 


things  as  is  here  presented.  "The  consent  or  choice  of  the 
will  is,  then,  after  all,  the  turning  point  in  the  existence  of 
sin.  The  reviewers  have  told  us  how  the  natural  propen- 
sities are  excited  and  increased,  but  they  have  not  told  us 
how  they  result  in  choice."  In  pressing  Taylor  so  hard 
at  this  point,  Harvey  pointed  the  way  to  a  necessary  further 
advance.    But  Taylor  was  not  able  to  make  it. 

Taylor,  however,  replied  to  Harvey  in  an  Inquiry, in 
which  he  first  defended  himself  from  the  charge  of  de- 
parture from  Dr.  Dwight,  and  then  discussed  the  points 
brought  forward  in  the  Examination.  He  thought  the 
prospect  *^fair"  "of  a  speedy  and  an  almost  exact  agree- 
ment" between  the  contestants.  He  recalls  Harvey  from 
the  point  which  that  gentleman  had  stated  as  the  true  issue 
(whether  men  are  sinners  from  their  birth),  to  the  true 
point  as  he  conceives  it,  the  nature  of  sin.  He  drives  Har- 
vey into  the  corner  as  to  the  possibility  of  a  sin  before 
conscious  voluntary  transgression;  but  he  does  not  answer 
the  difficulty  about  the  previous  certainty  of  sin  upon  the 
basis  of  a  doctrine  of  freedom. 

One  or  two  more  tracts  followed  in  this  controversy; 
but  they  added  nothing  to  the  presentation  of  the  issue. 
Taylor's  views  were  still  too  new  to  be  properly  under- 
stood by  the  churches. 

II.    THE  CONTROVERSY  WITH  WOODS 

We  have  already  followed  Dr.  Leonard  Woods,  of  An- 
dover,  in  his  controversy  wath  the  Unitarians,  and  have 
seen  the  immovable  conservatism  of  his  position,  which 
prevented  him  from  attempting  any  constructive  work 
upon  the  doctrines  involved,  by  which  work  alone  a  help- 
ful reply  could  have  been  given  and  the  state  of  theology 
really  advanced.     The  same  conservatism,   joined  with 

^^Examination,  p.  38.  i»  New  Haven,  1829;  43  pages. 


378 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


some  inability  to  put  himself  at  another  man's  point  of 
view,  led  him  to  form  an  unfavorable  estimate  of  the  tend- 
encies of  Taylor's  suggestions  in  the  Concio,  and,  with  a 
good  deal  of  solemn  and  misplaced  unction,  to-  reply  to 
them  at  considerable  length.^^ 

The  reply  is  principally  confined  to  Taylor's  suggestions 
as  to  the  prevention  of  sin.  But  no  sooner  does  Woods 
strike  the  subject  than  it  is  evident  that  he  is  incapable  of 
understanding  Taylor.  Whereas  Taylor's  idea  was  that 
it  was  impossible  for  God  to  prevent  sin  while  maintaining 
the  moral  system  in  which  agents  are  inalienably  able  to 
sin.  Woods  infers  that  he  meant  that  God  had  no  power  to 
prevent  it  "in  the  literal  and  proper  sense."  As  soon  as 
the  discussion  of  the  subject  fairly  begins,  Woods  presents 
his  own  theory,^^  which  may  be  concisely  stated  thus :  The 
existence  of  sin  is  a  mystery.  "The  incomprehensible  God, 
for  reasons  which  lie  beyond  human  intelligence,  taking  a 
perfect  view  of  his  own  attributes  and  of  the  whole  system 
of  created  beings,  saw  it  to  be  best  not  to  prevent  the  exist- 
ence of  moral  evil"  and  "chose  to  admit  it  into  the  uni- 
verse," and  "will  make  it  a  means  of  glory  to  his  name 
and  of  good  to  his  kingdom."  Thus  he  takes  a  position 
midway  between  the  plain,  unvarnished  Hopkinsian  "means 
of  the  greatest  good"  and  Taylor's  ascription  of  the  dif- 
ficulty to  the  will  of  man.  He  later  argues  powerfully  in 
support  of  Hopkins'  view  and  is,  on  the  whole,  in- 
clined to  it.  But  he  is  always  prepared  to  deny  stoutly  the 
supposition  that  God  could  not  prevent  sin. 

The  root  of  his  opposition  to  the  idea  that  God  could 
not  prevent  sin  while  maintaining  moral  agency  is  ex- 
hibited as  soon  as  he  touches  upon  the  subject  of  the  will. 
He  does  not  believe  in  "power  to  the  contrary,"  thus  occu- 

Letters  to  Rev.  Nathaniel  W.  Taylor,  D.D.   (Andover,   1830;   114  pages). 
21  Op.  cit.,  p.  27.  22  iijid.,  p.  37.  23  ii,id.,  pp.  70  f. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


379 


pying  the  Burtonian  position.^^  Taylor's  theory,  he  says, 
"seems  toi  imply  that  moral  agents  as  such,  that  is,  moral 
agents  in  the  exercise  of  their  moral  agency,  are  not  de- 
pendent upon  God;"  and  dependence  upon  God  he  defines 
thus:  ''That  it  depends  upon  God's  will  whether  their 
moral  agency  shall  be  exerted  in  one  way  or  another." 
That  is  strict  Edwardean  determinism.  He  was  thus  led 
to  believe  that  Taylor's  scheme  would  tend  ''towards  a 
denial  of  all  divine  power  and  divine  influence  in  the  con- 
version of  sinners  except  merely  such  a  kind  of  power  and 
influence  as  we  have  over  the  minds  of  our  fellow  men." 
He  himself  later  recurs  to  the  old  theory  of  the  arbitrary 
will  of  God,  for  he  proves  that  God  has  power  to  convert 
men  by  several  arguments,  among  which  are,  "God  is 
omnipotent,"  ^"^  and  makes  an  antithesis  between  the  "will, 
counsel,  or  pleasure  of  God"  and  his  "power"  to  con- 
vert. 

Thus  it  is  evident  that  Woods  could  not  understand 
Taylor,  and  that  his  part  in  the  controversy  was  not  cal- 
culated to  throw  any  more  light  upon  the  subject  than  Har- 
vey's had  been.  Both  of  these  writers  were,  in  fact,  out- 
side the  current  of  the  New  England  development,  and, 
while  loyal  to  such  predecessors  as  Hopkins,  failed  en- 
tirely to  comprehend  Hopkins  or  his  great  constructive  as- 
sociates in  the  true  significance  of  their  labors.  This  was 
the  less  astonishing  in  Wood's  case,  for  it  was  a  funda- 
mental idea  in  the  constitution  of  Andover  Seminary,  for 
which  he  was  more  responsible  than  any  other  person, 
that  a  man  could  be  both  a  Hopkinsian  and  a  true  follower 
of  Westminster.  The  theological  struggle  to  unite  these 
irreconcilable  positions  is  the  tragedy  of  that  institution. 


2*  Ibid.,  p.  40. 
2«  Ibid.,  p.  47. 
28  Ibid.,  p.  65. 


25  Ibid. 

Ibid.,  p.  61. 


38o 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


As  usual,  the  New  Haven  writers  replied  in  the  Spec- 
tator}^ The  reply  is  exceedingly  sharp  when  compared 
with  the  labored  and  cumbrous  style  of  Dr.  Woods.  After 
showing  that  Woods  has  erected  Taylor's  hypothesis  into 
a  theory,  thus  improperly  changing  the  point  at  issue,  the 
reviewer  goes  on  to  prove  that  Woods  ''conceded  the  great 
principle  maintained  by  Dr.  Taylor  ....  by  affirming 
that  all  that  the  nature  of  the  case  admits  of  our  saying  is 
this :  that  God  for  wise  and  good  reasons  decided  to  permit 
the  existence  of  sin." 

Now  if  these  things  are  so — if  the  reasons  for  God's  permission 
of  sin  are  known  only  to  his  own  infinite  mind,  if  we  are  incapable 
of  discovering  the  reasons — if  the  case  does  not  admit  of  assigning 
a  reason,  then  to  assign  the  reason  in  question,  viz.,  "that  sin  is  the 
necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good,"  is  wholly  unwarranted.  Has 
not  Dr.  Woods,  then,  most  abundantly  conceded  all  that  Dr.  Taylor 
asserts  on  this  point?  The  whole  includes  the  parts;  and  if  no  reason 
can  properly  be  assigned  in  the  case,  then,  this  particular  reason,  Dr. 
Woods  himself  being  judge,  cannot  be  assigned.  What  concession 
could  be  more  ample  or  complete?  If  God  "only"  knows  the  reasons 
for  the  entrance  of  sin  into  the  universe,  then  Dr.  Woods  does  not 
know  them;  and,  as  Dr.  Taylor  says,  "ignorance  is  incompetent  to 
make  an  objection." 

But  ample  as  these  general  concessions  are,  Dr.  Woods  has  been 
more  specific.  He  has  actually  adopted  the  very  statements  of  those 
whom  he  has  come  forward  to  arraign  before  the  public.  Dr.  Tay- 
lor asks  in  substance,  may  not  God  have  chosen  his  present  "method 
of  administration"  not  because  (as  any  part  of  the  reason)  it  em- 
braced moral  evil,  "but  though  or  notwithstanding  it  would  not  en- 
tirely exclude  (such)  evil."  Now  this  is  the  identical  statement  made 
by  Dr.  Woods  in  the  following  passage.  May  not  this  have  been  the 
case,  says  Dr.  Taylor.  Might  not  this  be  the  case,  says  Dr.  Woods; 
this  is  the  sole  difference. — "Might  not  God  see  that  the  particular 
mode  of  proceeding  which  he  actually  adopted,  was  better  than  any 
other,  ....  and  though  it  would  not  entirely  exclude  evil,  would 
ultimately  raise  his  kingdom  to  a  higher  degree  of  holiness  and  hap- 
piness than  any  other  ? 

Aggravating  as  this  mode  of  turning  the  controversy 

2»  Volume  for  1830,  pp.  540  flf.  JUd.^  p.  542. 

81  Ihid.,  p.  543. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


381 


must  have  been,  it  did  in  fact  exhibit  the  entire  consistency 
of  Taylor's  new  explanations  with  the  fundamental  posi- 
tions of  his  predecessors  and  contemporaries,  and  thus  legi- 
timatize his  speculations  in  the  system  of  New  England 
thought.  The  remaining  portions  of  the  reply,  while 
equally  effective  as  an  answer  to  Woods,  did  nothing  to 
further  the  controversy.  Others  joined  in  the  discussion, 
as,  for  example,  Rev.  E.  R.  Tyler  in  a  sermon  with  the 
illuminating  title,  Holiness  Preferable  to  Sin  (1829);  but 
the  controversy  was  soon  lost  in  the  stir  occasioned  by  a 
still  greater  one,  viz. : 

III.     THE   CONTROVERSY   WITH  TYLER 

The  roots  of  this  controversy  lie  far  back  in  the  New 
England  history.  We  have  seen  the  great  interest  which 
was  displayed  from  the  time  of  Edwards  himself  in  all  the 
philosophy  of  revivals.  The  discussions  of  methods  of  ex- 
horting sinners,  and  of  the  proper  use  of  the  "means"  of  re- 
generation, had  been  frequent;  and  the  appearance  of  a 
new  work  upon  this  subject  at  any  time  would  have  been 
always  regarded  as  entirely  appropriate — indeed  as  a  fa- 
vorable indication  as  to  the  piety  and  earnestness  of  the 
churches. 

It  was  therefore  quite  in  the  order  of  things  when 
Gardner  Spring,  pastor  of  the  Brick  Church,  New  York, 
published  in  1827  A  Dissertation  on  the  Means  of  Regen- 
eration. He  defines  the  means  as  "whatever  is  adapted  to 
arrest  the  attention  of  men  to  moral  and  spiritual  objects," 
including  the  Bible,  ministry,  word  of  God,  sabbath,  sanc- 
tuary, etc.  God  seems  uniformly  to  connect  the  operation 
of  his  Spirit  with  these  means, and  in  the  offers  of  the 
gospel  he  is  entirely  sincere.  Now,  unregenerate  men  make 
only  an  insincere  and  wrong  use  of  the  means,     and  the 


op.  cit.,  pp.  6,  7. 


Ibid.,  p.  13. 


3S2  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


question  hence  arises  how  such  a  use  of  means  is  con- 
nected with  regeneration.^^  Such  a  use  is  not  acceptable 
to  God:  there  is  no  promise  made  to  such  a  use  of  means; 
they  do  not  bring  man  to  hoHness ;  they  do  not  ahvays  ter- 
minate in  regeneration;  they  do  not  change  the  heart, 
which  is  the  resuh  of  the  immediate  exercise  of  the  divine 
power.  Spring  speaks  of  this  as  the  '''production"  of  holi- 
ness.He  thus  uses  the  phrase  of  Emmons,  and  his  doc- 
trine is  that  of  Em.mons,  its  metaphysical  elements  being 
omitted.    He  says : 

The  principal  reason  why  this  influence  is  necessary  is  that  un- 
regenerated  men  are  enemies  to  God  and  holiness,  and  their  hostility 
is  so  un>-ielding  that  no  light  communicated  to  their  understanding, 
no  obligations  addressed  to  their  conscience,  no  motives  presented  to 
their  hopes  or  their  fears,  can  produce  holy  love.''^ 

Thus  they  are  substantially  put  out  of  the  entire  reach  of 
the  m.oral  government  of  God  and  reduced  under  a  govern- 
ment of  force. 

It  can  be  of  little  interest  to  know  that  Spring  found 
under  these  circumstances  some  use  for  ''means.'''"  They 
enlighten  the  understanding,  impress  the  conscience,  illus- 
trate the  obduracy  of  the  heart,  exhibit  the  powerlessness 
of  men.'^^'  Hence  the  only  true  exhortation  to  be  addressed 
to  men  when  unrepentant  is  to  repent,  not  to  use  the  means 
of  regeneration. 

Taylor,  who  was  a  great  preacher  and  evangelist,  could 
not  rest  easy  under  the  publication  of  such  doctrines,  after 
he  had  once  got  clear  ideas  upon  the  nature  of  the  sensibil- 
ity and  the  will,  and  had  begun  to  understand  the  moral 
government  of  God.  Accordingly,  he  reviewed  Spring  in 
the  several  numbers  of  the  Spectator  for  1829  at  great 
length.  Spring  left  the  question  why  the  sinner  should  do 
anything  preparatory  to   conversion  substantially  unan- 

L(yc.  cit.,  p.  16.  Ihvd.,  pp.  17-24. 

2«  Ihid.,  p.  2;.  Ibid.,  pp.  26-32. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


383 


swered.  He  did  not  show  a  way  to  the  heart  whereby  it 
might  be  influenced  to  repent,  nor  justify  his  doctrine  that 
the  sinner  should  be  exhorted  to  nothing  but  immediate 
repentance.  The  pulpit,  unless  sustained  by  reasons  drawn 
from  other  regions,  was  prostrated  by  his  argument.  It 
was  to  raise  it  again,  to  perform  the  task  left  unperformed 
by  Spring,  to  find  a  neutral  point  in  the  mind  to  which  the 
motives  of  the  gospel  could  be  addressed  and  the  pulpit 
make  its  appeal,  that  Taylor  wrote. 

He  begins  by  denying  that  acts  which  are  themselves 
sinful  can  be  in  any  proper  sense  of  the  words  called  "using 
the  means  of  regeneration."  He  lays  down  the  great 
principle  that  "the  mode  of  divine  influence  is  consistent 
with  the  moral  nature  of  this  change  as  a  voluntary  act  of 
man;  and  also  that  it  is  through  the  truth,  and  implies  at- 
tention to  truth  on  the  part  of  man."  Thus  he  rescues 
freedom  and  the  divine  government  at  the  outset.  For  the 
purposes  of  the  discussion  he  takes  the  liberty  which  every 
writer  has,  of  defining  his  terms  according  to  the  way  in 
which  he  proposes  to  use  them,  and  confines  the  term  "re- 
generation" to  "that  act  of  the  will,  or  heart,  which  con- 
sists in  a  preference  of  God  to  every  other  object."  He 
thus  differs  from  Hopkins,  but  differs  explicitly  and  con- 
sistently. 

The  process  of  regeneration  (or,  as  the  Hopkinsians 
would  have  said,  conversion)  Taylor  describes  as  follows: 

There  is  in  man  a  capacity  of  feeling,  which  responds 
to  appropriate  motives,  even  those  which  exhibit  the  glory 
and  excellence  of  God.  This  he  sometimes  terms  a  "desire 
for  happiness,"  which  is  constitutional  in  man,  and  hence 
unalienated  by  the  course  of  sin  in  which  the  unrepentant 
man  has  lived.    His  usual  designation  for  this  was  "self- 

s»  Ibid.,  p.  17.  38  jiid^^  p. 

"  Ibid.,  p.  19. 


384         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


love,"  which  gave  rise  to  a  great  amount  of  misunderstand- 
ing, and  may  have  been  the  reason  why  he  did  not  gain 
even  a  hearing  from  his  opponents  for  the  important  sug- 
gestions which  he  had  to  make  in  human  psychology.  Hop- 
kins had  used  the  term  synonymously  with  "selfishness," 
and  so  it  was  often  interpreted  in  Taylor's  use.  In  a  reply 
to  Dr.  Tyler,^^  Taylor  subseqently  said  that  the  distinction 
between  "self-love"  and  "selfishness"  was  the  turning-point 
of  the  whole  discussion;  and  so  it  was,  for  by  propounding 
the  idea  of  "self-love"  he  had  made  a  most  important  addi- 
tion to  theory  of  the  will.   He  added : 

On  the  authority  of  Dugald  Stewart,  we  use  the  term  self-love 
to  denote  the  simple  desire  of  happiness.  In  this  sense  it  is  employed 
by  Dr.  Griffin  and  many  other  divines.  "Mere  self-love  is  only  the 
love  of  happiness  and  aversion  to  misery;  and  so  far  from  being  sin- 
ful, is  an  essential  attribute  of  a  rational  and  even  a  sensitive  nature" 
(Park-street  Lecture,  3d  ed.,  p.  74).*^ 

Such  being  the  meaning  of  "self-love,"  the  sinner  act- 
ing upon  this  desire,  has  chosen  the  immediate  gratification 
of  his  passions  and  appetites  in  preference  to  all  other 
things,  or  has  made  his  happiness  to  consist  in  self.  He  is 
supremely  selfish.  Let,  now,  God  and  duty,  in  contrast 
with  the  world  and  self,  be  presented  to  the  mind,  and  let 
there  be  an  "intellectual  perception  of  their  adaptedness 
to  the  nature  of  man  as  sources  or  means  of  happiness," 
and  they  will  appeal  to  this  desire  of  happiness.  If,  now, 
under  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  sinner  ceases  to 
perform  acts  under  the  governing  influence  of  his  former 
selfish  choice  and  stops  to  deliberate,  and  if  thus  "the  selfish 
principle  is  suspended,"  and  the  man  considers  these  ob- 

Review  of  the  Strictures,  Spectator,  March,   1830,  and  separately  printed, 

p.  15. 

*2  He  might  have  cited  Hopkins  himself,  "Nature  of  Holiness"  (Works,  Vol. 
Ill,  p.  22).  So  in  the  controversy  with  Mills  (ibid.,  pp.  293  and  424): — "Self 
love  ....  the  principle  of  all  exercises  and  actions,  both  good  and  bad." 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


385 


jects  as  fitted  to  gratify  his  constitutional  desire  and  if 
then,  under  the  view  of  them  as  the  greatest  good,  he 
actually  chooses  them,  thus  taking  God  as  his  portion,  he  is 
regenerated;  and  these  motives  which  have  appealed  to  his 
desire  of  happiness  are  the  means  of  regeneration,  and  in 
yielding  to  them  he  "uses"  them.  The  agent  of  regenera- 
tion is  thus  the  Holy  Spirit,  who  acts  as  such  in  presenting 
these  motives.  Here  then  is  freedom,  the  neutral  ground 
to  which  appeal  can  be  made  in  the  sensibility,  and  the 
divine  government  preserved  by  the  theory  of  the  divine 
action  through  motives. 

The  following  single  and  unbroken  paragraph  sum- 
marizes the  whole  position.    Speaking  of  "self-love" : 

Nor  ought  it  to  be  overlooked  that  this  part  of  our  nature  is 
always  with  us,  be  our  moral  character  what  it  may.  It  always  longs 
for  h?ppVess,  without  including  in  itself  the  act  of  the  will  or  heart 
fixed  on  any  given  source  of  object,  whence  we  resolve  to  seek  our 
happiness :  for  whether  by  an  act  of  the  will  or  heart  we  resolve  to 
seek  our  chief  happiness  from  one  object  or  another,  we  still  desire 
to  be  happy.  Whenever  we  do  fix  upon  the  object,  self-love  primarily 
prompts  to  the  choice  (not  determines  it)  ;  and  therefore  exists  prior 
to  the  act  of  will  by  which  we  fix  our  affections  on  any  object  as  our 
chief  good.  To  self-love  the  appeal  may  always  be  made,  and  feel- 
ingly made,  even  in  the  lowest  stages  of  moral  degeneracy,  to  pro- 
duce both  the  conviction  and  impression  that  there  is  greater  good 
in  God  than  in  the  world.  To  this  part  of  our  nature  all  motives  de- 
signed to  change  the  governing  purpose  or  supreme  affection  of  the 
heart  must  always  be  primarily  addressed.  They  cannot  be  addressed 
to  a  holy  heart,  already  existing  in  sinful  man.  Nor  will  it  be  pre- 
tended that  God  proffers  gratification  to  the  selfish  principle  in  man 
as  the  means  of  winning  him  to  holiness,  since  this  would  have  no 
other  tendency  than  to  prevent  the  change.  The  motives  fitted  to  de- 
stroy the  selfish  principle  (and  such  must  be  all  the  motives  addressed 
to  man  to  restore  him  to  holiness)  can  find  nothing  in  that  prin- 
ciple but  resistance.  If  therefore  there  be  not  in  man  a  constitutional 
capacity  of  happiness  from  some  other  source  than  the  world ;  if 
man  cannot  be  made  to  see  and  feel  that  there  is  to  him  greater 
good  in  God  than  in  any  other  object,  the  motives  of  holiness  might 
as  well  be  addressed  to  the  trees  of  the  forest  as  to  men.  So  certain 
as  man  is  a  moral  agent  ?nd  is  properly  addressed  by  motives  to  holi- 


386         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


ness,  so  certain  is  it  that  he  has  constitutional  susceptibilities  to  that 
good  which  these  motives  proffer;  and  that,  if  he  is  led  at  all  to  prefer 
this  good  to  every  other,  he  is  primarily  prompted  to  the  choice  by 
the  desire  of  happiness  or  self-love.*^ 

Taylor  then  takes  up  the  issue  more  sharply  with  Spring 
and  maintains  that  "no  acts  of  the  sinner  while  the  selfish 
principle  remains  active  in  the  heart  constitute  using  the 
means  of  regeneration."  And  before  he  closes  the  series 
of  articles  he  enters  upon  the  nature  of  moral  government 
at  large,  and  upon  the  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit  through, 
motives,  rejecting  with  great  emphasis  the  idea  that  the 
change  in  regeneration  must  be  in  the  "very  substance  of 
the  soul."  44 

To  these  articles  Bennet  Tyler,^^  then  minister  in  Port- 
land, Me.,  replied  in  Strictures  (1829).  He  was  most  un- 
fortunate in  having  written  his  pamphlet  before  the  arti- 
cles in  the  Spectator  were  completed,  although  he  supposed 
that  they  were  complete.  He  had  to  adjust  his  discussion 
to  the  last  article  of  the  series  by  an  appendix,  in  which  he 
was  rather  unsuccessful.  He  had,  in  fact,  thoroughly  mis- 
understood Taylor,  having  failed  to  get  the  initial  pro- 
posal of  a  neutral  point  in  the  soul,  to  which  the  preaching 
of  the  gospel  could  appeal,  at  all  into  his  mind.  Thus  he 
thought  that  Taylor  was  already  substantially  gone  over 
to  Arminianism,  and  he  scrutinized  every  word  under  this 
false  light.  He  misstates  the  question  to  begin  with.  He 
says :  The  question  is  "whether  any  acts  performed  by  the 
sinner  antecedent  to  a  change  of  heart  are  means  of  effect- 
ing this  change."  Taylor  never  confused  acts  with 
means.    The  motives  were  the  means,  and  motives  are  not 

^■^  Reprint,  p.  22.  ■**  Spectator,  p.  504, 

45  Born  at  Middlebury,  Conn.,  July  10,  1783;  died  at  East  Windsor,  Conn., 
May  14,  1858;  president  of  Dartmouth  College,  1822-28;  pastor  at  Portland,  Me., 
1828-33;  president  of  the  Theological  Institute  of  Connecticut,  at  East  Windsor, 
1833-57.    For  the  later  quotation  in  the  text  see  op.  cit.,  p.  8. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


acts.  Then  Tyler  makes  a  sharp,  though  totally  incorrect, 
analysis  of  the  mental  operations.  He  says :  "To  my  mind 
it  is  plain  that  if  sinners  use  the  means  of  regeneration, 
they  must  use  them  with  a  holy  heart,  or  an  unholy  heart, 
or  no  heart  at  all;  that  is  with  right  motives,  or  wrong 
motives,  or  no  motive  at  all."  He  thus  denies  that  there 
can  be  any  volition  (such,  for  example,  as  fixing  the  at- 
tention, which  Taylor  mentions)  of  a  morally  neutral  char- 
acter. 

A  passage  will  illustrate  Tyler's  difficulties: 

But  what  is  the  moral  character  of  the  man  after  the  suspension 
of  the  selfish  principle  and  previous  to  regeneration?  Is  he  holy? 
No.  Is  he  sinful  ?  No.  Then  he  cannot  be  a  moral  agent.  And  how 
has  his  moral  agency  ceased?  Has  he  lost  his  reason?  No.  Has  he 
ceased  to  act?  No.  He  is  using  the  means  of  regeneration.  But  to 
use  means  for  the  accomplishment  of  an  end  is  to  act  with  some  in- 
tention ;  and  it  must  be  either  a  good  or  bad  intention.  Consequently 
the  act  must  be  either  sinful  or  holy.  But  what  does  he  do?  He 
"determines  to  direct  his  thoughts  to  the  objects"  oi  choice,  viz.,  God 
and  the  world,  "for  the  sake  of  considering  their  relative  value,  of 
forming  a  judgment  respecting  it,  and  of  choosing  one  or  the  other 
as  his  chief  good."  He  takes  into  solemn  consideration  the  question 
whether  the  highest  happiness  is  to  be  found  in  God  or  the  world; — 
he  pursues  this  enquiry,  if  need  be,  till  it  results  in  the  conviction 
that  such  happiness  is  to  be  found  in  God  only; — he  follows  up  this 
conviction  with  that  intent  and  engrossing  contemplation  of  the  real- 
ities which  truth  discloses,  and  with  that  stirring  up  of  his  sensibil- 
ities in  view  of  them  which  shall  invest  the  world,  when  considered 
as  his  only  portion,  with  an  aspect  of  insignificance,  of  gloom,  and 
even  of  terror;  he  perseveres  in  this  contemplation,  till  he  discovers 
a  reality  and  an  excellence  in  the  objects  of  holy  affection,  which 
shall  put  him  on  direct  and  desperate  efforts  to  fix  his  heart  upon 
them ;  and  he  enters  upon  this  process  of  thought,  of  effort,  and  of 
action,  as  one  which  is  never  to  be  abandoned  until  the  end  proposed 
by  it  is  accomplished.  All  this,  it  must  be  recollected,  he  does  with- 
out either  holiness  or  sin,  and  consequently  without  performing  a 
single  moral  act.    Believe  this  who  can ! 

The  reader,  if  entirely  dependent  upon  the  present  his- 
tory for  his  knowledge  of  this  controversy,  will  be  aston- 

Ibid,  ^"^  Strictures,  p.  17. 


388 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


ished  at  this  extract  and  will  be  inclined  to  wonder  how 
Tyler  could  ever  have  supposed  that  he  was  correctly  repre- 
senting Taylor's  position.  But  a  reference  to  the  page  in 
the  Spectator  to  which  Tyler  refers  (32)  will  show  that 
nearly  all  these  phrases,  describing  processes  and  acts  of 
choice,  are  Taylor's  own!  The  passage,  however,  was  not 
designed  as  a  careful  view  of  Taylor's  understanding  of  re- 
generation, but  was  designed  to  illustrate  how  a  sinner 
might  be  regenerated  in  a  totally  different  way  from  that 
which  Spring  had  described.  Natural  as  the  misunder- 
standing was,  especially  when  Tyler  had  not  put  himself  at 
Taylor's  central  point  of  view,  it  might  have  been  entirely 
avoided  if  Tyler  had  seen  the  following  passage,  from  the 
article  still  unprinted  when  he  was  writing  his  Strictures. 

The  question  arises  ....  where  do  zve  place  the  using  of  the 
means  of  regeneration?  We  answer,  under  regeneration  itself,  in 
the  comprehensive  sense  of  that  term — in  those  acts  of  contemplat- 
ing divine  truth  which  we  have  spoken  of  as  necessarily  co-existing 
with  the  act  of  choice  or  love,  denominated  regeneration  in  the  re- 
stricted, theological  meaning  of  the  word.  Up  to  that  moment  the 
selfish  principle  had  predominated  in  the  soul,  and  no  acts  per- 
formed under  its  influence  could  be  a  using  of  the  means  of  grace. 
But  at  this  moment,  by  the  influence  of  the  divine  Spirit,  the  selfish 
principle  ceases  to  predominate  in  the  heart.  At  that  moment,  God 
and  divine  things  stand  before  the  soul,  no  longer  pre-occupied  by 
supreme  selfishness  and  love  of  the  world.  At  that  moment  this 
view  of  God  and  divine  things  becomes  the  means  of  regeneration^ 
A  mind  thus  detached  from  the  world  as  its  supreme  good,  instantly 
chooses  God  for  its  portion,  under  the  impulse  of  that  inherent  de- 
sire for  happiness  without  which  no  object  could  ever  be  regarded 

good — as  either  desirable  or  lovely  In  that  moment — which  is 

properly  esteemed  an  indivisible  moment — and  in  that  only,  does  the 
sinner  so  use  the  truth  of  God  that  it  can  according  to  the  laws  of 
mental  action  become  the  means  of  a  right  act  of  the  will  or  affec- 
tion of  the  heart.  All  his  previous  perceptions  of  divine  objects 
were  so  obscure  and  in?dequate,  his  sensibilities  were  so  far  from 
che  requisite  excitement  and  direction,  Lhrough  the  counteracting  in- 
fluence of  the  selfish  principle — this  principle  itself,  in  the  form  of 
earthly  affection,  was  so  far  from  relinquishing  its  final  hold  of  its 
object  (though  it  may  have  ceased  actively  to  pursue  it),  that  with- 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


389 


out  a  farther  change  in  these  respects,  the  heart  will  never  yield.  This 
farther  advance  in  respect  to  the  suspension  of  the  selfish  principle — 
in  respect  to  the  vividness  of  the  intellectual  perception — and  in  re- 
spect to  the  degree  of  excitement  in  the  susceptibilities  of  the  mind, 
must  take  place  in  every  instance  of  regeneration.*^ 

To  resume  the  argument  of  the  Strictures:  Tyler  ad- 
vances to  charge  Taylor  with  denying  total  depravity,  be- 
cause, if  the  means  are  used  without  motive,  the  heart  is 
then  not  under  the  dominion  of  depravity,  which  is  there- 
fore not  "total."  And,  finally,  Tyler  says:  ''The  ques- 
tion is  reduced  to  this  single  point,  whether  unrenewed  men 
perform  any  acts  in  consideration  of  which  God  grants 
his  renewing  gr?ce,"  as  if  the  divine  presentation  of  mo- 
tives, which  attract  the  attention  of  the  sinner  and  cause 
him  to  suspend  his  wicked  course  to  consider  them,  was 
made  in  consequence  of  anything  which  the  man  does! 
We  may  have  more  sympathy  with  the  difficulty  which  the 
word  *'self-love"  caused  Tyler,  when  he  said  that  the 
theory  destroyed  the  radical  difference  between  sin  and 
holiness,  since  sin  was  seeking  one^s  own  happiness  by 
choosing  the  world  as  his  chief  portion,  and  holiness  seek- 
ing one's  own  happ'ness  by  choosing  God.^^  Yet  he  himself 
teaches  that  holiness  is  choosing  God,  and  sin  choosing  self. 
Sometimes  he  identifies  self-love,  which  Taylor  made  en- 
tirely non-voluntary,  with  a  choice.  In  short,  he  stands 
substantially  upon  the  ground  of  Hopkins  and  Spring, 
has  no  thought  of  any  advance  in  the  theory,  and  hence, 
especially  after  he  has  once  classified  Taylor  under  Armin- 
ians  and  Socinians,  is  unable  to  understand  him. 

The  Strictures  close  with  seven  questions  addressed  to 
Dr.  Taylor,  which  exhibit  compendiously  Dr.  Tyler's  opin- 
ion of  the  new  proposals.  They  are :  ( i )  Whether  regen- 
eration is  not  (to  Dr.  Taylor)  a  gradual  and  progressive 

*®  spectator  for  1829,  p.  694.  *°  Strictures,  p.  12. 

60  Ibid.,  p.  20. 


390         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

work?  (2)  Whether  the  theory  does  not  involve  the  incon- 
sistency of  supposing  that  the  heart  is  changed  antecedent 
to  regeneration?  (3)  What  becomes  of  the  sinner's  con- 
viction of  sin  while  using  the  means  of  regeneration?  (4) 
Whether  the  theory  does  not  dispense  with  the  necessity 
of  divine  influence  in  regeneration?  (5)  Whether  Dr. 
Taylor  does  not  represent  the  sinner  as  laboring  under  a 
natural  inability  to  do  his  duty?  (6)  Whether  he  does  not, 
in  effect,  deny  the  doctrine  of  sovereign  and  distinguishing 
grace?  (7)  Whether  this  theory,  if  drawn  out  in  detail,  and 
inculcated  by  the  teachers  of  religion,  has  not  a  direct 
tendency  to  stifle  conviction  of  sin,  and  produce  spurious 
conversions? 

The  Strictures  were  reviewed  in  the  Spectator  for  1830, 
probably  by  Taylor  himself.  The  review  is  keen  and  meets 
Tyler's  sharp  distinctions  with  others  equally  sharp.  The 
reviewer  shows  abundantly  that  Dr.  Tyler  himself  differed 
from  many  of  his  predecessors,  as  indeed  he  must,  since 
they  differed  among  themselves.  His  orthodoxy  was, 
therefore,  not  that  of  the  universal  consent  of  New  Eng- 
land thinkers.  There  was  no  such  consent.  Taylor  soon 
strikes  the  main  question,  viz. :  What  is  a  free  moral 
agent  ?  He  rescues  neutrality  of  voluntary  action,  states 
the  question  as  "not  w^hether  regeneration  includes  the 
act  of  God,  but  whether  it  excludes  the  act  of  man,'' 
vindicates  his  use  of  the  term  "self-love,"  points  out  that 
Tyler's  theory  makes  natural  depravity  physical  and  re- 
generation a  physical  change,^^  that  he  robs  the  nature  of 
man  of  any  neutral  point  to  which  the  gospel  can  appeal 
and  thus  denies  that  the  gospel  presents  "motives  to  sin- 
ners,'* ^'^  and  so  further  clears  up  his  theory — in  which  we 
have  anticipated  him  in  the  first  statement  of  it. 


^'^  spectator,  1830,  p.  150.  ^'^  Ibid.,  p.  iss- 
Ibid.,  p.  163.  Ibid.,  p.  198. 


S3  Ibid.,  p.  159. 

5<»  Ibid.,  pp.  164,  165. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


391 


This  controversy  was  well-nigh  interminable,  for  it 
lasted  eight  years  longer,  and  was  carried  on  by  means  of 
a  multitude  of  articles  in  the  much-suffering  Spectator, 
pamphlets,  etc.  We  need,  however,  note  but  few  of  these, 
for  the  main  points  of  proposition  and  of  opposition  are 
now  before  us,  and  the  further  discussion  led  to  no  essential 
modification  on  either  side.  In  1833  the  Theological  In- 
stitute at  East  Windsor  was  formed  to  resist  the  influence 
of  New  Haven  in  Connecticut,  and  Dr.  Tyler  was  made  its 
president.  From  this  time,  of  course,  there  was  no  hope 
of  an  accommodation.  We  shall  therefore  dismiss  the  sub- 
ject after  noting  a  few  incidental  features  of  the  debate. 

Dr.  Tyler  replied  to  the  review  last  mentioned  by  a 
Vindication  (1830).  A  number  of  other  writers  came  to 
Taylor's  defense,  such  as  Rev.  Hubbard  Winslow  and 
Rev.  Samuel  Rogers.^^  Dr.  Hawes  joined  in  the  contro- 
versy by  requesting  from  Dr.  Taylor  a  fresh  statement  of 
his  views,  which  was  given  in  the  Connecticut  Observer, 
and  was  followed  by  a  little  interchange  of  articles  in  the 
Spirit  of  the  Pilgrims,  Dr.  Taylor  took  occasion  to  affirm 
explicitly  his  belief  in  election,  in  total  depravity,  in  the 
necessity  of  the  atonement,  in  the  moral  character  of  the 
change  called  conversion  and  in  its  production  by  the  Holy 
Spirit  through  the  truth,  in  special  grace,  and  in  the  per- 
severance of  the  saints.  The  most  interesting  of  these  later 
papers  is  the  one  in  w^hich  Dr.  Taylor  followed  the  practice 
which  he  had  introduced  with  the  former  disputants,  and 
wrote  an  elaborate  letter  to  show  that,  "on  the  basis  of  Dr. 
Tyler's  last  statements  and  explanations,  all  controversy 
between  us  may  be  terminated  jn  an  entire  agreement  on 
the  chief  points  at  issue."       He  abundantly  shows  in  this 

An  Evangelical  View  of  the  Nature  and  Means  of  Regeneration,  etc.,  and 
An  Exatnination  of  Dr.  Tyler's  "Vindication,"  etc.,  both  of  1830. 

What  Is  the  Real  Difference  Between  the  N.  H.  Divines  and  Those  Who 
Oppose  Them?  (1833.) 

s»  Spectator,  September,  1833,  and  reprinted. 


392 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


article  that  Dr.  Tyler  had  the  same  objections  to  certain 
implications  of  various  terms  (necessary  means,  etc.) 
which  Dr.  Taylor  thought  natural  or  inevitable  implica- 
tions, as  he  himself  had.  He  also  shows  that  their  differ- 
ences were  not  in  the  great  facts  of  Christian  doctrine,  but 
in  theories.  Dr.  Tyler  identified  his  own  theories,  as  many 
another  theologian  has  done,  with  doctrine;  and  accord- 
ingly, no  doubt  somewhat  incensed  by  the  turn  given  to  the 
discussion,  he  replied  in  a  pamphlet,^^  which  may  be  re- 
garded as  closing  this  controversy,  in  which  he  reiterated 
most  of  his  original  objections  and  misunderstandings.^^ 
As  late  as  1837,  in  a  little  book  entitled  Letters  on  the 
Origin  and  Progress  of  the  New  Haven  Theology,  an  ex- 
ceedingly interesting  collection  of  the  small  personal  gossip 
of  the  controversy  in  connection  with  a  summary  of  the 
principal  positions  taken  by  both  sides.  Dr.  Tyler  is  "of  the 
same  opinion  still." 

It  would  be  gratifying  to  be  able  to  state  that  Dr.  Tyler 
finally,  if  slowly,  came  to  understand  the  new  positions  bet- 
ter and  to  accept  them.  This  is,  however,  impossible.  He 
had  still  twenty  years  to  labor  and  study,  but  his  theological 
lectures,  as  published  in  their  final  form,  the  year  after  his 
death,  reproduce  unchanged  the  propositions  and  argu- 
ments of  the  controversy.  His  theory  of  the  will  remains 
the  strict  Edwardean  theory,^^  and  hence  he  continues  to 
ascribe  moral  character  to  the  affections,^^  although  he  dis- 
tinguished between  affections  and  volitions  sufficiently  to 
recognize  the  fact  that  Edwards  united  both  under  the 

Letter  to  the  Editor  of  the  Spirit  of  the  Pilgrims  (1833). 
Tyler  Thacher  published  in  1834  his  Taylorism  Examined,  a  vigorous  book 
against  Taylor. 

82  Cf.  a  review  of  Taylor's  theology  by  Professor  George  P.  Fisher  in  the 
New  Englander  for  April,  1868 — one  of  the  finest  monographs  in  the  department 
of  the  history  of  doctrine  ever  written. 

Lectures  on  Theology,  etc.(Boston,  1859),  pp.  255  ff. 

Ibid.,  pp.  155,  190,  196,  296,  357. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


393 


will.^^  Hence  native  depravity  is  put  in  the  emotions; 
right  and  wrong  in  conduct  depend  upon  these  affections, 
which  are  the  ''motives;"  and  hence  regeneration  is  a 
change  by  the  immediate  power  of  God  in  the  ''rehsh/'  that 
is,  the  affections.  All  the  old  misunderstandings  and  mis- 
representations of  Taylor  are  repeated  without  even  essen- 
tial modification  of  their  verbal  expression.^^  He  refused 
to  permit  posterity  to  write  him  down  among  them  who 
either  assisted  or  understood  the  progressive  movements  oi 
his  day.^^ 

With  Taylor  the  case  was  far  different.  He  remained 
a  student  to  the  end  of  his  days,  and  was  always  hoping  to 
add  to  his  knowledge  and  his  teaching.  As  in  Tyler's  case, 
his  theological  lectures  as  published  cover  but  a  portion 
of  the  system  of  theology ;  but  they  make  a  marked  advance 
upon  the  positions  in  which  he  was  at  the  time  at  which  we 
have  left  him.  These  volumes  will  therefore  reward  our 
careful  examination. 

It  is  significant  that  the  first  two  volumes  are  entitled 
Moral  Government.  This  subject  had  been  a  favorite  one 
since  the  time  of  Bellamy.  Hopkins,  particularly,  had  dis- 
tinguished between  the  providence  of  God,  which  operated 
through  "power,"  and  his  moral  government,  which  was 
conducted  by  ''law."  Emmons  does  not,  in  the  fragmen- 
tary form  in  which  his  system  has  come  down  to  us,  treat 
specifically  of  moral  government.  All  the  writers  upon  the 
atonement  were  full  of  the  subject;  for  the  very  idea  upon 
which  their  theory  was  founded  was  that  of  a  preservation, 
by  means  of  the  vicarious  sacrifice,  of  the  divine  govern- 
ment. Dwight  defines  moral  government  with  great  accur- 
acy as  "a  government  of  rules  and  motives;"  and  con- 

«^  Ibid.,  pp.  255  ff. 

^'^  For  example,  op.  cit.,  pp.  158,  218  ff.,  370. 

^"^  His  little  work  on  The  Sufferings  of  Christ  (1847)  shows  him  to  have  held 
the  governmental  theory  of  the  Atonement. 


394         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


tinues :  "A  government  of  mere  power  may  be  upheld  in  its 
full  strength  by  the  exercise  of  power  only.  But  a  moral 
government  cannot  be  thus  preserved,  unless  the  motives 
to  obedience  are  continued,  to  the  view  of  its  subjects,  in 
their  full  force?'  But  all  these  writers  had  failed  to  set 
forth  the  central  element  of  divine  moral  government,  be- 
cause they  had  none  of  them  arrived  at  a  correct  under- 
standing of  the  freedom  of  the  will.  It  remained  for  Tay- 
lor to  clear  the  subject  of  many  errors  and  infelicities. 
This  he  did  with  a  very  large  degree  of  success,  and  may  be 
said  to  have  first  formulated  a  correct  theory  of  moral 
government. 

His  definition  of  moral  government  does  not,  at  first 
sight,  seem  to  differ  from  that  common  to  his  predecessors. 
It  is  a  system  of  influences  on  moral  beings,  implying  a 
moral  governor,  designed  to  control  the  action  of  moral 
beings,  and  possessing  the  character  of  authority.^^  All 
this  has  been  said  as  well  before.  But  the  word  "influ- 
ences" and  the  word  "control"  have  a  new  meaning;  for, 
while  the  idea  of  causation  from  without  had  always  en- 
tered into  their  connotation  heretofore,  that  idea  was  en- 
tirely eliminated  by  Taylor,  who  distinguished  sharply  be- 
tween influence  and  causation.  All  the  causation  of  voli- 
tional action  resided  in  the  agent  putting  forth  the  volition. 

But  this  point  has  been  abundantly  illustrated  before. 
We  need  only  call  attention  to  it  now.  With  equal  brevity 
may  we  dispatch  the  fact  that  Taylor  founds  the  divine 
government  upon  the  Edwardean  theory  of  virtue,^^  and 
that  he  follows  Hopkins  in  reducing  all  sin  to  selfishness. 
A  large  portion  of  the  treatment  is  devoted  to  the  discus- 
sion of  the  sanctions  of  the  divine  law,  where  the  prin- 
ciple is  clearly  brought  out  that  the  true  punishment  of  sin 

^8  Theology,  Vol.  II,  p.  196.  Moral  Government,  Vol.  I,  p.  i. 

'^^  Ibid.,  p.  471. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


395 


is  the  suffering  of  the  eternal  world,  and  that  all  the  suf- 
ferings which  men  undergo  in  this  world,  including  death 
itself,  are  of  the  nature  of  correctives,  and  should  receive 
the  name  of  chastisements/^  An  important  turn  to 
apologetic,  adopted  by  Park,  was  the  introduction  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  in  the  discussion  of 
the  divine  benevolence  to  remove  objections  to  the  equity 
of  the  divine  government  as  displayed  in  this  world/ ^ 
The  element  of  grace  in  the  government,  which  effects  its 
ends  through  revelation  and  atonement,  is  also  newly  em- 
phasized. In  all  this  we  see  the  vigor  and  scope  of  the  new 
and  great  suggestion  of  freedom  which  Taylor  was  thus 
working  out. 

One  more  of  these  details  we  must  note,  and  this  time  at 
length,  for  it  marks  the  point  where  Taylor  became  con- 
scious of  his  fundamental  difference  from  Edwards.  He 
says: 

The  Edwardian  theory  of  inability,  what  is  it?  The  inability  to 
love  God,  which  it  maintains,  is  the  inability  to  love  and  hate  the 
same  object  at  the  same  time,  or  the  inability  to  will  opposites  at  the 
same  time.  The  ability  which  this  scheme  affirms,  to  soften  it  may  be 
the  revolting  aspect  of  the  inability  which  it  maintains,  is  the  wonder- 
ful power  of  man  not  to  will,  or  to  avoid  willing  opposites  at  the  same 
time,  or  power  to  will  without  willing  against  his  will.  Now  as  to 
this  inability,  it  is  an  absolutely  fatal  possession,  for  God  can  never 
remove  it,  i.  e.,  he  can  never  impart  power  to  man  to  will  opposites 
at  the  same  time,  any  more  than  he  can  impart  power  to  a  body  to 
move  in  opposite  directions  at  the  same  time.  And  then  again,  as 
to  the  ability,  or  natural  ability  of  this  scheme,  there  is  the  same 
difficulty;  for  the  mind  neither  has  nor  can  have  in  the  nature  of 
things,  the  power  or  ability  specified.  It  doubtless  has  power  to  will, 
but  has  not  power  in  willing  to  avoid  willing  against  its  will,  any 
more  than  a  part  has  power  to  be  less  than  the  whole,  or  than  two 
and  two  not  to  be  four.  ....  A  part  is  less  than  the  whole  in  the 

nature  of  things,  and  not  as  the  result  of  power  The  natural 

ability  of  man  to  obey  God,  as  defined  by  Edwards  and  others,  has 
no  existence  and  can  have  none.    It  is  an  essential  nothing.  Thus, 

'ij&ji.,  pp.  82  ff;  cf.  Vol.  II,  pp.  224,  367  ff. 
'2  Ibid.,  pp.  230  f¥. 


396         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

according  to  this  Edwardian  theory,  while  there  is  not  a  shadow  of 
ability  or  power  on  the  part  of  man  to  obey  God,  the  moral  inability 
of  the  theory,  the  inability  to  love  and  hate  the  same  object  at  the 
same  time,  though  undeniable,  is  unchangeable  either  by  man  or  his 
Maker.73 

In  one  department  of  the  system  these  final  lectures  of 
Taylor  present  an  essential  advance.  This  is  in  the  treat- 
ment of  the  subject  of  the  prevention  of  sin. 

The  topic  was  introduced  in  connection  with  questions 
relating  to  the  government  of  God."^*  The  subject  of  the 
divine  benevolence  must  necessarily  arise  in  connection 
with  the  divine  government,  and  did  thus  arise.  Taylor 
found  all  the  arguments  for  the  divine  benevolence  before 
his  own  time  defective.  Particularly,  he  rejects  the  argu- 
ment which  would  prove  benevolence  from  the  Scriptures, 
since  it  begs  the  question.  To  credit  revelation,  we  must 
assume  at  least  the  divine  veracity,  which  is  but  one  form  of 
benevolence,  "which  is  the  very  thing  to  be  proved."  We 
must  therefore  prove  the  divine  benevolence  from  the  light 
of  nature  before  we  are  capable  of  presenting  a  proof  of 
revelation;  but  when  the  latter  has  once  been  done,  we 
may,  of  course,  gather  additional  evidence  from  revelation 
for  our  thesis.  Here  again  Taylor  laid  down  the  method 
which  New  England  theology  was  thenceforward  to  fol- 
low. 

Considering  the  supposition  of  the  divine  benevolence 
in  the  light  of  nature,  Taylor  comes  to  the  fact  of  the  exist- 
ence of  sin  in  the  world,  which  seems  to  impugn  benevo- 
lence.   He  meets  this  objection  in  the  following  way: 

The  divine  benevolence  is  the  disposition  to  produce  the 
greatest  good,  or  the  highest  happiness  which  it  is  possible 
to  produce.  This  requires  that  there  should  be  not  merely 
more  happiness  than  misery  in  the  world,  but  that  God 

Moral  Government,  Vol.  II,  pp.  133  f. 
Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  276  ff. 


NATHANIEL  W.  TA\XOR 


397 


should  adopt  the  best  possible  system  in  creating  the  world. 
That  is,  God  could  not  have  made  a  better  world  than  this 
is  in  its  stead.  By  this  is  meant  that  the  present  world  con- 
tains the  greatest  good  possible  to  God.  There  might  be 
more  good  through  the  combined  action  of  God  and  his 
creatures.  If  men  and  angels  had  voluntarily  chosen  holi- 
ness invariably,  with  the  system  of  the  universe  otherwise 
unchanged,  more  good  would  thus  have  resulted  than  will 
now  be  attained.  But  sin  has  actually  entered  by  the  free 
act  of  moral  agents.  If,  on  the  contrary,  we  should  sup- 
pose that  there  is  in  the  world  the  greatest  good  possible 
on  the  whole,  or  under  any  condition,  then  we  should  be 
driven  to  suppose  that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the 
greatest  good,  because  it  actually  exists.  This  is  to  say  that 
the  worst  action  is  the  best  action,  which  is  absurd.  Hence 
what  we  mean  when  we  say  that  the  world  is  the  best  pos- 
sible world,  even  though  sin  is  found  in  it,  is  that  it  is  the 
best  possible  to  God.  And  if  this  is  so,  then  the  fact  of  sin 
is  no  detraction  from  his  benevolence. 

Taylor  seeks  therefore  to  prove  that  this  is  the  best  pos- 
sible world  by  the  following  arguments: 

I.  If  this  system,  containing  evil,  may  be  the  best  pos- 
sible to  the  Creator,  then  the  presence  of  evil  in  it  is  no 
impeachment  upon  his  benevolence.  Under  this  head  he 
considers,  first,  natural  evil,  or  pain,  and,  after  several  in- 
genious remarks,  advances  to  the  subject  of  moral  evil,  or 
sin.  Now,  it  may  be  an  impossibility  in  the  nature  of 
things  that  God  should  prevent  the  present  degree  of  moral 
evil  under  the  best  moral  system,  and  therefore  moral  evil 
may  exist  because,  in  respect  to  divine  prevention,  it  is 
incidental  to  a  moral  system  which  is  not  only  better  than 
no  system,  but  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator. 

In  answering  an  objection  to  this  line  of  argument,  that 
it  is  better  to  leave  the  great  question  of  the  mystery  of  evil 


398 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


alone,  as  one  that  has  baffled  the  minds  oi  the  best  thinkers 
of  all  generations,  Taylor  cites  the  parable  of  the  tares  as 
containing  the  same  solution  which  he  has  offered,  thus 
meeting  this  objection,  if  it  proceeds  from  Christians,  who 
must  allow  any  explanation  given  by  our  Lord.  In  this 
parable,  he  says,  we  are  taught  (a)  that  the  kingdom  of 
heaven  is  perfectly  fitted  to  its  great  design  of  reforming 
and  saving  men;  (b)  that  the  existence  in  it  of  moral  evil 
is  in  direct  contravention  of  this  great  design  of  its  divine 
author;  (c)  that  the  reason  that  moral  evil  exists  is  that 
there  is  an  impossibility,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  that 
God  should  prevent  it  under  the  system  which  exempts  him 
from  all  responsibility  in  respect  to  its  existence.  And 
hence  (d)  the  interposition  requisite  to  remove  the  evil 
would  do  more  hurt  than  good  by  modifying  the  freedom 
of  the  will  and  thus  diminishing  the  amount  of  holiness 
under  the  system. 

2.  Taylor  now  advances  two  points: 

a)  There  may  be  an  impossibility  that  God  should  pre- 
vent all  sin  under  a  moral  system.  Here  he  stands  exactly 
upon  the  ground  of  the  Concio,  and  sustains  the  position 
in  exactly  the  old  language.  He  repeats  that  this  supposi- 
tion does  not  derogate  from  the  divine  omnipotence  be- 
cause the  creatures  who  have  this  power  have  it  as  a  gift, 
and  God  is  limited  in  the  involved  limitation  only  as  he  has 
limited  himself.  But  he  advances  upon  the  doctrine  of 
the  Concio  when  he  adds : 

h)  If  it  be  conceded  that  God  may  prevent  all  sin  in  a 
moral  system,  it  may  still  be  impossible  that  he  should 
prevent  all  moral  evil,  or  even  the  present  degree  of  moral 
evil,  under  the  best  moral  system.  That  is,  it  may  be  better 
to  suffer  such  an  amount  of  sin  as  does  actually  enter  into 
this  system  without  taking  those  means  which  would  pre- 
vent it,  than  thus  to  cause  the  degree  of  moral  weakness, 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR 


399 


or  that  diminution  in  happiness,  which  might  result. 
Against  this  supposition  Taylor  declares  there  are  no  valid 
objections.  For  himself,  however,  he  still  stands  upon  the 
ground  of  his  former  contention. 

In  a  word,  as  the  sum-total  of  results  in  this  long  dis- 
cussion: The  freedom  necessary  to  a  moral  system,  un- 
checked by  influences  which  may  be  inconsistent  with  the 
highest  perfection  of  that  system,  may  lead  to  that  degree 
of  sin  which  we  actually  find  in  the  world. 

Now,  says  Taylor,  if  this  hypothesis  is  a  rational  hypo- 
thesis, it  completely  removes  the  objections  to  God's  good- 
ness derived  from  moral  evil.  We  are  now  prepared  for 
the  positive  proofs  of  God's  goodness,  and  these  are  so 
great  that  the  argument  is  soon  complete. 

Thus  we  close  our  review  of  the  work  of  this  great 
thinker.  It  must  have  become  already  manifest  to  every 
discerning  reader  that  we  have  been  following  the  thoughts 
of  a  bold  and  innovating,  but  logical  and  essentially  conser- 
vative, mind.  Radical  as  Taylor  was  in  his  determination 
to  get  at  the  root  oi  every  matter  he  handled,  and  unflinch- 
ing in  his  loyalty  to  the  logical  outcome  of  new  positions 
in  respect  to  fundamental  truths,  he  was  thoroughly  con- 
vinced of  the  divine  truth  and  authority  of  the  historic 
faith  of  Christendom,  and  sought  only  to  defend  it  better 
and  set  it  forth  with  greater  power.  And  when  we  con- 
sider the  topics  upon  which  he  made  original  contributions 
of  the  first  importance,  and  the  breadth  of  the  theological 
field  which  he  cultivated  with  distinguished  success,  his 
true  greatness  appears  in  the  most  striking  light.  Finding 
a  fruitful  suggestion  as  to  the  nature  of  the  will  and  its 
relation  to  the  other  faculties  in  Burton,  but  lost  there  in  a 
tangle  of  inconsistencies  created  by  the  effort  to  buttress 
again  the  fabric  of  necessitarianism,  he  first  affirmed  and 
vindicated  the  freedom  of  the  will,  and  made  this  to  reside 


400         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

in  a  true  power  of  original  causation.  In  pursuance  of  this 
idea,  he  threw  some  light  upon  every  topic  of  anthropology, 
upon  original  sin,  human  ability,  prevenient  grace,  the 
means  of  regeneration,  the  process  of  conversion,  the 
psychology  of  childhood,  the  processes  of  divine  election 
and  providence.  His  discussions  of  the  prevention  of  sin 
surpass  in  depth  and  comprehensiveness  those  of  any  other 
theological  writer,  whether  in  New  England  or  out  of  it. 
He  saw  more  deeply  into  the  Unitarian  contention  than  any 
of  his  contemporaries,  and  formulated  an  answer  more 
thorough;  as  well  as  defining  the  Trinity  so  as  to  escape 
the  various  evils  of  tritheism,  subordinationism,  modalism, 
and  substantial  unitarianism,  as  successfully  as  had  ever 
been  done,  or  more  successfully.  Besides  these,  he  illumi- 
nated in  passing  a  multitude  of  minor  topics  in  theology. 
He  contributed  to  Christian  apologetics  a  better  stating  of 
its  problems,  and  a  more  logical,  and  thus  more  successful, 
method  of  approaching  them.  In  most  of  these  sugges- 
tions, while  not  independent  of  his  predecessors,  he  went 
largely  his  own  way  and  was  substantially  original.  While 
his  acuteness  was  not  inferior  to^  Edwards',  his  originality 
in  both  substance  and  manner  was  far  greater.  He  ap- 
pears in  the  review  of  his  work  which  we  have  now  com- 
pleted as  the  greatest  mind  which  New  England  had  pro- 
duced for  penetration  and  originality,  and  for  that  con- 
structive force  which  carries  a  man  on  to  great  intellectual 
achievement.'^^ 

'^^  A  comprehensive  and  strong  review  of  Taylor  (though  his  name  is  not 
mentioned),  from  the  standpoint  of  a  deterministic  theory  of  the  will,  is  given 
by  Henry  B.  Smith  in  Faith  and  Philosophy,  pp.  152  ff.  He  regards  Taylor's 
great  error  as  setting  up  an  (incorrect)  ethical  theory,  and  then  bringing  every 
Christian  doctrine  forcibly  into  conformity  to  it. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


THE  LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 

Under  this  head  we  may  most  conveniently  subsume 
certain  writers  who,  without  belonging  to  the  creative 
forces  of  New  England  theology,  have  either  served  to 
sustain  it,  or  have  modified  it  greatly  while  remaining  in 
substance  loyal  to  it,  or  have  opened  new  vistas  before  it 
while  standing  in  its  succession,  and  all  in  connection  with 
the  Divinity  School  of  Yale  College,  or  under  the  influences 
which  emanated  from  Dwight  and  Taylor.  Of  these  the 
first  in  importance  was  Horace  Bushnell. 

The  theological  labors  of  Bushnell  will  never  be  under- 
stood and  appreciated  till  his  distinctive  position  is  clearly 
conceived  and  carefully  kept  in  mind.  He  was  pre-emi- 
nently a  preacher,  and  his  work  as  a  theologian  was  such 
as  a  preacher  is  qualified  and  naturally  led  to  perform.  He 
never  held  academic  position  after  his  life-work  was  fairly 
begun,  and  never  engaged  in  the  instruction  of  candidates 
for  the  ministry.  There  were  great  advantages  in  this  po- 
sition, and  decisive  influences  proceeding  from  it  to  deter- 
mine the  lines  and  character  of  his  work.  The  academic 
teacher  is  to  a  degree  imprisoned  in  routine.  He  must  pay 
attention  to  every  department  of  his  subject,  for  he  has  to 
teach  them  all.  He  may  be  thus  diverted  at  important 
moments  from  studies  which  might  otherwise  prove  largely 
fruitful.  He  gains  in  comprehensiveness  and  critical  qual- 
ity, for  he  must  know  and  judge  many  opinions,  and  must 
be  a  man  of  books;  but  he  loses  in  originality,  spontaneity, 
and  freshness.  The  preacher,  on  the  contrary,  need  pay  no 
attention  to  routine.  He  will  best  serve  his  people  when 
he  is  most  fully  himself.    He  is  regularly  engaged  in  work 

401 


402  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

which  is  largely  creative,  and  thus  his  originality  is  receiv- 
ing constant  stimulus  and  training.  And,  above  all,  he  is 
constantly  brought  into  direct  contact  with  men,  with  life, 
with  the  pressing  problems  of  the  living  present,  with  the 
needs  which  the  day  and  hour  have  created,  and  which  the 
theology  of  the  day  needs  to  meet.  Hence,  if  the  preacher 
becomes  a  theologian,  the  theology  is  likely  to  become  one 
of  life  and  of  power.  This  effect  Bushnell  amply  illustrates. 

At  the  same  time  there  are  disadvantages  in  this  position, 
from  which  have  flowed  most  of  Bushnell's  defects.  As  we 
are  tO'  be  occupied  vv^ith  the  positive  estimate  of  his  serv- 
ices, we  shall  best  prepare  ourselves,  as  well  as  relieve  the 
discussion  of  a  certain  burden,  if  we  briefly  note  some  of 
these  disadvantages  at  this  preliminary  stage  of  our  theme. 

His  lack  of  historical  knowledge  was  one  disadvantage. 
After  he  had  written  his  chief  contribution  to  the  discus- 
sion of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  he  reviewed  the  matter 
in  another  work,  in  which  he  wrote :  "On  a  careful  study 
of  the  creed  prepared  by  this  [the  Nicene]  council,  as  in- 
terpreted by  the  writings  of  Athanasius  in  defense  of  it,  I 
feel  obliged  to  confess  that  I  had  not  sufficiently  conceived 
its  import,  or  the  title  it  has  to  respect  as  a  Christian  doc- 
ument."^ He  might  have  gone  farther  and  said  that  he 
had  not  even  then  "sufficiently  conceived  the  import"  of 
that  creed,  or  of  the  New  England  divines  whose  writings 
he  was  criticizing  with  a  vigor  which  sometimes  bordered 
on  acerbity,  and  demanded  some  "charity"  of  his  readers, 
as  Dr.  Munger  suggests.^  If  he  has  himself  not  received  a 
due  share  of  that  comprehension  which  a  more  historical 
study  of  his  writings  would  have  produced,  he  has  certainly 
failed  in  comprehending  the  full  scope  of  those  forms  of 
stating  Christian  doctrine  against  which  he  protests. 

Then  the  preaching  habit  led  him  into  another  error, 

'^Christ  in  Theology,  p.  177-  ^Bushnell,  p.  190. 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 


which  for  a  constructive  theologian,  such  as  Bushnell  as- 
pired to  be,  was  a  very  serious  one — that  of  premature  pub- 
Hcation.  "He  not  only  wrote,  but  published  first,  and  read 
later."  ^  The  three  discourses  which  form  his  first  principal 
work,  God  in  Christ,  were  all  prepared  and  delivered  in 
one  half-year,  and  published  almost  immediately.  Thus  his 
thought  was  not  only  not  finished — which  he  would  esteem 
no  great  reproach — but  it  was  not  even  matured — which 
every  reader  has  a  right  to  demand  of  a  writer  who  aspires 
to  large  and  permanent  influence. 

We  need  note  but  one  more  of  these  preliminary  and 
cautionary  criticisms,  before  plunging  into  the  main  work 
before  us — that  as  a  preacher  he  was  naturally  inclined  to 
the  method  which  he  employed,  the  method  of  intuition. 
He  saw  truth;  he  did  not  laboriously  reason  it  out.  It 
was  the  precipitate  in  his  mind  resulting  from  long  pro- 
cesses of  solution  and  digestion.  It  finally  was  its  own 
chief  evidence.  Hence  he  neither  carefully  criticized  the 
positions  of  his  opponents,  scrupulously  refuted  them,  nor 
elaborately  defended  his  own.  He  thus  brought  life  into 
the  discussion  of  great  themes — and  this  was  an  advan- 
tage; he  forged  his  way  into  new  regions  and  made  "dis- 
coveries," which  can  scarcely  ever  come  except  as  the  inex- 
plicable findings  of  great  and  independent  minds;  but  he 
failed  to  do  what  is  specially  incumbent  on  those  who  have 
the  faculty  of  "insight,"  and  which  the  methods  of  natural 
science  have  increasingly  emphasized  as  essential — he 
failed  to  treat  his  discoveries  as  mere  hypotheses  and  to 
subject  them  to  verification  before  he  announced  them  as 
truths.  In  no  other  respect,  possibly,  has  he  had  more  in- 
fluence on  later  thinkers  than  in  promoting  the  intuitive 
habit  of  thought;  but  his  imitators  have  generally  been 
more  able  to  follow  him  in  his  neglect  of  the  sober  and 

3  Ibid,,  p.  I  55. 


404         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


prosaic  labors  of  necessary  verification  and  self-criticism 
than  in  his  brilliant,  and  often  profound  intuitions. 

Bushnell's  first  and  greatest  contribution  to  the  world  of 
thought  was  himself.  When  he  began  his  theological  life, 
he  found  New  England  theology  somewhat  sharply  formu- 
lated under  the  direct  influence  of  a  controversy  which  had 
been  going  on  for  nearly  a  century,  but  was  just  about 
coming  to  a  close.  It  began  with  Edwards'  books  against 
Arminianism  and  closed  with  Stuart's  against  Unitarian- 
ism„  Bushnell  found  great  difliculty  in  adjusting  himself 
to  prevailing  forms  of  statement  among  orthodox  teachers 
and  preachers.  The  many  controversies,  with  their  subtile 
and  often  mutually  contradictory  distinctions  and  defini- 
tions, seemed  to  him  more  like  an  impassable  jungle  than  a 
well-ordered  garder.  He  felt  himself  compelled  to  recon- 
sider every  doctrine  from  its  foundation — and  it  is  his  title 
to  enduring  fame,  and  the  condition  of  his  highest  service, 
that  he  followed  this  inward  compulsion.  He  thought  his 
way  through  the  difficulties  for  himself,  and  the  result  was 
that  he  had  something  to  say  which  was  often  vivifying 
and  permanently  instructive. 

The  gain  made  by  this  history  of  struggle  in  the  depart- 
ment of  theological  method  was  gathered  up  in  the  essay 
on  language.    He  says : 

Words  are  the  signs'  of  thought  to  be  expressed.  They  do  not 
Hterally  convey  or  pass  over  a  thought  out  of  one  mind  into  another, 
as  we  commonly  speak  of  doing.  They  are  only  hints  or  images  held 
up  before  the  mind  of  another,  to  put  him  on  generating  or  reprodu- 
cing the  same  thought;  which  we  can  only  do  as  he  has  the  same  per- 
sonal contents,  or  the  generative  power  out  of  which  to  bring  the 
thought  required.* 

In  other  words,  there  can  be  no  thinking  in  theology  but 
what  is  original  thinking,  the  production  of  the  thought  by 
the  student's  own  mind,  assisted  by  others,  but  not  receiv- 

*  God  in  Christ,  p.  46, 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY  405 

ing  doctrine  in  a  state  of  passivity.  If  it  is  supposed  to  be 
thus  received,  there  is  and  must  be  even  then  individual 
thinking — only  in  this  case  it  is  hasty,  careless,  and  mostly 
worthless.  Hence  the  true  method  of  theological  teaching 
is  that  of  suggestion.  It  seeks  to  kindle  thought,  to  pro- 
voke to  originality.  It  employs  the  indirect  path  to  its 
end,  if  this  is  more  suggestive;  it  brings  up  diverse  forms 
of  statement. 

Thus,  as  form  battles  form,  and  one  form  neutralizes  another, 
all  the  insufficiencies  of  words  are  filled  out,  the  contrarieties  liquidated, 
and  the  mind  settles  into  a  full  and  just  apprehension  of  the  pure 
spiritual  truth.  Accordingly,  we  never  come  so  near  to  a  truly  well- 
rounded  view  of  any  truth  as  when  it  is  offered  paradoxically,  that 
is,  under  contradictions,  that  is,  under  two  or  more  dictions,  which, 
taken  as  dictions,  are  contrary,  one  to  the  other.  ^ 

How  profound  and  important  is  the  principle  embodied 
in  this  emphasis  of  the  necessity  of  re-creating  truth  for 
one's  self  by  the  originative  processes  of  the  mind,  every- 
one who  has  watched  the  growth  of  his  own  knowledge 
O'f  truth  or  engaged  in  the  education  of  others  will  ap- 
preciate. It  is  SO'  very  easy  to^  accept  doctrines  from  others 
without  understanding  either  their  grounds  or  their  mean- 
ing, and  so  easy  to  settle  down  upon  beliefs  which  gradu- 
ally acquire  the  seeming  character  of  self-evident  truths, 
when  we  have  even  forgotten  the  reasons  originally  urged 
for  them  and  are  totally  incapable  of  defending  them  from 
any  earnest  attack!  New  England  was,  no  doubt,  as  free 
from  this  paralysis  of  the  faculties  of  theological  discussion 
and  digestion  in  Bushnell's  day  as  any  portion  of  the  Chris- 
tian world;  but  some  trace  of  it  will  be  found  wherever 
the  indolence  which  is  a  part  of  humanity's  inheritance  of 
original  sin  is  to  be  found.  His  services  in  banishing  it 
and  awakening  the  unparalleled  activity  of  Congregation- 
alism in  leading  the  efforts  of  later  days  to  discover  and 

»  Ibid.,  p.  55- 


4o6         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

appropriate  the  new  thoughts  of  the  age,  can  scarcely  be 
too  highly  appraised. 

Bushnell  had  also  discovered,  and  he  now  opposed  with 
biting  severity,  some  of  the  perennial  fallacies  of  theologi- 
ans. Nothing  is  more  common  among  orthodox  theologi- 
ans, and  among  their  heterodox  critics,  than  the  fallacy  of 
merely  verbal  reasoning — the  using,  that  is,  of  words  as 
counters  of  a  logical  process  forgetful  of  their  meaning — as 
we  employ  the  symbols  a,  bj  c,  in  algebra,  and  carry  them 
through  long  operations  without  ever  pausing  to  question 
what  they  may  mean.  Nothing,  also,  is  more  fatal  than 
this.  He  employed  his  own  methods  of  "suggestion"  and 
"paradox"  with  great  effectiveness  to  expose  this  error.  "A 
writer  without  either  truth  or  genius,  a  mere  estimating^ 
inferring  machine,  is  just  the  man  to  live  in  definitions."  ^ 
"That  deductive,  proving,  spinning  method  of  practical 
investigation,  commonly  denoted  by  the  term  logical,'^  was 
held  up  to  pitiless  derision.  He  pushed  his  affirmations 
to  the  extreme,  as  when  he  suggested  "the  very  great  diffi- 
culty, if  not  the  impossibility"  of  theology  and  of  psychol- 
ogy as  well.  "Poets,"  he  says,  "are  the  true  metaphysi- 
cians, and  if  there  be  any  complete  science  of  m.an  to  come, 
they  must  bring  it."  The  impression  which  most  sympa- 
thetic readers  would  carry  away  from  these  pages  would 
be  that  of  the  worthlessness  of  systematic  theology.  It  has 
become  the  fashion  in  certain  quarters  to  sneer  at  the  very 
effort  to  obtain  exact  conceptions  of  great  religious  truths 
and  to  put  them  in  accurate  form,  and  this  tendency  has 
derived  a  powerful  impulse  from  Bushnell's  pages.  He 
has  thus  assisted  the  tendency  to  loose  thinking,  and  to  the 
abandonment  of  all  thinking,  and  has  helped  in  the  process 
of  emasculating  the  church  and  bringing  it  into  contempt 
with  earnest  men,  trained  and  exercised  in  the  strenuous 

«  Loc.  cit.,  p.  57. 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY  407 

methods  by  which  truth  is  advanced  in  our  day.  But  this 
has  been,  after  all,  a  misuse  of  Bushnell.  It  has  been  be- 
cause men  have  not  used  his  words  suggestively  and  them- 
selves burrowed  down  by  original  thinking  into  his  true 
meaning.  No  man  was  ever  more  anxious  to  promote  cor- 
rect thinking  and  clear  views  than  Bushnell.  It  was  be- 
cause he  was  so  earnest  for  the  substance  of  thought  that 
he  exposed  and  ridiculed  the  abuse  of  its  form  as  though 
that  were  substance.  Listen  then  with  discriminating  at- 
tention to  his  summary  of  this  whole  question  in  the 
words : 

Considering  the  infirmities  of  language,  therefore,  all  formulas 
of  doctrine  should  be  held  in  a  certain  spirit  of  accommodation.  They 
cannot  be  pressed  to  the  letter,  for  the  very  sufficient  reason  that  the 
letter  is  never  true.  They  can  never  be  regarded  as  proximate  represen- 
tations, and  should  therefore  be  accepted  not  as  laws  over  belief  or 
opinion,  but  more  as  badges  of  consent  and  good  understanding.  The 
moment  we  begin  to  speak  of  them  as  guards  and  tests  of  purity,  we 
confess  that  we  have  lost  the  sense  of  purity,  and,  with  about  equal 
certainty,  the  virtue  itself."^ 

But,  while  Bushnell  did  not  justify  the  excesses  of  some 
of  his  followers  in  abuse  of  creeds  and  systems,  it  is  un- 
doubtedly true  that  he  failed  to  give  creeds  their  true  place. 
We  are  never  to  forget  Bushnell's  great  idea,  that  systems 
are  to  be  revivified  and  in  a  sense  re-made  by  every  gener- 
ation for  itself.  But  it  is  not  true  that  there  are  no  such 
things  as  best  forms  of  stating  truths  and  best  methods  of 
their  presentation  and  defense.  Bushnell  did  not  see  this 
because  he  did  not  study  the  past  sympathetically.  He  did 
not  let  it  work  ''suggestively"  on  his  own  mind.  He  was 
too  eager  in  discovery,  he  had  too  much  of  the  independ- 
ence of  a  strong  spirit,  and  perhaps  something  of  its  con- 
ceit. The  great  dogmatic  systems  of  the  past  have  actually 
done  just  what  he  says  they  cannot,  they  have  conveyed 
the  same  system  of  thought  to  countless  minds,  and  been 

7  Ibid.,  p.  81. 


4o8 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


sources  of  instruction  and  of  strength  to  religious  opinion 
and  life  without  which  the  church  would  have  been  im- 
poverished indeed;  and  they  have  done  this  for  two  rea- 
sons: because  they  worked  "suggestively,"  originating 
re-creative  processes  in  multitudes  of  minds,  and  because 
they  were  admirable  formulations  of  the  truth  as  their  au- 
thors conceived  it.  Theological  progress  will  never  be 
gained  except  by  building  on  their  foundations,  correcting 
their  errors,  and  supplying  their  defects.  The  original 
genius  who  begins  everything  from  the  foundation  and 
presents  a  system  of  doctrine  of  which  the  church  has  never 
heard  before,  erects  a  castle  of  mist  on  a  rock  of  cloud. 
And  Bushnell  would  have  been  the  last  man  to  attempt  such 
a  chimerical  task. 

The  preacher  appeared  again  in  Bushnell's  second  con- 
tribution to  the  world  of  thought,  in  his  quite  original  and 
characteristic  emphasis  on  tJie  religious  life  as  the  source 
and  guiding  principle  in  theology.  As  a  preacher  he  was 
daily  engaged  in  the  task  of  developing  the  religious  life 
of  his  people.  He  needed  truth  for  this  work,  and  needed 
to  find  those  elements  in  it,  and  those  forms  of  expressing 
it,  which  were  best  adapted  to  promote  the  religious  life, 
and  therefore  he  was  compelled  in  his  thinking  to  approach 
theology  on  the  experiential  side.  He  seems  to  have  gone 
a  step  farther  and  to  have  said  to  himself,  not  only  that 
truth  must  contribute  to  life,  but  also  that  nothing  was 
truth  which  did  not  thus  contribute — a  step  leading  easily 
to  the  further  and  quite  false  position  that  the  theologian's 
personal  view  of  the  religious  life,  limited  though  it  may 
be  by  his  defects  of  temperament  and  character,  is  to  be 
made  the  measure  of  universal  truth.  Thus  this  movement 
of  Bushnell's  mind  had  elements  of  danger  in  it  from  the 
beginning;  but  also  contained  the  promise  of  fresh  and 
valuable  results. 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 


409 


The  theological  situation  in  New  England,  where  there 
had  been  a  division  among  the  churches,  and  where  Uni- 
tarians were  an  exceedingly  influential  portion  of  the  re- 
ligious community,  comprising  the  chief  personages  of  in- 
fluence socially  and  politically  in  the  greatest  of  the  New 
England  states,  and  holding  the  control  in  the  oldest  and 
greatest  of  our  universities,  led  Bushnell  naturally  to  re- 
flection on  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity;  and  here  the  appli- 
cation of  his  new  principle  began.  His  thought  moved 
between  two  poles — the  incomprehensibility  of  the  Abso- 
lute, and  the  necessary  accommodation  of  any  revelation 
of  God  to  our  human  capacities.  Hence  he  found  a  trinity 
of  revelation,  an  "instrumental  trinity/'  as  he  called  it, 
by  which  ''we  are  elevated  to  proximity  and  virtual  con- 
verse with  him  who  is  above  our  finite  conditions,"  and  by 
which  "the  Absolute  Jehovah,  whose  nature  we  before 
could  nowise  comprehend,  but  dimly  know  and  yet  more 
dimly  feel,  has  waked  up  within  us  all  living  images  of  his 
love  and  power  and  presence,  and  set  the  whole  world  in  a 
glow."  ^  This  was,  of  course,  a  "modal"  Trinity;  but 
Bushnell  would  not  aflirm  that  it  was  "modal  only."  "I 
will  only  say,"  he  puts  it,  "that  the  trinity,  or  the  three 
persons,  are  given  to  me  for  the  sake  of  their  external  ex- 
pression, not  for  the  internal  investigation  of  their  contents. 
If  I  use  them  rationally  or  wisely,  then,  I  shall  use  them 
according  to  their  object.  /  must  not  intrude  upon  their 
interior  nature,  either  by  assertion  or  denial."  ^  He  is 
equally  reticent  as  to  the  nature  of  the  divinity  in  Christ. 
He  affirms  his  true  divinity,  and  puts  the  personific  ele- 
ment of  his  nature  in  the  divine — and  this  with  abundant 
citation  of  Scripture  proof.  But  the  Nestorianizing  forms 
of  statement  about  the  two  natures  common  to  all  Re- 


8  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  173,  174. 


»  Ihid.,  p.  175. 


4IO         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


formed  theology,  and  never  more  offensive  than  in  some 

expressions  current  then  in  New  England,  he  repudiates. 

This  theor)'  of  two  distinct  subsistences,  still  maintaining  their 
several  kinds  of  action  in  Christ, — one  growing,  learning,  obeying, 
suffering;  the  other  infinite  and  impassible, — only  creates  difficulties  a 
hundred-fold  greater  than  any  that  it  solves.  It  virtually  denies  any 
real  unity  between  the  human  and  the  divine  and  substitutes  colloca 
tion  or  copartnership  for  unity.  If  the  divine  part  were  residing  in 
Saturn,  he  would  be  as  truly  united  with  the  human  race  [under  this 
theory]  as  now.^^ 

It  was,  thus,  not  the  human  soul  of  Christ,  and  not  the  two 
natures,  but  the  "distinct  subsistence  [of  the  soul]  so  as  to 
live,  think,  learn,  worship,  suffer  by  itself,"  that  he 
denied.  Thus  it  was  Bushnell's  purpose  in  his  discussions 
of  this  theme  to  secure  a  real  revelation  of  God  to  man  in 
Christ,  a  real  condescension  of  God  to  our  estate,  a  real 
entrance  of  divinity  into  humanity,  so  that  God  could  sym- 
pathetically know  our  lot,  suffer  like  us,  ''be  tempted  in  all 
points  as  we  are,"  "learn  obedience,"  and  bring  to  us  the 
help  and  consolation  which  only  a  true  incarnation  of  God 
can  procure.  He  saved  for  orthodoxy,  which  in  reaction 
from  Unitarian  humanitarianism  was  about  to  believe 
nothing  but  the  deity  of  Christ  and  so  lose  his  humanity 
and  lose  Christ,  Christ's  true,  consubstantial  humanity ;  and 
this  was  an  immense  and  priceless  service.  We  need  the 
divine  Christ  to  bear  our  sins  and  uphold  us  by  his  almighty 
power;  but  we  need  fully  as  much  the  condescension,  pity- 
ing sympathy  and  fraternal  love  of  our  Elder  Brother,  the 
human  Christ.  We  owe  our  present  realization  of  this  side 
of  Christ  very  largely  to  Horace  Bushnell. 

But  Bushnell  did  not  by  any  means  state  the  whole  truth 
as  to  the  Trinity — he  did  something,  indeed,  to  obscure  it. 
He  was  so  impressed  with  the  danger  of  tritheism  that  he 
could  not  do  the  Scripture  representations  as  to  the  rela- 

Note  the  likeness  of  this  term  to  the  Nestorian  o-uva(/>6ia. 
God  in  Christ,  p.  154. 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 


411 


tions  of  Father,  Son,  and  Spirit  justice,  nor  appreciate  the 
great  current  of  church  expression  on  this  theme  in  creed, 
psalm,  and  system.  The  distinction  of  the  three  personific 
factors  in  God  is  undeniably  emphasized  in  these  represen- 
tations and  expressions.  The  many  prayers  of  Christ  all 
emphasize  it,  and  none  more  so  than  his  last,  in  the  seven- 
teenth chapter  of  John.  The  Te  Deum  rings  with  the  wor- 
ship of  ''the  Father,  of  an  infinite  majesty;  Thine  adorable, 
true,  and  only  Son;  also  the  Holy  Ghost,  the  Comforter." 
It  is  strange  that  Bushnell,  with  his  doctrine  of  expression 
through  paradox,  did  not  value  more  highly  these  individ- 
ualizing, anthropomorphic  forms  of  speech.  Why  should 
not  he,  of  all  men,  have  said  what  Professor  Park,  in  the 
large-minded  comprehensiveness  of  his  truly  catholic  intel- 
lect said,  that  ''one  might  either  lay  the  emphasis  in  the 
trinity  upon  the  unity  of  God,  and  find  the  mystery  in  the 
threeness,  or  lay  it  on  the  threeness  and  find  the  mystery 
in  the  oneness?"  Professor  Park,  like  Bushnell,  occupied 
for  himself  the  former  position;  but  he  defended  the  legit- 
imacy of  the  latter  position. 

In  truth,  Bushnell  was  at  this  point  a  substantial  ration- 
alist. Toi  apply  his  own  remark  about  New  England  in 
general  to  himself — "without  being  at  all  aware  of  the 
fact  as  it  would  seem,  his  theologic  method  was  essentially 
rationalistic;  though  not  exactly  in  the  German  sense." 
He  never  gives  evidence  of  careful  exegetical  study  of  the 
Bible — had,  in  fact,  never  had  any  competent  training  in 
its  methods.  He  saw;  but  his  vision  was  not  always  pro- 
duced by  the  light  that  streams  from  the  pages  of  the 
Bible.  And  hence,  in  the  left  wing  of  his  followers  (if  I 
may  import  a  German  designation  into  American  theology) 
there  has  been  a  neglect  of  Scripture  in  theorizing  which 


12  God  in  Christj  p.  92. 


412 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


has  wrought  sad  results,  some  of  which,  as  we  shall  later 
see,  were  anticipated  in  Bushnell's  own  labors. 

Those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  writings  of  Albrecht 
Ritschl  will  be  struck  no  doubt  with  the  resemblance,  both 
in  point  of  departure  and  in  detailed  results,  between  this 
great  German  leader,  so  prominent  in  the  world  of  English 
and  American  thought,  and  Bushnell.^^  The  resemblance 
is  indeed  striking,  and  it  is  not  merely  superficial  likeness, 
but  fundamentally  the  product  of  like  histories.  While 
Ritschl  was  a  purely  academic  character,  and  proceeded 
by  the  methods  of  the  scholar,  and  Bushnell  was  a  pastor 
whose  vital  atmosphere  was  that  of  the  poet.,  both  had  been 
trained  in  an  orthodoxy  wh'ch  was  uncongenial  to  their 
minds;  both  had  been  taught  by  gifted  professors  of  that 
orthodoxy  who  only  repelled  them  ;  both,  in  deep  personal 
throes  of  intellectual  and  spiritual  labor,  had  given  birth  to 
a  new  theology,  which  started  with  the  Christian  life  as 
source  and  norm,  both  hated  metaphysics  (except  their 
own)  ;  both  concentrated  their  chief  attention  on  the  atone- 
ment of  Christ;  both  arrived  at  substantially  the  results 
above  sketched  as  to  the  Trinity  and  the  person  of  Christ; 
both  had  their  long  period  of  suffering  under  suspicion  and 
ostracism ;  and  both  lived  long  enough  to  emerge  from  this 
and  to  begin  to  see  the  fruits  of  their  labors,  but  neither 
of  them  long  enough  to  know  on  earth  the  full  power  of  the 
influence  that  they  were  to  exert.  Of  the  two,  Bushnell 
was  the  greater  man — greater  in  vivacity  {Geist,  in  Ger- 
man phrase),  in  prophetic  vision,  in  range  of  thought  and 
depth  of  religious  experience,  and  greater  in  his  apprecia- 
tion and  retention  of  most  of  the  chief  elements  of  the 
historic  theology.  It  is  a  sad  commentary  on  the  superficial- 
ity of  much  of  what  styles  itself  "thought"  that  in  Bush- 

A  considerable  number  of  the  similarities  have  been  drawn  out  by 
Professor  George  B.  Stevens,  in  an  article  on  Bushnell  and  Ritschl,  in  the  Ameri- 
can Journal  of  Theology  for  January,  1902. 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 


413 


nell's  own  land  he  has  been  so  ignored  and  the  inferior 
Ritschl  so  much  quoted — and  that  often  by  men  who  owe, 
historically,  every  valuable  thought  they  have  to  the  great 
American.   But  omne  remotum  (et  novum)  pro  miriUco! 

Bushnell's  deeper  religious  life  led  him  into  one  prac- 
tical discussion,  which  demands  a  brief  notice  as  we  prose- 
cute our  theme — that  upon  Christian  Nurture.  Ritschl 
could  never  have  undertaken  this  because  of  his  lack  of 
pastoral  experience;  and  still  more  for  the  reason  that  he 
had  no  adequate  doctrine  of  the  new  birth.  Bushnell  had. 
He  lived  in  a  time  when  certain  forms  of  religious  conver- 
sion were  greatly  emphasized,  and  when  the  conscious  con- 
version of  adults  was  aimed  at  with  an  intensity  of  purpose 
which  obscured  other  forms  of  entrance  on  the  religious 
life  which  he  felt  were  even  more  normal  and  worthy  of 
direct  effort.  Hence  he  brought  out  his  new  idea  with 
great  power — which  was  ''that  the  child  is  to  grow  up  a 
Christian  and  never  know  himself  as  being  otherwise/^ 

The  work  was  received  with  much  sharp  criticism,  most 
of  which  arose  from  misunderstanding.  New  England  had 
never  wholly  forgotten  the  duty  of  Christian  nurture  or  de- 
nied the  possibility  of  child  piety.  But  the  overemphasis 
of  covenant  relations  and  of  the  importance  of  baptism  in 
the  period  before  Edwards  had  led  him  and  his  followers, 
as  we  have  seen,  to  correct  certain  disastrous  results  by 
a  corresponding  overemphasis  on  conversion  as  an  epoch 
in  the  conscious  experience  of  the  believer.  And  the 
development  of  the  theory  of  the  will  at  New  Haven  had  led 
to  a  great  revival  epoch  in  which  the  elder  Beecher,  Taylor, 
Nettleton,  and  others  were  the  chief  leaders.  At  times  it 
seemed  as  if  "nurture"  had  been  forgotten.  Yet  many  a 
church,  like  the  First  of  Springfield,  had  always  been  re- 
ceiving children  into  full  membership,  Bushnell's  book  was 
a  protest  against  the  excesses  of  revivals  and  an  arraign- 


414 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


ment  of  a  system  which  depended  on  them  well-nigh  ex- 
clusively as  the  times  of  conquest  and  victorious  advance  up- 
on a  hostile  world.  As  we  review  it  now,  it  seems  an  ex- 
ceedingly well-balanced  and  careful  statement  of  the  truth. 
Bushnell  did  not  neglect  the  doctrine  of  innate  depravity 
— which,  indeed,  he  knew  how  to  set  forth  with  unsur- 
passed power — nor  deny  the  necessity  of  regeneration  and 
conversion.  He  did  not  even  depreciate  revivals  as  such. 
He  said: 

We  have  been  expecting  to  thrive  too  much  by  conquest  and  too 
little  by  growth.  I  desire  to  speak  with  all  caution  of  what  are 
very  unfortunately  called  revivals  of  religion ;  for,  apart  from  the 
name,  which  is  modern,  and  from  certain  crudities  and  excesses  that  go 
with  it — zvhich  name,  crudities,  and  excesses  are  zvholly  adventitious 
as  regards  the  substantial  merits  of  such  scenes, — apart  from  them,  I 
say,  there  is  abundant  reason  to  believe  that  God's  spiritual  economy 
includes  varieties  of  exercise,  answering  in  all  important  respects  to 
these  visitations  of  mercy,  so  much  coveted  in  our  churches.  They 
are  needed.  A  perfectly  uniform  demonstration  in  religion  is  not  pos- 
sible or  desirable.    Nothing  is  thus  uniform  but  death. 

Nor  did  he  teach  baptismal  regeneration,  nor  any  other  de- 
parture from  a  sound  evangelical  theology.  He  simply 
emphasized  anew  the  possibility  of  child  piety,  the  organic 
character  of  the  family,  the  normal  results  of  Christian 
training,  the  duty  of  expecting  early  conversion  and  of  la- 
boring directly  for  it.  And  if  he  had  done  nothing  else, 
the  one  scorching  epithet  by  which  he  designated  parental 
neglect  of  the  religious  life  of  children  as  "ostrich  nur- 
ture" would  have  been  worth  all  the  labor  expended. 

Hence,  though  sharp  controversy  arose,  Bushnell's 
book,  plus  the  wholesome  tendencies  which  were  both  latent 
and  active  in  the  churches,  brought  back  a  better  balance  of 
the  methods  of  nurture  and  of  conscious  conversion  in  the 
churches.  The  last  thirty  years  of  the  nineteenth  century 
were  the  period  of  the  greatest  revivals,  and  of  the  devel- 
opment of  the  greatest  society  for  nurture,  the  Christian 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 


415 


Endeavor,  and  its  daughter-societies  in  various  denomina- 
tions. If  certain  extremists  have  hailed  the  "passing"  of 
the  revival  and  have  credited  Bushnell  with  the  *'honor"  of 
destroying  it,  they  have  ascribed  to  him  a  work  which  he 
repudiated,  and  have  run  into  the  danger  of  having  prophe- 
sied according  to  their  own  limited  acquaintance  and  sym- 
pathy with  evangelical  history  and  principles. 

Of  Bushnell  as  an  apologist  of  the  Christian  religion 
there  could  be  said  very  much.  His  principal  work  in  this 
department  is  Nature  mid  the  Supernatural.  He  distin- 
guishes nature  as  the  realm  of  force,  and  the  supernatural 
world  as  the  realm  of  freewill.  He  has  made  here  a  pro- 
found distinction  which  has  prepared  the  way  for  the  mod- 
ern apologetics,  in  which  the  teachings  of  natural  science 
as  to  evolution  and  law— which  Bushnell  lived  too  early 
tO'  appropriate — are  gradually  approaching  an  adjustment 
with  the  Christian  ideas  of  personality  and  freedom.  He 
also  put  the  defense  of  Christianity  upon  its  modern 
ground,  upon  its  own  distinctive  religious  character,  as  he 
had  sought  to  place  the  whole  edifice  of  doctrine  upon 
its  true  foundation  in  the  Christian  life.  The  proof  of 
miracles  he  rested  on  the  specific  Christian  truths.  Here 
again  is  a  point  of  contact  with  Ritschl,  but  here  also  a 
point  of  superiority,  for  he  never  occupies  the  ambiguous 
and  evasive  attitude  as  to  the  reality  of  biblical  miracles 
above  which  Ritschl  never  rose.  But  all  this  work  was 
only  preparatory.  The  new  epoch  of  apologetics  could 
not  come  in  until  evolution  was  cordially  accepted  by 
Christian  theologians  and  the  task  of  adjustment  to  it  sym- 
pathetically undertaken.  Bushnell  had  not  time  enough 
to  undertake  this  task  before  he  was  called  away  from 
earth.  He  anticipated  it  at  many  points,  as  in  the  new 
emphasis  he  lays  on  heredity.  A  fully  modern  atmosphere 
breathes  through  his  pages.    We  fail  to  realize  it,  possi- 


4i6         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


bly,  if  we  have  not  been  compelled  by  professional  study 
to  go  back  and  live  for  a  time  in  some  theologian  who  calls 
himself  modern,  and  writes  the  date  eighteen  hundred  and 
something  on  his  title-page,  but  does  nothing  except  re- 
produce Turretin  and  the  English  theologians  of  the  sev- 
enteenth century.  But  Bushnell's  work  will  be  so  modi- 
fied by  his  successor,  even  in  order  tO'  gain  the  full  force 
of  what  he  actually  did,  that  it  will  be  his  no  more.  To 
save  his  life,  he,  like  many  another,  will  have  to  lose  it. 

The  third  and  greatest  contribution  made  by  Bushnell 
to  theology  was  the  enrichment  bestowed  by  him  upon  the 
doctrine  of  the  atonement.  I  am  aware  that  some  will  say 
that  he  impoverished  the  doctrine — and  so,  in  a  sense,  he 
did.  But,  I  believe  when  thought  has  finally  adjusted  itself 
again  in  respect  to  this  theme,  and  the  defects  of  Bushnell's 
theory  have  been  supplied  by  the  restoration  of  elements 
which  he  neglected  or  denied,  it  will  be  found  that  the 
church  is  richer  in  thought  and  in  experience  for  the  labors 
of  the  great  Hartford  preacher. 

When  Bushnell  began  his  career,  the  doctrine  of  the 
atonement  was  still  incumbered  with  many  artificial  and 
erroneous  elements.  The  prevailing  theology  was  still 
forensic,  artificial,  external.  Ethical  relations  were  feebly 
perceived  and  little  emphasized.  True,  New  England  the- 
ology had  introduced  that  revolutionary  theory  of  virtue 
which  was  eventually  to  remodel  the  entire  system  in  the 
direction  of  ethical  demands.  But  as  yet,  it  had  accom- 
plished little.  The  old  theology  still  reigned  among  the 
people  and  in  a  majority  of  the  pulpits,  the  new  belonging, 
as  a  kind  of  privileged  private  possession,  to  the  compara- 
tively few  ''Edwardeans,"  of  whom  Professor  Park,  then 
just  beginning  his  labors  at  Andover  (1836),  was  easily 
chief,  and  was  destined  to  give  it  a  passing  supremacy  in 
Congregationalism.    Bushnell  did  not  fully  understand  this 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 


417 


new  school,  and  in  his  arguments  attacked  chiefly  the  old. 
Perhaps  he  was  not  so  culpable  for  his  failure  to  under- 
stand it,  for  its  new  theory  of  the  atonement  was  pro- 
fessedly only  a  better  form  of  stating  the  old,  and  was 
couched  like  that  in  forensic  formulas,  and  expounded  in 
the  terms  of  human  law  and  government,  with  little  refer- 
ence to  the  ideal  basis  of  the  whole  in  the  nature  of  virtue, 
and  with  the  retention  of  many  of  the  forms  which  had 
been  employed  in  stating  the  older  ideas  now  to  be  aban- 
doned. Hence,  as  a  general  average  of  the  New  England 
situation,  Bushnell's  conception  that  the  prevailing  theory 
of  the  atonement  involved  immoral  ideas,  was  derogatory 
of  the  justice  and  goodness  of  God,  and  needed  to  be  re- 
placed by  something  real  and  true,  was  correct. 

His  earlier  objections,  as  expressed  in  the  Cambridge 
address,^*  did  not  lack  piquancy  of  expression.  He  objects 
tO'  the  lack  of  ''real  economy"  in  the  older  view,  its  double 
ignominy,  first  of  letting  the  guilty  go,  and,  secondly, 
of  accepting  the  sufferings  of  innocence."  And  of  the 
later  view  he  says  that 

nO'  governmental  reasons  can  justify  even  the  admission  of  innocence 
into  a  participation  of  frowns  and  penal  distributions.  If  consenting 
innocence  says,  "Let  the  blow  fall  on  me,"  precisely  then  is  it  for  a 
government  to  prove  its  justice,  even  to  the  point  of  sublimity;  to  re- 
veal the  essential,  eternal,  unmitigable  distinction  it  holds  between 
innocence  and  sin  by  declaring  that,  as  under  law  and  its  distribu- 
tions,  it  is  even  impossible  to  suffer  any  commutation,  any  the  least 
confusion  of  places. 

In  the  later  volume  on  The  Vicarious  Sacrifice  he  dis- 
misses the  later  view  as  having  *'no  base  of  reality  even  to 
those  who  resort  to  it,  save  as  it  reverts  to  the  older  scheme, 
and  resumes  all  the  methods  of  that  scheme."  He  there- 
fore concentrates  his  attack  on  the  earlier  view,  and  his  ob- 
jection in  a  word  is  that,  while  professedly  satisfying  jus- 
tice, it  really  travesties  and  offends  justice. 

1*  God  in  Christ,  pp.  194  ff.  Pp.  364  ff. 


4i8 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Bushnell  here  fell  into  two  of  those  errors  incidental  to 
his  method  to  which  reference  has  already  been  made.  He 
failed  to  do  just'ce  to  the  biblical  statements  as  to  the 
atonement  because  he  had  no  sufficient  and  correct  methods 
of  exegesis;  and  he  rejected  the  ''later,"  or  New  Eng- 
land, view  because  he  did  not  study  it  carefully  enough  to 
understand  it.  We  may  make  this  charge  of  failure  to  un- 
derstand, because  Bushnell  himself  presents,  as  an  integral 
element  of  his  own  theory,  the  precise  idea  which  under- 
lay the  New  England  view.  That  view  was  much  ob- 
scured by  poor  forms  of  statement,  and  he  might  well 
claim  that,  if  he  misunderstood,  the  friends  of  the  theory 
and  not  he  must  bear  the  blame;  but  misunderstand  he 
did.  For,  as  just  remarked,  he  affirms  the  same  things. 
He  says : 

It  is  even  a  fundamental  condition,  as  regards  moral  ef¥ect  upon 
our  character,  that,  while  courage  and  hope  are  given  us,  we  should 
be  made  at  the  same  time  to  feel  the  intensest  possible  sense  of  the 
sanctity  of  the  law  and  the  inflexible  righteousness  of  God.  What 
we  need,  in  this  view,  is  some  new  expression  of  God,  which,  taken 
as  addressed  to  us,  will  keep  alive  the  impression  in  us  that  God 
suffers  no  laxity.  In  a  word,  we  must  be  made  to  feel,  in  the  very 
article  of  forgiveness,  when  it  is  of¥ered,  the  essential  and  eternal 
sanctity  of  God's  law — his  own  immovable  adherence  to  it,  as  the  only 

lasis  of  order  and  well-being  in  the  universe  In  order  to  make 

men  penitent,  and  so  to  want  forgiveness, — that  is,  to  keep  the  world 
alive  to  the  eternal  integrity,  verity,  and  sanctity  of  God's  law, — that 
is,  to  keep  us  apprised  of  sin,  and  deny  us  any  power  of  rest  while  we 
continue  under  sin,  it  was  needful  that  Christ,  in  his  life  and  suffer- 
ings, should  consecrate  or  reconsecrate  the  desecrated  law  of  God, 
and  give  it  more  exact  and  imminent  authority  than  it  had  before.^^ 

Could  Bushnell  have  united  these  ideas  with  the  biblical 
statements  as  to  the  death  of  Christ,  under  the  influence  of 
the  new  and  correct  discriminations  which  he  introduced, 
he  would  now  be  known,  not  as  the  antagonist  of  the  "gov- 

i*'  There  are  many  such  passages,  for  which  see  God  in  Christ,  pp.  234, 
272;  Vicarious  Sacrifice,  p.  298. 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 


419 


emmental  theory,"  but  as  its  chief  advocate,  as  the  one 
who  had  converted  it  into  a  truly  "ethico- juridical"  theory. 

For  what  he  positively  did  was  to  put  the  divine  rela- 
tion to  the  work  of  atonement  in  a  truly  ethical  light,  and 
emphasize  with  new  power  the  fundamental  doctrine  of 
the  Edwardean  school,  that  God  in  all  his  activities,  and 
especially  in  his  work  of  atonement,  was  actuated  by  the 
great  motive  of  love.  Man  was  lost  and  miserable  in  his 
sin.  God  went  forth  in  Christ  to  effect  his  salvation.  He 
performed,  as  one  of  Bushnell's  followers  phrases  it,  the 
direct  work  of  saving  men.  He  came  into  the  world  to 
lead  men  to  repentance  and  thus  to  reconcile  them  to  God. 
They  needed  to  know  God,  and  God  himself  needed  to 
gain  a  new  moral  power  over  them  whereby  he  could  lead 
them  to  turn  away  from  sin  and  to  him.  Hence  God  came 
and  did  on  the  earth,  out  of  the  supreme  motive  of  love, 
in  obedience  to  its  inner  obligation  in  his  own  heart,  just 
what  every  man  has  to  do  when  he  tries  to  save  his  fellow- 
men.  He  entered  sympathetically  as  well  as  actually  into 
the  lot  of  men,  bore  with  them,  suffered  under  their  oppo- 
sition and  sin,  served  them  in  every  way,  healing  their 
bodies  as  well  as  their  souls,  subjecting  himself  to  the 
same  law  which  laid  its  commands  on  them,  and  finally 
made  perfectly  clear  what  God  was,  in  all  his  holiness  and 
suffering  love,  and  broke  their  opposition  thereby.  He 
pre-engaged  their  feelings  so  that  they  "liked  the  friend 
before  they  loved  the  Saviour;"  he  awakened  their  con- 
science ;  he  stood  the  exemplar  of  God's  perfections  and  ho- 
liness; and  thus  he  gamed  them.    This  was  the  atonement. 

This  was  all  good,  because  all  true.  It  opened  to  the 
apprehension  of  the  theological  world  a  new  view  of  one 
side  of  Christ's  work,  and  greatly  enriched  the  humanity 
of  Christ,  which  Bushnell  had  already  done  so  much  to 
save  to  the  apprehension  of  the  times.    This  enrichment 


420         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

of  the  doctrine  will  never  be  lost.  Particularly  was  it  valu- 
able as  bringing  out  the  fact  that  the  ethical  principles 
underlying  Christ's  action  and  that  of  all  good  men  in 
doing  good  are  the  same.  The  work  of  Christ  is  imitable 
and  demands  imitation.  To  see  this  is  well.  But  it  is 
also  wimitable  and  surpasses — defies — imitation.  This 
Bushnell  did  not  see  so  clearly  and  rather  obscured  than 
set  forth.  Could  he  have  seen  that  the  law  of  God  which 
Christ  honored  included  the  penal  law,  and  that  the  obe- 
dience which  he  rendered  included  obedience  "unto  death," 
and  that  there  was  a  real  sense  in  which  God  "laid  on  him 
the  iniquities  of  us  all,"  then  he  would  not  have  run  in 
danger  of  being  charged  with  impoverishing  the  biblical 
doctrine  of  atonement. 

To  a  degree,  he  did  see  all  these  things.  While  per- 
sistently maintaining  that  his  "subjective"  view  of  the 
atonement  was  the  whole  of  the  doctrine,  he  was  constant- 
ly endeavoring  to  gain  an  "objective"  view.  His  first  ef- 
fort was  by  laying  emphasis  on  the  "altar  form,"  by  which 
he  supposed  certain  correct  impressions  to  be  conveyed  to 
the  minds  of  Israel  and  the  church  which  were  really  in- 
dispensable. The  trouble  with  these  explanations  was 
that  they  did  not 'go  far  enough  tO'  accomplish  their  object. 
They  sought  to  make  objective  what  was  to  be  unswerv- 
ingly maintained  as  solely  subjective.  It  was  to  be  ob- 
jective and  not  objective  in  the  same  breath!  Surely,  this 
was  a  free  use  of  the  principle  of  paradox!  But  this  ear- 
lier attempt  did  not  satisfy  Bushnell.  He  increasingly 
felt  that  he  had  not  done  justice  to  such  terms  as  "propi- 
tiation" found  in  Scripture.  Hence,  on  the  "arrival  of 
fresh  light,"  he  finally  propounded  the  astonishing  principle 
that  neither  God  or  man  can  forgive  a  sinner  until  he  has 
sought  tO'  do  him  good  and  suffered  under  his  repulses, 
and  thus  so  identified   himself  with   him   as   to  have 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 


421 


burned  up  in  this  Hame  of  suffering  sympathy  all  his 
''disgusts.''  This  is  a  true  propitiation — a  self-propitia- 
tion, which  God  laid  upon  himself  and  performed  ere  he 
was  able  to  forgive  men!  Bushnell  did  not  see  that  he 
had  thus  made  God  inferior  to  what  good  men  are  com- 
manded to  be  and  are. 

We  accept,  then,  with  gratitude  from  Bushnell's  hands 
the  enlargement  and  clarification  of  our  views  of  the  atone- 
ment which  he  has  given  us,  regretting  his  failure  more 
perfectly  to  adjust  himself  to  the  best  thinking  of  his  own 
time.  The  failure  is  the  more  regrettable  because  the  in- 
fluence of  this  theory  of  the  atonement  has  actually  been 
to  lower  the  plane  of  theological  thought  and  tO'  lead  tO'  de- 
nials of  the  positive  statements  of  the  Bible.  Everybody, 
it  is  sometimes  said,  now  teaches  the  moral  view  of  the 
atonement;  and  that  is  generally  interpreted  as  this,  that 
Christ  makes  so  complete  and  affecting  a  display  of  the 
love  of  God  for  sinners  by  his  death  that  he  wins  men  to 
God.  Even  his  sanctifying  the  law  by  his  obedience  is 
let  drop  out  of  sight,  and  as  for  future  punishment — upon 
which  Bushnell  depended  to  maintain  the  authority  of 
God's  law— he  is  a  bold  man  who  is  willing  to  be  known 
as  believing  in  it.  The  profound  view  of  Bushnell,  that 
God  himself  gained  moral  power  over  men  by  the  humilia- 
tion of  Christ,  is  too  strong  meat  for  many  of  his  professed 
followers. 

To  this  theological  decline  Bushnell  undoubtedly  con- 
tributed, and  for  it  he  is  to  be  held  in  part  responsible. 
But  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  his  deeper  meaning  will  yet  have 
a  new  influence,  that  the  passionate  devotion  to  truth 
which  kept  him  ever  alert  and  pressing  forward,  and  the 
great  loyalty  to  the  personal  Christ  which  inspired  him, 
and  to  the  Bible  in  the  atmosphere  of  which  he  lived,  how- 
ever defective  his  methods  of  its  study  may  have  been, 


422         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

will  yet  produce,  under  the  original  and  creative  action  of 
the  awakened  mind  of  the  age,  a  broader,  deeper,  and  more 
ethical  understanding,  first  of  law  and  penalty,  and  then  of 
the  relation  of  the  sacrifice  of  Calvary  to  both. 

The  work  upon  the  atonement  closed  Bushnell's  theo^ 
logical  labors,  and  here  our  review  of  his  theological  ca- 
reer must  close.  As  a  man  amid  the  practical  affairs  of 
life  too  much  cannot  be  said  in  praise  of  him.  But  men  are 
too  apt  to  overlook  the  element  of  heroic  manliness  dis- 
closed in  the  story  of  his  theological  work — the  heroism 
of  the  lonely  and  retired  student.  For  twenty-six  years 
he  was  a  pastor,  in  the  full  light  of  publicity  and  the  gla- 
mor of  evident  success.  Then  came  seventeen  years  of 
retirement  and  comparative  obscurity.  A  lesser  man 
would  have  consumed  this  time  in  self-indulgence  under 
the  plea  of  ill-health.  This  man  girded  his  loins  for  the 
hardest  and  most  persistent  labor  of  his  life.  He  gathered 
together  all  he  had  seen  and  thought,  and  put  it  forth  for 
the  benefit  of  the  world.  He  regarded  himself  responsible 
to  God  for  the  full  use  of  his  remaining  powers  and  the 
delivery  of  his  message.  For  this  self-neglecting  and  con- 
stant loyalty  to  opportunity,  to  his  vision  of  truth,  and  to 
his  Master,  those  who  believe  in  Christian  theology  will 
join  in  honoring  Bushnell,  theologian  and  hero,  man  of  in- 
sight and  man  of  faith. 

The  coming  of  George  P.  Fisher  to  the  chair  of  ecclesi- 
astical history  in  Yale  Divinity  School  in  1861  was  in  many 
respects  the  beginning  of  a  new  era.  For  the  first  time 
there  was  a  man  in  the  chair  of  history  in  an  American 
theological  seminary  who  had  an  adequate  preparation  for 
his  task.  Professor  Fisher's  great  services  to  the  depart- 
ment of  history  it  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  this 
work  to  review.  They  have  been  epoch-making.  But  he 
also  rendered  high  service  to  the  department  of  theology  by 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 


423 


his  writings  in  one  branch  of  the  systematic  disciphnes,  viz., 
apologetics.  A  thoroughly  loyal  and  appreciative  son  'of 
New  England,  he  more  than  maintained  her  repute  in  the 
philosophical  defense  of  the  doctrines  of  religion,  while  he 
pushed  the  historical  defense  into  regions  into  which  our 
fathers  never  could  have  penetrated.  A  master  in  German 
theology,  he  confuted  its  errorists  with  a  power  equal  to 
the  best  among  German  apologists,  and  with  a  sanity  and 
cogency  which  they  have  sometimes  seemed  to  lack.  The 
latest  edition  of  his  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian 
Belief  (1902)  shows  him  still  true  to  the  great  positions  of 
New  England  orthodoxy.  But  his  discussions  are  for  the 
new  time.  If  he  maintains  the  position  won  by  Taylor,  that 
the  will  is  free  with  the  power  of  originative  causation,  it 
is  not  to  discuss  Edwards,  but  Spinoza,  Hume,  Mill,  Spen- 
cer, etc.  He  defends  the  reality  of  the  evangelical  miracles, 
and  the  Johannine  authorship  of  the  Fourth  Gospel,  and 
the  integrity  and  trustworthiness  of  the  Book  of  Acts,  as 
his  predecessors  would  have  done;  but  it  is  with  reference 
to  new  difficulties  and  to  meet  objectors  of  whom  they  had 
never  heard.  Apologetics  are  not  systematic  theology;  but 
Professor  Fisher  has  made  it  evident,  that,  however  he 
might  feel  himself  in  accord  with  the  writers  with  whom 
this  history  has  been  engaged  in  the  results  of  their  labors, 
the  time  had  come  when  he  could  no  longer  avail  himself 
of  their  work,  and  when  the  questions  which  must  be  met 
lay  far  beyond  their  horizon  and  had  entered  regions  in 
which  they  were  s'crangers. 

The  addition  to  the  Yale  faculty  in  1871  of  Samuel 
Harris  in  the  chair  of  systematic  theology  gave  to  that 
institution  one  of  the  clearest  and  fullest  minds  which  have 
labored  in  this  department  in  our  theological  seminaries. 

Born,  June  14,  1814;  professor  of  systematic  theology,  Bangor,  1855-67; 
president  of  Bowdoin  College,  1867-71;  Yale,  1871  till  his  death  in  1899. 


424         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

After  nearly  thirty  years  of  service  he  retired,  having  pub- 
lished in  three  separate  works,  the  Philosophical  Basis  of 
Theism  (1883),  the  Self-Revelation  of  God  (1887),  and 
God,  the  Creator  and  Lord  of  All  (1896),  the  principal  ele- 
ments of  his  system. 

Harris  stood  squarely  upon  the  general  ground  of  New 
England  theology,  and  may  be  regarded  in  this  respect  a 
member  of  the  school.  He  teaches  the  Trinity,  the  deity  of 
Christ  (but  not  as  meagerly  as  Stuart  and  Park  had),  de- 
fines original  sin  as  native  corruption,  thus  making  all 
''sin  to  consist  in  sinning,"  thoroughly  adopts  Edwards' 
doctrine  of  the  nature  of  virtue  as  benevolence,  teaches  a 
true  freedom  with  even  more  clearness  and  cogency  than 
Taylor  did  (as  already  shown),  emphasizes  the  moral 
government  of  God,  and  accordingly  affirms  the  govern- 
mental theory  of  the  atonement,  rejects  imputation,  and 
teaches  regeneration  by  the  use  of  means. 

For  all  these  statements,  proofs  are  now  about  to  be 
offered — not  so  much  for  the  sake  of  proof  as  of  another 
thing  which  will  become  evident  as  the  passages  are 
perused,  a  fact  of  the  greatest  importance  in  its  bearing 
upon  the  history  of  New  England  theology  after  Harris' 
day.   Let  us  note  it  as  it  appears. 

In  respect  to  the  less  meager  treatment  of  the  Trinity 

and  Christology : 

God  is  numerically  and  indivisibly  one  in  his  substance  or  essential 
being.    This  is  the  common  doctrine  of  our  evangelical  Protestant 

creeds ;  as  the  Westminster  Confession  The  same  has  been  the 

teaching  of  the  great  Protestant  theologians.    Turretin  affirms  that 

God,  in  his  essential  being,  is  indivisbly  and  numerically  one  

It  is  sometimes  said  that  God  as  absolute  transcends  all  number.  "To 
apply  arithmetical  notions  to  him  may  be  as  unphilosophical  as  it  is 
profane"  (Cardinal  Newman).  But  this  position  is  as  fatal  to  mono- 
theism as  it  is  to  tritheism  and  polytheism.  If  God  transcends  all 
forms  of  number,  it  is  as  profane  to  say  there  is  one  only  God  as  to 
say  there  are  three,  or  a  thousand.    It  is  argued  that,  in  order  to 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 


425 


count  things  together,  there  must  be  some  point  of  Hkeness  among 
them  so  that  they  can  be  designated  by  a  common  name.  But  Dr. 
Newman  says,  God  "has  not  even  such  relation  to  his  creatures  as  to 
allow,  philosophically  speaking,  of  our  contrasting  him  with  them." 
Here,  then,  is  a  complete  sundering  of  God  from  all  likeness  to  his 
creatures  and  from  all  relation  to  them.  Man  is  no  longer  in  the 
image  of  God  nor  capable  of  coming  into  any  communion  with  him 
or  of  having  any  knowledge  of  him.  This  speculation  is  founded 
on  some  false  idea  of  the  absolute  which  necessarily  issues  in  pan- 
theism, epicureanism,  or  agnosticism  The  doctrine  is  not  that 

the  Father  is  God  the  absolute  being,  the  Son  God  in  his  personality. 
The  one  only  God  is  the  absolute  personal  God,  and  it  is  this  absolute 
personal  God  who  exists  in  each  of  the  three,  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
Spirit.  The  distinction  is  not  a  quantitative  distinction,  a  part  of 
God  in  the  Father,  a  part  in  the  Son,  and  a  part  in  the  Holy  Spirit, 
and  the  whole  God  only  in  the  unity  of  the  three.  The  one  God  is 
indivisible.  It  is  not  that  the  Father  is  God,  and  the  Son  and  the 
Spirit  attributes,  faculties,  or  powers  of  God.  The  one  personal  God 
is  undivided  and  eternal  in  each  of  the  three;  yet  in  each  mode  of 
being  he  is  distinguished  by  some  peculiar  proprietas,  or  property, 
and  so  by  a  peculiar  relation  of  each  to  the  other.  Hence  the  per- 
sonal God  cannot  be  fully  known  in  all  his  manifoldness  till  we  know 
him  in  all  three  of  his  modes  of  being, — as  Father,  Son  and  Holy 

Spirit  The  Father  is  the  original  fountain  and  source  of  light 

and  life  and  energy;  in  the  Son  he  goes  forth  in  creating  the  uni- 
verse and  energizing  in  it,  and  in  the  Spirit  he  abides  in  the  universe, 
and  especially  in  the  spiritual  system,  quickening  spiritual  life  and 
carrying  forward  the  great  designs  of  his  wisdom  and  love.  And 
yet  in  all  conditions  and  modes  of  manifestation  it  is  one  and  the 

same  God  In  Hegel's  trinity  the  absolute  being  is  conceived 

as  evolving  itself  into  the  universe  and  returning  into  itself  enriched 
with  the  consciousness  of  itself  as  revealed  to  itself  in  the  universe. 
Here  the  Spirit,  the  third  in  the  trinity,  is  conceived  as  God  thus 
returning  into  himself  conscious  of  himself  in  his  oneness  in  this 
threefold   form.     But  because   Hegel's   conception   is   pantheistic  it 

loses  all  real  significance  The  Hegelian  trinity  suggests  truth, 

but  gropes  in  vain  for  its  real  significance  and  its  adequate  expres- 
sion.   These  are  found  only  in  the  Christian  trinity.^^ 

That  ''fact  of  the  greatest  importance"  has,  no  doubt, 
already  made  itself  manifest  to  the  attentive  reader.  It  is 
the  new  tone  which  breathes  through  the  discussion.  Here 
is  no  provincial  theologian,  under  the  influence  of  one  re- 

1*  God,  Creator,  etc.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  z^^SZ- 


426         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


stricted  current  of  theological  thought.  The  variety  of 
quotation  illustrates  his  range  of  search  for  material.  In 
the  chapter  from  which  these  extracts  have  been  princi- 
pally taken,  Harris  cites  Neander,  Doederlein,  Robert 
South,  Gebhardt,  Reuss,  Ritschl,  Baur,  Strauss,  Pliny, 
Ewald,  Tiele,  Hodge,  Rothe,  Edersheim,  Gess,  Luther, 
Goltz,  Orr,  Calvin,  Augustine,  Gieseler,  TertuUian,  New- 
man, Dorner,  Turretin,  Stuart,  Athanasius,  and  many 
more  like.  Kant  was  one  of  his  chief  favorites.  You  have 
here  a  theologian  drawing  his  material  from  the  whole 
world.  But  that  is  not  all  the  fact.  We  shall  see  more 
yet. 

As  to  the  nature  of  sin: 

Sin  is  the  choice  of  self  as  the  supreme  object  of  trust  and  ser- 
vice. This  is  sinful  character  in  its  primary  and  essential  significance. 
It  is  this  which  distinctively  characterizes  an  act  or  character  as  sin- 
ful. It  is  the  sinful  character  which  manifests  itself  of  finds  ex- 
pression in  every  sinful  act.  Because  it  is  the  choice  of  self  as  the 
supreme  object  of  trust  and  service,  it  must  present  itself  in  two 
forms:  self-trusting  ard  self-serving.  Each  of  these,  again,  will  pre- 
sent itself  in  two  forms  :  the  former  as  self-sufficiency  and  self-glori- 
fying, the  latter  as  S3lf-will  and  self-seeking.  The  supreme  choice  ol 
self  acts  in  these  four  forms  in  every  sinful  character.^^ 

We  may  note  as  we  pass  that  Harris  has  here  taken  up 

the  doctrine  of  Hopkins  that  all  sin  is  selfishness,  but  has 

given  it  a  much  deeper  grounding  and  sharper  analysis. 

But  to  go  on — as  to  the  nature  of  virtue : 

The  knowledge  of  existence  in  a  moral  system  being  presup- 
posed, the  knowledge  of  the  real  principle  of  the  law  is  immediate 
and  self-evident  in  rational  intuition.  This  intuition,  that  the  law 
requires  love  to  God  and  our  neighbor,  arises,  like  all  others,  on 
some  particular  occasion  in  experience  and  is  practically  operative 
before  it  is  recognized  and  formulated  in  thought.  When  a  man 
finds  his  own  action  affecting  the  interests  of  another  person,  and 
recognizes  the  fact  that  he  and  the  other  exist  together  in  a  rational 
system,  he  knows  intuitively  that  he  ought  to  respect  the  rights  of  the 
other  equally  with  his  own  This  intuition  is  germinal  in  the 

Loc.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  193. 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY 


427 


virtual  conscioiisness  before  it  is  recognized  and  formulated  in 
thought.2o 

It  will  be  necessary  to  add  but  one  more  quotation — one 
pertaining  to  the  theory  of  the  atonement: 

The  only  conception  which  admits  the  rightfulness  and  the  ethical 
obligation  of  punishment,  or  of  atonement  in  order  to  the  justifica'^ 
tion  cf  oinneis,  h  chat  which  recognizes  the  law  of  love  as  eternal  in 
God  the  absolute  reason,  which  he  cannot  rescind  without  annulling 
his  own  rationality;  and  also  recognizes  God.  by  his  eternal  free  choice, 
acting  in  obedience  to  that  law  in  all  its  righteousness  and  benevo- 
lence, constituting  and  evolving  the  universe  in  accordance  with  it; 
and  Christ,  the  exponent  to  us,  under  human  limitations  and  con- 
ditions, of  God's  love  in  the  redemption  of  men  from  sin,  obeying  the 
law  of  love  even  unto  death.  Thus  God  reveals  the  inviolable  au- 
thority, the  universality  and  immutability  of  that  law,  the  inevitable- 
ness  of  the  persistent  punishment  of  the  persistent  transgressor, 
and  the  impossibility  of  redeeming  the  sinner  from  sin  to  God,  ex- 
cept in  such  way  as  asserts,  maintains,  and  vindicates  the  supremacy 
of  the  law  of  love  as  effectually  as  does  the  punishment  of  the  sin- 
ner persisting  in  sin, — and  thus  makes  atonement  for  sin.  If  God 
in  the  exercise  of  his  benevolence  in  the  redemption  of  sinners  is  not 
himself  obeying  the  law  of  love,  then  he  is  not  asserting  and  maintain- 
ing it,  and  therefore  is  not  making  atonement  for  sinners;  and  he 
needs  to  make  none  because,  being  above  law  in  his  benevolence, 
he  can,  at  his  mere  lawless  will,  remit  the  penalty  which  the  law 
imposes  on  transgressors.  David  sank  the  judge  in  the  father.  Brutus 
sank  the  father  in  the  judge.  God  is  both  father  and  judge  in  every 
act,  alike  when  commanding,  condemning,  redeeming,  or  justifying.21 

This  is  New  England  theology,  but  it  is  that  theology 
from  a  new  point  of  approach.  The  materials  are  brought 
from  new  regions,  but  the  starting-point  is  new,  and  the 
methods,  and  the  principles,  in  very  many  respects.  How 
significant  this  is,  and  how  far-reaching,  will  be  evident  at 
once  if  we  but  glance  at  a  number  of  the  topics  discussed, 
and  the  terms  employed,  say,  in  the  Philosophical  Basis  of 
Theism. 

This  work  begins  with  a  discussion  of  knowledge  and 
agnosticism.    This  leads  to  the  topic  of  the  reality  of 

Philosophical  Basis  of  Theism,  p.  209. 
21  God,  Creator,  etc.,  Vol.  II,  p.  486. 


428         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


knowledge,  and  the  criteria  of  primitive  knowledge.  The 
"Acts  and  Processes  of  Knowing"  are  then  introduced,  in- 
cluding an  elaborate  consideration  of  the  inductive  and  the 
Newtonian  methods  of  investigation.  The  fourth  chapter 
is  upon  ''What  Is  Known  through  Presentative  Intuition." 
In  it  is  a  section  of  ten  pages  upon  "Kant's  Thing  in  Itself." 
Then  comes  "rational  intuition,"  with  thorough  examina- 
tions of  Mill,  Clifford,  Hamilton,  Mansel,  Kant,  Spencer, 
Diderot,  etc.  Then  the  ultimate  realities  of  knowledge  are 
taken  up — Being,  the  True,  the  Right,  the  Perfect,  the 
Good,  the  Absolute.  Under  the  Right  the  ultimate  prin- 
ciples of  ethics  are  discussed.  Chapters  on  the  Sensibilities, 
the  Will,  PersonaHty,  etc.,  follow;  and  under  the  head  of 
"Materialistic  Objections  to  the  Existence  of  Personal 
Beings"  is  to  be  found  one  of  the  earliest  (1883)  and  best 
discussions  of  the  ultimate  meaning  for  ethics  and  theology 
of  the  theory  of  evolution. 

We  have,  then,  here  the  Sir  William  Hamilton  of  the 
New  England  theology.  Sir  William  was  a  loyal  member 
of  the  Scotch  school,  but  he  enriched  it  with  a  learning 
which  none  of  his  predecessors  had  had,  defended  it  more 
ably  against  wider,  if  not  subtler,  antagonism,  and  sunk 
for  it  deeper  foundations  in  his  "philosophy  of  the  condi- 
tioned." Such  was  Harris'  relation  to  the  New  England 
school.  And,  as  Sir  William  was  more  than  a  member  of 
his  school,  being  in  fact  that  thinker  who  formed  the  tran- 
sition to  later  and  different  modes  of  thought,  so  Harris 
formed  the  transition  from  the  New  England  to  later 
theologies,  now,  perhaps,  only  in  course  of  formation  among 
Congregationalists — or  rather,  among  Americans;  for  the 
theological  process  has  become  a  common  labor  shared 
fully,  under  the  new  conditions  of  the  modern  learning,  by 
the  representatives  of  many  different  communions.  He 
built  the  New  England  edifice  of  doctrine,  but  he  built  it 


LATER  NEW  HAVEN  THEOLOGY  429 

upon  other  foundations,  or  foundations  laid  much  deeper, 
and  with  other  methods.  It  remained  to  be  seen  whether 
the  new  would  really  assimilate  with  the  old,  or  whether 
the  new  methods  and  new  problems  of  the  new  time  would 
lead  to  the  substantial  abandonment  of  the  old  theology. 


CHAPTER  XV 


THE  NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM 

It  was  inevitable  that  the  theological  movement  which 
has  been  traced  should  have  a  great  influence  upon  the 
Presbyterian  church.  It  had  become  dominant  in  Con- 
gregationalism, and  whatever  was  dominant  there  must 
command  the  attention  of  the  leaders  of  a  church  which 
from  the  beginning  had  been  inextricably  involved  with 
Congregationalism.  Some  of  the  early  Congregational 
churches  had  been  Presbyterian  in  their  internal  govern- 
ment rather  than  democratic.  The  great  churches  of  Long 
Island,  and  particularly  New  Jersey  (Newark,  Elizabeth, 
etc.),  which  had  become  the  main  support  of  early  Presby- 
terianism,  were  of  New  England  origin,  and  originally 
Congregational.  The  most  numerous  and  strongest  reli- 
gious element  in  the  emigration  which  began  to  build 
up  the  West,  even  before  the  Revolution,  came  from  New 
England,  and  carried  an  attachment  to  Congregationalism 
into  the  new  home.  In  1801  an  agreement,  called  the 
"Plan  of  Union,"  was  entered  into  between  the  General 
Association  of  Connecticut  and  the  General  Assembly  of 
the  Presbyterian  church,  whereby  Congregational  churches 
might  form  relations  with  presbyteries,  and  Congrega- 
tional ministers  might  serve  Presbyterian  churches  and 
have  a  connection  with  presbytery.  When  Lane  Seminary 
was  founded,  Lyman  Beecher,  one  of  the  most  prominent 
Congregational  ministers  of  Boston  and  a  strong  represen- 
tative of  the  new  school,  was  called  to  the  professorship 
of  theology  (1832).  Union  Theological  Seminary  in  New 
York  was  a  union  of  Presbyterians  and  Congregationalists 
(1836),  and  was  suppHed  with  professors  principally  from 

430 


NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM  431 

New  England.  The  number  of  members  and  ministers 
who  have  passed  from  Congregationalism  to  Presbyterian- 
ism  in  the  settlement  of  the  western  states  from  the  be- 
ginning till  now  has  been  very  large. 

From  an  early  point  this  intermingling  of  Congrega- 
tionalists  with  Presbyterians,  and  the  consequent  influence 
of  the  new  school  upon  the  theology  of  the  Presbyterian 
church,  was  looked  upon  with  suspicion.  Edwards  was 
called  to  be  president  of  Princeton  College,  and  his  son  of 
Union  College.  But  as  the  theclogy  of  Hopkins  and  par- 
ticularly Taylor,  began  to  be  understood  (or,  rather,  mis- 
understood), antagonism  to  Congregationalism  began  to 
develop,  till  in  1837  it  culminated  in  the  abrogation  of  the 
"Plan  of  Union,"  to  be  followed  in  1838  by  the  separation 
of  the  new-school  element,  and  the  formation  of  the  New 
School  Presbyterian  Church.  This  result  was  brought 
about  by  the  old-school  and  high-ecclesiastical  element  in 
the  church,  aided  by  the  southern  element  and  their  north- 
ern, pro-slavery  friends.  Congregationalism  was  distrusted 
and  disliked  for  its  theology,  for  its  democratic  influence  in 
church  polity,  and  for  its  anti-slavery  attitude.  It  might 
be  supposed  that  the  old-school  element  would  now  regard 
itself  as  done  with  Congregationalism,  and  let  it  alone. 
But  this  was  impossible,  for  Congregationalism  still  con- 
tinued to  exert  a  most  powerful  influence  throughout  the 
entire  West  in  every  Presbyterian  church  and  ecclesiastical 
gathering.  Princeton  specially  recognized  in  everything 
New  England  a  permanent  enemy,  and  Professor  Charles 
Hodge  set  himself  so  determinedly  to  oppose  all  its  emana- 
tions, whether  in  the  theological  or  in  the  ecclesiastical 
sphere,  that  he  occupied  a  large  portion  of  his  time  in  this 
work,  and  had,  in  particular,  an  epoch-making  controversy 
with  Professor  Park.  His  standard  charge  against  Tay- 
lorism  was  Pelagianism.    "There  is  no  ghost  which  so 


432         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


greatly  disturbs  Dr.  Hodge,"  said  Professor  Park  on  one 
occasion,  ''as  that  of  Pelagius,— unless  it  be  that  of  Semi- 
Pelagiusr  In  fact,  Dr.  Hodge  showed  no  ability,  and  but 
little  desire,  to  understand  the  New  England  men.  He  so 
constantly  misinterpreted  them  that  he  soon  lost  all  in- 
fluence in  opposing  their  speculations  among  thinking  men^ 
and  may  be  entirely  neglected  in  a  history  of  the  school. 
He  may  be  safely  left  by  the  historian  of  a  progressive 
school  of  theology  to  the  natural  consequence  of  his  own 
remark  that  during  the  many  years  of  his  predominance  at 
Princeton  that  institution  had  never  brought  forward  a  sin- 
gle original  thought. 

In  the  New  School  Church  the  new-school  theology  was, 
of  course,  dominant.  Yet,  as  that  church  continued  to 
pledge  her  ministers  to  the  Westminster  Confession,  it  was 
not  to  be  expected  that  she  would  develop  enough  of  the 
spirit  of  freedom  to  prove  theologically  productive.  She 
was,  in  fact,  remarkably  sterile.  She  received  her  ideas 
from  the  New  England  thinkers,  and  spent  her  own  theo- 
logical strength  in  the  effort  to  adjust  them  to  the  Confes- 
sion. She  did  not  produce  in  all  the  thirty-one  years  of  her 
separate  existence  one  single  great  theologian.  Hence  her 
ecclesiastical  individuality  may  be  left  out  of  the  account 
in  the  following  pages.  Her  writers  will  be  treated  simply 
as  members  of  the  New  England  school.  Of  these  the 
greatest  was  Henry  B.  Smith. 

We  begin,  however,  with  an  earlier  teacher— the  fa- 
mous Lyman  Beecher.^  Born  in  Connecticut,  and  a  pupil 
of  Dwight  at  New  Haven,  he  became  famous  in  connection 
with  the  Unitarian  controversy  in  Massachusetts,  and  be- 
came a  Presbyterian  upon  going  to  Lane.    He  joined  the 

1  Born  at  New  Haven,  Conn.,  October  12,  1775;  died  in  Brooklyn,  N.  Y., 
January  10,  1863;  graduated  at  Vale  College,  1797;  pastor  at  Easthampton,  L.  I., 
1799;  at  Litchfield,  Conn.,  1810;  called  to  the  Hanover  Street  Church,  Boston, 
1826;  president  of  Lane  Seminary,  Cincinnati,  O.,  1832-51. 


NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM 


433 


New  School  church  at  the  time  of  the  division,  and  thus  be- 
came one  of  its  most  important  leaders.  His  Views  in  Theol- 
ogy,^ issued  in  connection  with  his  trial  before  the  Synod 
of  Cincinnati  for  departure  from  the  Westminster  Confes- 
sion, are  the  most  valuable  source  of  knowledge  as  to  his 
special  theology. 

Were  we  engaged  in  the  external  history  of  the  churches, 
or  of  our  theology,  we  should  therefore  have  much  to  say  as 
to  Lyman  Beecher.  His  Bible  a  Code  of  Laws  at  Park 
Street  Church,  Boston  (1818),  his  Worcester  sermon  at 
the  ordination  of  Mr.  Hoadley  (1823),  and  his  Rights  of 
the  Congregational  Churches  of  Massachusetts  (1826), 
were  all  powerful  blows  against  the  rising  Unitarianism 
of  the  day,  and  clear  theological  defenses  of  the  New  Eng- 
land theology  at  the  points  in  dispute.^  But  in  all  these 
he  was  on  the  defense,  and  they  contribute  nothing  to  the 
further  exemplification  of  the  doctrines  of  the  school  or  of 
his  own  thinking.  The  Viezvs  suffers  under  the  same  lim- 
itation, since  it  was  his  defense  before  the  Synod  of  Cin- 
cinnati against  charges  of  heresy.  It  is  engaged  in  ex- 
hibiting his  agreement  in  doctrine  with  the  Westminster 
Confession,  and  carefully  avoids  theoretical  statements 
which  might  bring  him  into  conflict  with  either  the  phi- 
losophy underlying  that  Confession,  or  even  its  phraseology. 
Had  he  ever  published  his  theological  lectures,  they  would 
probably  have  been  found  to  suffer  under  the  same  unfor- 
tunate necessity  of  considering  a  document  beyond  which 
he  had  actually  passed  in  his  theologizing.  We  know 
from  his  biography  *  that  he  was  a  warm  friend  and  ardent 
admirer  of  Taylor,  and  agreed  substantially  with  him  in  his 

2  Cincinnati,  1836. 

2  His  Works  were  published  in  three  volumes  in  Boston,  1852-53,  but  are  in- 
complete. See  Dexter's  Bibliogi^phy  in  "Congregationalism,"  Nos.  4241,  4463, 
4530,  4580,  4774,  4899,  4924,  4975,  4996,  5017,  5118,  5353,  6140. 

*  New  York,  1864-65;  two  volumes. 


434 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


theology.  At  one  point  this  fact  appears  even  under  the 
restrictions  of  a  defense,  for  he  adopts  Taylor's  phrase 
"power  to  the  contrary."  "Choice,"  he  says,  "without  the 
possibility  of  other  or  contrary  choice,  is  the  immemorial 
doctrine  of  fatalism."  Again:  "Their  [the  early  Fa- 
thers'] doctrine  of  free  will  is  ....  the  antifatalism  doc- 
trine of  mind  free  as  uncoerced  in  choice,  and  with  the 
power  always  of  contrary  choice."  And  still  again :  "The 
Confession  of  Faith  teaches  plainly  and  unanswerably  the 
free  agency  and  natural  ability  of  man,  as  capable  of  choice, 
with  the  power  of  contrary  election."  ^  But  in  general  we 
only  see  what  he  might  have  done,  had  he  only  been  him- 
self as  free  as  the  will  w^as  whose  freedom  he  was  advocat- 
ing. He  is  strong  in  the  advocacy  of  a  real  power  of  choice, 
a  real  natural  ability  to  choose.  Toi  the  proof  of  the  prop- 
osition that  ability  and  obligation  are  commensurate  he  de- 
votes many  pages.  The  following  passage  deserves  quota- 
tion as  being  one  of  the  best  interpretations  of  Augustine 
which  have  ever  been  given: 

Down  to  his  time,  the  free  will  and  natural  ability  of  man  were 
held  by  the  whole  church,  against  the  heretical  notions  of  a  blind 
fate,  of  material  depravity,  and  of  depravity  created  in  the  substratum 
of  the  soul.  The  great  effort,  hitherto,  had  been  to  maintain  the 
liberty  or  uncoerced  action  of  the  mind  in  choice,  with  the  power  of 
contrary  choice.  But  now  Pelagius  arose  and  denied  the  doctrine 
of  the  fall;  and  from  this  spot  it  became  necessary,  not  so  much  to 
prove  natural  ability  which  Pelagius  admitted,  as  to  prove  moral  in- 
ability, v/hich  v.as  as  much  opposed  to  the  Pelagian  heresy  as  natural 
ability  was  to  that  of  the  Pagan  philosophers,  the  Gnostics  and  the 
Manichaeans.  The  church  had  now  to  enter  upon  a  new  controversy, 
and  to  fix  her  eye  upon  the  question,  w  hat  were  the  consequences  of 
the  fall?  The  question  of  free  agency  was  no  longer  to  be  argued, 
for  that  was  not  now  controverted.  Both  Augustine  and  Pelagius  ad- 
mitted it  The  question  indeed  turned  upon  the  same  words, 

viz.,  free  will ;  but  it  did  not  mean  the  same  thing.  The  question 
between  them  was,  is  the  will  unbiased?  Is  it  in  equilibrio?  It 
was  not  whether  it  was  free  from  the  necessity  of  fate,  or  the  coercion 

6  Views,  pp.  35,  48,  loi. 


NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM 


435 


of  matter,  or  of  created  depravity;  but  the  question  was,  has  the  fall 
given  it  a  bias?  has  ii;  struck  it  out  of  eqjihbrio?  and  struck  the  bal- 
ance Vv'rong?  Pclag^'as  seid,  no.  Augustine  said,  yes;  and  while  in 
opposition  to  Pelagius  he  denied  free  will,  meaning  unbiased  will; 
he  was  as  strong  in  favor  of  free  will  in  the  other  sense  as  any  of  the 
fathers  before  him;  as  strong  as  I  am:  so  that  if  I  am  a  Pelagian, 
Augustine  was  a  Pelagian;  although  hie  whole  strength  was  exerted 
against  Pelagius.  If  what  I  teach  is  Pelagianism,  then  Augustine, 
and  Calvin,  and  Luther,  and  aU  the  best  writers  of  the  church  in  this 
age  have  been  Pelagians,  except  the  few  who  deny  natural  ability.^ 

In  the  last  sentences  Beecher  voices  the  answer  of  the 
whole  New  England  school  to  the  standing  charge  made 
against  it  by  Princeton. 

But,  strange  to  say,  though  familiar  with  Taylorism, 
Beecher  fell  into  confusion  as  to  the  nature  of  the  moral 
government  of  God,  and  repeatedly  refers  regeneration  to 
the  "almighty  power"  of  God,  "as  really  so  as  the  crea- 
tion of  worlds  or  the  resurrection  of  the  dead !"  It  would 
seem  as  if  Taylor  had  forever  established  the  doctrine 
that  the  moral  government  of  God  was  not  conducted  by 
force.    But,  alas,  no ! 

Henry  B.  Smith  ^  received  his  theological  instruction 
from  Leonard  Woods,  of  Andover,  and  at  greater  length 
from  Enoch  Pond,^  of  Bangor.   Woods,  we  have  seen,  was 

«  Ibid.,  pp.  56,  57. 
Ibid.,  p.  202. 

8  Born  at  Portland,  Me.,  November  21,  1815;  died  at  New  York,  February 
7,  1877;  graduated  at  Bowdoin,  1834;  studied  at  Andover  "for  a  few  months"  in 
1834;  resumed  his  studies  at  Bangor  in  1835,  and  left  the  seminary  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1836  for  a  year  as  tutor  in  Bowdoin  College,  at  the  close  of  which  he 
went  to  Europe  (1837-40).  Here  he  had  some  contact  with  the  intellectual  world 
of  France  in  Paris;  spent  the  year  1C38-39  in  Halle,  where  he  had  the  inestim- 
able advantage  of  a  close  intim?.cy  with  Tholuck,  and  1839-40  in  Berlin,  where 
he  came  in  contact  with  Hengstenbsrg,  Near.der,  Trendelenburg,  and  Twesten. 
He  was  pastor  at  West  Amesbury,  Mass.  [842-47;  professor  of  mental  and  moral 
philosophy  at  Amherst,  1847-50;  of  church  history  in  Union  Theological  Sem- 
inary, New  York,  1850-55;  and  of  systematic  theology  in  the  same  seminary, 
1855-77. 

®  Born  at  Wrentham,  Mass.,  July  29,  1791;  died  at  Bangor,  Me.,  January  21, 
1882;  graduated  at  Brown  University,  18 13;  studied  under  Dr.  Emmons,  pastor 
of  the  church  at  Auburn  (Ward),  Mass.,  r8r5-28;  editor  of  the  Spirit  of  the 
Pilgrims,  1828-32;  professor  in  Bangor  Theological  Seminary,  1832-82. 


43^  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


a  moderate  follower  of  Hopkins,  and  as  an  adherent  of  the 
''taste  scheme"  would  be  called  a  member  of  the  "old 
school"  in  New  England  theology.  He  exercised  a  large 
influence  over  Smith,  short  as  was  the  period  of  their  con- 
nection. Pond  was  a  pupil  of  Emmons,  and  the  marks  of 
Emmons'  influence  are  very  clearly  traceable  in  the  Lec- 
tures which  he  published  at  the  close  of  his  theological 
career;  but  what  had  survived  at  that  distant  date  were 
chiefly  the  analytical  method  of  discourse,  the  simplicity 
and  clearness  of  thought,  the  emphasis  upon  plain  com- 
mon-sense, and  the  general  agreement  with  the  New  Eng- 
land thinkers  upon  the  great  doctrines  of  the  evangelical 
system.  The  tone  of  the  whole  is  far  more  biblical  than 
that  of  Emmons'  Sermons  had  been. 

To  note  a  few  features  of  Pond's  system: 
His  treatment  of  the  divine  authority  of  the  Bible 
closes  with  the  argument  from  the  witness  of  the  Spirit, 
to  which  he  gives  one  of  the  best  statements  ever  made. 
He  says: 

I  have  but  another  argument  to  urge  in  favor  of  the  divine  au- 
thority of  the  Bible, — the  same  which  was  urged  in  support  of  its  truth : 
it  is  that  which  the  Christian  finds  in  his  own  soul.  "H  any  man," 
saith  Christ,  "will  do  his  will,  he  shall  know  of  the  doctrine  whether 
it  be  of  God."  True  Christians  have  fulfilled  the  condition  here  pro- 
posed, and  they  realize  the  truth  of  the  promise.  They  do  know  of 
the  doctrine  that  it  is  of  God.  They  find  such  a  blessed  agreement 
between  the  representations  of  Scripture  and  the  feelings  of  their  own 
hearts  that  they  cannot  doubt  as  to  the  divine  origin  of  the  Bible.  It 
must  have  proceeded  from  the  same  Being  who  knows  the  hearts  of 
his  children  perfectly.  ....  This  argument  has  more  weight,  prob- 
ably, than  every  other,  with  Christians  in  common  life,  to  remove 
their  doubts  and  give  them  a  settled,  unwavering  faith  in  the  truth 
and  divine  authority  of  the  sacred  word.^^ 

That  is,  as  we  trace  certain  of  our  own  experiences  to 
the  agency  of  God,  so  we  trace  the  book  which  records  the 

'^^  Lectures  on  Christian  Theology   (Boston,  1867). 
^1  Lectures,  p.  120. 


NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM 


437 


same  experiences  tO'  the  same  hand.  Like  effects,  the  same 
cause.^^ 

As  to  the  Trinity,  Pond  shows  the  effects  of  Stuart's 
work  in  modifying  the  sharp  and  gross  distinction  of  per- 
sons between  the  members  of  the  Trinity  which  Emmons 
had  made. 

The  distinctions  in  the  Godhead  are  commonly  called  persons; 
and  if  this  word  is  understood  with  some  necessary  qualifications, 
there  is  no  objection  tO'  it.  When  used  in  relation  to  this  subject,  it 
cannot  mean  (what  it  commonly  does)  that  those  to  whom  it  is  ap- 
plied are  entirely  separate  beings,  like  three  human  persons ;  for  this 
would  be  inconsistent  with  their  essential  unity.  But  in  some  sense, 
and  to  some  extent,  the  divine  persons  are  distinct.  They  are  so  far 
distinct  that  they  may  properly  speak,  or  be  spoken  of,  in  the  plural 
number.  They  may  use  the  personal  pronouns,.  /,  thou,  and  he,  in 
reference  to  each  other.  They  are  represented  as  entering  into  a 
covenant,  and  as  holding  an  infinitely  blessed  intercourse  and  com- 
munion, one  with  another.  They  are  said  also  to  discharge  different 
offices  and  works.  .... 

Neither  is  the  doctrine  thus  stated  self-contradictory.  To  say  that 
God  is  one  and  three  in  the  same  sense,  would  be  a  contradiction. 
But  to  say  that  God  is  in  some  sense  one,  and  in  some  other  sense 
three,  is  no  contradiction. 

As  to  the  will,  his  doctrine  is  entirely  the  Edwardean 
determinism.  His  formulation  of  its  law  is  in  simpler 
languaige,  but  less  felicitous  than  Edwards'  own :  ''The 
will  is  always  as  the  strongest  motive/'  The  "power  of 
contrary  choice"  he  regards  as  an  Arminian  position.^ ^ 
His  definition  of  freedom  may  be  added  to  the  museum  of 
psychological  curiosities  which  the  readers  of  this  history 
cannot  have  failed  of  accumulating.  It  is  this :  'Tt  con- 
sists in  voluntarily  yielding  to  the  strongest  motives.^ ^ 

On  the  foundation  of  obligation  and  the  nature  of  virtue 

12  The  same  argument  is  more  fully  stated  in  the  monumental  work  of  a 
successor  of  Pond  in  the  chair  of  theology  at  Bangor,  Lewis  F.  Stearns,  Evidence 
of  Christum  Experience,  pp.  303,  304;  and  by  F.  H.  Foster  in  Christian  Life  and 
Theology,  pp.  104  f. 

Lectures,  pp.  172,  173,  176.  Ibid.,  p.  294. 

1^  Ibid.,  p.  297.  16  Ibid.,  p.  304. 


43^         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

Pond  is  entirely  Edwardean.  He  did  not  follow  Taylor  in 
his  endeavors  to  improve  theodicy,  maintaining  stoutly  that 
God  could  prevent  all  sin  without  impairing  free  will.  He 
regards  it  as  a  strong  argument  for  this  position  that  God 
can  convert  sinners/^  not  perceiving  that  restoring  from 
some  sin  is  quite  a  different  thing  from  preventing  all  sin. 
In  regeneration,  he  follows  Emmons  in  identifying  regen- 
eration, conversion,  and  sanctification,  as  in  nature  the  same, 
and  in  making  the  Spirit  of  God  ''the  efficient  cause  of  all 
holy  affections,"  though  he  makes  man  himself  the  "agent" 
or  "active  cause." 

It  is  evident  from  Smith's  later  work  that  he  care- 
fully studied  Emmons,^ ^  and  that  he  fundamentally  re- 
jected his  peculiarities,  as  both  Woods  and  Pond  led  him 
to  do.  But  when  he  had  arrived  at  the  point  of  construct- 
ing a  theological  system  for  the  instruction  of  his  pupils, 
he  had  received,  first  of  all  the  theologians  whose  work  has 
passed  under  our  eye,  the  full  influence  of  a  wide  acquaint- 
ance with  the  theologians  of  Germany,  and  through  them 
with  those  of  all  Christian  history.  Owing  to  the  character 
of  his  published  works  upon  theology,  which  are  mere  frag- 
ments, and  those,  fragments  of  lectures  designed  to  in- 
troduce the  student  to  theology  rather  than  to  set  forth 
a  complete  system,  it  will  ever  remain  doubtful  to  the  his- 
torian whether  he  had  a  truly  originative  and  creative 
capacity.  He  was  certainly  a  great  historian.  The  tradi- 
tion handed  down  by  his  friends  is  that  he  was  a 
great  theologian.  But  that  tradition  remains  unveri- 
fied by  his  actual  productions.  Whether  it  be  true 
or  not,  he  was  certainly  a  very  receptive  mind.  His 
works  are  full  of  citations  from  a  wide  range  of  read- 

17  Loc.  cit.,  p.  345. 

18  Ibid.,  pp.  462,  463. 

1®  See  "The  Theological  System  of  Emmons,"  in  the  volume  Faith  and  Phi- 
losophy, pp.  215  ff. 


NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM  439 


ing,  and  are  equally  full  of  criticism  of  the  most  trenchant 
and  suggestive  sort.  He  brought  into  our  theology  for 
the  first  time  the  influence  of  the  entire  Christian  world  of 
thought.  In  this  historical  review  we  have  had  occasion 
toi  observe  the  effect  upon  our  theology  of  the  importation 
of  influences  from  abroad  of  an  essentially  hostile  character. 
That  effect  may  be  concisely  stated  as  the  creation  of  the 
Universalist-Unitarian  theology,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of 
the  formation  of  the  theology  represented  best  by  Professor 
Park,  on  the  other.  We  have  now  to  see  what  will  be  the 
effect  upon  it  of  the  reflections  of  a  mind  sO'  widely  informed 
and  variously  disciplined  as  was  Henry  B.  Smith. 

First,  was  his  theology  New  England  theology?  Was 
the  effect  of  his  wider  introduction  to  the  field  of  Christian 
thought  obtained  at  the  best  universities  of  Europe  to  ex- 
hibit the  thought  of  his  native  New  England  in  so  unfavor- 
able a  light  as  to  lead  him  to  turn  aside  from  it  as  inade- 
quate and  to  build  upon  other  foundations  and  after  a  dif- 
ferent plan?  Or  could  he  retain  the  chief  results  of  the 
dogmatical  development  here  and  build  on  after  the  same 
general  plan,  and  in  the  same  spirit,  as  his  predecessors? 
The  return  to  America  and  the  call  to  theological  thinking 
of  so  great  a  mind  as  Smith's  was  a  critical  moment  for 
our  theology.  What  would  a  gifted  son  who  had  gone 
out  into  the  wider  world  think  of  his  home? 

It  is  distinctly  and  decidedly  to  be  answered  that  Smith 
remained  a  member  of  the  New  England  school.  He 
found,  as  others  have  after  him,  that  Germany  had  much 
to  teach  him,  especially  in  enlarging  his  conceptions  of 
what  theology  was,  in  opening  new  problems,  in  giving 
depth  and  breadth  to  his  thinking.  It  was  here  that  he  got  a 
profounder  view  of  the  relation  of  "faith  and  philoso- 
phy."      Here  he  came  to  see  the  lack  in  many  of  the 

20  See  book  of  same  title,  pp.  35  f. 


440 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


forms  of  New  England  theology  of  a  "principle,"  as  the 
Germans  call  it,  a  starting-point,  a  norm  by  which  all  the 
thinking  of  the  theologian  is  to  be  guided,  and  a  germ 
which  shall  contain  the  secret  of  the  whole  system.  But 
he  found  that  no  thinking  has  been  more  thorough  than 
that  of  the  New  Englanders  upon  many  of  the  themes 
of  the  discipline,  and  that  at  many  a  point  New  England 
had  advanced  far  beyond  Germany.  Not  to  discard,  nor  to 
uproot  and  destroy,  did  he  return  and  take  his  place  among 
teachers  and  laborers  in  his  native  province,  but  to  honor 
the  past,  to  conserve  the  valuable,  to  advance  as  he  should 
be  able,  and  everywhere  to  deepen  and  enlarge.  To  note 
certain  particulars : 

He  taught  that  benevolence  is  the  one  comprehensive 
moral  attribute  of  God.^^  In  accordance  with  this,  justice 
is  finally  public  justice,^^  and  ''punishment  is  needful  to  ex- 
press the  displeasure  of  a  holy  God  against  sin  as  ill-deserv- 
ing, and  also  to  preserve  the  love  of  holiness  and  hatred  of 
sin  in  otliers."^^  Human  virtue  is  determined  by  this  idea. 
It  is  "love  to  God  as  being  in  effect  all  being  or,  other- 
wise stated,  it  is  the  "love  of  all  intelligent  and  sentient 
beings,  according  to  their  respective  capacities  for  good, 
with  chief  and  ultimate  respect  to  the  highest  good,  or  holi- 
ness." This  is  strictly  Edwardean.  Edwardean  also  was 
the  theory  of  the  will.  To  be  sure,  Smith  did  not  follow 
Edwards  in  all  the  minor  points  of  his  theory.  Thus  he 
adopted  the  threefold  division  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul 
in  place  of  the  twofold,  and  was  much  clearer  as  to  causa- 
tion. "Man,"  he  says,  "acting  as  will,  choosing,  is  an  effi- 
cient cause;  among  second  causes  in  this  world,  the  chief; 
a  dependent,  but  real  cause.  There  is  proper  causal  effi- 
ciency in  every  act  of  choice.    Power  is  an  attribute  of 

21  System,  pp.  34  f.  22  j^id.,  p.  45, 

23  Ibid,  p.  47.  2*  Ibid.,  pp.  142,  223. 


NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM  441 


cause :  it  is  the  distinctive  attribute  of  an  efficient  cause : 
it  is  that  in  the  cause  which  gives  it  its  efficiency  in  respect 
to  any  particular  end  or  object."  He  expands  the  ter- 
minology of  the  subject  to  follow  Dr.  Richards  in  dis- 
tinguishing between  the  executive  and  immanent  voli- 
tions,^^ defining  the  latter  as  Taylor  had  defined  "primary, 
predominant  choice."  Germany  is  drawn  upon  for  the 
distinction  between  formal  and  real  freedom,^^  as  had  been 
done  by  Park.  He  does  much  to  relieve  the  Edwardean 
theory  of  misunderstandings,  and  of  unnecessary  compli- 
cations. But  he  finally  comes  fully  to  the  Edwardean  posi- 
tion that  *'the  will  always  acts  according  to  the  strongest 
motive,"  or,  as  he  elsewhere  phrases  it,  more  in  accord- 
ance with  Edwards,  "always  choosing  that  which  in  the 
view  of  the  mind  is  most  desirable."  And  in  the  theory 
of  the  atonement  he  is  one  with  the  New  England  school 
in  rejecting  the  theory  of  a  satisfaction  to  distributive  jus- 
tice, and  in  making  the  service  of  the  sacrifice  of  Christ 
to  consist  in  "satisfying  the  demands  of  Public  Justice, 
meaning  ....  what  the  divine  holiness  sets  before  itself 
as  the  chief  end  of  the  universe,  or  that  which  is  the  end 
of  the  requirement  of  the  law." 

These  positions,  which  are  the  cardinal  positions  of  the 
New  England  school,  fully  identify  Smith  with  that  school. 

At  the  same  time  he  did  not  go  to  the  lengths  of  single 
teachers  in  respect  to  extreme  positions.  The  phrase,  "All 
sin  consists  in  sinning,"  which  was  characteristic  of  the 
Emmonian  strain,  and  which  Professor  Park  fully  accepted 
as  a  most  valuable  and  illuminating  suggestion,  Smith  con- 
trasted with  the  other  phrase,  "All  men  sinned  and  fell  in 
Adam,"  and  said :    "Each  of  these  plants  itself  on  one  side 


25  Ibid.,  p.  238. 

27  Ibid.,  p.  243. 
2^  Ibid.,  p.  245. 


Ibid.,  p.  240. 
28  Ibid.,  p.  247. 
Ibid. J  p,  470. 


442         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


of  the  dilemma,  as  containing  the  whole  truth;  and  each 
of  these  taken  strictly  by  itself,  is  about  as  true,  for  the 
solution  of  the  problem,  as  the  other ;  for  each  neglects  the 
other,  and  leaves  unaccounted  for  about  half  of  the  diffi- 
culty." Hence,  while  rejecting  "immediate  imputation," 
he  finally  adopts  a  position  of  "mediate"  imputation.^^  One 
cannot  but  feel  that  here  is  a  trace  of  the  undue  influence  of 
the  Westminster  Confession  upon  a  New  Englander  who 
had  consented  to^  accept  this  yoke;  for,  after  all.  Smith 
found  "neither  immediate  nor  mediate  imputation  fully 
satisfactory."^^  He  refers  the  corrupt  nature  of  men  to 
heredity. 

On  account  of  this  innate  depravity,  all  men,  mankind  as  such,  are 

exposed  to  evils  For  this  native  corruption  before  act,  we  need 

not  say  that  the  person  who  is  the  subject  of  it  will  receive,  or  de- 
serves everlasting  death.  It  is  a  liability,  exposure, — justly  such; 
but  not  personal  desert.  The  desert  of  eternal  death  is  a  judgment 
in  respect  to  individuals  for  their  personal  acts  and  preferences.  Until 
such  choice  there  cannot  be,  metaphysically  or  ethically,  such  a  judg- 
ment.2* 

He  goes  back  with  some  satisfaction  to  Edwards'  treat- 
ment of  imputation.^^  But,  in  fact,  with  his  view  of  moral 
action,  he  is  only  entangling  himself  in  phraseology  which 
was  formed  under  the  influence  of  another  philosophy,  and 
which  only  impedes  him  in  the  expression  of  his  thought. 

An  interesting  incidental  topic  is  his  treatment  of  the 
governmental  theory  of  the  atonement  which  he,  in  general, 
espoused. He  divides  this  theory  into  two  forms,  of 
which  the  first  is  the  form  which  views  the  atonement  as 
"having  reference  to  happiness  or  expediency,  in  maintain- 
ing the  divine  government."  The  twO'  representatives 
chosen  for  this  form  are  Grotius  and  N.  W.  Taylor.  It  is 
quite  evident  that  Smith  had  no  adequate  idea  of  Grotius. 

cit.,  p.  304-  ^^Ihid.,  pp.  314  ff. 

33J6tU,  p.  314.  Ibid.,  pp.  315  ff- 

Ibid.,  p.  317.  Ibid.,  pp.  469  fF, 


NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM 


443 


He  refers  to  Baur  and  is  open  at  least  to  the  suspicion  of 
not  having  read  Grotius  himself.  Baur  did  not  understand 
Grotius.^^  Smith  accordingly  fails  to  note  the  great  point 
of  the  Grotian  theory,  that  it  changes  the  idea  of  God 
from  that  of  offended  party  tO'  that  of  ruler;  to  give  a  true 
estimate  of  its  office  of  law  and  punishment;  or  to  show 
that  Grotius  thought  the  atonement  to  maintain  the  au- 
thority of  the  law  by  effecting  the  same  thing  that  the  pun- 
ishment of  men  under  the  law  would  have  done,  viz.,  the 
prevention  of  sin  among  the  subjects  of  the  law.  Law 
certainly  was  nO'  more  ^'individual,  personal  ....  exclu- 
sively" to  Grotius  than  it  was  to  Smith  when  he  wrote,  upon 
the  following  pages:  "Moral  law  has  two  main  ends,  to 
secure  the  supremacy  of  holiness  in  the  universe,  to  fur- 
nish the  rule  for  individuals."  Grotius'  "consulting  for  the 
order  of  things  and  for  the  authority  of  [God's]  own 
law"  does  not  differ  essentially  from  Smith's  "main- 
tenance of  the  supremacy  of  holiness."  Nor  is  Smith's 
treatment  of  Taylor  much  more  successful.  He  under- 
stands Taylor,  when  including  holiness  in  happiness,  to 
mean  the  same  thing  as  he  does  himself,  when  distingiiish- 
ing  hetzveen  holiness  and  happiness.  Unsatisfactory  in 
some  respects  as  the  statements  of  the  New  Haven  theolo- 
gians had  been  from  Dwight  down,  they  did  not  mean  sub- 
stantially anything  different  from  Smith  whose  statement 
was  so  much  better. 

The  second  form  of  the  theory  is  that  which  makes  the 
atonement  to  have  reference  to  holiness  as  the  end  of  all 
moral  government.  He  identifies  government  and  law,  since 
government  is  by  law;  and  the  atonement  is  that  sacrifice 
of  Christ  which  answers  the  end  of  public  justice — that  is, 
substantially  effects,  by  the  substitution  of  Christ  for  the 

37  Baur's  errors  are  somewhat  fully  exhibited  in  the  notes  to  the  present 
writer's  edition  of  the  Defence  (Andover,  1889).    See  Index  for  the  passages. 
Defence  (Andover  ed.),  p.  137. 


444 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


sinner,  just  what  would  have  been  effected  under  the  law 
by  the  punishment  of  the  sinner.  "It  secures  the  highest 
good  of  the  universe,  viewed  as  true  happiness  as  well  as 
holiness."       This  is  the  form  which  Smith  adopts. 

Returning  for  a  moment  to  the  name  of  Nathaniel  W. 
Taylor,  one  of  the  interesting  inquiries  as  tO'  Smith's  theol- 
ogy is  upon  its  relation  to  Taylorism.  It  might  be  anti- 
cipated that  he  would  find  little  in  the  special  work  of  Tay- 
lor to  commend,  rejecting  as  he  did  the  fundamental  prop- 
osition which  Taylor  made  as  to  the  will.  Taylor  taught 
''power  to  the  contrary,"  or  a  real  prime  causality  in  man; 
while  Smith  remained  upon  the  platform  of  the  Edwardean 
determinism.  He  therefore  rejects  Taylor's  positions  in 
respect  to  the  prevention  of  sin."**^  With  Park,  he  main- 
tains that  God  can  prevent  sin  in  a  moral  system,  thus  re- 
jecting the  positive  form  of  Taylor's  favorite  hypothesis. 
Its  hypothetical  form  does  not  diminish  its  offense  in  his  eyes 
very  much.  "On  this  basis,  sin  could  never  be  certain  in 
the  system."  He  thus  held  up  before  Taylor  his  great 
failure  in  this  topic,  either  to  combine  freedom  and  cer- 
tainty by  a  rational  explanation,  or  to  drop  the  idea  of  cer- 
tainty in  its  strict  Calvinistic,  mathematical  application. 
He  himself  refers  God's  ability  to  prevent  sin  to  his  omni- 
potence, as  he  may  upon  the  Edwardean  basis,  thus  exhibit- 
ing how  completely  he  failed  to  accept  the  new  proposals 
as  to  moral  government,  and  furnishing  a  new  proof,  if 
one  was  needed,  that  the  Edwardean  "moral"  government 
did  not  differ  essentially  from  the  government  of  external 
nature,  both  being  by  force.    He  finally  says : 

The  only  question  which  can  be  proposed  in  respect  to  vindicating 
the  divine  government,  and  the  point  to  which  any  theory  that  attempts 
to  solve  the  question  must  come,  is  this:  To  show  why  a  holy  and 
benevolent  God  chose  a  system  in  which  sin  was  to  be  a  matter  of  fact, 

88  System,  p.  477. 

*o  Ibid.,  pp.  149  ff. 


NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM  445 


and  why  the  existence  of  sin  in  that  system  was  a  condition  of  its 
being  the  best  system.  Understanding  that  to  be  the  question,  it  may 
be  said  that  the  theory  that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good  fairly  undertakes  to  meet  the  question,  though  it  does  not  answer 
it.  But  the  other  theory  does  not  meet  the  question.  It  merely  says 
that  in  the  best  system  free  agency  involves  the  possibility  of  sin, 
and  that  there  cannot  be  a  moral  system  without  free  agents.  The 
theory  thus  leaves  the  question  and  problem  wholly  undecided.  No 
relief  can  be  found  in  a  scheme  which  limits  divine  omnipotence.*^ 

Smith  has  here  entirely  forgotten  the  place  of  Taylor's 
argument  in  his  system,  which  was  to  remove  an  objec- 
tion to  the  benevolence  of  God  by  introducing  a  hypothesis 
which  should  evacuate  the  objection;  not  to  solve  the  ques- 
tion of  the  permission  of  sin. 

The  same  attitude  is  held  in  reference  to  other  points  in 
the  system.  The  efforts  of  Taylor  tO'  establish  the  existence 
of  a  neutral  point  in  the  soul  to  which  preaching  could  ap- 
peal, receive  no  proper  attention,  but  the  unfortunate  phrase- 
ology which  he  adopted  as  to  ^'self-love"  is  made  the  ground 
of  a  definition  of  his  position  which  admits  of  an  easy  re- 
futation, viz. :  **My  happiness  in  the  general  happiness  is 
the  spring  and  sum  of  virtue."  The  position  that  ''all 
that  is  moral  is  in  voluntary  action"  is  said  to  resolve  all 
original  sin  intO'  physical  depravity.^ ^  Taylor's  neutral 
state,  which  was  introduced  according  to  him  by  the  Holy 
Spirit,  "suspending  the  selfish  principle,"  is  characterized 
as  ''neutral,  yet  always  producing  sin"  ^'^ — a  characteriza- 
tion of  which  Taylor  would  have  said  that  it  had  no  corre- 
spondence tO'  his  meaning.    And  so'  forth. 

Smith  thus  joined  Park  in  rejecting  the  advanced  posi- 
tions of  Taylorism.  In  one  theological  center  alone  did 
they  receive  full  recognition — in  Oberlin.  The  foremost 
representatives  of  the  school  thus  united  in  saying,  at  the 


*i  Ibid.,  p.  152. 
**J&iU,  p.  310. 


Ibid.,  p.  206. 
Ibid.,  p.  312. 


446 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


end  of  the  development,  that  Calvinism  could  not  be  main- 
tained upon  a  theory  of  freedom. 

What,  now,  did  Smi:h  do  in  the  way  of  advancing  the 
New  England  problems?  The  answer  cannot  be  a  very 
satisfactory  one.  He  had  early  seen  the  necessity  of  a 
better  "principle"  in  our  theology,  and  a  great  vision  of 
what  it  ought  to  be  had  risen  before  him.  He  formulated 
it  as  "Incarnation  in  order  to  Redemption,"  which  ought 
to  be  the  principle  "which  gives  the  true  center  of  unity  to 
the  whole  theological  system,  ....  that  in  which  the 
whole  system  hangs  together  and  moves  together,  .... 
the  principle  in  the  sense  that  all  the  parts  can  be  best  ar- 
ranged in  relation  to  it."  If  his  thought  can  be  recon- 
structed from  his  various  expressions  of  it  in  abstract  form, 
it  would  seem  to  have  involved  a  new  point  of  approach  to 
the  system;  for  example,  man  as  a  sinner  and  needing 
something,  which  something  should  be  defined  from  his 
needs  as  redemption,  which  redemption  should  be  devel- 
oped as  involving  incarnation,  and  this  the  Trinity,  etc. 
This  would  have  involved  a  new  use  of  Christian  expe- 
rience, such  as  that  made  by  Stearns  and  Foster  in  connec- 
tion with  the  German,  Frank,'*^  and  it  would  have  effectu- 
ally disposed  of  the  Calvinism  of  the  system,  when  due  at- 
tention had  been  given  to  all  its  implications.  But  nO'  such 
new  approach  was  adopted  by  Smith.  His  system  moves 
along  the  old  paths,  and  his  division  into  "antecedents  of 
redemption,"  "the  redemption  itself,"  and  "the  kingdom 
of  redemption"  is  scarcely  more  than  a  verbal  suggestion 
of  his  principle.  He  himself  recognized  this  failure  to 
realize  his  early  visions  and  aspirations.^^  Whatever  the 
explanation  of  it  may  be,  the  fact  remains  that  he  did  not 
introduce  his  principle  into  the  development  of  the  system. 

*^  Introduction  to  Christian  Theology,  p.  58. 
System  der  Christlichen  Gewissheit. 
Introduction,  p.  iv. 


NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM 


447 


Nor  did  he  contribute  much  to  carry  the  system  farther 
on  at  points  where  it  sadly  needed  it.  The  Unitarian  chal- 
lenge to  exhibit  the  possibility  of  the  old  Chalcedon  for- 
mula, one  person  in  two  natures,  had  never  been  met.  Ger- 
many was  doing  something  really  to  meet  it.  Smith  knew 
this.  He  presented  clearly  the  central  importance  of  the 
unity  of  the  person  to  Christology,  and  he  put  the  personal 
center,  the  Ego,  unmistakably  in  the  divine  element.  But, 
though  he  knew  Dorner's  suggestions  as  to  the  gradual  de- 
velopment of  the  incarnation,  and  the  kenotic  suggestion 
as  to  the  divine  self-limitation  in  the  incarnation,^^  he 
adopted  neither  for  himself,  nor  brought  them  forward 
in  such  a  way  as  to  furnish  any  appreciable  help. 

As  an  apologist,^^  Smith  appears  at  greater  advantage. 
His  Introduction  to  theology  is  full  of  valuable  generaliza- 
tions, gives  evidence  of  the  widest  reading  and  fullest 
knowledge,  and  is  illuminating  and  stimulating  in  a  high 
degree.  The  Apologetics  proper  give  a  great  outline  of  a 
learned  and  cogent  argument,  and  cause  the  greater  regret 
for  their  incompleteness  by  the  greater  evidence  which 
they  give  of  the  entire  competence  of  their  author.  And 
yet,  nothing  can  be  more  plain  to  the  reader  of  today  than 
that  both  of  these  works  belong  to  a  bygone  age.  How 
completely  this  is  so  one  may  judge  from  the  simple  fact 
that  the  plan  for  ihe  ''Ely  Lectures"  upon  evolution  which 
Smith  had  been  appointed  to  give  in  the  year  1877,  re- 
gards the  evolution  which  began  with  the  work  of  Darwin 
as  a  member  of  the  long  series  of  speculations  which  have 
gathered  about  this  word.  "The  history  of  evolution,"  he 
says,^^  ''is  as  old  as  human  thought.  Its  materialistic  forms 
were  advanced  and  rejected  in  the  dawn  of  philosophy. 

System,  pp.  422  flf. 

Introduction  to  Christian  Theology.     Apologetics.       Two  volumes  in  one 
(New  York,  1891). 

^'^Apologetics,  p.   170.  , 


448 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


It  is  now  newly  formulated  (by  Spencer  more  ably  than 
any  other)."  Thus  the  vital  consideration  that  an  age  of 
exact  observation  of  facts,  such  as  had  never  been  known, 
had  been  ushered  in,  and  that  all  reasoning  was  to  take  on 
new  forms  in  consequence,  had  entirely  escaped  him.  As 
a  representative  of  the  old  apology,  Smith  had  had  no  pre- 
decessor in  America;  as  an  apologist  for  the  new  age,  he 
was  incapacitated  by  the  fact  that  he  did  not  live  in  it. 
Evolution  can  never  be  rightly  appraised  nor  its  relation  to 
Christian  theology  set  forth  by  one  who  begins  with  the 
idea  that  ancient  philosophy  stands  upon  a  level  with  the 
inductive  science  of  the  present  day.  The  historic  spirit, 
so  strong  in  Smith,  blinded  him  to  the  fact  that  a  right 
method  of  investigation  had  made  the  nineteenth  century 
absolutely  revolutionary  in  human  thinking.^^ 

Smith's  immediate  successor  at  Union  Seminary  was 
William  G.  T.  Shedd.^^  He  was  a  son  of  New  England, 
and  graduated  in  theology  at  Andover  while  Woods  was  in 
the  chair  of  theology  and  Park  in  that  of  homiletics.  But 
while  a  student  in  Vermont  University  he  came  in  contact 
with  Coleridge's  philosophy,  under  the  influence  of  President 
Marsh,  and  thus  received  a  philosophic  tendency  which  led 
him  far  away  from  the  positions  of  the  New  England  di- 
vines. Of  Edwards'  doctrines  as  tO'  the  will  he  retained 
only  the  idea  of  determinism,  which  was,  however,  more 
of  a  Burtonian  position  with  Shedd  than  an  Edwardean.^^ 

^1  The  completest  examples  of  Smith's  apologetic  work  are  to  be  fom.d  in 
the  volume,  Faith  and  Philosophy,  essays  upon  "The  New  Latitudinarians  of  Eng- 
land," "Sir  William  Hamilton's  Theory  of  Knowledge,"  "Draper's  Intellectual  De- 
velopment of  Europe,"  "Kenan's  Life  of  Jesus,"  "The  New  Faith  of  Strauss." 

^2  Born  at  Acton,  Mass.,  June  21,  1820;  died  in  New  York,  November  17, 
1894;  graduated  from  the  University  of  Vermont,  1839;  Andover  Seminary, 
1843;  pastor  at  Brandon,  Vt.,  1844-45;  professor  of  English  literature  in  the 
University  of  Vermont,  1845-52;  of  sacred  rhetoric  at  Auburn,  1852-53;  of 
ecclesiastical  history  at  Andover,  1853-62;  of  biblical  literature  in  Union  sem- 
inary, 1863-74;  and  of  systematic  theology,  1874-90. 

^8  He  rejected  the  threefold  division  of  the  mind  in  favor  of  the  twofold 
(Dogmatic  Theology,  Vol.  II,  p.  118).     He  made  a  distinction  between  the  "in- 


NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM 


449 


The  Nature  of  Virtue  he  entirely  abandoned,  denying  that 
benevolence  was  the  single  moral  attribute  of  God,^^  and 
refusing  to  accept  ''public  justice"  as  being  justice  at  all.^'^ 
The  proposition  that  obligation  is  commensurate  with  abil- 
ity he  acknowledged,^^  but  he  put  the  ability  in  Adam,  not 
in  us.^^  He  taught  that  all  sin  is  voluntary,  but  made 
original  sin  the  voluntary  sin  of  every  individual  man  in 
Adam}^  He  totally  rejected  the  New  England  doctrine 
of  ability  to  repent,  and  declared  its  preaching  injurious 
to  sinners,^^  thus  reacting  to  the  paralyzing  position  of  the 
Puritan  epoch.  He  rejected  the  governmental  theory  of 
the  atonement.^^  And  he  was  so  far  opposed  to  Taylor- 
ism  that  he  did  not  think  it  worthy  of  mention,  and  the 
name  of  N.  W.  Taylor  does  not  even  get  into  the  index  of 
the  work.  In  his  own  words,  the  "general  type  of  doc- 
trine is  the  Augustino-Calvinistic :  upon  a  few  points,  the 
elder  Calvinism  has  been  followed  in  preference  to  the 
later."    He  well  says: 

It  will  be  objected  by  some  to  this  dogmatic  system  that  it  has 
been  too  much  influenced  by  the  patristic,  mediaeval,  and  reformation 
periods,  and  too  little  by  the  so-called  "progress"  of  modern  theology. 
The  charge  of  scholasticism,  and  perhaps  of  speculativeness,  will  be 
made.    The  author  has  no  disposition  to  repel  the  charge.  While 


clination,"  and  the  volition,  closely  corresponding  to  that  between  "primary  pre- 
dominant choice"  in  Taylor  and  individual  volitions.  "Inclination"  was  fixed  upon 
evil  at  the  moment  of  the  fall,  by  what  seems  to  be  an  act  of  primal  causality, 
and  so  of  true  freedom.  But  it  is  the  only  such  act.  The  Burtonian  turn  of 
the  thought  consists  in  the  fact  that  in  regeneration  the  "holy  inclination  is  re- 
originated  in  the  sinful  will  of  the  individual  men  by  the  Holy  Ghost,"  and  that 
individual  volitions  then  follow  of  necessity  this  bent  of  the  will.  ^Theology, 
Vol.  II,  pp.  144,  165,  171,  178,  250.) 

Theology,  Vol.  I,  pp.  369  ff . ;  cf.  Vol.  II,  p.  434. 


Ihid.,  p.  255. 

•°  He  quite  misunderstands  Grotius  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  "relaxation" 
of  the  law,  and  to  the  necessity  of  satisfaction  (Vol.  I,  p.  383;  cf.  Vol.  II,  p.  453). 
He  himself  takes  God  in  the  matter  of  forgiveness  as  acting  as  the  offended 
party  (Vol.  II,  pp.  384,  447)  ;  and  other  positions  of  his  render  the  governmental 
theory  an  impossibility  (Vol.  II,  pp.  435,  437,  etc.). 


^5  Ihid..  p.  383. 
5^  Ihid.,  pp.  168  ff. 


5«  Ihid.,  Vol.  II,  p.  241. 
58  Ihid.,  p.  181. 


450 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


acknowledging  the  excellences  of  the  present  period  in  respect  to  the 
practical  application  and  spread  of  religion,  he  cannot  regard  it  as 
pre-eminent  above  all  others  in  scientific  theology.^^ 

Hence  he  shows  himself  even  more  impervious  to  the 
fact  of  the  revolution  in  methods  of  thought  wrought  by 
scientific  evolution  than  Smith,  and  continues  to  quote 
Aristotle  and  the  Fathers,  with  a  very  large  addition  of 
material  from  a  quarter  where  Smith  had  not  anticipated 
him — from  the  scholastics  of  the  Middle  Ages.  This  he 
does  as  if  their  utterly  a  priori  and  altogether  ungrounded 
and  groundless  speculations  were  quite  on  a  level,  if  not 
above,  the  best  results  of  modern  inductive  thinking.  With 
great,  though  somewhat  inaccurate,  learning  he  has,  there- 
fore, presented  a  system  of  theology  which  might  equally 
well  have  been  written  before  Edwards  wrote  his  first  work, 
and  which  represents  the  extreme  of  recoil  from  every- 
thing that  New  England  had  done. 

Shedd  was  the  last  of  the  incumbents  of  the  Roosevelt 
chair  in  Union  Seminary  who  could  be  reckoned  to  the 
New  England  school.  This  position  of  his  is,  therefore, 
of  the  nature  of  a  judgment  of  New  England  theology, 
and  a  condemnation  of  it.  Smith  had  declared,  in  har- 
mony with  Edwards,  that  Calvinism  could  not  be  main- 
tained except  upon  the  basis  of  determinism,  and  had  thus 
rejected  the  crowning  work  of  Taylor,  while  otherwise 
acknowledging  his  connection  vv^ith  the  school.  But  Shedd 
said  in  substance  that  the  whole  effort  of  the  school,  from 
the  beginning  in  Edwards  tO'  the  summit  reached  in  Tay- 
lor, was  a  mistaken  one  and  had  ended  in  failure.  To 
him  the  alternative  was  between  Calvinism  of  the  unmodi- 
fied type  and  not-Calvinism ;  and  he  was  a  Calvinist. 

Of  other  thinkers  in  the  New  School  Presbyterian  church 
it  is  not  necessary  to  speak  at  length.    Albert  Barnes  was 


^1  Theology,  Vol.  I,  pp.  v,  vi. 


NEW  SCHOOL  IN  PRESBYTERIANISM  451 


a  singularly  beautiful  and  religious  nature  whoi  early  in  his 
ministry  adopted  the  chief  distinguishing  doctrines  of  New- 
England.  His  sermon  on  The  Way  of  Salvation,^^  deliv- 
ered to  his  own  people  in  the  midst  of  a  revival  of  religion 
"to  bring  together  in  a  single  discourse  the  leading  doc- 
trines of  the  Bible  respecting  God's  way  of  saving  men," 
was  in  effect  a  kind  of  creed,  and  was  made  the  basis  of  his 
trial  before  the  Second  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia  for 
heresy.  The  following  extracts  will  show  his  agreement 
with  New  England: 

God's  plan  of  saving  men  is  based  on  the  fact  that  the  race  is 

destitute   of   holiness  Christianity   does   not   charge   on  men 

crimes  of  which  they  are  not  guilty.  It  does  not  say,  as  I  suppose, 
that  the  sinner  is  held  to  be  personally  answerable  for  the  transgres- 
sions of  Adam,  or  of  any  other  man;  or  that  God  has  given  a  law 

which  man  has  no  power  to  obey  The  violation  of  this  pure 

law  is  held  to  be  the  first  act  of  the  child  when  he  becomes  a  moral 
agent ;  and  continued  act  of  his  life  unless  he  is  renewed ;  and  the 
last  act  on  his  dying  pillow.  ....  The  Son  of  God  died  in  the  place 
of  sinners.  He  did  not,  indeed,  endure  the  penalty  of  the  law — for 
his  sufferings  were  not  eternal,  nor  did  he  endure  remorse  of  con* 
science;  but  he  endured  so  much  suffering,  bore  so  much  agony,  that 
the  Father  was  pleased  to  accept  of  it  in  the  place  of  the  eternal  tor- 
ments of  all  that  should  by  him  be  saved.  "The  atonement  of  itself, 
secured  the  salvation  of  no  one."  It  made  it  consistent  for  God  to  offer 
pardon  to  rebels.  It  so  evinced  the  hatred  of  God  against  sin — so 
vindicated  his  justice^so  asserted  the  honor  of  his  law,  that  all  his 
perfections  would  shine  forth  illustriously,  if  sinners  through  this 
work  should  be  saved.  .  ,  .  .  This  atonement  was  for  all  men.  ...  I 
assume  the  free  and  full  offer  of  the  gospel  to  all  men  to  be  one  of 
those  cardinal  points  of  the  system  by  which  1  gauge  all  my  other  views 
of  truth.  It  is,  in  my  view,  a  corner-stone  of  the  whole  edifice;  that 
which  makes  it  so  glorious  to  God,  and  so  full  of  good  will  to  men. 
....  While  God  thus  sincerely  offers  the  gospel  to  men,  all  mankind, 

while  left  to  themselves,  as  sincerely  and  cordially  reject  it  

Those  who  are  saved  will  be  saved  because  God  does  it  by  the  re- 
newing of  the  Holy  Ghost.  ....  There  is  here  supposed  to  be  no 
violation  of  freedom.  In  all  this  the  sinner  chooses  freely.  The 
Spirit  compels  no  one:  he  shuts  out  no  one  It  is  no  part  of  this 

«2  Edition  before  me,  the  seventh,  with  Barnes's  defense  before  synod  and 
presbytery  (New  York,  1836). 


452         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


scheme,  as  you  will  see,  that  God  made  men  on  purpose  to  damn 

them  This  is  done  by  a  change  in  the  affections  and  life  of 

man  It  is  not  merely  a  love  of  happiness  in  a  new  form,  it  is 

a  love  of  God  and  divine  things  because  they  are  good  and  amiable  in 
themselves. 

These  are  the  leading  positions  of  the  New  England 
theology,  and  Barnes  continued  to  teach  them  to  the  end. 
But  his  theological  activity  was  largely  consumed  and  his 
creative  faculties  permanently  lamed  by  the  necessity  under 
which  he  lay  of  reconciling  all  this  with  the  Westminster 
Confession. 

We  therefore  close  this  chapter  of  our  history  with  the 
remark  that  the  verdict  of  the  history  justifies  the  con- 
tention of  Princeton  in  its  chief  objection  to  the  New  Eng- 
land theology,  however  little  justification  there  may  be  for 
the  details  of  the  Princeton  warfare  against  everything 
which  New  England  proposed.  The  new  theology,  if  con- 
sistently carried  out,  must  in  the  end  disrupt  the  system 
of  Calvinism,  and  in  this  sense  it  was  irreconcilable  with 
the  Confession.  The  influence  of  the  Confession,  when- 
ever it  began  really  to  be  felt  by  a  New  England  thinker, 
was  always  for  reaction  and  ultimately  for  stagnation. 
Princeton  might  well  say  to  New  Haven  what  Luther  said 
to  Zwingli :  Ihr  habt  einen  anderen  Geist  denn  wir. 


CHAPTER  XVI 


THE  OBERLIN  THEOLOGY 

The  greatest  mind  and  the  regulating  force  in  the  de- 
velopment of  Oberlin  theology  was  Charles  G.  Finney. 
Converted  under  remarkable  experiences  in  the  compara- 
tive solitude  of  a  New  York  village,  in  his  early  manhood, 
and  after  he  had  already  begun  the  practice  of  law,  he 
formed  his  theology  in  connection  with  his  early  labors  as 
a  preacher  with  but  little  assistance  from  human  teachers.^ 
His  thinking  was  marked  from  the  beginning  by  strong 
originality;  but  he  was  not  so  completely  independent  as 
he  was  sometimes  thought  to  be.  Various  underground  cur- 
rents set  from  New  Haven  westward,  and  some  of  them 
bore  theological  ideas  into  the  region  where  Finney  was. 
Subsequently  he  had  personal  association  with  the  great 
New  Haven  theologian.^  Influenced  by  legal  analogies, 
and  early  adopting  the  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of  the  will, 
he  had  struck  into  the  path  which  all  New  England  theol- 
ogy was  following,  and  had  arrived  at  its  main  results  be- 
fore he  left  the  seclusion  of  his  home  and  became  the  most 
famous  revivalist  of  his  time.  It  is  not  strange,  therefore, 
that  he  ultimately  adopted  most  of  Taylor's  positions,  and 
was,  among  the  great  leaders  of  New  England,  Taylor's 
true  successor. 

Finney's  earliest  studies  had  given  him  the  govern- 
mental theory  of  the  atonement,  and  the  doctrine  of  gen- 
eral atonement;  had  taught  him  the  freedom  of  the  will, 
true  human  ability,  that  man  is  active  in  regeneration,  and 

'^Memoirs  of  Rev.  Charles  G.  Finney  (autobiographic;  New  York,  1876),  pp. 
42  ff. 

2  Professor  G.  Frederick  Wright,  Charles  Grandison  Finney  (New  York, 
1891),  pp.  177  ft.  A  very  valuable  and  discriminating  chapter  on  Finney's  the- 
ology. 

453 


454 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


that  he  is  converted  by  the  influence  of  the  truth;  and  had 
led  him  to  reject  imputation,  and  by  impHcation  the  re- 
maining- artificial  elements  of  the  Westminster  system.  It 
is  an  interesting  detail  that  it  was  the  presentation  of  the 
old  Rellyan  arguments  for  universalism  by  a  traveling 
Universalist  minister  that  led  him,  as  it  had  the  younger 
Edwards  and  his  associates,  to  the  formulation  of  the  gov- 
ernmental theory  of  the  atonement.^ 

When  he  arrived  at  Oberlin,  he  found  there  three  other 
powerful  men — Mahan,  Morgan,  and  Cowles.  These  four 
leaders  had  all  been  engaged  in  the  remarkable  revival 
movements  of  those  days,  and  had  almost  come  to  feel 
that  the  earnestness  and  warmth  of  the  revival  were  the 
proper  characteristics  of  any  normal  Christian  experience. 
The  Oberlin  colony  was  a  collection  of  men  and  women 
intensely  in  earnest  in  the  Christian  life,  and  dissatisfied 
with  anything  which  fell  short  of  the  highest  attainable 
degree  of  perfection.^  The  preaching  was  pungent  and 
searching.  There  soon  arose  the  inquiry  whether  com- 
plete victory  over  temptation,  by  the  help  of  the  almighty 
Savior,  was  not  possible  tO'  true  Christian  believers. 

This  question  took  the  strongest  hold  upon  the  interest 
of  Mahan,  who  had  been  made  president  of  the  college. 
He  had  been  originally  educated  in  the  old  Calvinism, 
which  had  been,  with  few  real  improvements  in  his  esti- 
mation, taught  by  Leonard  Woods  when  he  was  a  student 
at  Andover.^  Under  the  influences  emanating  from  New 
Haven,  he  had  later  adopted  the  doctrine  of  the  true  free- 
dom of  the  will,  and  was  thereby  prepared  for  further 
changes.^    One  thing  he  had  long  desired,  and  that  was 

3  Memoirs,  pp.  49  f. 

*  The  theology  of  Oberlin  can  scarcely  be  understood  without  a  view  of  the 
"Colony,"  for  which  see  President  Fairchild's  Oberlin,  the  Colony  and  the  Col- 
lege. 

'^Autobiography  (London,  1882),  pp.  140  ff.         ^  Ibid.,  pp.  203  ff. 


THE  OBERLIN  THEOLOGY 


455 


deliverance  from  the  power  of  sin.  When  the  inquiry  was 
solemnly  put,  in  one  of  the  Oberlin  meetings,  by  a  young 
man,  whether  he  could  hope  to  gain  a  complete  victory 
over  temptation,  or  must  expect  to  go  on  stumbling  as  he 
had  done  before;  and  when  at  another  time  a  third  of 
the  professing  Christians  present  rose  to  signify  that  they 
saw  that  their  hopes  were  not  well  founded,  he  felt  that 
he  had  come  to  a  crisis  when  he  must  know  the  secret  of 
such  a  Christian  life  as  the  apostle  Paul  lived,  hid  with 
Christ  in  God  and  filled  with  triumphant  power.  A  re- 
markable experience  of  the  love  of  Christ  gave  him  the 
answer,  and  from  this  event  he  dated  a  new  period  in  his 
Christian  life.^ 

This  answer  was  expressed  by  him  in  a  sermon  imme- 
diately preached,  in  the  following  form : 

Speaking  of  his  former  preaching,  he  said,  "When  a  sinner  had 
inquired  of  me  what  he  should  do  to  be  saved,  I  had  known  perfectly 

what  was  needed  to  be  done  in  his  case  But  when  a  believer 

had  come  to  me  and  confessed  that  he  was  not  living  as  God  requires, 
and  asked  me  how  he  should  escape  the  "bondage  of  corruption,"  and 
attain  to  "the  liberty  of  the  sons  of  God,"  I  had  instructed  him  to 
confess  his  sins,  put  them  away,  renew  his  purpose  of  obedience,  and 
go  forward  with  a  fixed  resolution  to  do  the  entire  will  of  God.  Now, 
here  was  a  fundamental  mistake.  We  are  not  only  to  be  "justified  by 
the  faith  of  Christ,"  but  to  be  sanctified  also  by  the  faith  that  is  in  him. 
.  ...  If  you  desire  a  victory  over  your  tempers,  your  appetites,  and  all 
your  propensities,  take  them  to  Christ,  just  as  you  take  your  sins  to 
him,  and  he  will  give  you  the  victory  over  the  former,  just  as  he  gives 
you  pardon  for  the  latter.  .  .  It  is  not  he  that  resolves,  but  "he  that 
abideth  in  Christ  and  Christ  in  him,  that  bringeth  forth  much  fruit." 
(1836.)^ 

A  little  after  this  (1839)  Mahan,  in  his  Scripture  Doc- 
trine of  Christian  Perfection,  defined  this  perfection  as  fol- 
lows : 

It  is  the  consecration  of  our  whole  being  to  Christ,  and  the  per- 
petual employment  of  all  our  powers  in  his  service.    It  is  the  perfect 

''■  Out  of  Darkness  into  Light  (London,  1875),  p.  133. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  135.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  140  f. 


456 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


assimilation  of  our  entire  character  to  that  of  Christ,  having  at  all 
times,  and  under  all  circumstances,  the  "same  mind  that  was  also  in 
Christ  Jesus."  It  is,  in  the  language  of  Mr.  Wesley,  "In  one  view, 
purity  of  intention,  dedicating  all  the  life  to  God.  It  is  the  giving  God 
all  the  heart;  it  is  one  desire  and  design  ruling  all  our  tempers.  It  is 
devoting,  not  a  part,  but  all  our  soul,  body  and  substance  to  God.  In 
another  view,  it  is  all  the  mind  that  was  in  Christ  Jesus,  enabling  us  to 
walk  as  he  walked.  It  is  the  circumcision  of  the  heart  from  all  filthi- 
ness,  from  all  inward  as  well  as  outward  pollution.  It  is  the  renewal 
of  the  heart  in  the  whole  image  of  God,  the  full  likeness  of  him 
that  created  it.  In  yet  another,  it  is  loving  God  with  all  our  heart, 
and  our  neighbor  as  ourselves." 

The  distinctive  thought  of  this  Httle  treatise  is  that  such 
perfection  is  attainable,  and  is  to  be  sought  for  by  prayer 
and  by  the  exercise  of  faith  in  Jesus  Christ  who,  taking 
up  his  dwelHng  in  the  soul  by  his  Spirit,  will  bring  it  into 
perfect  sympathy  with  himself,  stilling  its  passions  and 
destroying  the  power  of  its  temptations. 

Professor  Morgan  somewhat  later  (1845)  published  in 
the  Oberlin  Quarterly  an  article  upon  "The  Gift  of  the  Holy 
Ghost."  He  maintained  that  this  gift,  spoken  of  in  the 
Book  of  Acts  so  continually,  was  not  designed  for  that  age 
alone,  was  not  the  gift  of  working  miracles,  nor  in  any 
other  way  exceptional,  but  was  designed  for  all  Christians 
to  fit  them  for  the  development  of  holy  character  and  the 
performance  of  effective  Christian  service.  He  summarizes 
his  view : 

The  baptism  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  then,  in  its  Pentecostal  fullness 
was  not  to  be  confined  to  the  primitive  church ;  but  it  is  the  common 
privilege  of  all  believers — of  believers  even  of  this  generation,  and  of 
every  generation  to  come.  It  was  at  first  indispensable  to  the  appropri- 
ate happiness  and  befitting  characteristics  of  the  children  of  God  and 
brethren  of  Jesus  Christ — a  happiness  and  dignity  impossible  except 
by  becoming  one  with  him,  not  by  an  external  bond  ....  but  an  in- 
ternal union  through  the  indwelling  of  the  same  Spirit.  We  say  it 
was  at  first  indispensable  for  these  ends;  and  it  has  not  ceased  to  be 
indispensable  for  the  same  ends  by  the  lapse  of  time.  It  was  necessary 
to  make  Apostles,  and  Prophets,  and  Saints,  able  efficient  ministers  of 

10  Op.  cit.,  p.  13. 


THE  OBERLIN  THEOLOGY 


457 


the  New  Testament.  Till  endued  by  this  baptism  with  power  from  on 
high,  they  were  not  prepared  to  convert  the  nations  to  God.  The  same 
necessity  exists  at  the  present  day,  and  will  continue  to  exist  till  the 
last  sinner  is  converted  through  the  gospel  preached  with  the  Holy 
Ghost  sent  down  from  heaven.  Who  without  the  Holy  Ghost  is  suf- 
ficient for  these  things?  And  of  what  other  sufficiency  from  God 
does  the  inspired  word  make  mention?  Nor  will  a  less  effusion  of 
the  Spirit,  a  less  degree  of  the  Spirit  and  power  of  sonship,  answer 
now,  than  was  found  necessary  in  the  apostolic  age.^i 

With  these  presentations  of  the  matter  both  Finney  and 
Cowles  agreed,  though  themselves  employing  somewhat  dif- 
ferent terms. 

The  idea  was  much  the  same  under  these  varying  forms  of  ex- 
pression, namely,  that  there  is  an  experience  attainable  in  the  Chris- 
tian life,  subsequent  in  general  to  conversion,  in  which  the  believer 
rises  to  a  higher  plane,  secures  new  views  of  Christ  and  his  salvation, 
obtains  victory  over  weaknesses  which  had  before  marred  his  char- 
acter, and  attains  a  stability  to  which  he  was  before  a  stranger.^^ 

Mahan  insisted  upon  a  sanctification  of  the  sensibility,  and 
claimed  that  he  had  experienced  a  stilling  of  passions  be- 
fore which  he  had  previously  been  impotent,  so  as  to  be 
delivered  from  their  bondage.  It  sometimes  seemed  as  if 
he  viewed  this  as  essentially  mechanical.  Finney  spoke 
more  of  the  moral  power  of  the  truth  upon  the  heart.  None 
of  them  noted,  so  far  as  I  have  observed,  an  interesting 
point  of  contact  of  the  new  view  with  President  Edwards' 
view  of  original  sin.  Our  corruption  was  traced  by  him, 
not  to  some  positive  taint  implanted  in  our  nature,  but  to 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Holy  Spirit  upon  the  sin  of  Adam. 
We  were  intended  to  live  in  communion  with  the  Spirit, 
and  without  him  we  are,  of  course,  unfitted  for  our  environ- 
ment, and  hence  liable  to  sin.  If  now  the  Holy  Spirit  is 
bestowed  upon  all  believers  who  will  receive  him,  then  the 

11  Reprint  of  1875,  pp.   70  ff. 

12  See  the  very  interesting  and  valuable  article  by  President  J.  H.  Fairchild 
in  the  Congregational  Quarterly,  Vol.  VIII  (1876),  pp.  237  ff.  It  is  itself  an 
original  source  of  high  rank. 


458 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


defect  which  we  call  original  sin  is  repaired,  and  sinners  are 
restored  to  the  original  elevation  of  unfallen  human  nature. 
That  such  a  consummation  has  been  a  dim  but  ever  pres- 
ent ideal  of  the  church's,  the  Roman  doctrine  of  the  re- 
moval of  all  guilt  of  original  sin  by  baptism  may  serve  as 
a  proof.  Here  at  last  the  way  was  opened  for  a  spiritual 
development  of  the  same  idea;  but  it  was  never  followed 
out. 

The  emphasis  laid  at  Oberlin  upon  the  peculiar  char- 
acter of  the  experience  of  sanctification  gradually  disap- 
peared.^^ It  was  gradually  felt  that  it  did  not  differ  so 
much  as  had  been  thought  from  the  experience  of  ordinary 
Christians.  In  the  realm  of  doctrine  the  movement  re- 
sulted in  the  proposal  of  a  new  psychological  principle,  that 
of  the  "simplicity  of  moral  action." 

This  doctrine  was  first  propounded  in  public  by  Wil- 
liam Cochran,  a  graduate  in  the  year  1839,  in  an  address 
before  the  Society  of  Inquiry,  and  subsequently  the  Alumni, 
in  1 84 1.  It  ''was  very  generally  accepted,"  says  President 
Fairchild,  ''as  conclusive  on  the  subject."  The  position  it 
presented  was  adopted  by  all  the  leading  teachers  in  Ober- 
lin,^* except  Professor  Cowles,  though  with  different  de- 
grees of  earnestness  and  different  success  in  applying  it  in 
the  development  of  other  doctrines.  It  became,  however, 
especially  by  the  consistent  and  unvarying  advocacy  of  Pres- 

13  The  literature  of  this  phase  of  Oberlin  theology  is  large.  The  Oberlin 
Evangelist  (1839-62)  was  established  in  the  interest  of  Christian  perfection.  It 
had  five  thousand  subscribers  for  many  years.  It  is  a  mine  of  information  as 
to  all  the  higher  Oberlin  affairs.  Morgan  published  an  essay  on  The  Holiness  Ac- 
ceptable to  God,  which  was  incorporated  in  the  first  (Oberlin)  edition  of  Finney's 
Systematic  Theology,  and  reprinted  in  1875  at  Oberlin.  Cowles  wrote  for  the 
Evangelist  articles  reprinted  as  a  small  book  at  Oberlin  (1840)  on  Holiness  of 
Christians  in  the  Present  Life.  Finney  reprinted  from  the  Evangelist,  Views  of 
Sanctification  (1840),  and  from  his  Theology,  Guide  to  the  Saviour,  or  Conditions 
of  Attaining  to  and  Abiding  in  Entire  Holiness  of  Heart  and  Life  (1848). 

1*  See  the  original  address  in  the  Oberlin  Evangelist,  1S42,  pp.  33  f¥.,  and 
41  ff. 


THE  OBERLIN  THEOLOGY 


459 


ident  Fairchild,  a  characteristic  portion  of  the  Oberlin 
theology.^  ^ 

Cochran  begins  his  discussion  by  defining  moral  action 
as  "the  coincidence  or  disagreement  of  the  free  will  with 
the  law  of  right  which  Reason  reveals  and  imposes;"  or 
again,  as  "choosing  good  for  its  own  sake,  and  of  course  as 
the  ultimate  end  of  effort,  or,  when  good  is  apprehended, 
refusing  thus  to  choose."  Two  ideas  underlie  the  discus- 
sion which  are  not  definitely  mentioned.  It  could  hardly 
have  been  thought  at  that  time  necessary  to  mention  them, 
so  fully  were  they  presupposed  by  all  the  philosophy  of  the 
day  as  self-evident  truth.  These  were  that  the  action  of 
the  will  was  single,  making  but  one  volition,  or  choosing 
but  one  object  at  a  time ;  and  that  it  was  entirely  a  phenom- 
enon of  consciousness,  for  philosophy  was  confined  then 
to  the  conscious  mind,  the  main,  if  not  the  sole,  implement 
of  investigation  being  introspection.  These  suppositions 
are,  therefore,  passed  over  without  specific  mention,  but  it 
is  thought  important  to  specify,  as  conditions  of  this  con- 
ception of  moral  action,  responsibility  and  its  presupposi- 
tion, freedom,  the  latter  understood  in  the  Oberlin  sense. 
Cochran  also  lays  down  the  principles  that  "intentions  or 
choices  alone  are  moral  actions,"  and  that  "it  is  often  in 
choices  or  intentions  alone  that  there  is  any  essential  differ- 
ence between  men  who,  nevertheless,  are  in  character  as  op- 
posite as  the  poles."  After  a  few  other  preliminary  re- 
marks he  is  ready  for  his  thesis,  which  he  defends  in  the 
following  words : 

The  question  whether  a  moral  action  may  be  of  a  mixed  character 
can  now  be  easily  answered.  From  what  has  been  said,  the  question 
is  simply  this :  can  the  will  at  the  same  time  be  coincident  with  im- 
partial reason  and  self-centering  inclination f  Or  thus:  can  a  moral 
agent  choose  the  general  good  as  the  ultimate  end  of  his  exertions, 

Cf.  President  Finney's  discussion  in  his  Theology  (original  Oberlin  ed.,  Vol. 
I,  pp.  150  ff.),  which  adds  nothing  essential. 


460         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


and  at  the  same  instant  choose  his  individual  good  as  the  ultimate 
end  of  his  exertions?  Or,  less  abstractly  still:  can  one  supremely 
prefer  the  good  of  being  in  general,  and  at  the  same  point  of  time  su- 
premely prefer  his  own  to  the  general  good?  li  I  were  to  reply- 
affirmatively  to  the  question  as  at  first  put,  I  should  say  that  one  could 
choose  partially  and  impartially;  that  is,  do  and  not  do  the  same 
thing  at  the  same  time.  If  to  the  second  form  of  the  question  an 
affirmative  answer  were  given,  it  would  involve  the  absurdity  of  say- 
ing that  at  the  same  time  we  may  have  two  ultimate  ends.  To  answer 
the  question  as  last  put  in  the  affirmative  would  be  to  say  that  at  the 
same  time  by  the  same  will  tzua  preferences  may  be  supreme.  That  is, 
to  affirm  and  deny  of  each  that  it  is  supreme — a  contradiction  as 
palpable  as  saying  that  a  thing  may  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time. 
Tertullian,  whose  rule  of  faith  was,  it  is  absurd,  and  therefore  I  believe 
it,  might  have  answered  either  of  these  questions  in  the  affirmative 
and  believed  what  he  said.  But  I  should  be  loath  to  expect  as  much 
of  any  man  living. 

The  chief  objection  which  would  naturally  strike  every 
reader  of  this  address  would  be  that  the  theory  destroys 
character.  Every  choice  is  either  wholly  sinful  or  entirely 
holy,  and  hence,  since  all  admit  that  the  Christian  falls  into 
sin,  when  he  sins  he  is  entirely  a  sinner  and  not  a  Christian 
at  all.  Thus  there  is  no  abiding  or  permanent  thing  about 
him  which  can  be  called  character,  and  what  he  is  at  any 
moment,  saint  or  sinner,  no  observer  can  tell.  Cochran 
saw  this  objection,  and  in  the  following  paragraph  he  meets 
it  after  the  following  manner : 

There  are  not  wanting  those,  however,  who  believe  (whether  from 
a  thorough  investigation  or  not  it  is  not  mine  to  decide)  that  our 
ultimate  design  to  serve  God  may  permanently  remain  and  yet  specific 
volitions  from  time  to  time  be  contrary  to  it.  Let  us  examine  this 
theory,  for  it  can  claim  in  its  support  high  authority  and  many  great 
names.  When  it  is  said  that  specific  volitions  are  contrary  to  the  generic 
purpose,  or  ultimate  design,  it  must  be  meant,  either  that  self-gratifi- 
cation is  their  end,  or  that  it  is  not.  If  it  is  not,  as  there  is  no  third 
end,  they  must  be  classed  among  instinctive  or  irresponsible  actions, 
and  moral  character  must  be  denied  of  them.  Of  course,  if  this  be 
done,  they  can  with  no  more  propriety  be  said  to  be  inconsistent  with 
the  ultimate  end  than  the  beating  of  the  heart.  If  self-gratification 
is  their  ultimate  end — that  to  which  they  sustain  the  relation  of  means, 


THE  OBERLIN  THEOLOGY 


461 


then  either  the  ultimate  end  of  serving  God  is  not  existing — and  this 
contradicts  the  hypothesis;  or  there  are  two  ultimate  ends  co-existing, 
which  we  have  just  shown  to  be  absurd.  H,  notwithstanding  this  ab- 
surdity, the  co-existence  with  wrong  volitions  of  a  generic  purpose 
to  secure  universal  good  be  still  contended  for,  it  must  at  least  be 
conceded  that  during  their  existence  it  retires  to  the  dormitory  of 
the  soul  and  takes  on  a  sleep  which  is  the  exact  image  of  death.  How 
this  can  be  conceived  of  as  an  existing  choice,  may  well  excite  our  won- 
der. A  choice  which  chooses  nothing!  A  purpose  to  promote  the 
general  good  which  results  in  nothing!  Nay,  which,  somehow  or 
other,  results  in  volitions  to  promote  the  opposite!  ....  The  doc- 
trine, I  apprehend,  originates  in  the  mistaken  notion  that  the  choice  of 
self-gratification  as  an  ultimate  end,  is  a  deliberate  determination 
never  again  to  serve  God.  Nothing  in  most  cases  is  farther  from  the 
truth.  For  the  present,  and  it  may  be  for  some  time  to  come,  the 
sinner  chooses  his  own  gratification,  promising  himself  and  others 
that  he  will  repent  before  he  dies.  This  he  expects  to  do  in  his  sense 
of  repentance.  That  there  is  no  virtue  in  this  expectation  is  true, 
that  it  is  real  is  equally  true. 

The  words  italicized  above  contained  a  suggestion  which 
w^ould  have  brought  Cochran  to  the  contemplation  of  the 
sub-conscious  mind,  if  it  had  been  followed  out;  but  the 
presupposition  upon  which  he  was  proceeding,  that  all  the 
acts  of  the  mind  take  place  in  consciousness,  combined  with 
the  further  error  that  all  sin  is  the  deliberate  choice  of  self- 
gratification  and  involves  a  perception  of  the  irreconcilabil- 
ity of  this  with  the  choice  of  the  general  good,  shut  his  eyes 
to  this  fruitful  suggestion.  Upon  his  psychological  basis 
he  was  right  and  his  reasoning  conclusive;  but  the  basis 
was  not  right. 

The  remaining  portion  of  the  address  dealt  with  various 
objections.  The  subject  was  handled  in  an  exceedingly 
thorough  manner.  The  fact  that  a  single  volition  may  be 
the  product  of  many  motives  does  not  give  it  a  mixed  char- 
acter— partly  good  and  partly  bad — since  it  is  the  subjec- 
tive motive  that  determines  the  character  of  a  choice,  and 
this  must  be  either  a  supreme  choice  of  good,  or  of  self- 
gratification.    Lack  of  intensity  of  choice  does  not  make  it 


462         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


partly  good  and  partly  evil;  for  if  this  is  lack  of  choosing 
less  than  the  good  we  ought,  it  is  not  choosing  that  good  at 
all  in  any  proper  sense ;  and  if  it  is  merely  a  failure  of  the 
natural  powers,  it  does  not  involve  culpability. 

While  still  answering  objections,  Cochran  advances  to 
positions  which  constitute  the  true  contribution  of  this 
discussion  to  New  England  theology.  To  gain  a  biblical 
proof  for  his  proposition,  he  argues  that  "the  indispensable 
condition  of  reconciliation  to  God  is  the  abandonment  of  all 
sin."  The  act  of  self-surrender  to  God  must  be  a  perfectly 
holy  act,  since  it  must  consist  in  a  choice  of  the  will  of  God 
as  our  supreme  good.  "Entire  conformity  to  the  law  of 
God  is  a  condition  indispensable  to  continuance  in  his 
favor."  The  effect  of  these  positions  upon  the  theory  of 
sanctification,  of  a  "second  blessing,"  and  of  a  peculiar 
sanctification  attained  by  some  Christians  and  not  by  others, 
is  at  once  evident.  President  Fairchild  summed  up  this 
result  of  the  theory  of  the  simplicity  of  moral  action  in  the 
following  form: 

One  of  the  most  obvious  consequences  of  the  doctrine  is  that 
conversion  is  entire  consecration;  that  the  earliest  obedience  of  the 
converted  sinner  is  entire  obedience,  and  that  his  moral  state  is  entirely 
approved  by  God.  The  very  first  exercise  of  faith  involves  all  the 
faith  that  under  the  circumstances  is  possible,  and  therefore  all  that  is 
obligatory.  There  is  no  partial  faith,  in  the  sense  in  which  faith  is  a 
duty,  nor,  in  the  same  sense,  any  imperfect  love.  The  sinner  in  giving 
his  heart  to  God  gives  it  all, — makes  no  reservation;  any  holding  back 
corrupts  the  whole  action  The  idea,  then,  of  rising  from  a  par- 
tial to  a  complete  obedience,  from  imperfect  to  perfect  faith  and  love, 
in  the  sense  in  which  these  are  voluntary  and  responsible  acts  or  states 
to  be  required  of  men,  is  incompatible  with  the  idea  of  simplicity  of 

moral    action  The    work    required   in    Christian   progress  is 

growth  in  grace,  enlargement  of  views,  experience  of  Christ's  power 
and  of  one's  own  weakness,— all  resulting  in  establishment  of  Chris- 
tian character  and  more  and  more  complete  deliverance  from  these 
interruptions  of  obedience, — an  obedience  more  and  more  constant 
until  it  becomes  permanent  and  suffers  no  interruption.  In  this  view 
every  believer  is  sanctified,  in  the  sense  that  he  has  utterly  renounced 


THE  OBERLIN  THEOLOGY 


463 


sin  in  his  acceptance  of  Christ,  and  given  him  his  whole  heart.  This 
is  sanctification  in  the  Scripture  sense,  and  all  believers  are  called  saints 
in  the  Bible,  that  is,  sanctified  ones.    We  hear  nothing  in  the  Bible  of 

justified  people  that  are  not  sanctified  The  work  of  edification 

which  follows  conversion  is  of  vast  consequence ;  it  is  growth  from  in- 
fancy to  manhood.  But  it  can  be  accomplished  by  no  one  act  of  the 
will,  no  immediate  exercise  of  faith.  There  is  no  promise  in  God's 
Word  upon  which  a  believer  can  plant  himself  in  present  faith  and 
secure  his  stability  in  faith  and  obedience  for  all  the  future,  so  that 
we  can  say  of  him  that  he  is  perfectly  sanctified.  We  can  say  of  one 
that  he  has  grown  in  the  grace  of  Christ,  that  he  has  made  attain- 
ments in  knowledge  and  experience  and  stability.  We  may  judge  at 
length  that  he  is  perfectly  sanctified;  but  God  alone  can  know.  It  is 
not  a  question  of  his  own  consciousness.  Consciousness  can  give  the 
fact  of  entire  consecration,  which  is  the  essence  of  conversion ;  it 
cannot  give  the  fact  of  permanent  sanctification;  that  is  in  the  history 

of  the  future,  not  in  present  consciousness  We  find,  then,  no 

line  of  division,  upon  this  view  of  Christian  character,  between  sanc- 
tified and  unsanctified  Christians.  All  Christians  while  in  the  exercise 
of  faith  are  sanctified,  nor  is  there  any  clear  line  between  the  simply 
sanctified  and  the  permanently  sanctified. 

Cochran  seemed  in  this  discussion  to  be  the  originator 
of  a  new  doctrine,  which  was  soon  accepted  by  the  eager 
laborers  in  the  field  of  theology  at  Oberlin  as  of  the  highest 
value.  But,  in  fact,  the  same  position  had  been  presented 
still  earlier  by  Emmons.^'  In  his  sermons  upon  ''The  True 
Character  of  Good  Men  Delineated"  he  has  the  folloiwing 
passages : 

Let  us  inquire  whether  [the  saints']  imperfection  can  arise  from 
their  moral  affections  being  partly  holy  and  partly  sinful.  If  their 
affections  were  of  such  a  mixed  nature,  they  certainly  would  be  crimi- 
nally imperfect.  For,  if  each  of  their  moral  affections  could  be  partly 
holy  and  partly  sinful,  then  each  would  have  something  in  it  of  moral 
perfection  and  of  moral  imperfection.  But  can  we  conceive  of  such  a 
mixture  of  moral  good  and  evil,  in  one  and  the  same  exercise  of 
heart?    Let  us  pursue  the  inquiry.    Can  the  affection  of  love  be  partly 

1^  Congregational  Quarterly,  loc.  cit.,  pp.  248  ff. 

Professor  Wright,  in  his  Finney,  says  that  "he  had  adopted  the  view  of 
Emmons,"  making  no  reference  to  Cochran  as  contributing  to  the  discussion 
(p.  209).  In  fact,  it  goes  back  beyond  Emmons,  for  Hopkins  dropped  a  hint 
of  it  when  he  said  {System,  Vol.  I,  pp.  29) :  "Every  moral  action  is  either 
perfectly  holy  or  perfectly  sinful." 


464         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


love  and  partly  hatred  to  God?  Can  the  exercise  of  repentance  be 
partly  love  and  partly  hatred  to  sin?  ....  It  is  absolutely  absurd 
to  suppose  that  any  voluntary  exercise  should  be  partly  holy  and 
partly  sinful.  ....  The  notion  that  the  imperfection  of  saints  arises 
from  their  moral  affections  being  all  partly  holy  and  partly  sinful,  is 
contrary  to  reason,  Scripture,  and  their  own  experienced^ 

Emmons  further  taught  that  "saints  do  have  some  per- 
fectly good  affections/'  and  insisted  upon  their  "duty  to  be- 
come absolutely  perfect."  His  greatest  difference  from 
Oberlin  arose  from  his  theory  of  human  dependence, 
which  was  much  more  strongly  accentuated  by  him  than  by 
the  later  teachers,  in  accordance  with  which  he  taught  that 
gracious  exercises  are  not  necessarily  and  inseparably  connected  with 
each  other ;  and,  of  consequence,  they  may  at  any  time  be  interrupted 
by  totally  sinful  affections.  They  have  no  permanent  source  or  foun- 
tain of  holiness  within  themselves,  from  which  a  constant  stream  of 
holy  affections  will  naturally  and  necessarily  flow.  As  one  holy 
affection  will  not  produce  another,  so  they  are  immediately  dependent 
upon  God  for  every  holy  affection.  The  moment  he  withdraws  his 
gracious  influence,  their  gracious  exercises  cease,  and  sinful  exercises 
instantly  succeed.  And  in  this  case  they  are  no  more  able  to  renew 
the  train  of  holy  affections  than  they  were  to  begin  it  at  first.  Their 
sanctification,  therefore,  is  precisely  the  same  as  continued  regenera- 
tion.i» 

Finney  began  the  publication  of  his  theology  in  the  form 
of  skeletons  of  lectures  in  1840.^^  But  one  volume  of  these 
appeared,  for,  six  years  after,  he  began  the  publication  of 
more  finished  lectures,  of  which  two  volumes  were  issued. 
These  later  volumes  began  with  the  subject  of  moral  gov- 
ernment, and  had  been  in  part  anticipated  by  the  first.  It 
was  his  intention  to  prefix  a  first  volume  which  should 

18  Works  (Boston,  i860),  Vol.  Ill,-  pp.  290  fif. 

1*  Emmons  was  commonly  understood  to  hold  that  the  soul  consisted  merely 
in  a  series  of  exercises,  which  view  is  most  consistent  with  the  doctrine  of  the 
simplicity  of  moral  action.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  observe  that  the  Oberlin 
theologians  did  not  follow  him  into  this  peculiarity. 

20  Skeletons  of  a  Course  of  Theological  Lectures.  By  Rev.  C.  G.  Finney, 
Professor  of  Didactic,  Polemic,  and  Pastoral  Theology,  in  the  Oberlin  Collegiate 
Institute.  Vol.  I.  Oberlin,  Printed  and  published  by  James  Steele,  1840.  8vo, 
248  pages.    (Olivet  College  Library.) 


THE  OBERLIN  THEOLOGY 


465 


begin,  as  the  skeletons  had,  with  the  first  principles  of  the 
science,  but  this  intention  was  never  carried  out.  The  im- 
perfect Skeletons  therefore  remains  our  chief  source  of  in- 
formation as  to  his  views  upon  natural  theology,  the 
Scriptures,  the  Trinity,  and  Christology;  and  deserves, 
therefore,  our  first  attention  in  a  review  of  his  theology. 

The  topic  may,  however,  be  dispatched  very  briefly. 
The  existence  of  God  is  argued  from  moral  obligation, 
from  design,  from  the  dependent  form  of  man's  existence, 
and  from  the  necessity  of  a  first  cause.  The  divine  author- 
ity and  inspiration  of  the  Bible  are  then  argued  from  the 
need  and  the  possibility  of  a  further  revelation  and  from 
the  correspondence  of  the  Bible  to  the  revelation  re- 
quired (as  authentic,  genuine,  and  credible).  Thus  the 
basis  is  obtained  for  the  development  of  the  attributes  of 
God,  including  his  moral  attributes,  and  for  the  proof  of 
such  doctrines  as  the  Trinity,  the  divinity  of  Christ,  etc. 
The  treatment  is  everywhere  strong,  logical,  rational,  and 
biblical.  The  inspiration  of  the  Bible  implies  that  the  writ- 
ers were  ''infallibly  secured  from  all  error,"  and  that  "they 
communicated  authoritatively  the  mind  and  will  of  God." 
The  argument  is  from  miracle,  prophecy,  the  assertions  of 
the  writers  and  their  credibility;  and  makes  no  mention  of 
the  witness  of  the  Spirit.  On  the  other  points  m.entioned 
there  is  no  disagreement  with  the  general  trend  of  new 
school  divinity  at  the  time.  The  same  meagerness  and  de- 
fects which  we  have  found  elsewhere  in  the  treatment  of 
the  Trinity  and  Christology  reoccur  here. 

As  already  remarked,  the  fuller  edition  of  1846-47  in 
part  repeated  the  discussions  of  the  earlier.  It  begins  with 
the  moral  government  of  God,  nothing  being  written  upon 
natural  theology,  or  the  revealed  doctrines  of  the  Trinity 
and  Christology,  except  what  is  incidentally  brought  in  in 
discussing  later  portions  of  the  system.    It  was  repub- 


466 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


lished  in  England  with  some  modifications  by  the  author 
in  1 85 1,  and  from  this  edition  an  abridgment  was  pre- 
pared by  President  Fairchild  and  published  in  Oberlin 

(1878). 

Finney  begins  with  a  remark  which  exhibits  the  founda- 
tion and  indicates  the  trend  and  probable  value  of  his 
work : 

The  truths  of  the  blessed  gospel  have  been  hidden  under  a  false 
philosophy.  Of  this  I  have  long  been  convinced.  Nearly  all  the  prac- 
tical doctrines  of  Christianity  have  been  embarrassed  and  perverted  by 
assuming  as  true  the  dogma  of  a  Necessitated  Will.  This  has  been  a 
leaven  of  error  that,  as  we  shall  see,  has  'leavened  nearly  the  whole 
lump'  of  gospel  truth.  In  the  present  work  I  have  attempted  to  prove, 
and  have  every  where  assumed  the  freedom  of  the  will. 21 

A  little  below  he  adds :  ''What  I  have  said  on  the  Foun- 
dation of  Moral  Obligation  is  the  key  to  the  whole  sub- 
ject." He  might  have  added  that  his  whole  theology  was 
controlled  by  two  fundamental  purposes — to  make  men 
Christians  and  to  keep  them  so — and  was  hence  a  theology 
of  conversion  and  sanctification. 

The  first  volume  (second  of  the  proposed  complete  sys- 
tem, which  was  never  finished)  is  entitled  ''Moral  Govern- 
ment," as  was  the  main  portion  of  N.  W.  Taylor's.  Moral 
law  is  defined  as  "a  rule  of  moral  action  with  sanctions." 
It  is  the  "law  of  liberty,  as  opposed  to  the  law  of  neces- 
sity— of  motive  and  free  choice,  as  opposed  to  force  of 
every  kind  that  renders  action  necessary  or  unavoidable." 
His  conception  of  freedom,  and  his  argument  from  con- 
sciousness, already  developed,  need  not  be  repeated. 

Finney's  position  as  to  moral  obligation  has  often  been 
thought  to  be  original ;  but  it  does  not  seem  to  differ  in  any 
degree  from  Edwards'.  He  differs  only  in  his  conception 
of  freedom,  which  affects  the  moral  action  of  men,  but  not 
the  specific  point  of  the  foundation  of  moral  action.  The 


21  Oberlin  ed.,  p.  iii. 


2^  Ibid.,  p.  2. 


THE  OBERLIN  THEOLOGY 


467 


whole  matter  is  comprehended  in  his  statement:  "It  is  a 
first  truth  of  reason  that  we  ought  to  will  the  valuable  for 
its  own  sake."  This  is  the  same  as  Edwards'  "love  to 
being  in  general,"  being  simply  considered,  viewed  as  pos- 
sessing worth.  Historically  the  formulation  of  the  prin- 
ciple originated  in  Oberlin  in  a  discussion  of  the  year  1839, 
as  Professor  W.  E.  C.  Wright  has  shown.^^  Mahan  had 
advocated  intuitive  rightarianism,  and  Cowles  a  rational 
utilitarianism.  Finney  presided  at  the  discussion,  and  finally 
summed  up  the  truth  of  the  two  conflicting  views  in  the 
statement  that  "I  ought  to  love  my  neighbor  because  his 
welfare  is  valuable."  The  Oberlin  audience  saw  in  this 
result,  which  was  generally  accepted,  and  became  the  foun- 
dation of  the  Oberlin  theology  in  this  division,  a  new  illus- 
tration of  the  genius  of  their  great  leader,  and  a  new  point 
of  progress  made  then  and  there;  but  the  historian  will 
refer  it  to  the  Taylorism  into  which  Finney  had  long  before 
been  initiated.  In  his  Theology  he  later  put  it :  "The  well- 
being  of  God  and  the  Universe  is  the  absolute  and  ultimate 
good,  and  therefore  it  should  be  chosen  by  every  moral 
agent." 

It  will  be  the  less  important  for  us  to  dwell  further  upon 
Finney's  system  because  it  may  be  dismissed  in  the  one  word 
"Taylorism,"  independent  as  it  was,  and  vigorously  as  its 
author  had  impressed  upon  it  the  marks  of  his  own  pro- 
nounced individuality.  As  an  illustration  of  the  often 
minute  correspondence  between  the  two  thinkers,  the  fol- 
lowing explanation  of  the  rise  of  moral  depravity  may  be 
cited : 

The  impulses  of  the  sensibility  are  developed  at  birth.  The  first 
acts  of  will  are  in  obedience  to  these.  Self-gratification  is  the  rule  of 
action  previous  to  the  development  of  reason.    No  resistance  is  offered 

23  Ibid.,  p.  25. 

"Oberlin's  Contribution  to  Ethics,"  an  article  in  the  Bibliotheca  Sacra. 
July,  1900,  pp.  429  ff. 


468 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


to  the  will's  indulging  appetite  until  a  habit  of  self-indulgence  is 
formed.  When  reason  affirms  moral  obligation,  it  finds  the  will  m  a 
state  of  habitual  and  constant  committal  to  the  impulses  of  the  sensi- 
bility. The  demands  of  the  sensibility  have  become  more  and  more 
despotic  every  hour  of  indulgence.  In  this  state  of  things,  unless  the 
Holy  Spirit  interpose,  the  idea  of  moral  obligation  will  be  but  dimly 
developed.  The  will,  of  course,  rejects  the  bidding  of  reason  and 
cleaves  to  self-indulgence.  This  is  the  settling  of  a  fundamental  ques- 
tion. It  is  deciding  in  favor  of  appetite  against  the  claims  of  con- 
science and  of  God.  Light  once  rejected  can  be  thereafter  more  easily 
resisted.  Selfishness  confirms  and  strengthens  and  perpetuates  itself 
by  a  natural  process.  It  grows  with  the  sinner's  growth  and  strength- 
ens with  his  strength,  and  will  do  so  forever  unless  overcome  by  the 
Holy  Spirit  through  the  truth. 

This  connection  with  Taylor  is  fully  recognized  by  Pro- 
fessor G.  Frederick  Wright  in  his  Finney  in  many  places.^^ 
At  one  point,  in  the  very  valuable  and  detailed  review  of 
Finney  as  a  theologian  and  a  philosopher,  which  constitutes 
the  principal  chapter  of  his  book,  he  criticizes  Taylor  as 
maintaining  that  "all  the  goodness  of  an  action  pertains  to 
its  adaptation  to  produce  results."  He  continues:  "Finney 
clearly  maintains  that  the  obligation  to  use  any  particular 
means  to  do  good  must  be  conditioned  upon  the  supposed 
'tendency  of  those  means  to  secure  the  end.'  But  this  is 
the  obligation  to  put  forth  a  proximate  rather  than  an  ulti- 
mate choice.  Ultimate  intention  has  no  such  condition.'' 
But  even  here,  however  much  disagreement  there  may  be 
in  forms  of  speech,  the  final  meaning  of  the  two  thinkers 
seems  to  be  the  same.  Taylor  defines  benevolence  as  "an 
elective  preference  of  the  highest  well-being  of  all  other 
sentient  beings  as  his  supreme  object/'  That  choice  is 
founded  upon  the  ultimate  "worth"  of  such  beings;  and 
this  worth  is  defined  as  consisting  in  the  "capacity  of  hap- 
piness." Such  is  the  implication  of  the  whole  context. 
And  that  would  seem  to  be  Finney's  doctrine  precisely. 

Ci.  pp.  25,  179,  181,  196,  200.  Ibid.,  pp.  214,  215. 

2"^  Moral  Government,   Vol.   I,  p.    19.  Ibid.,  p.  32. 


THE  OBERLIN  THEOLOGY 


469 


Aside  from  this,  however,  so  sharp-sighted  a  thinker  as 
Professor  Wright,  and  one  so  well  acquainted  with  Finney's 
theology,  with  which  he  has  been  familiar  from  his  youth, 
can  find  no  substantial  disagreement  with  Taylor  upon  the 
great  doctrines  of  the  system. 

Finney's  immediate  successor  in  the  teaching  of  theol- 
ogy at  Oberlin  was  James  Harris  Fairchild,^^  whose  Ele- 
ments of  Theology,  Natural  and  Revealed,^^  continue  the 
Oberlin  tradition  and  brings  its  work  in  New  England  theol- 
ogy to  a  close.   The  connection  of  this  work  with  the  Theol- 
ogy of  Finney  is  evident  at  once,  but  its  differences  are 
still  more  noticeable.    It  is  less  formal,  seeks  less  con- 
stantly for  cogent  proof,  treats  each  subject  as  largely  in- 
dependent rather  than  as  dependent  upon  all  that  has  pre- 
ceded for  its  evidence,  pursues  the  objector  less  uncompro- 
misingly, and  relies  more  upon  general  rationality  and  the 
utterances  of  simple  common-sense,  than  had  its  predeces- 
sor.   But  it  maintains  the  same  great  principles  with  Fin- 
ney— the  freedom  of  the  will  and  the  simplicity  of  moral 
action,  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation  in  the  essential 
worth  of  sentient  being;  teaches  the  great  central  doc- 
trines of  the  evangelical  system  in  the  sense  in  which  Fin- 
ney and  other  New  England  divines  taught  them,  mini- 
mizes the  Calvinistic  element,  though  not  elimniating  it, 
and  maintains  the  divinity  of  Christ,  the  atonement  (gov- 
ernmental theory),  and  the  endless  future  punishment  of 
the  incorrigibly  wicked.    In  apologetics  it  shows  a  distinct 
tendency  to  waive  the  unimportant  and  to  concentrate  the 
argument  upon  the  central  and  decisive  elements  of  the 

2»  Born  in  Stockbridge,  Mass.,  November  25,  1817;  removed  to  Ohio  in  18 18; 
graduated  at  Oberlin  in  1838,  and  from  the  Theological  Seminary  in  1841;  pro- 
fessor of  Greek  and  Latin,  and  instructor  in  Hebrew,  in  1842;  professor  of  math- 
ematics and  natural  philosophy  in  1847;  professor  of  theology  in  1858;  president 
in  1866;  published  his  Moral  Philosophy  in  1869;  his  Elements  of  Theology  in 
1892;  retired  froin  the  presidency  in  1889,  and  from  the  professorship  of  theology 
in  1895;  died  in  1902. 

Published  by  Goodrich  in  Oberlin,  1892  (8vo,  xvi  +  358  pages). 


470         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

question  in  hand.  Its  strength  lies  in  its  adaptation  to  the 
needs  of  plain  men  in  search  of  a  workable  system  of 
thought,  in  the  simplicity  and  clearness  of  its  anthropology, 
in  the  prominence  with  which  the  great  essentials  of 
Christian  doctrine  stand  out  above  the  controverted  and  un- 
certain. Its  defects  are  those  of  the  school  at  this  time: 
its  philosophical  shallowness,  its  failure  to  supply  the  omis- 
sions of  its  predecessors  in  the  treatment  of  such  themes  as 
the  unity  of  the  person  of  Christ,  the  two  natures,  human 
and  divine,  and  in  unfolding  the  meaning  and  application 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  in  the  system.  It  was  not 
fertilized  by  the  new  thought  of  its  day,  and  had  little  to 
say  to  the  times  in  which  it  was  finally  published;  but  its 
place  as  a  plain  and  untechnical  statement,  in  a  moderate 
and  sensible  way,  of  the  general  results  at  which  New  Eng- 
land theology  had  arrived,  will  never  be  challenged. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 

We  have  now  arrived  in  the  progress  of  our  history 
at  the  close  of  the  New  England  development,  having  con- 
sidered all  the  great  productive  minds  which  contributed 
to  the  erection  of  this  system  of  thought.  The  impression 
made  upon  the  mind  of  the  reader  must  still  be  somewhat 
discordant,  for  the  history  has  been  one  of  many  differing 
tendencies,  which  have  as  yet  been  brought  into  complete 
and  comprehensive  expression  by  no  one  theologian.  If 
the  history  had  to  close  here,  it  would  appear  like  a  broken 
column  in  the  great  edifice  of  human  thought.  So  far  as 
it  is  a  history  of  printed  systems,  it  must  close  here;  but 
there  is  a  system  which,  though  it  does  not  exist  yet  in 
printed  form,  and  may  never  do  so,  is  still  in  existence  in 
so  many  students'  notebooks,  and  in  so  complete  and  care- 
ful reports,  that  it  may  be  included  among  the  materials 
of  this  history,  and  will  serve  the  essential  purpose  of  rep- 
resenting New  England  theology  in  its  most  perfect  system- 
atic form.  Professor  Edwards  Amasa  Park,  of  An- 
dover,^  was  himself  the  ripest  fruit  of  New  England,  and 
was  one  of  her  most  loyal  sons.  His  theology  summed 
up  in  the  most  perfect  form  the  long  line  of  her  theological 

1  Born  at  Providence,  R.  I.,  December  29,  1808;  died  at  Andover,  Mass., 
June  4,  1900;  graduated  at  Brown  University,  Providence,  1826,  and  at  An- 
dover 1831;  pastor  at  Braintree,  Mass.,  1831-33;  professor  of  intellectual  philos- 
ophy at  Amherst,  1835-36;  professor  of  sacred  rhetoric  at  Andover,  1836-47; 
professor  of  systematic  theology  there,  1847-81;  professor  emeritus  till  his  death. 
He  was  one  of  the  founders  of  the  Bibliotheca  Sacra  in  1844,  which  he  con- 
tinued to  edit  till  its  transfer  to  Oberlin  in  1883;  published  largely  in  this  and 
other  periodical  issues;  wrote  a  number  of  valuable  memoirs,  of  which  the  most 
important  theologically  are  those  of  Hopkins  and  Emmons,  and  one  still  (1906) 
expected  from  the  press,  of  Jonathan  Edwards;  conducted  a  most  trenchant  con- 
troversy with  Professor  Charles  Hodge  {The  Theology  of  the  Intellect  and  That 
of  the  Feelings,  1850,  etc.);  issued  a  volume  of  Discourses;  and  this  list  has 
been  increased  by  a  posthumous  Memorial  Collection  of  Sermons. 


472         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

discoveries  and  ratiocinations.  He  himself  was  contempo- 
rary with  some  of  her  greatest  and  her  latest  theological 
innovators.  He  continued  to  lecture  till  all  the  original 
contributions  of  the  last  explorers  had  been  brought  in,  and 
while  he  lectured  he  thought  critically  upon  all  that  was  pro- 
posed, and  incorporated  what  seemed  good  into  his  in- 
struction and  his  system.  Thus  closing  his  lectures  in  1881, 
he  was  among  the  last,  though  not  the  very  last,  represent- 
ative of  New  England  theology;  and  he  might  thus,  for 
this  reason  alone,  be  placed  at  the  end  of  the  historical 
account  of  the  school.  But  the  relation  of  the  material 
contents  of  his  system  to  that  of  his  predecessors  makes 
such  an  arrangement  imperative  upon  the  historian.  Even 
the  results  of  that  theologian  who  taught  and  published 
after  the  close  of  Park's  public  labors,  President  Fairchild, 
had  been  weighed  and  discussed  before  1881 ;  and  these  two 
may  certainly  be  said  to  have  been  the  last  of  our  public 
teachers  of  theology  who  were  controlled  by  the  unmodi- 
fied tradition  of  New  England  alone. 

It  is  important  to  note,  first,  that  Park  had  come  squarely 
upon  the  ground  of  the  Scotch  school  of  philosophy.  We 
have  already  no':ed  this  in  part  in  the  chapter  upon  the 
will.  There  his  adoption  of  the  threefold  division  of  the 
faculties  of  the  mind  was  shown  to  have  modified  his 
theory  of  the  will.  But  he  adopts  quite  as  earnestly  the 
intuitive  element  of  that  philosophy  and  its  realism  of  "com- 
mon-sense." The  Berkeleian  sublimation  of  the  material 
world  into  one  merely  ideal  received  no  countenance  with 
him.  His  sarcastic  wit  delighted  in  the  practical  answer 
of  the  philosopher  who  kicked  a  stone  to  prove  its  objec- 
tive existence.  Both  the  beginning  of  his  reasoning  and  its 
entire  method  rested  upon  the  Scotch  principles  and  pre- 
cedents. The  names  of  Reid  and  Stewart  were  often  upon 
his  lips;  and,  if  he  did  not  give  so  large  a  place  to  Ham- 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


473 


ilton,  it  was  because  he  regarded  him  as  having  passed  off 
somewhat  from  the  sound  basis  of  the  school  upon  ques- 
tionable ground.  To  this  result  both  Woods  and  Taylor 
had  contributed;  for  Park  had  heard  both,  Woods  in  the 
regular  progress  of  an  Andover  education,  and  Taylor  upon 
a  special  residence  in  New  Haven  for  the  purpose.  Park 
was  a  pupil  of  Taylor  more  than  of  Woods^  to^  whom  he 
seldom  referred  and  whom  he  probably  did  not  fully  appre- 
ciate. Taylor  captivated  his  imagination  by  boldness  of 
speculation  and  led  his  judgment  into  substantial  agree- 
ment with  himself.  He  even  accepted  the  ''power  to  the 
contrary,"  while  remaining  much  more  completely  upon  Ed- 
wards' ground  as  to^  the  will  than  Taylor  did.  This  com- 
plete adoption  of  the  late  change  of  philosophical  base  in 
the  school  becomes,  therefore,  both  decided  and  of  large 
influence  upon  the  whole  structure  of  his  system. 

Professor  Park's  theology  was,  first  of  all,  a  system.  He 
began  with  a  principle — "Every  event  has  a  cause" — but 
this  was  not  assumed  till  it  was  shown  to  be  a  fundam.ental 
postulate  of  thought,  and  involved  in  all  our  thinking. 
When  he  had  thus  proved  his  principle,  so  far  as  it  admits 
of  proof,  he  proceeded  to  build  up  his  system  upon  it  step 
by  step,  proof  by  proof,  proof  resting  in  every  case  on  what 
had  been  proved  before.  Thus  his  system  was  not  a  sys- 
tem in  the  sense  of  a  mere  orderly  arrangement  of  parts, 
each,  however,  standing  by  itself,  in  nO'  inner  and  vital  con- 
nection with  the  rest;  but  it  was  a  system  in  the  sense  that 
it  was  one  linked  process  of  proof,  every  step  preparing  for, 
and  not  depending  on,  the  following,  every  step  adequately 
prepared  for  by,  and  naturally  flowing  out  of,  all  the  preced- 
ing. It  was  like  the  wall  of  the  cathedral,  resting  on  foot- 
ing-stones laid  deep  in  the  earth,  course  rising  on  course, 
each  depending  on  what  was  beneath  it  and  capable  of 
bearing  all  that  was  to  be  above  it,  till  the  last  pinnacle 


474 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


stood  in  its  place  perfect,  secure  in  the  security  of  the 
whole  wall.  In  this  respect  Professor  Park's  system  pre- 
sented a  great  contrast  to  that  of  his  contemporary  and 
friend,  Henry  B.  Smith,  who  wrote,  in  his  Faith  and 
Philosophy: 

Systematic  Theology  is  not  a  mere  arrangement  of  the  facts  and 
doctrines  of  the  Bible  in  a  lucid  order;  it  is  not  a  series  of  uncon- 
nected doctrines,  with  the  definitions  of  them,  it  is  the  combining  of 
doctrines  into  a  system :  its  parts  should  not  only  be  co-ordinate,  they 
should  be  regularly  developed.  It  should  give  the  whole  substance 
of  the  Christian  faith,  starting  with  its  central  principle,  around  which 
all  the  members  are  to  be  grouped.  It  must  defend  the  faith  and  its 
separate  parts  against  objections,  and  show  that  it  is  congruous  with 
well-established  truths  in  ethical  and  metaphysical  science.^ 

Park  said  all  that,  but  much  more.  Hence  his  system 
was  always  the  system  of  a  progress  from  the  known  to 
the  unknown  by  rational  examination  and  logical  proof.  If 
he  failed  at  any  point,  it  was  not  for  lack  of  effort  or  for 
forgetfulness  of  the  necessities  of  such  a  method  of  pro- 
cedure. 

The  method  of  proof  was  the  inductive,  or  the  a  poste- 
riori. Park  always  proceeded  from  the  known  tO'  the  un- 
known, from  the  facts  to  the  principles  involved  in  them, 
from  elementary  principles  to  those  pertaining  to  detail. 
Hence  his  theology  was  always  subject  to  revision.  Give 
him  a  new  fact,  and  you  have  made  necessary  a  new 
induction,  and  perhaps  a  new  conclusion.  Hence  he  was 
always  open  to  new  light,  and  manifested  the  most  remark- 
able hospitality  for  new  ideas.  ''Take  them  in,"  he  said 
once,  ''and  entertain  them  as  you  would  guests  at  your  table, 
until  you  know  them;  and  then  you  can  estimate  their 
worth  and  their  bearing  on  the  truth."  Textual  criticism 
never  disturbed  him.  If  a  text  had  to  go,  he  looked  to  see 
if  anything  had  been  built  on  it  alone,  and  to  cast  out  such 
an  element  of  his  thought;  for  error  eliminated  he  thought 

2  p.  27. 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


475 


to  be  truth  gained.  The  new  theory  of  evolution  did  not 
trouble  him.  It  had  not  ''come  to  itself"  during  Park's 
day,  and  neither  friends  nor  foes  understood  it.  But  while 
Professor  Hodge,  in  his  little  book,  was  styling  it  bluntly 
"Atheism,"  Professor  Park  observed  a  scarcely  interrupted 
silence  upon  it,  except  as  he  was  ready  now  and  then  to  ask 
what  effect  it  would  have  on  theology  if  it  were  to  be 
found  true.  The  present  v/riter  remembers  very  well  ask- 
ing him  one  day,  on  one  of  those  walks  and  talks  which  he 
delighted  to  take  with  inquiring  students,  what  the  bearing 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  origination  of  man  by  evolution  would 
be  on  the  doctrine  of  original  sin.  ''What  do  we  need,"  I 
asked,  "to  maintain  universal  depravity?  If  the  race  origi- 
nated at  several  independent  points,  do  we  need  to  suppose 
anything  more  than  an  early  sin,  at  one  or  more  of  these 
points,  and  the  involvement  of  all  mankind,  by  whatever 
process,  in  this  early  sin,  to  have  all  the  elements  now  given 
in  the  common  idea  of  the  fall  of  Adam,  and  all  the  conse- 
quences that  can  legitimately  be  drawn  from  it?"  His 
answer  was,  "No!"  And  the  discussion,  as  it  went  on, 
showed  how  deeply  interested  he  was  in  the  adjustment  of 
theology  and  evolution,  though  not  yet  ready  to  adopt 
either  evolution  or  any  such  adjustment. 

The  treatment  of  the  propositions  discussed  was  predom- 
inantly rationalistic.  True,  the  starting-point  was  the 
biblical;  but  the  method  was  rational,  and  the  cogent  ele- 
ments of  the  proof,  exciting  the  greatest  interest  of  both 
teacher  and  pupils,  were  the  rational.  Not  that  the  doc- 
trines were  formulated  with  little  reference  to  the  Bible,  or 
that  the  Bible  was  belittled  whether  by  the  formal  treat- 
ment it  received  or  by  implication.  Professor  Park's  exe- 
gesis was  always  accurate,  and  quite  in  accord  with  the 
best  of  the  exegetical  departments  under  his  younger  col- 
leagues. Professors  Mead  and  Thayer.    But  theology  in 


476 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


his  conception  was  the  philosophy  of  Christian  truth.  The 
Bible  gave  that  truth,  but  why  it  was  so,  and  how  it  could 
be  defended,  and  what,  precisely,  it  meant  to  the  modern 
mind,  were  all  rational  questions,  and  constituted  the  bur- 
den of  theology.  The  biblical  argument  hence  some- 
times tended  toward  the  dry  and  formal.  Sometimes  its 
force  had  been  so  anticipated  that  it  seemed  almost  super- 
fluous. Even  before  the  days  of  modern  criticism,  it  had 
lost  something  of  its  power.  The  system  must,  therefore, 
be  weighed  rather  as  a  rational  creation  than  as  a  biblical 
elaboration.  Nor  did  the  historical  argument,  either  the 
critical  or  the  positive,  receive  due  attention  from  Professor 
Park.  It  was  sometimes  appealed  to -in  a  general  way,  as 
when  ^'the  general  opinions  of  men,"  or  "the  voice  of 
Christian  experience,"  were  alluded  to.  But  such  a  thing 
as  the  "verdict"  of  the  scientific  history  of  Christian  doc- 
trine for  or  against  any  position  was  never  heard  of  in  the 
lecture-room  in  systematic  theology.  Professor  Park's  ed- 
ucation had,  in  fact,  scarcely  fitted  him  for  such  an  appeal 
to  history.  He  knew  the  history  of  New  England  theology 
intimately  and  well,  and  understood  its  current  of  progress 
and  the  intellectual  forces  that  bore  it  on.  But  the  appeals 
of  Anglicans  and  Catholics  tO'  the  church  "fathers,"  by  their 
specious  adulation  and  irreverent  reverence  for  mere  men, 
and  often  for  men  of  little  training  and  feeble  intellectual 
grasp  at  that,  awoke  a  scorn  in  the  mind  of  the  practical 
American  theologian,  who  was  as  strong  in  the  element  oi 
common-sense  as  he  was  in  intellectual  acumen.  "Fathers !" 
said  he  once,  with  a  flash  of  his  sarcastic  wit,  "They  would 
better  be  called  the  church  babies!''  The  elaborate  efforts 
of  the  brilliant  Professor  Shedd  at  Andover  to  bring  his- 
tory, in  a  totally  unhistorical  and  really  a  crypto-dogmatical 
method,  to  the  defense  of  an  exceedingly  "old"  form  of 
Calvinism,  had  not  tended  to  help  Professor  Park  tO'  a  bet- 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


477 


ter  understanding  or  use  of  history.  To  its  formal  and 
real  disadvantage  his  system  was  essentially  unbiblical  and 
unhistorical  in  style,  and  occasionally  in  substance. 

The  simplest  method  of  gaining  a  clear  conception  of 
Park's  theology  would  be  to  set  forth  the  great  determin- 
ing principles  which  made  it  what  it  was,  and  then  trace 
their  influence  upon  the  several  doctrines,  passing  over 
those  in  which  he  did  not  differ  from  his  predecessors  and 
other  evangelical  theologians.  With  the  advantage  of  sim- 
plicity would,  however,  be  combined  the  disadvantage  of 
losing  some  of  the  most  important  lessons  which  he  has  to 
teach  us,  particularly  in  the  department  of  theological 
method,  where  he  was  an  unsurpassed  master.  We  shall 
therefore  follow  his  lectures  in  the  order  of  their  delivery, 
and  this,  in  the  early  part  of  the  system,  quite  strictly. 

Professor  Park  adopted  and  employed  the  distinction 
which  had  been  handed  down  from  the  days  of  the  deistic 
controversy,  and  had  been  so  ably  used  by  Paley,  between 
natural  and  revealed  theology.  His  object,  as  already 
said,  was  proof.  He  desired  to  put  the  biblical  doctrines 
upon  a  sure  basis  of  irrefragable  proof.  This,  and  this  only, 
would  lift  them  from  the  rank  of  mere  pleasing  opinions, 
of  more  or  less  value,  of  that  of  the  truth,  upon  which  men 
might  venture  their  immortal  destinies;  and  tru^h  was  alone 
a  worthy  object  of  consideration  to  a  Christian  theologian. 

Now,  to  the  proof  of  the  Christian  doctrines,  the  proof  of 
the  Bible,  from  which  they  are  derived,  is  essential.  If 
the  Bible  is  such  an  authority  as  the  church  has  always 
said,  it  is  a  revelation  from  God.  To  prove  the  Bible,  you 
must  therefore  first  prove  the  being  and  benevolence  of 
God ;  and  you  must  do  it  without  the  Bible,  since  you  are 
not  permitted  to  commit  any  circle  in  your  reasoning. 
Hence  natural  theology  must  precede  revealed.  Professor 
Park  therefore  begins  here,  and  lays  down  as  his  first  prop- 


478 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


osition  that  every  event  has  a  cause.  But  here  he  meets  at 
once  with  a  principal  difficulty  of  theology.  To  prove  the 
Bible  he  has  to  prove  a  benevolent  God,  because  a  God  not 
benevolent  could  never  be  relied  upon  tO'  igive  a  revelation 
to  man,  however  great  man's  need.  But  the  benevolence 
of  God  is  not  a  doctrine  oi  pure  natural  theology,  which  can 
never  either  originate  or  prove  it,  and  has  never  done  so'; 
but  it  is  historically  and  logically  itself  a  doctrine  of  the 
Bible.  Hence,  if  you  need  a  doctrine  of  the  divine  benev- 
olence to  prove  the  Bible,  you  need  a  Bible  to  prove  the 
divine  benevolence.  How  shall  this  circle  be  escaped? 
Ritschl  recognized  this  peculiarity  of  the  argument,  and 
stated  it  better  than  any  recent  theoJogian,  but  Park  also 
fully  perceived  it,  and  sought  to  do  full  justice  to  it.  In 
fact,  its  necessities  determined  the  entire  course  of  the 
argument  of  the  natural  theology. 

Park,  therefore,  began  by  giving  *'some  elemental  idea 
of  God,  not  the  whole  being."  He  defines  God  as  "the 
Mind  which  other  minds  are  obligated  to  worship,  because 
they  are  ultimately  dependent  upon  it."  The  existence  of 
such  a  being  can  be  proved  by  logical  arguments  from  na- 
ture proceeding  on  the  basis  of  the  principle  of  causation; 
and  to  establish  this  is,  for  the  time.  Park's  sole  effort. 
He  takes  up  successively  the  arguments  for  a  creator,  a 
preserver,  a  contriver,  a  natural  governor,  and  a  moral  gov- 
ernor. In  the  discussion  of  these,  however  acute,  compre- 
hensive, and  profound  it  was,  there  was  nothing  which 
differed  essentially  from  the  general  positions  of  natural 
theology  as  developed  by  his  predecessors.  Yet  one  in- 
novation had  already  been  made,  and  this  was  the  intro- 
duction of  a  '^biblical  argument"  on  point  after  point. 
He  expressly  says  that  he  takes  the  Bible  for  these  argu- 
ments only  "as  a  book  written  by  sages,"  or  as  "contain- 
ing the  wisdom  of  the  world."    But  when  the  argument 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


479 


is  completed,  he  devotes  more  careful  attention  to  this  bib- 
lical argument.  He  remarks  that  ''some  men  believe  that  all 
truths  in  natural  theology  are  derived  from  the  Bible :  others 
believe  that  the  Bible  is  drawn  from  natural  theology." 
His  own  position  is  that  the  Bible  is  "a  part  of  natural 
theology."  Just  as  we  infer  a  God  from  the  solar  system 
considered  as  a  fact,  so  we  infer  God  from  the  perfectness 
of  the  biblical  description  of  Christ.  The  Bible,  as  a  record 
of  assertions,  rests  upon  natural  theology,  and  it  proves  the 
existence  of  God,  not  by  the  assertion  that  there  is  a  God, 
as  an  assertion,  but  by  the  fact  that  it  makes  such  an  asser- 
tion, by  this  act;  just  as  Webster  proved  he  was  alive,  not 
by  the  assertion  "I  still  live,"  but  by  the  act  of  speaking.^ 
The  Bible  as  it  is^  with  all  its  contents  of  natural  theology, 
demands  a  cause,  and  that  cause  must  be  God. 

How  happens  it  that  we  may  find  in  the  writings  of  Peter  a  sys- 
tem of  Natural  Theology  more  in  accordance  with  later  times  than  in 
Aristotle  or  all  the  ancients?  Philosophers  grasped  only  by  piece- 
meal that  which  fishermen  have  given  in  fullness  and  perfection.  All 
the  results  of  modern  investigation  can  detect  no  fallacy  in  the  state- 
ments of  these  fishermen  who  purport  to  have  been  divinely  inspired. 

The  accord  of  the  Bible  with  natural  theology  is  also  seen 
in  the  fact  that  the  Bible  is  explained,  in  passages  other- 
wise dark,  by  natural  theology ;  and  this,  as  a  fact,  demands 
an  explanation,  which  it  finds  only  in  the  existence  oi  God. 

This  is  the  first  stage  of  Professor  Park's  answer  to  the 
problem  of  getting  a  true  order,  which  shall  avoid  the  fal- 
lacy of  circle,  into  the  argument.    He  has  incidentally 

^  As  an  illustration  of  Park's  close  dependence  upon  his  predecessors  it  may 
be  said  that  this  striking  argument  is  to  be  found  in  Hopkins  {Works,  Vol.  I,  p. 
35):  "The  being  of  God  is  made  evident  by  the  Holy  Scriptures;  not  merely 
by  being  there  abundantly  asserted  but  by  the  existence  of  such  a  book  as  the 
Bible.  It  is  as  much  impossible  there  should  be  such  a  book,  were  there  no  God, 
as  that  there  should  be  such  a  world  as  we  see,  without  an  invisible  cause.  For 
it  is  as  much  beyond  the  power  and  skill  of  man,  or  any  number  of  men,  to 
form  such  a  book  as  it  is  to  make  the  world.  .  .  .  The  character  of  God  there 
given  is  far  above  and  beside  the  thought  of  man,  and  could  no  more  be  drawn 
by  man,  were  there  no  such  God,  than  the  world  can  be  made  by  him." 


48o         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

brought  out  the  fact  that  the  Bible,  as  a  textbook  of  nat- 
ural theology,  precedes  the  modern  treatises.  He  now 
takes  up  successively  the  "natural  attributes"  of  God — his 
self-existence,  omnipotence,  omniscience,  omnipresence, 
eternity,  immutability,  and  unity — in  treating  all  of  which 
he  introduces,  on  the  same  basis  as  above,  the  "biblical  argu- 
ment." He  is  thus  brought  finally  to  the  benevolence  of 
God.  How  does  he  prove  this  attribute,  to  the  proof  of 
which  the  Bible  is  essential? 

It  is  characteristic  of  the  method  of  Professor  Park  that 
he  often  makes  an  objection  against  one  point  of  his  argu- 
ment the  gateway  through  which  he  introduces  the  fol- 
lowing point.  Thus  each  argument,  like  the  pinnacle  of 
the  flying  buttress,  solidifies  and  strengthens  by  its  weight 
that  which  goes  before,  while  itself  dependent  upon  it. 
From  the  proof  of  the  omnipotence  of  God  arises  the  ques- 
tion :  How  can  he  then  be  benevolent,  when  he  has  not 
prevented  sin?  He  could  but  would  not,  or  else  he  did 
not  because  he  could  not.  The  last  alternative  being  ex- 
cluded by  the  argument  for  God's  omnipotence,  is  not  his 
benevolence  impugned  by  his  permission  of  sin?  Before 
he  advances  to  the  positive  argument  for  the  divine  benev- 
olence. Park  therefore  discusses  the  prevention  of  sin,  and 
as  a  preparatory  argument  to  this,  a  lemma,  if  I  may  so 
say,  he  discusses  the  immortality  of  the  soul.^ 

The  argument  for  immortality  is  relatively  weak  and 
somewhat  inconclusive.  Park  was  accustomed  to  acknowl- 
edge this;  but  he  added  immediately:  "We  do  not  need 
much  proof  of  such  a  proposition."  He  "took"  it  (lemma), 
in  part,  as  a  hypothesis,  more  or  less  reasonable,  and  help- 
ful for  his  argument  even  in  this  hypothetical  form.  But 

*  He  thus  adopts  the  brilliant  suggestion  of  N.  W.  Taylor  (see  p.  395  above). 
These  two  thinkers  were,  in  fact,  bent  on  the  same  thing — proof — and  it  may 
quite  possibly  be  that  we  owe  this  great  excellence  of  Park's  to  Taylor's  example 
and  influence. 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


481 


he  felt,  no  doubt,  also  that  there  was  little  real  disposition 
or  ground  for  denying  it.  He  practically  rolled  the  burden 
of  cogent  proof  upon  the  shoulders  of  the  deniers.  Yet  he 
presented  such  an  argument  as  his  inability  to  use  at  this 
point  the  testimony  of  Jesus,  who  ''brought  immortality  to 
light,"  left  to  him.  There  is  nothing  decisive  (in  the  phe- 
nomena of  death,  etc.)  against  the  supposition  that  the  soul 
is  immortal.  The  fact  that  the  soul  exists  up  to  the  moment 
of  death,  and  our  belief  that  nothing  that  has  once  existed 
has  ever  been  annihilated,  point  to  the  probability  of  im- 
mortality. Then,  man  is  fitted  for  immortal  existence  by 
the  scope  and  character  of  his  powers  which  find  only  a 
partial  employment  here  upon  the  earth.  In  fact,  he  has 
generally  to  die  just  as  he  is  on  the  brink  of  some  discovery 
or  achievement  greater  than  any  he  has  been  able  to  make ; 
and,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  he  might  go  on  developing  greater 
powers  of  acquisition  and  labor  forever.  He  is  made  for 
eternity,  and  he  ought  to  have  eternity  in  which  to  realize 
the  idea  implanted  in  his  very  being.  This  argument  is 
confirmed  by  the  character  of  God,  who,  whether  benevo- 
lent or  not  (the  point  under  argumentation),  is  certainly 
skilful  and  cannot  be  believed  tO'  have  done  so'  unskilful  a 
thing  as  to  make  such  a  creature  as  man,  for  a  brief  space  of 
an  existence  of  seventy  years !  Man,  if  destined  tO'  extinc- 
tion at  death,  is  out  of  place,  and  constitutes  the  greatest 
riddle  of  the  universe,  and  cannot  be  so  explained  as  to 
leave  the  universe  of  which  he  is  so  important  a  part,  ra- 
tional. This  preparatory,  and  chiefly  negative,  argument 
is  reinforced  by  the  biblical  statements,  which  are  given  in 
all  their  fulness;  but  the  Bible  is  still  ''a  collection  of  wise 
sayings,"  and  not  a  source  of  decisive  authority. 

The  idea  of  immortality  partially  answers  those  objec- 
tions to  the  goodness  of  God  which  have  been  already 
summarized.    All  that  is  incidental— the  pain  in  the  world. 


482  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


the  frustration  of  powers  in  the  range  of  their  expected  and 
appropriate  accomplishment  by  death,  and  all  the  other  dis- 
order of  the  world — presents  no  serious  obstacle  if  it  is 
understood  that  there  remains  another  life  in  which  in- 
equalities shall  be  removed  and  mysteries  resolved.  But 
there  still  remains  a  fundamental  difficulty.  Pain  may  be 
disciplinary,  and  may  lose  its  appearance  as  an  evil  in  view 
of  the  greater  good  to  come.  But  sin  is  different.  It  is  re- 
bellion against  God;  it  is  moral  disorder  of  the  soul;  it  in- 
troduces disharmony  and  disease  into  the  very  highest  and 
most  central  that  there  is  in  man,  into  his  conscience  and 
all  his  moral  faculties.  It  is  structural  evil.  How  can  it  be 
explained  or  palliated?  And  how  can  God  be  truly  good, 
and  have  his  highest  choices  fixed  on  holiness,  if  he  permits 
it?  These  questions  lead  to  the  deeper  problem,  that  of 
the  permission  of  sin. 

It  will  at  once  be  recalled  that  this  topic  had  engaged 
the  attention  of  our  divines  from  the  beginning.  The 
answer  which  Bellamy  and  Hopkins  had  substantially  given 
to  the  question  why  God  permitted  sin,  was  that  it  is  the 
necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good.  Taylor  had  been 
unable  to  accept  this  position,  and  had  substituted  for  it  the 
supposition  that  Cod  could  not  prevent  sin  in  a  moral  sys- 
tem. He  had  done  this  in  consequence  of  the  new  position 
to  which  he  had  come  upon  the  freedom  of  the  will.  He 
taught  a  "power  to  the  contrary"  which  constituted  a  real 
freedom,  and  wh'ch  placed  man  beyond  the  control  even 
of  motives,  so  that  in  a  system  in  which  free  will  was  a 
component  part,  though  this  or  that  sin  might  be  prevented, 
all  sin  could  not  be  because  prevention  would  make  impos- 
sible that  which  was  constitutionally  and  permanently  pos- 
sible. And  yet,  as  heretofore  pointed  out,  he  held  the 
further  position,  which  was  quite  irreconcilable  with  this, 
that  all  moral  events  were  previously  certain. 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


483 


Park  took  up  the  discussion  where  Taylor  had  left  it. 
He  did  not  meet  Taylor  squarely  upon  the  doctrine  of  the 
will,  in  which  he  held  a  position  more  Edwardean  than  Tay- 
lor's; for  to  both  of  these  theologians  their  disagreement 
was  obscured  by  their  supposed  agreement  with  Edwards. 
Nor  did  he  by  any  means  oppose  Taylor  at  every  point.  He 
says,  on  the  contrary,  that  "the  New  Haven  controversy  has 
brought  out  the  fact  that  sin  is  not  the  necessary  means 
of  the  greatest  good."  With  the  hypothetical  form  in  which 
Taylor  stated  his  theory  Park  was  satisfied,  and  indeed  re- 
garded it  as  a  distinct  advantage  for  the  construction  of  the 
apologetic  argument,  for  both  Taylor  and  he  were  labor- 
ing to  remove  objections  to  God's  benevolence,  and  "a 
reasonable  hypothesis  is  as  complete  a  refutation  of  an  ob- 
jection as  a  positive  fact."  //  God  cannot  prevent  sin,  then 
he  is  benevolent,  although  sin  exists.  But  the  New  Haven 
answer  did  not  commend  itself  to  Park  in  another  aspect. 
It  was  "unphilosophical,"  because  inventing  one  hypothesis 
toi  explain  something  that  could  better  be  explained  by 
another  hypothesis;  and  "too  specific,"  because  fixing  the 
difficulty  in  the  freedom  oi  the  will,  whereas  it  might  lie 
elsewhere.  Indeed,  Park  said  explicitly  that  it  did  lie  else- 
where, for  tO'  him  freedom — Edwards'  freedom — was  per- 
fectly consistent  with  the  control  of  all  action  through 
motives.  Accordingly,  to  the  question,  "Can  God  prevent  sin 
in  a  moral  system  (i.  e.,  a  system  of  agents  possessing  free 
will  and  governed  in  accordance  with  that  fact)  ?"  Park 
with  Hopkins  replied  directly,  "Yes."  The  argument  for 
the  answer  is,  in  a  word,  that  it  involves  no  breach  of  a 
man's  freedom  to  prevent  him  by  persuasives  from  doing 
what  he  is  still  perfectly  able  to  do;  and  the  argument  is 
reinforced  by  the  example  of  the  angels  in  heaven.  He 
thus  rejected  the  original  and  favorite  solution  which  Tay- 
lor had  given  to  this  vexed  question;  but  even  here  he  was 


484 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


not  abandoning  Taylor,  for  he  did  this  only  to  bring  for- 
ward with  great  power  the  alternate  suggestion  which  Taylor 
makes  in  his  Moral  Government,  that  perhaps  God  can- 
not prevent  sin  in  the  best  moral  system,  or — what  is  the 
same — zvisely  and  consistently  prevent  sin  in  the  best  moral 
system.  Both  of  them  thus  held  the  Leibnitzian  optimism 
which  was  now  the  common  possession  of  the  New  Eng- 
land school.  This  hypothesis  Park  adopts  as  his  answer 
to  the  question  as  to  the  divine  permission  of  sin.  The 
leading  thought  under  this  department  of  the  discussion 
is  that  the  prevention  of  all  sin  might  require  a  degree  of 
direct  oversight  of  the  members  of  the  system,  a  degree  of 
tutelage,  and  a  consequent  degree  of  dependence,  inconsist- 
ent with  their  moral  strength;  and  greater  strength  with 
some  sin  (finally  overruled)  may  be  better  than  unbroken 
holiness  and  the  consequent  weakness. 

The  force  of  this  position,  whether  in  Taylor's  hands  or 
Park's,  depends  on  the  view  held  in  respect  to  the  nature  of 
the  moral  universe.  Park  regards  it  as  constituted  by  God 
as  a  system,  or,  to  use  modern  phrase,  under  general  laws. 
Among  the  facts  of  the  system  are  free  will,  and  its  corre- 
late, that  a  free  will  is  to^  be  governed  only  by  persuasives 
and  never  by  forces.  These  "persuasives"  constitute  the 
great  mass  of  things,  principles,  and  events  in  the  world. 
Not  independent  of  God,  they  proceed  under  his  divine  gov- 
ernment; but  they  have  been  wisely  established  and  are  not 
to  be  interfered  with,  even  by  God  himself,  except  for  great 
and  wise  reasons.  It  is  better  that  man  should  grow  into 
righteousness  and  true  freedom  under  such  system,  than 
that  he  should  have  righteousness  thrust  upon  him-,  and  be 
maintained  in  it,  even  by  persuasives  alone,  if  for  the 
sake  of  these  extraordinary  persuasives,  the  constituted  system 
should  be  destroyed. 

Although  Park  has  thus  varied  somewhat  from  Taylor 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


485 


in  the  interest  of  a  stricter  adherence  to  the  standard  of  the 
school,  the  Edwardean  theory  of  the  will,  he  affords  here 
an  instance  of  that  larger  doctrine  of  the  will  which  he 
really  held,  as  has  been  brought  out  in  the  chapter  dealing 
with  that  doctrine.  There  can  be  no  more  ''weakness" 
under  a  providential  course  which  excludes  all  sin,  upon  the 
strict  Edwardean  theory,  than  under  one  which  permits  sin ; 
for  motives  are  no  more  controlling,  and  no  more  of  direct 
divine  origin,  in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other.  When  Park 
uses  the  language  he  here  does,  he  is  giving  a  large  play  to 
the  free  will  of  man,  is  emphasizing  the  value  set  by  God 
upon  it,  and  the  sacredness  with  which  he  has  invested  it. 

Park's  final  answer,  therefore,  to  the  objection  against 
the  benevolence  of  God,  derived  from  the  existence  of  sin 
is  this,  that  our  limitations  and  our  ignorance  are  such 
that  we  must  acknowledge  the  possibility  that  sin  was  per- 
mitted for  wise  and  good  reasons.  Thus  he  comes  to  the 
question  of  the  benevolence  of  God  unhampered  by  this 
objection,  and  can  answer  directly  from  the  facts  that  God 
is  good.  The  conduct  of  the  argument  is  so  characteristic 
of  Park  that  we  may  profitably  devote  more  attention  to  it 
than  to  any  hitherto. 

After  calling  the  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  previous 
course  of  argument  has  now  removed  objections  to  the  di- 
vine benevolence  arising  from  the  existence  of  sin,  of  the 
various  other  moral  evils  (such  as  indolence),  and  of  pain. 
Park  argues  ( i )  from  God's  statural  attributes  to  his  benev- 
olence. "Thus  far  we  have  found  God  absolutely  perfect; 
therefore  we  anticipate  the  same  in  all  his  attributes." 
This  form  of  argument,  an  application  of  the  principle  of 
the  continuity  of  the  universe,  was  a  favorite  one  with 
him.  "If  a  rope  sustains  a  certain  weight  and  gives  no 
signs  of  breaking,  we  unhesitatingly  intrust  more  weight 
to  it.    If  it  has  borne  so  much,  it  will  bear  more."  He 


486 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


then  proceeds:  "The  natural  attributes  present  him  the 
strongest  motives  to  be,  and  take  from  him  all  motives  to 
be  otherwise  than,  benevolent  and  good."  Men  are  in- 
clined to  envy  and  other  sins  because  they  have  so  vague 
ideas  of  the  real  meanness  of  these  sins,  and  so  obscure 
ideas  of  the  opposite  virtues.  But  the  omniscience  of  God 
lifts  him  above  all  such  obscurity.  He  has  no  motive  to 
be  malevolent.  Again  (2)  the  natural  emotion,  the  taste 
for  the  noble  and  beautiful,  argues  for  benevolence;  for  sin 
is  most  ignoble,  and  virtue,  benevolence,  is  most  sublime. 
A  being  having  infinite  conceptions  of  the  grandeur  of  vir- 
tue could  not  fall  into  sin.  (3)  The  phenomena  of  the 
universe  constitute  another  argument.  Its  physical  phe- 
nomena, for  "we  might  have  been  in  such  a  state  that 
every  ray  of  light  would  pierce  the  eye  as  a  dagger  and 
every  taste  be  acrid.  But  happiness  is  the  law,  misery  the 
exception."  "The  vast  preponderance  of  contrivances  are 
for  our  good."  The  moral  phenomena  furnish  a  parallel 
argument.  ' 

We  might  have  been  constituted  so  as  to  feel  joy  at  the  sight 
of  pain;  but  now,  when  we  commit  a  vile  act  we  are  ashamed,  and 
pain  in  others  calls  forth  our  pity.  We  must  take  the  future  life  into 
account  to  get  the  frll  force  of  this  argument.  The  tendencies  here 
are  towards  good :  they  will  have  become  prevailing  and  exclusive 
of  all  others  there.  Now,  the  fact  that  God  has  made  us  with  these 
moral  feelings,  inclining  us  to  the  right,  indicates  that  he  is  good,  for 
no  Creator  would  fender  it  necessary  for  his  creatures  to  despise  him. 
But  if  he  is  not  morally  good,  his  creatures  must  feel  that  they  occupy 
a  higher  moral  level  than  he. 

Professor  Park  was  accustomed,  like  other  great  think- 
ers, to  make  sudden  plunges  to  the  very  depths  of  thought. 
Such  a  plunge  occurs  at  this  point  of  his  argument.  He 
enters  here,  according  to  his  custom,  certain  "objections." 
Among  them  is  this,  that  "after  all,  God,  to  make  us  more 
miserable,  may  have  deceived  us,  and  made  himself  appear 
to  us  benevolent,  while  he  actually  is  malevolent."  Park 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


487 


shows  that  this  objection  involves  the  fundamental  skepti- 
cism of  doubting  the  trustworthiness  of  our  faculties.  Lotze 
says  in  his  Metaphysik,  when  a  man  comes  forward  with 
this  "groundless  perhaps" — perhrps  everything  may  be 
other  than  it  necessarily  seems — "I  simply  turn  my  back 
upon  him  and  go  my  way."  Park's  answer  was  that  such 
a  position  implied  substantial  falsehood. 

Then  (4)  the  moral  instincts  of  men,  (5)  the  accordance 
of  the  divine  benevolence  with  the  nature  of  things  (con- 
trivances for  pain  may  be  for  our  good),  and  (6)  the  gen- 
eral opinions  of  men,  are  urged. 

Finally  (7)  the  biblical  argument,  the  Bible's  direct  as- 
sertions, its  structure,  and  particular  doctrines,  like  the 
atonement,  is  presented.  The  argument  is  still  from  the 
Bible  as  a  wise  book,  and  may  be  thus  expressed:  The 
greatest  scheme  of  thought  which  the  world  has  ever  pro- 
duced, the  biblical,  teaches  the  benevolence  of  God;  there- 
fore it  is  true.^ 

Now,  this,  we  submit,  is  a  great  and  a  valid  argument. 
It  has  committed  no  circles,  but  has  marched  straight  from 
the  first  premises  to  the  final  conclusion.  It  makes  the  be- 
nevolence of  God  credible  and  reasonable — vastly  more 
reasonable  than  the  conception  of  his  indifference  to  hu- 
man needs  or  his  malevolence.  It  gives  a  ground  of  be- 
lief, and  of  further  argument.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  it 
draws  its  materials  improperly  from  the  Scriptures.  Ritschl 
says  that  the  idea  of  order  is  a  biblical  idea.  This  is  true; 
but  it  is  also  a  pre-biblical  idea,  for  Plato  has  the  idea  of 
order  and  of  justice,  though  not  of  the  divine  goodness,  in 
its  full  Christian  sense.  Park  rests  heavily  upon  order 
and  reason  in  the  argument.  But  the  argument  may  be 
criticized  as  not  being  complete.  It  does  not  give  the  full 
Christian  idea  of  the  divine  benevolence.    We  do  not  see 

^  Compare  Lotze's:  *'Es  ist  ja  unmoglich,  dass  das  grosste  von  allem  denk- 
baren  nicht  ware." 


488 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


"the  glory  of  God  in  the  face  of  Jesus  Christ."  It  is  a 
''benevolent"  God,  but  not  a  "Father,"  and  not  ''the 
Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ."  Park  would  undoubtedly 
have  admitted  this  objection  at  once.  He  would  have  said : 
"But  I  am  not  done  yet."  He  has  not  got  the  full  idea  of 
God  now,  any  more  than  at  the  beginning;  nor  can  he  get 
it  till  the  entire  dogmatic  process  is  performed.  But  he 
has  enough  even  now  to  base  his  next  argument  upon, 
enough  to  prove  that  we  have  a  God  who,  in  condescen- 
sion to  man's  need,  will  make  revelation  of  himself  and 
provide  a  Bible.  And  then,  having  at  last  a  Bible,  he  can 
use  the  biblical  argument  as  sufficient  and  final,  and  pre- 
sent the  benevolence  of  God  in  its  full  sweep  as  that  love 
of  God  by  which  he  "sent  his  only  Son." 

But  the  treatment  of  the  divine  benevolence,  even  at 
this  stage,  is  not  yet  done.  Great  ideas  are  never  satisfac- 
torily disposed  of  in  Park's  view  till  they  have  been  fully 
defined  and  exhibited  in  their  various  relations;  and  this 
labor  he  proceeds  now  to  perform. 

It  is  Park's  position  not  merely  that  God  is  good,  but 
that  the  divine  goodness  comprehends  his  entire  moral  na- 
ture. God  has  but  one,  comprehensive  moral  attribute, 
and  that  is  benevolence.  He  here  follows  Edwards,  in  his 
posthumous  treatise  on  virtue.  We  enter  intO'  moral  rela- 
tions with  all  sentient  being,  and  that  vvhich  constitutes  the 
basis  of  these  relations  is  the  capacity  of  feeling  itself. 
Happiness,  the  gratification  of  the  feeling,  is  the  object 
sought  ultimately  in  all  moral  action,  and  when  a  sentient 
being  is  perceived  to  be  in  want,  conscience  at  once  and  im- 
peratively enjoins  upon  us  the  duty  of  satisfying  that  want, 
so  far  as  possible.  The  active  choice  to  do  this  is  benev- 
olence, and  it  is  the  primary  and  fundamental  moral  action. 
Happiness  is,  of  course,  not  to  be  taken  in  so  restricted  a 
sense  that  it  shall  embrace  nothing  but  physical  gratifica- 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


489 


tion.  The  highest  happiness  of  the  highest  beings  is  de- 
rived from  the  approbation  of  conscience,  and  thus  requires 
their  hoHness.  The  "sentient"  being  who  is  also  a  moral 
being,  finds  his  happiness  chiefly  in  this  highest  element  of 
his  nature.  But,  high  or  low,  that  which  calls  out  moral 
choice  in  respect  to  him  is  his  capacity  of  feeling,  his  value, 
his  worth ;  and  the  benevolent  choice  of  his  worth,  the  choice 
to  promote  it — holiness  first,  but  happiness  finally — is  vir- 
tue, and  this  alone  is  virtue. 

These  are,  according  to  Edwards,  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  human  ethics;  and  both  Edwards  and  Park 
apply  them  immediately  to  God.  We  know  God  by  know- 
ing ourselves.  His  "great,  generic  moral  attribute"  is 
love,  and  every  other  moral  attribute  is  only  a  new  appli- 
cation of  this  attribute  according  to  the  differing  circum- 
stances in  which  God  is  placed.  He  views  men  (and  other 
beings)  primarily  as  simply  capable  of  happiness;  and  he 
then  chooses  their  happiness.  Viewed  as  having  moral 
character,  men  are  regarded  by  God  with  "complacential 
benevolence" — that  is,  either  approved  as  holy  or  disap- 
proved as  sinful.  God  "loves  all  men"  with  primary 
benevolence,  but  "hates  the  wicked"  with  complacential  be- 
nevolence— for  benevolence  can  hate,  must  hate  the  wicked. 
But  there  is  a  "consequential  benevolence,"  or  justice,  which 
Park  defines  as  "the  cherishing  of  the  love  to^  the  right  char- 
acter of  sentient  beings  followed  by  the  cherishing  of  the 
desire  to  reward  the  character — or  the  reverse,  a  hatred  of 
the  wrong  clwacter  and  desire  to  punish  it."  This  justice 
is  of  two  sorts,  "distributive"  and  "public."  The  former  is 
"a  choice  to  make  such  an  expression  of  approval  or  disap- 
proval to  an  obedient  or  disobedient  agent  as  shall  be  to 
that  agent  a  merited  recompense  to  his  act."  The  latter  is 
"a  choice  of  expressing  complacency  or  displacency  to  an 
obedient  or  disobedient  agent  on  the  ground  of,  and  in  pro- 


490         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


portion  to,  the  usefulness  of  the  expression."  The  latter 
definition  was  not  the  one  always  given  by  Park,  and  the 
idea  may,  perhaps,  be  better  expressed  for  the  present  time 
if  public  justice  be  defined  as  "such  treatment  of  an  agent  in 
view  of  his  obedience  or  disobedience  as  shall  most  promote 
his  and  all  others'  holiness  and  happiness."  Consequential 
benevolence  is  also  ''grace,"  which  is  "the  choice  of  a  ruler 
to  bestow  favor  upon  a  subject  when  the  distributive  justice 
of  the  ruler  prompts  him  to  inflict  evil  on  that  subject,"  or 
it  is  "a  choice  to  favor  the  guilty." 

As  to  justice,  two  things  are  to  be  noted  as  we  pass  on. 
Park  teaches  distributive  justice,  but  he  does  not  teach  that 
there  is  an  eternally  fixed  relation  between  offenses  and 
punishments,  founded  in  exact  and  undeviating  fitness,  to 
be  inflexibly  executed.  He  declares  many  times  that  "dis- 
tributive justice  may  be  forever  unsatisfied" — -in  fact  teaches 
that  it  is  unsatisfied  and  must  be  in  regard  to  all  those  who 
are  forgiven.  They  are  still  guilty  (in  the  sense  of  having 
done  the  wickedness)  and  still  deserve  all  the  punishment 
they  ever  did.  Park's  "justice"  is  always  determined  by  the 
relations  of  the  act.  The  penalty  justly  due  to  any  act  is 
determined  by  all  the  relations  in  which  the  act  stands.  If 
"distributive  justice"  be  defined  so  that  these  general  rela- 
tions be  ignored.  Park  denies  such  justice.  There  is  always 
to  him  a  view  of  the  great  universe  of  fact  in  determining 
what  a  given  choice  shall  be,  and  so  the  most  distributive 
of  his  distributive  justice  has  an  element  of  "public"  justice 
in  it,  or  of  regard  to  the  public  interests,  the  general  whole 
of  things. 

Then,  again,  the  "public  justice"  is  not  to  be  distin- 
guished from  benevolence.  It  is  ''consequential  benevo- 
lence," but  the  epithet  might  be  suppressed.  It  is  simply 
"general  love,"  a  choice  as  to  individual  beings  determined 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


491 


by  the  interests  of  all  beings,  a  choice  of  ''the  good  of  be- 
ing in  general,"  as  Edwards  would  have  phrased  it. 

Park's  view  of  the  love  of  God  thus  emerges  from  the 
profundities  of  careful  definition  and  dogmatic  discussion, 
and  becomes  visible  and  capable  of  estimation.  God's  love 
is  his  sole  moral  attribute.  Every  other  attribute,  appar- 
ently diverse  though  it  may  be,  is  resolved  ultimately  into 
love,  since  it  is  a  form  of  love's  manifestation,  and  has  no 
virtue  apart  from  the  love  that  it  expresses  and  conveys. 
The  love  of  God  is  thus  the  determining  principle  of 
Park's  theology.  We  have  seen,  under  the  subject  oi  the 
Will,  that  it  meets  certain  restrictions  in  its  application. 
Nevertheless  the  statement  made  remains  true. 

But  Love,  according  toi  Park,  is  no'  mere  ill-regulated 
emotion.  It  does  not  desire  simply  the  sensuous  gratifica- 
tion of  God's  creatures.  It  does  not  lead  to  making  each 
individual  "happy,"  considering  each  by  himself  alone.  It 
regards  principally  that  lofty  happiness  which  consists  in 
holiness.  Hence  it  necessitates  "hate" — indeed,  includes 
it  in  itself.  If  God  loves  holiness,  he  must  in  the  same  act 
hate  sin.  Love  of  holiness  and  hate  of  sin  are  the  same 
thing,  the  two  sides  of  one  choice,  as  the  piece  of  paper  has 
two  inseparable  sides.  This  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
in  following  out  Park's  theology.  It  is  not  like  a  low  land- 
scape, basking  in  a  tropic  sun,  every  hill  crowded  with  mo- 
notonous vegetation.  It  is  rather  like  the  Sierras,  rising 
here  and  there  into  sublime  heights,  crowned  with  the 
eternal  purity  of  everlasting  snows.  Will  Park,  who  teaches 
that  God  is  love,  interpret  that  love  in  a  way  to  lead  to 
Universalism  ?  Not  while  he  holds  fast  to  the  eternal  "dis- 
placence"  of  God  toward  sin! 

A  brief  quotation  will  illustrate  the  inclusiveness  of 
Park's  conception  of  love: 

The  comprehensive  truth  may  be  stated  thus :    Our  benevolent 


492 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


Father  does  not  administer  his  moral  government  under  the  influence 
of  a  limited  attribute  alone;  not  under  the  influence  of  mercy  or  grace 
or  distributive  justice  without  any  regard  to  the  general  welfare;  not 
under  the  influence  of  a  choice  of  the  general  welfare  without  any 
regard  to  the  demands  of  retributive  justice  or  the  pleadings  of  mercy 
or  grace;  but  he  administers  his  moral  government  under  the  influ- 
ence of  a  general  attribute  looking  at  sin  and  at  pardon  in  all  their 
relations,  and  providing  for  the  greatest  and  highest  welfare  of  the 
universe.  Under  the  influence  of  this  general  attribute  our  benevo- 
lent Father  resists  the  plea  of  mercy  and  of  grace  when  the  safety  of 
the  universe  requires  him  to  resist  it ;  he  yields  to  the  demand  of  dis- 
tributive justice  when  the  general  good  requires  him  to  comply  with 
it;  his  distributive  justice  holds  the  scales  and  his  general  justice  holds 
the  sword ;  the  former  urges  its  claims  and  the  latter  complies  with 
them  on  the  ground  of  their  rectitude  and  on  the  condition  of  their 
necessity  for  the  general  welfare.  The  punishment  which  our  Father 
inflicts  is  useful,  but  its  usefulness  rests  on  the  ground  of  its  being  de- 
served;  the  justice  of  it  comes  first,  the  usefulness  comes  afterwards; 
the  punishment  cannot  be  useful  unless  it  be  just,  and  it  must  be  use- 
ful if  it  is  just,  unless  an  atonement  intervene.  The  fact  that  punish- 
ment is  deserved  rests  on  the  ground  that  sin  is  intrinsically  evil; 
the  intrinsic  evil  of  sin  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  is  a  preference  for 
the  inferior  above  the  superior  good, — it  is  a  love  of  self  or  the  world 
rather  than  of  Him  who  comprehends  in  his  own  being  the  welfare, 
not  of  the  world  only,  but  of  the  universe  also;  it  is  opposition  to 
general  benevolence,  to  general  justice,  to  Him  of  whom  our  text 
affirms,  "God  is  love."  ^ 

In  the  development  of  the  system  the  point  has  now 
been  reached  where  the  Bible  must  receive  a  more  careful 
consideration.  It  has  been  found  to  exist  in  the  world, 
and  to  demand,  as  a  fact  of  natural  theology,  constant  at- 
tention. But  Christianity  is  peculiarly  the  religion  of  the 
Bible.  The  doctrine  of  God  and  of  his  goodness  does  not 
constitute  the  whole  of  Christianity,  nor  even  its  peculiar 
and  distinctive  portion.  There  are  other  doctrines  which 
are  not  attested  by  nature;  as,  for  example,  the  doctrine  of 
atonement.  If  they  are  true,  they  must  derive  their  proof 
from  the  Bible,  for  they  must  depend  on  a  revelation,  such 
as  the  Bible  professes  to  be.    Hence  before  we  come  to 

^Memorial  Collection  of  Sermons,  pp.  319  f. 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


493 


them,  we  must  discuss  the  authority  of  the  Bible.  Men 
need  these  doctrines;  we  must  look  to  God  for  the  revela- 
tion of  his  will  in  respect  to  them;  and  we  come  to  look 
for  such  a  revelation  with  the  antecedent  probability  that 
so  great  a  God,  infinite  in  his  power  and  moved  by  love, 
will  in  some  suitable  way  make  revelation  of  himself.  The 
proof  of  the  Bible  thus  rests  upon  the  proof  of  the  benevo- 
lence of  God.  But  we  need  further  to  examine  the  facts 
in  order  to  ascertain  whether  God  has  carried  out  his  be- 
nevolent purpose  for  men  by  giving  them  the  particular 
book  of  revelation  which  we  call  the  Bible. 

The  argument  contains  nothing  particularly  striking. 
The  Westminster  argument  from  the  "witness  of  the 
Spirit"  is  not  even  mentioned — abandoned,  apparently  under 
the  rationalizing  influence  of  the  Unitarian  controversy. 
Park  proceeds,  according  to  the  method  of  that  day,  from 
the  genuineness  oi  the  books  tO'  their  authenticity,  and  thence 
to  their  claims  and  their  inspiration.  He  arrives  at  the 
same  rejection  of  verbal  inspiration  and  emphasis  of  the  in- 
fallibility of  the  Bible  as  is  to  be  found  in  all  the  preceding 
members  of  the  school. 

But  a  new  era,  the  era  of  modern  science  had  already 
arrived,  although  previous  to  the  issue  of  the  Origin  of 
Species,  in  1859,  it  had  not  exercised  the  modifying  influence 
upon  theology  which  it  was  destined  to  do  thereafter.  The 
question  of  miracles,  as  supposed  violations  of  the  constit- 
uent laws  oi  the  universe,  was  becoming  a  little  more 
serious,  though  nothing  had  yet  appeared  more  thorough- 
going than  Hume's  discussion  in  the  eighteenth  century.  In 
1866  Graf's  epoch-making  efforts  in  the  higher  criticism  of 
the  Old  Testament  appeared,  and  it  was  soon  evident  to 
Park  that  "the  question  of  our  day  is  not  what  the  Bible 
means,  but  whether  we  have  any  Bible;  and  even  whether 
we  have  any  God."    But  the  forces  wrapped  up  in  both 


494 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


higher  criticism  and  evolution,  of  which  the  one  is  merely 
a  form  of  the  other,  did  not  fully  reveal  themselves  till  just 
about  the  time  when  Park's  public  labors  ceased  (1881). 
He  was  therefore  not  prepared  to  say  anything  that  he  re- 
garded as  conclusive  upon  the  great  topics  which  he  saw 
rising  into  new  prominence.  The  time  for  the  work  of  the 
dogmatician  had  not  yet  come.  But  the  apologist  already 
had  a  task,  and  this  was  to  prepare  for  the  coming  discus- 
sions. He  did  this  by  the  simple  process  of  scrutinizing  the 
traditional  dogmatic  positions  very  keenly  for  their  con- 
tent of  exact  truth.  He  redefined  the  inspiration  which  the 
Bible  possesses,  and  stripped  the  doctrine  of  much  of  the 
exaggeration  and  detail  with  which  Protestant  scholasti- 
cism, in  a  false  ambition  for  a  perfect  system,  had  incum- 
bered it.  Distinguishing  between  ''revelation,"  as  God's 
action  in  unfolding  his  truth  to  men,  and  ''inspiration"  as 
the  method  under  which  the  Bible,  as  a  collection  of  writ- 
ings, has  come  into  existence,  he  makes  a  number  of  valu- 
able, and  sometimes  radical,  modifications  in  the  teachings 
of  our  historical  Calvinism.  His  inspiration  is  mostly  a 
divine  "superintendency"  so  exercised  over  the  writers  that 
the  Bible  is  perfectly  according  to  the  divine  will,  and  thus 
perfect  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  intended.  A  mere 
abstract  and  unrelated  perfection  is  never  claimed  for  it  by 
Park.  Inspiration,  also,  pertains  to  the  writers  of  the 
Bible  and  not  to  their  writings. 

Before  defining  inspiration  Park  lays  down  certain  pre- 
liminary cautions.  We  are  not  to  say  that  the  Bible  is,  or 
is  not,  correct  in  mere  matters  of  science.  Again,  we  are 
not  to  afiirm  or  deny  that  the  Bible  is  correct  in  mere  his- 
tory. Afiirmation  or  denial  here  is  aside  from  the  dog- 
matic problem,  because  science  and  history  are  both  aside 
from  the  purpose  of  the  Bible,  which  is,  in  a  word,  to  save 
men.    Hence  the  definition  of  inspiration  which  he  next 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


495 


proceeds  to  give  is:  "The  inspiration  of  the  Bible  denotes 
such  a  divine  influence  upon  the  minds  of  the  writers  as 
caused  them  to  teach  in  the  best  possible  manner,  zuhat- 
ever  they  intended  to  teach,  and  especially  to  communicate 
religious  truth  zvithout  any  error  either  in  religious  doc- 
trine or  religious  impression."  What  did  they  intend  to 
teach?  The  phenomena  in  any  case  must  show.  Where 
is  our  emphasis  to  be  laid,  and  as  to  what  may  we  be  sure 
that  they  are  right?  Religious  truth!  With  one  stroke 
of  definition  Park  has  thus  rendered  unnecessary  volumes 
of  current  discussion  and  irrelevant  pages  of  denunciation 
of  critics  and  scholars.  He  has  done  what  Ritschl  had  in 
mind  as  his  own  chief  service  to  theology;  but,  as  we  shall 
see,  he  did  not  later  follow  Ritschl  into  his  many  denials 
of  elements  of  positive  truth. 

Incidentally  to  this  larger  discussion  the  subject  of  the 
biblical  miracles  received  a  careful  review.  The  treatment 
given  them  does  not  meet  the  modern  objection  toi  them  de- 
rived from  an  evolutionary  revival  and  reinstatement  of 
Strauss's  mythical  theory  of  their  origin.  That  theory  was 
supposed  by  Park  to  have  been  forever  discredited.  But  the 
main  philosophical  considerations  which  connect  the  possi- 
bility of  miracles  with  the  personality  of  God,  so  that  one 
cannot  deny  them  without  impairing  that,  are  fully  brought 
out;  and,  accordingly,  discussion  will  always  have  to  come 
back  to  the  principles  laid  down  by  Park.  Pie  begins,  as 
always,  with  careful  definition.  Four  definitions  are  re- 
hearsed. A  miracle  is  (i)  "that  work  which  is  produced 
immediately  by  such  an  interposition  of  God's  bare  volition 
as  constitutes  a  phenomenon  which  without  that  interposi- 
tion could  not  have  taken  place."  Or  (2)  "a  miracle  is  a 
work  wrought  by  the  interposition  of  God  producing  what 
otherwise  the  laws  of  created  nature  must  have  prevented, 
or  preventing  what  the  laws  of  created  nature  must  other- 


49^         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


wise  have  produced."  Or  (3)  it  is  "a  work  wrought  by  the 
immediate  volition  of  God  interposing  and  violating  the 
laws  of  created  nature  in  their  established  method  of  opera- 
tion." Under  this  definition  he  discusses  Hume,  who,  he 
says,  committed  a  sophism  in  his  definition,  for  "he  defined 
a  miracle  as  a  Violation  of  the  laws  of  nature.'  He  objects 
to  the  existence  of  God,  being  a  skeptic,  and  hence  in  a  mir- 
acle has  an  event  without  a  cause.  But  when  we  admit  the 
being  of  God,  a  miracle  is  no  violation  of  the  laws  of  nature, 
for  it  is  a  law  of  nature  that  matter  obey  its  Creator.''  And 
(4)  he  defines:  "A  miracle  is  an  event  which  occurs  with- 
out a  cause  in  created  nature,  without  regularity  in  the 
times  and  places  of  its  occurrence,  and  in  manifest  opposi- 
tion to  all  those  natural  laws  which  have  been  observed  in 
other  events." 

Thus  possible,  miracles  need  a  sufficient  occasion  for 
their  occurrence,  which  Park  finds  in  the  necessity  of  mak- 
ing a  revelation  tO'  man.  Miracles  attest  the  divine  commis- 
sion O'f  the  bearers  of  this  revelation,  and  were  necessary 
tO'  convince  men  of  their  commission.  He  recognizes 
also  the  fact  that  at  this  point  of  time  miracles  themselves 
need  proof,  and  so'  proceeds  tO'  ask  whether  they  were 
actually  wrought  in  attestation  of  the  Bible.  By  a  character- 
istic turn  of  the  argument,  he  first  establishes  their  ante- 
cedent probability,  and  then,  remarking  that  they  need 
very  little  evidence  to  prove  their  reality,  cites  their  un- 
equivocal character  and  the  repute,  concurrence,  and  devo- 
tion of  the  witnesses,  as  sufficient  proof  of  their  actuality. 

From  this  point  on,  the  argument  of  Park's  system  rests 
upon  the  sure  foundation  of  the  Scriptures.  He  begins  this 
portion  of  his  discipline,  which  he  was  accustomed  to  call 
"revealed"  theology,  with  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity. 

Park's  treatment  of  this  theme  is  determined  by  his  his- 
torical situation.    New  England  was  not  yet  out  of  the 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


497 


period  of  the  Unitarian  controversy  when  he  began  his  pro- 
fessional work,  and  the  antithesis  to  Unitarianism  remained 
throughout  his  entire  career  more  distinctive  oi  the  theolo- 
gical condition  of  things  than  any  other  element.  Hence 
Park  devoted  an  unusual  amount  of  space  to  the  doctrine 
of  the  Trinity.  But  this  did  not  lead  him  to  go  into  such 
discussions  as  fill  Augustine's  treatise,  or  make  up  what  Dr. 
Hodge  would  call  the  "protestant  doctrine."  The  great 
portion  of  this  unusual  space  was  devoted  to  the  central 
part  of  the  Unitarian  denial — to  the  divinity  of  Christ.  As 
to  the  rest.  Park  followed  historically,  and  for  substance  of 
teaching,  Moses  Stuart,  who,  it  will  be  remembered,  had 
abandoned  the  word  "person"  as  descriptive  of  the  three 
elements  of  the  Trinity,  substituting  for  it  the  less  definite 
word  ^'distinction."  With  this  had  gone  the  ''eternal  genera- 
tion" of  the  Son,  and  the  "procession"  of  the  Spirit.  And,  in 
general,  Stuart  had  confined  himself  to  the  simple  results 
of  Nice  and  Chalcedon — one  God  in  three  ontological  and 
eternal  distinctions,  one  Christ  in  two  natures,  human  and 
divine.  Park  also  refused  to  advance  beyond  this  point,  af- 
firming our  ignorance  of  many  things.  "On  this  doctrine," 
he  says,  "we  must  be  careful  not  to  know  toO'  much."  "The 
profit  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  is  derived  in  some 
degree  from  the  fact  of  its  mysteriousness." 

The  path  of  approach  to  the  subject  was  determined  by 
the  inductive  method  of  investigation,  which  Park  had 
adopted,  and  of  which  many  an  example  has  already  been 
given  in  the  discussions  of  the  order  of  his  arguments.  He 
begins  the  Trinity  with  the  doctrine  which  historically  led 
to  it,  the  nature  of  Christ ;  and  this  he  begins  at  the  point 
nearest  to  the  investigator,  the  humanity. 

As  to  this,  comparatively  little  is  said.  The  ordinary 
and  simple  New  Testament  evidence  of  a  genuine  human 
body  and  soul  are  presented,  and  the  conclusion  of  true  hu- 


498 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


manity  drawn  without  great  elaboration.  No  special  con- 
troversy existed  in  New  England  over  this  point.  Simple 
facts,  like  Christ's  ignorance  of  the  condition  of  the  fig  tree 
and  the  time  of  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem,  are  noted 
without  further  comment.  They  serve  to  help  prove  that 
Christ  was  truly  man. 

When  the  argument  passes  to  the  divinity  of  Christ, 
however,  the  combatant  has  evidently  come  forth  in  his 
full  armor.  The  sole  question  is:  "What  is  the  fact?" 
and  that  fact  is  the  biblical  fact.  Consequently  the  whole 
argument  consists  in  a  biblico-theological  discussion  of  the 
New  Testament;  but  it  is  conducted  in  the  most  elaborate 
manner,  with  the  marshaling  of  innumerable  texts,  and 
under  eleven  general  heads.  Christ  is  God  because  ( i )  he 
is  called  so;  (2)  is  said  to  be  equal  with  God  in  condition; 
(3)  does  the  works,  and  (4)  has  the  attributes  of  the  Su- 
preme Being;  (5)  receives  divine  honors;  (6)  has  applied 
to  him  in  the  New  Testament  the  same  passages  elsewhere 
applied  to  the  supreme  God;  (7)  left  the  impression  on  his 
contemporaries  that  he  was  God;  (8)  the  Scriptures  make 
this  impression  on  the  masses  of  men;  (9)  Christ's  divinity 
commends  itself  to  the  moral  nature  of  man;  (10)  the  con- 
currence of  these  proofs  is  itself  a  distinct  proof;  (11)  no 
other  supposition  will  reconcile  the  Scriptures  and  con- 
sciousness. 

As  one  re-reads  the  argument  today,  he  is  struck  with 
its  scrupulous  accuracy  in  the  use  and  interpretation  of 
the  texts.  Under  the  first  head,  I  Tim.  3:16  is  not  cited, 
because  "the  external  [MS]  evidence  is  against  the  reading 
'God,'  although  the  internal  is  for  it."  Nor  is  Acts  20:28 
adduced,  because  "God"  is  also  disputed  here.  In  treating 
Rom.  9:5  the  argument  is  contextual,  and  the  sense  is  re- 
lied on  to  show  that  the  Christ  is  called  "God  blessed  for- 
ever."    The  most  impressive  argument  is  drawn  from 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


499 


Christ's  work — of  creation,  preservation,  raising  the  dead, 
the  judgment  of  the  earth — which  cannot  run  off  into  mere 
verbal  discussion. 

I  have  already  said  that  Park  did  not  advance  in  any 
respect  beyond  the  Chalcedon  positions  as  to  the  person  of 
Christ — two  natures,  human  and  divine,  each  perfect  and 
entire,  in  the  unity  of  one  person.  He  consented  to  follow 
his  Calvinistic  predecessors  in  the  Nestorianizing  distribu- 
tion of  ignorance  to  the  humanity  and  omniscience  to  the 
divinity  of  respect  to  the  same  thing  and  at  the  same  time. 
How  was  any  "unity  of  person"  possible  under  such  a 
view?  Park  does  not  seem  to  have  really  raised  this 
question.  He  illustrates  what  he  himself  says  of  Julius  Miil- 
ler,  whom  he  always  styled  (while  he  lived)  "the  greatest 
of  living  theologians,"  that  "his  greatness  is  nowhere  better 
seen  than  in  this  monstrous  blunder."  The  remark  was 
made  of  Miiller's  efforts,  by  means  of  a  doctrine  of  "ke- 
no'sis,"  to'  solve  the  Chalcedon  paradox.  Park  was  there- 
fore not  ignorant  of  this  most  strenuous  effort  of  German 
evangelical  theology  to  solve  the  difficulties  of  the  theme; 
but  he  rejected  it.  It  is  not  plain  that  he  fully  understood 
it,  for  he  says,  in  explanation  of  the  remark,  that  the  theory 
is  "absurd."  "A  being  who  is  weak  cannot  by  his  weak- 
ness turn  himself  into  omnipotence."  No  kenotic  ever 
thought  he  could.  But  one  must  make  such  a  criticism  of 
the  acute  and  indefatigable  Park  with  caution.  If  he  did 
not  understand  the  kenotics,  it  is  perfectly  certain  that  they 
did  not  understand  one  another.  Like  evolution,  kenotism 
was  long  in  "coming  tO'  itself;"  if,  indeed,  it  has  yet 
done  so. 

The  chief  difficulty  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  was 
met  when  the  divinity  of  Christ  was  proved,  for  those  who 
have  accepted  this  element  have  never  found  special  diffi- 
culty with  the  personality  of  the  Holy  Spirit.    But  Park 


500 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


gives  an  independent  and  thorough  investigation  to  this 
remaining  portion  of  the  theme,  that,  when  independently 
proved,  it  may  lend  corroboration,  by  its  reflex  influence, 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  divinity  of  Christ.  We  need  not  fol- 
low him  through  this  proof,  which  is  exclusively  biblical. 
At  its  close  comes  the  summary  of  the  whole  doctrine  in 
the  form  of  definitions  of  the  Trinity.  The  first  and  best 
of  these  is  this :  "The  Father  is  God :  the  Son  is  God :  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  God.  Neither  is  God  without  the  others. 
Each  has  a  property  incommunicable  to  the  others.  There 
is  only  one  God."  There  is  no  attempt  at  a  rationale  of  the 
doctrine.  Various  objections  are  answered  and  misunder- 
standings cleared  away;  but  the  doctrine  is  confessedly  a 
mystery  resting  on  revelation,  and  only  partially  revealed. 
Although  Park  had  studied  Hegel  under  the  guidance  of 
no  less  a  man  than  Kahnis,  there  is  no  trace  of  acceptance 
of  Hegel's  "construction,"  or  of  interest  in  it. 

The  treatment  of  the  Trinity  then  closes  with  a  couple  of 
sections  on  the  sonship  of  Christ  and  the  procession  of  the 
Spirit.  The  term  "Son"  is  applied  in  the  New  Testament  to 
the  historical  Jesus  Christ,  and  designates  him  as  miracu- 
lously conceived  and  especially  dear  to  the  Father.  Modern 
biblical  theology  has  so  generally  followed  this  position  that 
we  need  say  nothing  further  on  it  here.  But  as  this  was 
the  first  distinctive  point  (formally)  of  the  "new  school," 
and  was  always  introduced  by  Park  as  such,  it  is  interesting 
to  note  his  remarks  made  here  on  the  characteristics  of  the 
school.  "The  New  School,"  he  says,  "avoid  those  technical 
terms  which  will  suggest  a  false  idea,  unless  the  terms  are 
explained  away  (e.  g.,  'eternal  generation').  They  refuse 
to  convert  figurative,  poetical  phrases  into  metaphysical  dog- 
mas (e.  g.,  the  phrase  This  day  have  I  begotten  thee,'  Ps. 
2:7,  into  an  assertion  of  'eternal  generation').  They  re- 
fuse to  substitute  metaphysical  theories  for  plain  biblical 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


teaching."  In  the  first  of  these  sentences  speaks  the  dog- 
matician ;  in  the  second,  the  preacher  of  the  sermon  on  ''The 
Theology  of  the  Intellect  and  That  oi  the  Feeling;"  and  in 
the  last,  the  practical  New  England  pastor. 

Thus  it  appeared  that  New  England  theology  as  repre- 
sented by  Park  no  less  than  by  Stuart  was  to  fail  to  answer 
adequately  the  searching  questions  put  it  by  the  Unitarian 
leaders.  The  Trinity  remained  a  doctrine  reduced  to  its 
lowest  terms^ — depotentiated — and  having  but  one  element 
of  practical  application  to^  life,  the  true  divinity  of 
Christ.  This  element  was  in  turn  embarrassed  with  difficul- 
ties, for  the  Chalcedon  specifications  of  supposed  fact 
needed  adjustment.  What  meaning  had  unity  of  person 
when  the  elements  of  the  personality  were  things  as  diverse 
as  divinity  and  humanity  ?  All  the  old  methods  of  bringing 
them  into  harmonious  adjustment  had  proved  failures. 
Was  there  still  a  method?  Or  was  it  to  be  confessed  that 
the  problem  had  been  wrongly  conceived,  and  that  the  two 
natures,  or  else  the  unity  of  person,  must  be  surrendered? 
These  questions  are  now  thrust  upon  the  modern  public 
with  terrific  earnestness,  and  the  old  formulations  of  doc- 
trine seem  crumbling  on  every  side.  They  were  no  less 
imperatively  thrust  upon  the  theology  we  are  now  reviewing. 
If  to  leave  them  unanswered  then  was  not  a  confession  of 
incompetence  to^  meet  the  issues  of  the  day,  it  was  a  certain 
and  decisive  disqualification  for  the  more  strenuous  conflicts 
into  which  the  American  churches  were  soon  to  come. 

The  progress  of  our  study  is  thus  gradually,  but  only 
gradually,  bringing  us  to  a  view  of  the  distinctive  theology 
of  Professor  Park.  Most  of  his  teaching  was  identical  with 
that  of  all  evangelical  theologians.  But  one  great  distinctive 
position  has  been  as  yet  noticed,  and  that  only  partially — 
his  position  on  the  nature  of  virtue  as  applied  to  the  char- 
acter of  God.   I  do  not  include  the  so-called  "first  peculiar- 


502 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


ity  of  the  New  School/'  on  "eternal  generation,"  because, 
after  all,  that  is  not  characteristic  or  determinative  of  his 
thought,  however  peculiar  to  the  new  school  it  may  have 
been.  We  are  to  find  our  next  distinctive  position  in  his 
treatment  of  the  will.  It  might  conduce  to  clearness  if  we 
had  placed  that  topic  at  this  point.  We  actually  encounter 
next,  in  the  course  of  Professor  Park's  own  development 
of  his  system,  the  subject  of  decrees;  and  faithfulness  to 
him,  as  well  as  the  necessity  of  letting  him  speak  in  his 
own  way  if  we  wish  to  gain  the  fullest  knowledge  of  his 
innermost  thought,  compels  us  to  attack  decrees  before  the 
will.  It  was  the  inductive  character  of  his  system  that 
prompted  this  order.  The  theory  of  the  will  is  chiefly  valu- 
able as  a  means  of  explaining  and  defending  decrees.  The 
fact  must  come  before  the  theory  of  the  fact,  and  hence  de- 
crees before  the  will. 

Whatever  else  Park  was,  he  was  a  Calvinist.  He  used 
sometimes  to  say  that  Calvinism  was  the  only  ''respectable" 
theology.  This  was  a  specimen  of  his  playful  sarcasm;  but 
"many  a  truth  is  spoken  in  jest,"  and  his  sarcasm  often  cov- 
ered his  most  profound  convictions.  He  was  also  a  High 
Calvinist.  He  was  of  the  strain  of  Hopkins,  in  the  New 
England  theology.  Other  theologians  might  weakly  leave 
something  tO'  the  ungoverned  freedom  of  man,  as  even 
Augustine  seemed  to  leave  the  fall  of  Adam,  but  Hopkins, 
and  Park  after  him,  included  the  fall  as  fully  in  the  decree  of 
God  as  the  sending  of  the  Son  or  the  election  of  an  indi- 
vidual to  salvation.  And  hence  the  subject  of  decrees  was 
begun  by  Park  with  a  definition :  "The  decrees  of  God 
are  his  plan  so  to  constitute  and  circumstance  the  universe 
as  to  secure  the  previous  certainty  of  all  events  which 
actually  occur/' 

Park  derives  his  doctrine  fundamentally  from  the  sover- 
eignty, or  supreme  causality,  of  God.    His  whole  theology 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


503 


follows  the  Calvinistic  tendency  to  exalt  God.  It  is  wise, 
best,  desirable,  and  really  accepted  by  all  men  (when  in 
their  right  minds)  that  God  should  govern  all  things. 
Methodists  and  Calvinists  really  agree.  If  the  latter  say 
that  God  intends  to  do'  a  thing,  the  former  say  he  does  it 
intentionally!  And  it  is  a  fundamental  idea  that  decrees 
are  no  greater,  and  no  other  thing  in  religion  than  i  or- 
dinary affairs.  God  "foreordains  zvhatsoever  comes  to  pass 
actually." 

The  development  of  the  subject  is  therefore  primarily 
apologetic.  The  word  "decree"  is  a  bad  word.  "Plan" 
would  be  much  better.  It  pertains  primarily  to  what  God 
himself  will  do,  and  only  secondarily  to  what  his  creatures 
are  to  do,  as  the  certain,  but  not  necessary,  consequence  of 
his  action.  The  connection  here  is  made  under  the  Ed- 
wardean  theory  of  the  will,  which  Park  maintained. 
God  acts,  and  he  knows  exactly  how  men  will  act,  and  thus, 
by  decreeing  his  own  action,  he  plans,  decrees,  secures,  but 
does  not  force  or  compel  the  action  of  man.  No  sooner 
does  Park  thus  make  a  definition  than  he  laments  its 
terms;  "predestination,"  "election,"  "reprobation"  are  all 
"unfortunate." 

For  the  sake  of  illustrating  both  his  doctrine  and  some 
of  the  elements  of  his  method,  I  subjoin  here,  as  I  have 
hitherto  refrained  from  doing.  Park's  treatment  of  one  point 
of  the  subject  of  decrees.  What  follows  are  merely  heads: 
the  illuminating  and  enforcing  discussion  of  the  heads, 
their  "development"  in  no  ordinary  sense  of  that  word,  we 
must  dispense  with.  It  was  alw?ys  extempore,  and  is  gone 
into  the  great  abyss  of  time,  except  as  preserved  in  the 
memories  of  hearers.  But  something  of  the  real  Park  will 
here  be  seen  by  all  readers,  and  more  will  be  recalled  to 
some  who  were  once  hearers. 

2.  The  doctrine  of  Reprobation  is  not  inconsistent  with  benevolence. 


504         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

a)  It  is  for  the  best  that  God  ^should  not  ""pre  vent  sin,  and  he  does 
not.  It  is  best  that  he  should  leave  some  men  to  themselves,  and 
he  does  leave  some  to  themselves.  The  greater  part  he  elects,  the  few 
he  permits  to  perish.  We  have  a  right  to  make  the  supposition  that  the 
proportion  of  those  lost  to  those  saved,  in  this  and  other  worlds,  is 
as  one  grain  of  sand  to  the  myriad  grains  of  the  seashore. 

b)  It  is  not  unjust  for  God  to  leave  the  reprobate  to  themselves 
for  they  deserve  nothing. 

c)  He  does  leave  men  to  themselves;  therefore  it  is  right  for  him 
to  decree  to  leave  them  to  themselves. 

d)  God  does  place  and  constitute  some  men  so  that  they  will  sin. 
Then  it  is  right  for  him  to  do  so. 

e)  All  the  arguments  which  prove  that  it  is  benevolent  for  God  to 
permit  sin,  prove  also  that  it  is  benevolent  and  just  to  decree  to  per- 
mit sin. 

/)  All  the  arguments  which  prove  that  it  is  best  for  God  on  the 
whole  to  permit  sin,  prove  that  it  is  for  the  best  that  he  decree  to  per- 
mit sin. 

Remark:  All  these  objections  to  the  doctrine  of  decrees  lose  their 
force  when  we  consider  that  men  are  free,  notwithstanding  tlie  de- 
crees J 

We  are  now  brought,  in  the  regular  progress  of  the 
system,  to  the  subject  of  the  will.  For  purpose  of  a  more 
connected  view  of  the  New  England  speculations  upon  this 
important  subject,  a  separate  chapter  has  been  assigned  to 
this  theme,  and  Park's  work  has  been  included  there  with 
the  rest.  Suffice  it  here  to  say  that,  while  nominally  hold- 
ing to  Edwards'  determinism,  Park  had  emphasized  cer- 
tain elements  of  Edwards  and  of  consciousness,  so  as  to 
modify  greatly  the  substance  of  the  Edwardean  theory. 
In  fact,  a  new  thought,  new  for  Calvinism,  was  struggling 
in  Park's  mind,  as  yet  not  quite  able  to  come  to  the  birth. 
It  was  the  idea  of  freedom.  Not  of  a  "gracious  freedom," 
such  as  Arminians  had  taught,  but  a  new  natural,  consti- 

Here,  as  indicated  by  the  notes,  Professor  Park  introduced  Lyman  Beecher's 
famous  comparison:  Election  is  as  if  a  man  should  go  to  a  prison  on  fire,  open  all 
the  doors,  and  loose  every  chain,  and  then  call  to  the  prisoners  to  come  out!  They 
will  not.  Then  he  rushes  in,  seizes  as  many  as  he  can,  and  drags  them  out. 
These  are  the  "elect."  Those  whom  he  is  obliged  to  leave,  all  of  whom  have 
been  set  free,  and  invited  to  come  out,  and  every  one  of  whom  could,  but  does  not, 
come,  are  the  "reprobates." 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


505 


tutional,  and  inalienable  attribute  of  man.  On  the  side  of 
the  theory  of  decrees  and  the  will,  it  did  not  find  consistent 
expression ;  but  in  the  doctrine  of  sin  it  did.  It  begat  a  new 
bearing  toward  these  doctrines,  and  toward  all  the  re- 
maining doctrines  of  theology ;  for  it  introduced  into  them, 
for  the  first  time  with  completeness  and  power,  the  ethical 
conception.  The  mind  of  man  is  an  ethical  agent,  pos- 
sessed of  freedom  and  influenced  by  motives.  And  all  the 
great  processes  of  redemption — the  atonement  as  well  as 
regeneration,  conversion,  and  sanctification — are  to  be  ex- 
plained by  this  conception  of  his  nature.  We  shall  see  how 
thoroughly  controlled  Park  is  by  this  idea  as  we  proceed; 
and  it  needs  no  elaborate  exhibition  to  show  every  theo- 
logian how  great  a  modification  in  past  theories,  this  fact 
must  produce.  It  was  nothing  less  than  an  ethical  revolu- 
tion in  the  theological  system  which  New  England  theology 
in  Park's  hands  now  effected. 

The  next  topic  in  the  system  is  sin.  As  a  follower  of 
Taylor  and  of  Emmons — or,  it  might  better  be  said,  as 
a  follower  of  Edwards,  whose  the  phrase  is — Park  had 
already  laid  down  the  position  that  "all  moral  agency  con- 
sists in  choosing."  Nothing  which  goes  before  the  choice 
is  part  of  man's  moral  agency,  and  nothing  that  comes  after 
it.  Hence,  when  he  came  to  define  sin,  he  put  it  tersely  as 
"the  voluntary  transgression  of  known  law."  He  proves 
his  proposition  from  the  testimony  of  conscience  and  the 
common  opinions  of  men,  and  from  a  long  review  of  the 
biblical  use  of  the  various  words  for  sin. 

This  view  would  at  once  meet  with  opposition  from 
those  who  maintain  that  men  are  sinners  by  nature  pre- 
viously to  any  act  on  their  own  part.  Many  of  their  objec- 
tions are  met  by  a  more  delicate  analysis  than  they  had  been 
wont  to  apply.  That  "profound"  objection  that  "men  gen- 
erally feel  that  sin  lies  deeper  than  action,"  is  admitted; 


So6         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

but  it  is  shown  in  reply  that  the  chosen  definition  of  sin 
does  not  mean  that  it  is  only  the  outward  transgression.  It 
is  chiefly  the  ethical  process,  the  act  of  choosing.  When  sin 
is  said  by  Park  briefly  to  be  an  act,  he  always  means  an  act 
of  the  will,  a  volition.  The  objection,  again,  that  "sin 
consists  in  something  permanent,  but  actions  are  not  perma- 
nent," is  answered  by  showing  that  the  sinner  is  "perma- 
nently choosing."  Going  still  deeper,  the  reply  uncovers 
the  nature  of  character  by  showing  that,  even  if  moral 
action  be  interrupted,  it  always  is  sinful  when  resumed, 
for  the  sinner  "sins  whenever  he  can ;"  and  even  the 
citadel  of  his  opponents  is  invaded  by  the  further  reply, 
that,  "if  a  man's  nature  is  such  that  he  will  sin  whenever 
he  can,  then  he  may  be  called  a  sinner,  even  though  he  do 
not  sometimes  act  it  out." 

Another  definition  of  sin  as  "a  preference  of  the  less  and 
lower  above  the  greater  and  higher  good,"  and  of  virtue  as 
"a  preference  of  the  greater  and  higher  above  the  less  and 
lower  good,"  and  still  another,  "a  preference  of  the  world, 
or  of  self  and  the  world,  above  God,"  bring  Park  to  the 
question  whether  sin  may  be  defined  as  consisting  in  selfish- 
ness, which  he  answers  in  the  negative. 

Such  are  Park's  definitions  of  sin.  As  he  defines  virtue 
as  consisting  in  love — love  to  God  supremely  and  to  our 
neighbor  as  ourself,  or,  more  abstractly,  love  to  being  ac- 
cording to  its  worth — so  he  sometimes  defines  sin  as  any 
choice  not  consisting  in  such  love  or  intended  to  carry  it 
into  execution.  And  it  is  in  this  sense  particularly  that  the 
force  of  his  doctrine  of  "depravity"  appears.  He  makes 
this  universal  (all  men  sin)  and  total  (none  of  the  moral 
acts  of  the  individual  sinner  are  virtuous  prior  to  regen- 
eration). In  a  woird,  only  the  regenerate  exercise  Christian 
love.    Stated  thus,  the  principle  seems  axiomatic. 

All  this  is  simply  the  common  result  of  the  New  Eng- 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


land  school.  So  far  as  it  is  speculative,  it  tarries  wholly  in 
the  region  of  the  appeal  to  consciousness  and  the  common- 
sense  of  mankind.  But  church  theology  raises  further  ques- 
tions, for  so  universal  and  so  deep  a  fact  as  sin  must  have 
an  adequate  reason.  Its  cause,  properly  speaking,  is  the 
will  of  the  sinner  himself  acting  efficiently  in  producing  it. 
But  wills  are  led  to  choices  by  motives.  Hence  the  question 
rises  as  to  the  motives  leading  to  universal  and  total  deprav- 
ity or  its  occasion.  Park  specifies  two  occasions — the  prox- 
imate and  the  remote.  Of  the  former  he  says :  ''Total  de- 
pravity may  be  referred  to  a  disordered  state  of  man's  con- 
stitution, existing  previously  to  man's  voluntary  moral  acts 
and  occasioning  their  uniform  sinfulness."  He  further  de- 
fines this  "disordered  state"  as  consisting  in  a  dispropor- 
tion in  his  sensibilities  and  moral  powers.  Since  universal 
sin  is  a  fact  of  man's  active  life,  the  cause  must  be  found  in 
his  nature,  and  this  cause  is  his  disorder.  He  is  not  fitted, 
in  the  actual  world  into  which  he  comes,  to  lead  a  perfectly 
holy  life.  This  disorder  of  nature  being  antecedent  to 
every  moral  act,  and  operative  from  the  beginning,  it  is 
necessary  to  conclude  that  man  begins  to  sin  as  early  as 
he  begins  any  moral  action.  Thus  he  never  passes  through 
a  period  of  holiness  before  beginning  to  sin.  But  Park 
carefully  avoids  various  unwarranted  extremes  into  which 
theologians  had  sometimes  fallen ;  such  as,  that  infants  begin 
to  sin  as  soon  as  they  are  born. 

We  are  thus  brought  to  the  doctrine  commonly  called 
"original  sin."  So  far  as  it  taught  the  corruption  of  human 
nature,  Park  thoroughly  accepted  it.  But  when  corruption 
was  denominated,  in  the  language  of  Westminster,  as  "truly 
and  properly  sin,"  he  recurred  to  his  definition  of  sin  as  con- 
sisting in  wrong  choice,  and  denied  the  name  sin  to  that 
v/hich  has  come  upon  man  without  his  own  voluntary 
action.    The  central  point  and  chief  interest  of  original  sin 


5o8         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


lay,  however,  in  its  connection  with  Adam.  Park  is  thus 
brought,  as  well  as  by  the  course  of  his  own  argument, 
to  the  connection  of  Adam's  sin  (the  fall)  and  our  general 
depravity.  He  answered  the  question  as  to  the  proximate 
occasion  of  total  depravity  by  saying  it  was  the  corruption 
of  man's  nature;  he  now  asks  the  occasion  of  that  corrup- 
tion, or  the  remote  occasion  of  depravity,  and  answers  it  by 
the  fall  of  man  in  Eden. 

The  fall  is  thus  defined :  *'That  sin  of  Adam  by  which 
it  was  rendered  certain  that  all  the  moral  agents  descended 
from  him  should  be  totally  depraved,  and  necessary  that  all 
the  members  of  the  race  (Christ  only  excepted)  should  suf- 
fer appropriate  evil."  The  proof  of  such  a  connection  be- 
tween Adam's  sin  and  ours  is  purely  biblical,  and  does  not 
differ  from  that  employed  by  all  other  Calvinistic  theo- 
logians. 

What,  now,  is  the  link  that  connects  Adam's  sin  and  the 
disorder  of  nature  in  all  his  discendants?  Edwards  had 
made  it  all  a  "divine  constitution,"  as  he  was  most  naturally 
led  to  do  by  his  idealistic  philosophy,  which  makes  all  con- 
nection of  things  a  connection  of  ideas,  and  teaches  that  all 
ideas  arise  in  us  immediately  by  the  operation  of  deity. 
It  is  remarkable  that  Park  adopted  the  same  view,  so  far  as 
he  adopted  any.  He  does  not  seem  to  have  relished  the 
speculations  into  which  some  of  his  predecessors  had  gone. 
He  follows  neither  the  divine  efficiency  of  Emmons,  nor 
the  theory  of  the  prior  preponderance  of  the  sensual  pro- 
posed by  Taylor  and  adopted  by  Finney.  As  at  many  other 
points,  he  maintained  great  reticence.  The  relation  was  es- 
tablished by  God.  Why  ?  We  do  not  know.  How  ?  Here 
he  is  equally  silent.  A  suggestion  at  one  point  that  heredity 
may  have  had  something  to  do  with  it,  is  the  only  hint 
pertinent  to  this  question.  Of  one  thing,  however,  Park  is 
certain — that  it  was  not  by  identification  with  Adam  in  his 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


509 


sin  (''sinning-  in  Adam"),  nor  by  imputation  of  Adam's 
sin  to  us.  We  are  better  off  today  under  the  larger  view 
of  heredity  given  us  by  evokitionary  studies.  We  now 
know  how  necessary  it  is,  in  accordance  with  the  very  prin- 
ciples which  have  brought  the  physical  and  even  the  mental 
nature  of  man  to  its  present  condition,  that,  when  sin  has 
once  occurred,  every  descendant  of  the  sinner  should  be  pro- 
foundly affected  by  it;  and  how  increasing  sinning  should 
enlarge  the  affected  area  of  the  soul;  how  individual  sins 
should  become  first  habitual,  then  automatic,  and  then 
hereditary;  so  that  there  should  be  finally  racial  tendencies 
to  evil  rendering,  by  the  balance  of  the  nature  thereby 
created  (''corruption"),  actual  sins  by  all  the  individuals 
of  the  race  certain. 

The  treatment  of  these  topics  lacks  a  certain  vigor  be- 
cause Park  could  never  persuade  himself  to  take  sides 
clearly  with  either  of  the  parties  to  the  old  dispute  between 
the  "exercise"  and  the  "taste"  schemes.  What  was  handed 
down  by  Adam  to  all  his  descendants?  A  nature.  Was  it 
sin  ?  No !  Was  it  sinful,  so  as  to  need  a  renewing  by  some 
divine  change  of  its  balance?  Park  was  inclined  to  say 
"Yes."  His  treatment  was  not  merely  agnostic,  where  ag- 
nosticism becomes  us;  it  was  hesitating  and  not  altogether 
consistent. 

The  defects  of  his  positions  in  these  portions  of  the  sys- 
tem are  nowhere  better  brought  out  than  in  his  treatment  of 
the  salvation  of  infants  dying  in  infancy.  He  should  have 
said,  in  consistency  with  his  fundamental  principle  that  sin 
consists  in  the  ^'voluntary  transgression  of  knozvn  law," 
that  infants  dying  before  the  age  of  moral  consciousness 
and  responsibility  have  not  sinned  and  do  not  need  saving 
in  the  sense  in  which  we  speak  of  saving  sinners.  Hence 
their  salvation  is  as  certain  as  that  of  angels  who  have  never 
sinned.    But  he  only  ventures  to  say  that  infants  may  sin 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


from  the  first  moment  of  their  birth,  and  probably  do  sin 
at  an  early  period.  They  need  regeneration  because  of  their 
participation  in  universal  human  corruption;  and  they  are 
saved  by  the  atonement. 

The  whole  impression  of  reason  and  of  the  Bible  is  that  infants 
begin  to  sin  very  early.  We  have  an  instinctive  hope  that  infants  are 
saved.  We  cannot  perhaps  prove  it.  The  true  remark  would  be :  I 
have  an  instinctive  hope  that  they  will  be  saved.  Yet  I  cannot  prove 
it,  and  am  willing  to  leave  them  in  the  hands  of  God. 

Yes !  so  must  we  all  be!  But,  ''shall  not  the  Judge  of  all 
the  earth  do  right?"  And  can  souls  that  have  not  sinned 
be  lost  ?  Certainly  Professor  Park  might  have  said  more  at 
this  point !    His  result  falls  far  below  the  truth. 

We  are  now  brought  to  the  subject  of  the  atonement,  in 
reference  to  which  Professor  Park  rendered,  perhaps,  his 
largest  service  to  theology.  We  have  traced  in  a  previous 
chapter  the  progress  of  those  modifications  in  the  doctrine 
of  the  atonement  in  New  England  which  had  brought  its 
theology  in  general  to  the  acceptance  of  several  positions: 
that  the  atonement  was  meant  for  all  men,  consisted  in  the 
sacrifice  of  the  God-man  by  himself  upon  Calvary;  that  his 
sufiferings,  while  not  satisfying  distributive  justice  or  pay- 
ing the  debt  of  the  sinner,  did  render  it  consistent  with 
the  interests  of  the  divine  government  for  God  to  forgive 
repentant  sinners;  that  the  divine  motive  and  regulating 
principle  in  all  this  was  love;  and  that  both  the  imputation 
of  our  sins  to  Christ  and  of  Christ's  righteousness  to  us 
were  artificial  elements,  which  should  be  excluded  from  the 
doctrine.  The  various  writers  on  the  subject  did  not,  how- 
ever, explicitly  go  back  to  the  beginning  of  the  theme  and 
take  their  start  from  a  new  principle,  although  they  had 
such  a  principle  in  the  theory  of  virtue  which  Edwards  had 
left  them,  but  were  led  by  the  particular  circumstances  of 
the  controversy  to  redefine  the  old  terms  and  preserve,  in 
general,  the  tone  and  method  of  the  older  theology.  At 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


many  a  point  the  influence  of  the  new  theory  appeared,  as 
when  general  justice  was  explicitly  defined  by  some  of  them 
as  benevolence.  But  they  still  employed  chiefly  the  anal- 
ogies of  earthly  governments  in  the  formulation  and 
defense  of  their  positions.  And  their  new  theory  received 
the  name  of  "the  governmental  theory." 

By  the  time  that  Park  appeared  upon  the  scene  the 
theory  of  virtue  was  much  better  understood.  Its  applica- 
tion to  the  character  of  God,  and  the  development  of  the 
system  of  Christian  duties  in  accordance  with  it,  had  given 
it  a  new  scope  and  importance.  Professor  Park  had  a 
larger  comprehension  of  its  meaning  and  of  the  range  of 
its  application  than  any  of  his  predecessors  had  had.  It 
might  have  been  a  question  of  great  interest,  when  he  first 
began  the  presentation  of  his  views  upon  the  atonement, 
what  he  would  do;  whether  he  would  reject  all  idea  of 
atonement  in  deference  to  the  supposed  requirements  of  the 
love  of  God  which  should  need  noi  propitiation;  whether 
he  would  develop  it  afresh  from  the  theory  of  virtue  as  a 
starting-point,  exhibiting  its  ideal  side  and  setting  it  free 
from  a  certain  bondage  to  mechanical  relations  in  which  it 
had  hitherto  been  confined;  or  whether  he  would  let  it 
stand  substantially  where  his  predecessors  had  left  it.  His 
historical  sense,  and  his  intense  admiration  of  his  predeces- 
sors and  loyalty  to  them,  finally  cast  the  scale  in  the  last 
direction.  He  continued  to  use  the  governmental  anal- 
ogies, which  were  rapidly  becoming  offensive  to  his  times; 
and  this  fact,  more  than  anything  else  perhaps,  prevented 
him  from  coming  to  an  understanding  with  the  greatest 
thinker  upon  the  atonement  among  his  contemporaries, 
Horace  Bushnell,  or  from  doing  much  to  prepare  for  the 
new  epoch  that  was  coming.  There  is  something  sad,  if 
not  tragic,  about  this,  for  Park  studied  every  new  writer 
upon  this  theme  diligently,  and  has  left  incorporated  in  his 


512  HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


lectures  what  he  considered  best  and  truest  among  their 
contributions  to  the  theory. 

As  always,  Park  began  with  definition.  The  atonement 
is  "that  sacrifice  of  the  God-man  which  is  substituted  for 
the  punishment  of  men,  and  which  therefore  forms  the  sole 
ground  on  which  God  is  justified  and  satisfied,  and  the 
chief  motive  by  which  he  is  influenced  and  by  which  he 
exerts  an  influence,  in  directly  blessing  men." 

The  definition  is  highly  technical.  By  "directly  blessing 
men"  is  meant  converting  and  saving  them.  The  "sole 
ground"  is  the  last  cause  on  which  God  directly  depends  for 
blessing  men.  The  term  "propitiation"  is  later  defined  in 
exactly  the  same  words  as  atonement,  except  that  the  words 
"and  by  which  he  exerts  an  influence"  are  omitted.  He 
hastens  in  this  connection  to  guard  against  the  idea  that 
God  antecedently  to  atonement  was  "too  angry  to  favor  sin- 
ners." 

God  is  made  propitious  by  the  sacrifice  of  Christ  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  made  consistent  and  justifiable  for  him  now  to  bestow  blessings 
which  it  was  not  antecedently  consistent  for  him  to  do.  Therefore  it 
is  figuratively  that  God  is  propitiated.  He  is  propitiated  in  the  sense 
that  the  atonement  is  a  new  motive  for  him  to  bestow  blessings  upon 
men.  Also  in  the  sense  that  he  changes  his  outward  conduct  just  as 
if  he  had  changed  his  moral  purpose. 

The  definitions  also  introduce  a  number  of  weighty  mod- 
ifications of  old  conceptions  of  the  atonement.  Park  em- 
ployed the  word  "satisfied"  in  his  principal  definition.  But 
satisfaction  v/as  not  the  rendering  of  the  strict  equivalent 
in  distributive  justice.  On  the  contrary,  he  defines  "satis- 
faction" as  "that  sacrifice  of  Christ  by  which  it  is  made  con- 
sistent with  God's  blessedness  that  he  waive  the  exercise  of 
distributive  justice."  What  he  meant  by  distributive  jus- 
tice has  been  fully  explained  on  a  former  page.  He  was 
thus  gradually  stripping  off  the  artificial  distinctions  which 
had  formerly  incumbered  the  theory.    He  completed  this 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


513 


process  by  his  rejection  of  the  appHcation  of  the  idea  of 
imputation  to  the  atonement.  Christ's  righteousness  could 
no  more  be  imputed  to  us  than  Adam's  sin.  In  both  cases 
the  law  holds  that  character  is  not  transferable,  since  it  is 
always  produced  by  the  individual  choice.  Something  is 
done  for  us  by  the  obedience  of  Christ,  so  that  we  receive 
the  benefits  of  his  death.  But  neither  that  obedience  nor 
any  other  is  imputed  to  us,  for  it  is  forever  his  obedience 
and  not  ours. 

One  other  element  which  needs  to  be  noted  before  we 
proceed  to  the  more  systematic  development  of  Park's  argu- 
ment is  the  largeness  of  outlook  given  by  his  conception  of 
the  atonement  as  having  relations  to  the  entire  universe. 
In  this  he  was  following  his  predecessors.  The  suffering 
of  Calvary  was  not  an  event  done  upon  a  small  planet  in 
one  corner  of  the  stellar  universe,  without  relation  to  other 
worlds  and  beyond  the  knowledge  of  other  intelligent 
beings.  Neither  did  it  provide  for  the  salvation  of  men 
alone  nor,  much  less,  for  the  salvation  of  some  limited  por- 
tion of  the  human  race  who  might  happen  to  hear  of  it. 
But  it  was  the  display,  once  for  all,  of  the  divine  character, 
and  it  formed  the  ground  of  all  forgiveness  which  should 
anywhere  take  place  throughout  all  space  and  time.  When 
God  has  once  made  himself  fully  known,  then  it  is  forever 
and  everywhere  consistent  with  his  "justice"  that  he  should 
be  the  "justifier  of  him  that  believeth." 

The  next  step  in  the  development  of  the  atonement  is  its 
analysis,  which  was  conducted  under  three  heads :  ( i )  the 
facts  which  are  involved  in  it;  (2)  the  facts  which  con- 
stitute it  what  it  is;  (3)  the  essential  relations  of  it. 

I.  We  have  seen  how  Park  guarded  against  the  idea 
that  God  was  an  angry  and  implacable  God  without  the 
atonement.  He  now  again  emphasizes  the  truth  by  placing 
at  the  very  head  of  facts  involved  in  the  atonement  the  fact 


514         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

(a)  that  the  atonement  has  its  origin  in  the  grace  of  the 
Father.  "God  sent  his  Son,"  "God  so  loved  the  world," 
"I  come  toi  do  thy  will,  O  God,"  are  the  texts  he  cites. 
Christ  is  not  more  amiable  than  the  Father,  and  it  is  in- 
felicitous and  injurious  tO'  give  any  such  impression. 

(b)  The  second  of  these  involved  facts  is  the  divinity 
of  Christ.  In  making  the  atonement  he  needs  perfectly  to 
represent  the  will  of  God;  which  is  possible  to  God  only. 
And  then,  all  those  expressions  which  represent  the  sacrifice 
of  God  in  making  the  atonement  require  the  Godhead  of 
him  who  was  thus  sacrificed.  The  reverse  of  this  idea  was 
also  in  Park's  thought;  for  if  the  one  great  work  of  atone- 
ment which  required  the  divinity  of  Christ  were  denied, 
there  would  remain  no  necessity  for  any  such  divinity. 
Like  Henry  B.  Smith,  he  adopted  the  thought  expressed  by 
the  phrase  "incarnation  unto  redemption."  Remove  the  re- 
demption, and  you  have  removed  the  occasion  for  the  in- 
carnation. In  this  view  of  the  essential  connection  of 
ideas,  both  these  men  showed  their  greatness.  It  is  not  a 
chance  phenomenon  of  earlier  times  that  the  denial  of  an 
objective  atonement  has  led  to  the  denial  of  the  divinity  of 
Christ :  the  tvv^o  doctrines  are  so  connected  by  the  internal 
necessities  of  thought  that  they  stand  in  any  system,  or  fall 
together. 

(c)  The  third  involved  fact  is  the  humanity  of  Christ. 
He  must  be  a  man  fully  and  genuinely  to  represent  man. 
We  see  here  the  influence  of  Macleod  Campbell  upon  Park's 
course  of  thought.  His  views  were  carefully  and  not  un- 
sympathetically  reviewed  in  the  Bibliotheca  Sacra  by  Pro- 
fessor Park  himself;  but,  long  before,  his  great  idea,  that 
the  atonement  was  the  confession  of  humanity,  had  been 
fully  incorporated  in  the  theory.  But  while  Campbell  had 
rejected  other  elements  in  favor  of  his  own  newer  light, 
Park,  with  his  characteristic  breadth,  did  not  reject  one 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


truth  because  he  had  found  another.  The  atonement  makes 
forgiveness  ''consistent,"  and  a  profound  confession  of  hu- 
manity's sin  by  the  God-man  adds  another  element  to  that 
consistency,  but  does  not  take  away  every  other. 

2.  Passing  now  to  the  facts  constituting  the  atonement, 
Park  mentions  (a)  the  sacrifice  of  the  God-man.  Sacrifice 
is  so  often  conceived  mechanically  that  Park's  understand- 
ing of  its  meaning  will  have  a  permanent  interest.   Says  he : 

A  sacrifice  is  a  confession  of  the  guilt  of  the  person  for  whom 
it  is  offered.  It  is  an  expressive  gesture,  a  symbol.  It  is  thus  an 
acknowledgment  of  the  rectitude  of  the  being  to  whom  it  is  offered. 
It  is  an  acknowledgment  that  the  sin  may  be  deservedly  punished  by 
the  being  to  whom  it  is  offered.  It  is  an  acknowledgment  that  the 
sin  must  be  followed  by  some  pain  of  the  person  by  whom  the  sacri- 
fice is  offered.  Thus  the  sacrifice  of  the  lamb  without  blemish  by  the 
ancient  Hebrews  was  not  merely  the  loss  of  so  much  property,  but  was 
a  crossing  of  the  affections.  It  is  also  a  prayer  for  the  person  in 
whose  behalf  the  sacrifice  is  offered.  It  a  public  avowal  of  the  offerer's 
intent  to  honor  the  being  to  whom  the  sacrifice  is  offered.  And,  finally, 
it  is  an  avowal  that  the  sufferings  of  one  being  are  substituted  for  the 
punishment  of  another.  The  sufferings  of  the  lamb  are  substituted  for 
the  punishment  of  the  Jew :  the  sufferings  of  the  Lamb  of  God  are 
substituted  for  the  punishment  of  the  world. 

{h)  The  second  fact  constituting  the  atonement  was  the 
death  of  Christ.  Park  conceived  this  in  a  large  way.  It 
was  not  the  mere  physical  sufferings  of  the  moment  of 
death  which  constituted  the  atonement,  but  all  Christ's  suf- 
ferings, both  physical  and  mental,  culminating  in  Calvary. 
Park  emphasized  also  the  "public  and  judicial  character 
of  his  sufferings and  here  he  introduced — to  the  con- 
fusion of  the  argument,  as  it  will  seem  to  most — the  attempt 
to  connect  the  human  government,  cruel  as  it  was  upon  the 
side  of  the  Jews,  weak  and  subservient  upon  the  side  of  the 
Romans,  with  the  divine  government,  so  that  the  act  of  the 
one  should  be  the  act  of  the  other.  "He  suffered  at  the 
hands  of  the  rulers  who  are  in  this  respect  symbolical  of 
the  power  of  God."    This  element,  it  is  true,  plays  no  es- 


5i6         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


sential  part  in  Park's  theory,  but  it  was  introduced,  appar- 
ently under  the  influence  of  the  word  "government"  itself. 
It  would  much  better  have  been  omitted. 

(c)  "The  atonement  consisted  in  the  sacrifice  of  the 
God-man  substituted  for  the  punishment  of  sinners."  The 
proof  of  the  substitution  is  derived  from  the  use  of  the 
word  avTi  in  Matt.  20:28  and  parallel,  from  the  word 
vTrep  which,  while  not  so  distinct,  "in  its  connections  de- 
notes substitution,"  and  from  the  other  great  cardinal  pas- 
sages of  the  New  Testament,  especially  those  which  dwell 
upon  the  voluntary  character  of  Christ's  death.  It  is  no- 
ticeable that  Isa.,  chap  53,  is  not  employed  in  this  argu- 
ment. 

3.  Park  now  passes  to  another  grand  division  of  the 
theme — to  the  essential  relations  of  the  atonement.  These 
are  relations  tO'  the  created  universe,  tO'  the  sinner,  and  to 
God.  He  embraces  them  under  the  general  word  "appeal." 
The  atonement  is  an  appeal  to  the  universe  for  God  the 
Father.  It  expresses  his  love  to  his  Son,  to  the  universe, 
to  the  race  of  men;  and  it  expresses  his  justice.  It  is  an 
appeal  for  the  God-man,  who  is  an  object  of  regard  to 
angels,  principalities,  and  powers.  It  is  an  appeal  for  the 
perfected  race,  since  "the  perfect  representative  man  ac- 
knowledges by  his  sacrifice  that  God  is  right  and  man  is 
wrong." 

"Appeal"  has  therefore  the  meaning  in  this  connection 
of  a  solemn  setting-forth  of  the  elements  of  the  case  and 
the  demand  for  a  proper  attitude  in  reference  to  it.  Park 
accordingly  goes  on  to  say  that  this  appeal  to  the  created 
universe  exhibits  and  honors  the  justice  and  holiness  of 
God  as  much  as  these  attributes  could  have  been  exhibited 
and  honored  by  the  punishment  of  sinners;  it  exposes  also 
the  vileness  of  sin  as  much  as  this  would  or  could  have  been 
exposed  by  the  unconditional  punishment  of  sinners.  We 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


begin,  therefore,  already  to  see  what  Park  has  not  yet 
stated,  that  the  atonement  is  intended  to  accomplish  in  one 
way  exactly  what  the  punishment  of  the  sinner  would 
accomplish  in  another  way. 

But  the  atonement  has  relation  to  the  sinner.  It  is  an 
appeal  to  the  sinner  to  repent  and  be  saved.  God  appeals : 
"Behold,  how  I  love  thee ;"  the  God-man  appeals :  "I  have 
come  to  suffer  for  thee;"  and  the  perfected  race  appeals, 
because  that  race  will  universally  desire  the  conversion  of 
every  sinner.  And  then  there  is  the  relation  of  the  atone- 
ment to  God.  It  takes  away  the  motive  for  punishing  the 
sinner,  since  the  end  of  punishment  has  been  perfectly 
gained;  and  it  presents  a  positive  motive  for  forgiveness. 
Park  is  aware  that  this  last  statement  will  meet  with  objec- 
tion. God  saves  men  to  promote  his  own  glory;  but  his 
greatest  glory  is  the  glory  of  his  grace,  and  the  atonement 
is  the  fundamental  act  of  his  grace.  And  then,  the  atone- 
ment is  God  in  Christ;  and  to  glorify  the  God-man  express- 
ing the  desire  of  salvation  is  to  glorify  God  himself. 

With  these  many  definitions  and  qualifications,  suggest- 
ing repeatedly  very  broad  conceptions  of  the  atonement. 
Professor  Park  has  now  come  to  the  "principle  upon  which 
the  atonement  operates."  By  this  he  means,  of  course,  the 
theory  of  the  atonement.  We  shall  give  the  statement  of 
this  principle  in  his  own  words,  but  it  is  our  purpose,  in 
the  further  explanation  of  the  theory  to  depart  now  from 
the  exact  reproduction  of  the  form  in  which  he  expresses 
his  thought  and  to  strip  it  of  the  governmental  analogies  by 
which  it  was  enveloped  and  possibly  obscured.  It  is  pos- 
sible that  thereby  the  suspicion  may  be  aroused  that  a  de- 
parture is  being  made  from  Park's  real  theology.  But  in 
fact  an  explicit  reference  might  be  given  for  every  statement 
that  is  to  be  made.    If  there  is  any  difference  from  Park's 


5i8         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

own  statements,  it  is  one  merely  of  form,  and  scarcely  of 
that. 

1.  First,  then,  for  the  formal  statement  of  the  prin- 
ciple.   It  is  this  : 

The  atonement  exhibits  and  honors  the  holiness,  distributive  jus- 
tice, and  law  of  God,  and  it  promotes  the  holiness  and  happiness  of  the 
universe,  so  as  to  make  the  conduct  of  God  in  forgiving  men  consist- 
ent with  the  honor  of  his  holiness,  distributive  justice,  and  law,  and  so 
as  to  satisfy  his  general  justice  in  rescuing  sinners  from  uncondi- 
tional punishment,  in  adopting  measures  for  inducing  them  to  repent, 
and  in  eternally  rewarding  them  if  they  do  repent. 

2.  Second,  for  a  running  account  of  this  theory : 

The  theory  of  the  atonement  begins  in  the  theory  of 
man.  Park  has  given  to  men  the  attribute  of  freedom, 
and,  whether  successfully  or  not,  has  labored  to  establish 
the  principle  that  all  influence  over  their  action,  whether 
on  the  part  of  their  fellow-men  or  of  God,  must  be  exerted 
by  means  of  motives.  We  may  speak  of  the  divine  ''gov- 
ernment;" or  we  may  call  God  "Father,"  and  seek  to  find 
the  principles  upon  which  he  exercises  his  fatherly  office  in 
seeking  and  saving  men;  but,  however  we  put  it,  men  are 
controlled  or  led  through  motives. 

As  to  these  motives.  Park  has  the  further  idea  which  ex- 
ercises, as  we  have  seen,  a  large  influence  at  various  points 
of  his  theology — the  idea  of  "system,"  law,  general 
methods;  the  same  idea,  in  fact,  which  appears  in  the  scien- 
tific emphasis  of  "natural  law."  God  is  not  restricted  to 
these  methods  so  that  he  cannot  follow  anything  else,  but 
he  proceeds  upon  great  general  principles  from  which  he 
does  not  depart  (as,  for  example,  to  perform  a  miracle) 
except  for  grave  reasons. 

God  has,  therefore,  established  a  system  of  moral  in- 
fluences designed  to  lead  men  to  salvation.  One  element  of 
this  system  is  the  law,  involving  threat  of  punishment, 
and  summarily  comprehended  in  the  verse :   "The  soul  that 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


519 


sinneth,  it  shall  die."  This  whole  system,  including  the 
law,  originates  in  the  love  of  God.  He  is  seeking  the  holi- 
ness of  man,  and  he  surrounds  him  with  all  appropriate 
influences  which  will  tend  to  promote  his  holiness,  exhibit- 
ing the  attractiveness  of  holiness  and  the  repulsiveness  and 
danger  of  sin.  All  this  is  alike  the  outworking  of  the  same 
love. 

But  if  love  originates  such  a  system,  then,  while  love 
prevails  in  the  councils  of  God,  the  system  must  be  main- 
tained. This  is  true  of  the  law.  It  was  fully  understood, 
its  meaning  carefully  weighed,  the  possible  results  which 
might  flow  from  its  promulgation  clearly  foreseen,  before 
it  was  ever  proclaimed.  When  man  has  sinned,  if  he  is  to 
be  saved,  the  penalty  of  the  law  must  be  waived,  for  to  ex- 
ecute it  would  be  to  destroy  the  race;  but,  if  it  is  waived, 
it  must  be  so  waived  that  the  system  of  moral  influences  de- 
signed for  man's  good  shall  remain  unimpaired.  If  man  is 
not  punished,  then  all  that  punishment  would  effect  in  the 
way  of  moral  influence  upon  man  must  still  be  effected. 
His  forgiveness  must  be  made  consistent  with  the  main- 
tenance of  the  moral  system,  with  the  undiminished  total 
of  moral  influences  tending  to  promote  holiness  and  deter 
from  vice,  or  else  he  cannot  be  forgiven :  love  forbids  it. 

It  will  be  noted  that  this  view  of  the  case  exalts  the  posi- 
tive character  of  the  law.  God  might  have  written  his 
moral  law  in  the  nature  of  men  as  he  has  natural  law  upon 
the  phenomena  of  nature,  and  left  man  to  find  it  out  in  the 
same  way.  But  that  would  have  meant  the  destruction  of 
men.  He  therefore  adopted  the  method  of  revelation,  of  the 
communication  of  his  law  through  chosen  agents  tO'  men.  He 
has  declared  his  law  and  announced  the  penalty;  and  now 
he  comes,  and,  with  equally  distinct  objective  declaration, 
he  sets  forth  his  Son  as  the  sacrifice  for  sin,  saying  ex- 
plicity  that  his  sufferings  are  substituted  for  the  punish- 


520         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


ment  of  all  who  will  accept  of  his  salvation  by  believing  on 
him.  Park  did  not  suppose  this  declaration  a  matter  of 
necessity  in  the  nature  of  things.  If  his  Son  had  come  and 
quietly  endured  the  sufferings  which  actually  came  to  him 
without  any  explanation,  the  mere  fact  that  God  so  hated 
sin,  and  had  so  involved  all  beings  in  its  consequences  that 
not  even  his  own  Son  could  come  into  the  world,  sinless 
though  he  was,  without  suffering,  would  declare  his  right- 
eousness and  the  seriousness  of  the  threat  of  the  law,  and 
thus  maintain  its  honor.  But  this  is  not  God's  method,  be- 
cause we  are  under  a  system  of  grace.  God  has  declared 
what  Christ  does  by  his  death.  He  takes  the  place  of  sin- 
ners before  the  law. 

What,  when  thus  viewed,  does  the  suffering  of  Christ 
effect?  Precisely  that,  all  that,  and  even  more  than,  the 
punishment  of  guilty  but  repentant  men  could  effect. 

To  understand  this  reply,  we  need  to  ask  what,  in  Park's 
thought,  the  punishment  of  men  was  designed  to  effect.  It 
must  be  designed  to  effect  something  good,  for  else  it  could 
not  be  inflicted.  Punishment,  like  every  other  act  of  God, 
must  be  performed  under  the  influence  of  love,  or  else  his 
act  in  this  case  is  not  holy.  To  ask  what  punishment  effects 
is  therefore  to  ask  what  good  it  effects.  Does  it  do  any  good 
to  the  sinner?  Park's  answer  is,  "No."  He  thus  rejects 
the  idea  of  the  reformatory  design  of  punishment.  When 
man  is  finally  adjudged  guilty  before  the  bar  of  God,  the 
time  for  benefiting  him  through  painful  discipline  is  past. 
Such  discipline  is  properly  called  chastisement,  not  punish- 
ment. Punishment,  when  it  is  inflicted,  is  to  the  sinner 
nothing  but  an  unmitigated  evil.  Still  it  must  do  some 
good  somewhere;  and  this  must  be  among  the  innumerable 
intelligent  spirits,  men  and  angels,  who  may  hear  of  this 
punishment.  With  them  it  will  effect  two  principal  things : 
it  will  vindicate  the  character  of  God  as  having  no  pleasure 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


521 


in  sin,  but  as  eternally  opposed  to  it;  and  it  will  powerfully 
deter  them  from  sin,  since  it  exhibits  sin's  true  nature  in 
the  awful  consequences  which  ultimately  follow  upon  its 
commission. 

All  this,  and  more,  the  sufferings  of  Christ  upon  Cal- 
vary effect.  They  (a)  vindicate  the  holy  character  of  God. 
Did  he  really  express  his  holy  attitude  and  the  profound 
truth  of  things  when  he  promulgated  the  terrible  threat  of 
the  law?  Does  he  unspeakably  hate  sin?  When  he  for- 
gives it,  is  there  no  trace  of  carelessness  in  him,  no  com- 
plicity of  heart  with  it,  no  relaxation  of  his  moral  earnest- 
ness, no  giving  oi  the  lie  to^  the  solemn  implications  of  the 
threat  of  death  to  the  sinner?  All  these  questions  might 
be  raised,  if  God  forgave  sin  without  an  atonement. 

What  would  it  be  to  have  such  questions  raised?  Take 
the  repentant  sinner  himself,  what  would  it  be  to  him?  It 
would  destroy  his  repentance;  for  why  should  he  repent  of 
that  about  which  God  cared  so  little?  It  would  destroy  his 
God;  for  he  would  find  himself  upon  a  higher  level  in  re- 
penting than  that  occupied  by  God  in  forgiving  and  thus 
reversing  the  law  wi  hout  a  g'.ven  reason,  since  he  would  ex- 
hibit a  greater  sense  of  the  meaning  of  sin.  What  would 
it  be  to  angels  but  to  teach  them  that  they  might  indulge  in 
the  pleasures  of  sin,  if  they  seemed  attractive,  without  much 
hesitation,  since  God  thought  far  less  of  it  than  his  law 
seemed  to  indicate,  and  the  danger  of  transgression  was 
small  ? 

But  the  atonement  forever  shuts  off  such  questions.  God 
waives  the  punishment  of  the  repentant  sinner,  but  he  does 
it  for  a  great  reason.  His  own  dearly  beloved  Son  comes 
and  takes  upon  himself  the  suffering  of  the  cross.  This  is 
the  suffering  of  God.  Man  was  to  suffer  to  express  the 
infinite  ill-desert  of  sin,  but  now  God  suffers  to  bear  testi- 
mony to  the  same  thing.    If  man  suffered,  the  suspicion 


522 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


might  possibly  arise  in  some  mind  that  the  suffering  was 
inflicted  in  a  mechanical  manner  or  a  routine  spirit,  and 
did  not  mean  so  much  after  all.  But  when  God  suffers, 
no  such  suspicion  can  arise.  God  is  intensely  opposed  to 
sin,  his  law  expresses  the  ultimate  relations  of  things  and 
his  own  most  unchangeable  attitude  toward  all  sin,  if,  in 
order  to  waive  the  punishment  of  the  law  and  relieve  man 
from  eternal  suffering,  God  himself  must  first  suffer.  Such 
is  the  unavoidable  impression  of  the  beholder,  be  he  angel 
or  man. 

But  (b)  the  sufferings  of  Christ  deter  all  intelligent  be- 
holders from  the  commission  of  sin  as  effectually  as,  and 
even  more  effectually  than,  the  punishment  of  guilty  men 
could.  One  might  suspect  that  God  had  grown  indifferent 
to  men,  and  punished  them  without  deep  feeling;  but  no  one 
can  suspect  this  when  he  "sends  his  only-begotten  Son." 
The  threat  of  the  law  remains  in  all  its  terror.  If  God 
makes  exception  to  its  execution  in  the  case  of  those  who 
repent,  what  will  he  do  to  those  who  rush  forward  con- 
sciously into  sin,  are  thus  from  the  beginning  unrepentant, 
and  have  no  sort  of  warrant  in  themselves  that  they  ever 
will  repent?  And  to  those  souls  to  whom  the  thought  of 
the  vileness  of  sin  is  a  greater  deterrent  than  the  thought 
of  the  danger  involved,  how  much  clearer  is  its  essential 
odiousness  in  the  sight  of  God,  and  of  all  holy  beings  like 
the  Son,  when  God  will  not  pass  it  over  without  so  great  a 
reason  as  the  sacrifice  of  his  Son,  and  that  Son  voluntarily 
takes  the  cross  that  sin  may  be  condemned  in  the  act  of  its 
forgiveness ! 

Thus,  when  Christ  has  suffered,  the  object  of  punishment 
in  the  case  of  the  repentant  man  has  been  secured,  and  it  is 
now  consistent  with  God's  honor  and  the  honor  of  his  law, 
and  with  the  interests  of  all  holy  beings  everywhere,  that  he 
should  be  forgiven.    And,  since  he  is  now,  by  repentance 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


523 


and  faith,  brought  into  harmony  with  God,  the  love  of  God 
positively  prompts  him  to  receive  into  his  fellowship  one 
who  is  now  fit  for  it.  Thus  love  in  all  its  aspects  is  fulfilled 
by  the  forgiveness  of  the  sinner. 

This  is  the  form  of  the  theory  resulting  from  the  intro- 
duction of  positive  law  into  the  universe.  Dropping  this 
fact  now  from  view,  the  atonement  may  be  considered,  in 
conformity  to  that  ultimate  principle  already  enunciated,  as 
the  means  by  which,  when  sin  has  once  entered  the  world, 
man  may  be  saved  and  still  the  "system  of  moral  influences" 
originally  inaugurated  be  preserved.  Those  moral  in- 
fluences are  exerted  substantially  through  the  combined 
faculties  of  the  intellect  and  the  conscience.  In  the  voice 
of  conscience  and  in  the  teachings  of  history  as  interpreted 
by  the  faculty  of  the  reason  lie  the  great  natural  influences 
which  are  designed  to  restrain  men  from  sin  and  lead  them 
to  holiness.  If  man  repents  of  his  sin,  however  blindly  he 
may  grope  for  the  truth,  and  however  little  he  may  know  of 
himself  or  of  God,  he  is  received  by  the  forgiving  act  of 
God  into  the  divine  fellowship.  It  might  be  that,  in  a  lim- 
ited sense  and  for  a  time,  a  man  ignorant  of  the  atonement 
might  find  holy  influences  impaired  by  the  very  freeness  of 
the  divine  approach  to  his  soul.  But  the  ultimate  revelation 
of  the  atoning  death  which  Heaven  will  make,  the  fact  of 
the  cost  of  sin,  and  hence  the  cost  of  forgiveness,  to  God,  as 
shown  in  the  sufferings  of  the  Son  of  God,  would  so  rein- 
force the  voice  of  conscience  and  the  lessons  of  history  that 
the  soul  would  ultimately  rest  in  the  eternal  meaning  and 
validity  of  its  earliest  impressions  of  righteousness.  And 
thus  God's  intent  in  surrounding  it  and  filling  it  with  such 
moral  influences  in  favor  of  righteousness  would  be  both 
justified  and  maintained. 

Into  the  remaining  portions  of  Park's  treatment  of  the 
atonement  it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  enter.    Enough  to 


524         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

say  that  he  thoroughly  discussed,  along  lines  which  will  be 
easily  surmised  by  the  trained  reader,  the  old  theories  which 
the  New  England  speculations  were  intended  to  replace. 
He  then  passed  to  the  "fact"  of  the  atonement,  which  he 
elaborately  proved  from  the  Scriptures.  He  derived  its 
"relative  necessity"  from  the  principles  we  have  already 
passed  in  review.  And  he  taught  that  it  was  "general" — 
that  is,  made  the  salvation  of  all  men  possible.  It  is  easy 
to  see  that  if  the  atonement  makes  it  "consistent"  for  God 
to  forgive  one  sinner,  it  makes  it  equally  consistent  for  him 
to  forgive  all.  In  these  discussions  Park  displays  all  his 
characteristic  acuteness  and  profundity. 

For  a  time  the  theory  of  the  New  England  theologians 
which  Park  presented  received  a  very  large  acceptance 
among  Congregationalists.  It  became  the  working  theory 
of  the  great  majority  of  practical  ministers.  But  the  origi- 
nal minds  which  were  pressing  on  to  new  views  of  truth 
and  felt  most  fully  the  influences  of  the  new  forms  of 
thought  which  from  time  to  time  appeared,  did  not  accept 
it.  They  did  not  even  become  acquainted  with  it.  This 
was  undoubtedly  the  effect  of  Park's  error  in  following  too 
loyally  the  modes  of  presentation  of  his  great  predecessors, 
as  has  already  been  suggested.  It  is  quite  possible  that 
more  attention  may  be  paid  to  him  in  the  near  future,  and 
that  the  main  results  of  his  studies  may,  under  the  interpre- 
tation of  some  appreciative  student  who  possesses  the  neces- 
sary familiarity  and  sympathy  with  later  speculations,  sup- 
ply the  necessary  corrective  to  tooi  exclusively  subjective 
theories.  Almost  all  those  who  have  recently  gained 
the  ear  of  the  theological  pubhc  have,  more  or  less 
clearly,  explicitly  acknowledged  the  necessity  of  just  that 
element  which  Park  placed  at  the  center  of  his  theory,  that 
men  "must  be  made  to  feel,  in  the  very  article  of  forgive- 
ness, when  it  is  offered,  the  essential  and  eternal  sanctity  of 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


525 


God's  law."  These  are  the  words,  not  of  Park,  but  of  Bush- 
nell,  who  was  prevented  from  giving  his  adhesion  to  the 
New  England  theory  by  confounding  it  with  the  older  Cal- 
vinism, as  I  have  elsewhere  shown.^  William  N.  Clarke, 
who  has  removed  most  of  the  objective  elements  from  Chris- 
tian theology  in  favor  of  the  subjective,  lays  great  stress 
upon  the  manifestation  of  God's  righteousness  in  connection 
with  :'orgi\eness.  He  says  mat  Christ  does  not  satisfy  law 
or  punitive  justice,  but  he  has  in  mind  here  the  elder  ideas 
of  satisfaction  which  Park  also  rejects.  He  speaks  of  the 
"gladly  endured  pain  of  saving  love,"  and  adds  that  it  "is 
a  substitute  for  punishment  which  God  is  offering." 
Again:  "Whatever  exhibits  God's  righteousness,  or  right- 
ness  of  character  and  conduct  respecting  sin,  has  the  char- 
acter of  a  propitiation."  He  thus  approaches  very  near  to 
Park. 

One  would  suppose  that  in  entering  upon  the  topic  of 
regeneration,  where  so  much  of  Dr.  N.  W.  Taylor's  strength 
had  been  spent.  Park  would  take  the  same  position  toward 
his  labors  as  he  had  done  in  the  discussion  of  the  prevention 
of  sin.  But  this  was  not  so.  On  the  one  hand,  he  fol- 
lowed Taylor  in  the  most  important  part  of  his  labors:  he 
rejected,  as  Taylor  did,  Burton's  change  in  the  taste,  lead- 
ing by  necessity  to  a  change  in  the  sensibilities;  he  re- 
jected also  Emmons'  immediate  creation  of  holy  exercises; 
he  adopted  the  doctrine  that  the  means  of  regeneration  is 
the  truth;  and  he  insisted  that,  whatever  preparation  for 
regeneration  there  might  be  and  however  long  this  might 
last,  regeneration,  as  the  last  final  presentation  of  truth  by 
the  Holy  Spirit  and  the  consequent  yielding  of  the  soul  to 
it  in  conversion,  was  all  one  indivisible  and  instantaneous 
event.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  he  manifested  no  interest 
in  Taylor's  eagerness  to  establish  the  existence  in  the  soul 

*  See  above,  pp.  416  ff. 


526         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


of  a  neutral  point  to  which  the  truth  could  appeal;  he  did 
not  discuss  the  whole  philosophy  of  the  "selfish  principle" 
and  its  "suspension,"  nor  adopt  any  of  the  phraseology  by 
which  Taylor  hoped  permanently  to  advance  the  theme.  In 
fact,  while  he  emphasized  for  the  practical  work  of  the  pul- 
pit the  freedom  of  man,  and  thus  followed  Taylor,  in  his 
theory  he  reacted  fully  to  the  Edwardean  doctrine  of  the 
will.  He  did  not  feel  the  need  of  Taylor's  neutral  point 
because,  whether  there  was  a  neutral  point  or  not,  motives 
could  be  presented  to  the  will  in  such  a  way  that  holiness 
would  appear  the  greatest  good  and  would  be  chosen. 
Thus,  while  preserving  the  most  important  of  Taylor's  re- 
sults in  his  system,  he  was  prevented  from  unreservedly 
placing  himself  in  the  position  which  he  really  occupied 
with  reference  to^  this  great  teacher  by  his  remaining 
amount  of  adhesion,  real  and  imagined,  to  Edwards. 

His  definition  was  careful.  Regeneration  is  "the  change 
from  a  state  of  entire  sinfulness  to  a  state  of  some  degree 
of  holiness."  As  such,  it  was  "the  first  change,"  differing 
from  all  other,  subsequent  changes,  such  as  the  repentance 
by  which  a  Christian  who  has  fallen  into  sin  comes  back 
to  his  duty,  both  in  its  origin  and  in  the  fact  that  it  is  of  a 
fundamental  character.  It  is  also  viewed  by  Park  as  the 
whole  of  the  complex  change  from  sin  to  holiness,  and  not 
merely,  as  some  say,  the  divine  side  of  the  change.  Regen- 
eration thus  embraces  two  elements,  divine  and  human ;  but 
they  are  not  so  separated  by  Park  as  to  assign  them  two 
separate  terms,  regeneration  and  conversion.  Such  a  dis- 
tinction had  its  advantages,  but  upon  the  whole  Park  pre- 
ferred merely  to  say  that  "conversion  was  the  most 
important  part  of  comprehensive  regeneration." 

Analyzing  it  more  particularly,  regeneration  involves  a 
change  of  the  primary,  predominant  choice.  It  may  be 
questioned  whether  there  is  any  such  fixed  and  conscious 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


527 


choice  before  regeneration,  but  after  it  there  is  such  a  choice, 
which  is  recognized  by  the  Christian  as  determinative  of 
his  whole  Hfe.  It  has  "stopped  the  old  habit  of  uninter- 
rupted sin"  and  has  ''introduced  the  new  habit  of  holiness." 
"It  is  not  merely  a  holy  choice,  but  the  first  one  of  a  series ; 
and  not  merely  that,  but  an  influential  choice  which  stands 
so  related  to  the  former  and  subsequent  states  of  the  moral 
agent  that  it  breaks  up  the  continuity  of  the  sinful  habit 
and  introduces  a  new  habit."  It  also  involves  a  change  in 
the  sensibilities  and  a  change  in  the  intellect,  such  that,  in 
the  order  of  nature,  the  change  in  these  precedes  that  in  the 
will;  but  in  the  order  of  time  there  is  no  priority  of  either 
over  the  other,  for,  as  a  whole,  regeneration  is  instantane- 
ous. 

These  preliminary  and  explanatory  considerations  are 
no  sooner  completed  than  the  fact  becomes  clear  that  the 
treatment  of  the  subject  is  to  be  determined  by  the  phi- 
losophy of  revivals  which  had  grown  up  in  the  revival  at- 
mosphere of  New  England  in  the  early  half  of  the  last  cen- 
tury. Professor  Park  had  himself  been  a  revival  preacher, 
and  drew  to  the  last  some  of  his  most  illuminating  illustra- 
tions from  his  experience  with  his  parishioners  in  Brain- 
tree  in  revival  times.  The  two  perpetual  tendencies  of  his 
system  join  here  again  in  conflict :  the  Calvinistic  tendency, 
to  exalt  God,  which  is  brought  out  in  his  doctrine  that  God 
is  "the  sole  author"  of  regeneration;  and  the  practical  in- 
terest of  the  pastor  to  clear  away  obstacles  and  stimulate 
activity  on  the  part  of  sinners  and  so  eventually  to  elicit  the 
act  of  conversion.  These  chapters  contain,  therefore,  a 
philosophy  of  revivals. 

Thus,  in  the  very  "analysis,"  with  the  main  points  of 
which  we  were  just  now  busy,  he  guards  against  the  idea 
that  the  advocated  "change  in  the  intellectual  view"  of  the 
man  should  necessarily  involve  new  knowledge;  for  then 


528         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


the  unrepentant  man  would  not  be  responsible  for  not  hav- 
ing yielded  to  knowledge  which  he  did  not  have.  It  may 
be  merely  a  new  vividness  of  the  old  ideas.  The  emphasis 
placed  by  the  very  term  "regeneration"  upon  the  agency 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  not  to  lead  to  inactivity,  for  man  is  not 
responsible  in  any  way  for  what  God  does;  but  he  is  re- 
sponsible for  repenting.  This  he  can  do,  this  he  ought  to 
do,  and  this  he  is  to  be  exhorted  to  do  immediately.  This 
is  the  fulness  of  man's  liberty. 

The  means  of  regeneration  is  the  truth.  By  this  Park 
does  not  mean  the  Bible,  but  any  truth;  it  may  be  simply 
the  truth  of  conscience.  "God  may  regenerate  little  chil- 
dren by  the  truth  which  their  own  consciences  give  to  them. 
God  may  regenerate  heathen  by  the  truth  which  their  con- 
sciences and  the  volume  of  nature  give  them."  We  are 
thus  incidentally  brought  to  the  fact  that  he  followed  the 
tendency  of  our  theologians  to  emphasize  the  freedom  of 
the  working  of  the  Spirit  of  God  among  all  men,  and  the 
consequent  possibility  of  the  salvation  of  the  heathen.  He 
reduced  the  condition  of  salvation  to  its  ultimate  ethical  ele- 
ment, the  act  of  the  will  in  view  of  truth.  If  a  man  knew  of 
Christ,  he  must  believe  in  Christ,  but  the  essential  element 
of  this  faith  was  the  "affectionate  reliance'  on  the  atone- 
ment of  Christ.  This  reliance  was  choice,  and  this  choice, 
when  reduced  to  its  elements,  was  Edwardean  love.  "There 
is  no  holiness  in  religious  faith  or  Christian  faith  unless 
there  be  love  to  being  in  general."  Let  any  man  anywhere 
submit  to  the  truth,  more  or  less  ample,  which  he  under- 
stands; let  him  exercise  a  disinterested  love  toward  such 
being,  and  such  a  God  as  he  knows  about,  or  thinks  he 
knows  about;  and  that  man  is  right,  because  his  will  is 
right,  and  will  receive  the  forgiving  grace  of  God.  This 
position,  which  was  later  designated  as  the  holding  of  salva- 
tion by  the  essential  Christ,  rather  than  by  the  historical 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


529 


Christ,  was  not  the  result  of  the  rationalizing  tendency  of 
our  theology,  but  was  believed  to  be  an  interpretation  of 
Scripture;  for  example,  of  such  passages  as  Rom.  2  :  14,  15 ; 
4:4. 

'  And  now,  with  his  usual  breadth,  Park  refuses  to  limit 
regeneration  to  any  one  fixed  scheme.  Some  revivalists 
were  always  attempting,  as  some  do  still,  to  produce  a  single 
type  of  experience,  their  favorite  type,  which  they  under- 
stood most  fully  and  could  guide  most  easily  to  the  best  final 
result.  Thus,  while  the  "antecedents  of  regeneration"  were 
defined  as  "increased  thoughtfulness,  fear  and  alarm,  con- 
viction of  sin,  endeavor  to  secure  the  favor  of  God,  despair 
of  securing  this  by  works,"  he  said  most  explicitly  that  "we 
must  not  insist  upon  these  antecedents  in  the  order  specified 
above,  nor  in  any  uniform  degree,  nor  must  we  insist  upon 
them  at  all  as  the  ultimate  or  chief  aim  of  the  sinner,  nor  re- 
gard them  as  conditions  which  ensure  regeneration."  Ex- 
perience varies  as  the  individuals  which  undergo  it  vary. 
There  is  one,  and  one  only,  condition  of  salvation,  and  that 
is  repentance  and  faith.  We  are  to  insist  upon  this  one 
thing  only,  and  to  admire  the  ways  of  God  in  what  he 
otherwise  gives  and  does. 

And  now  there  enters  again,  and  for  the  last  time  in  this 
review,  that  strange  hesitation  upon  Park's  part  between 
freedom  and  determinism  which  characterizes  his  treatment 
of  the  will,  to  modify  his  treatment  of  regeneration.  He  is 
about  to  prove  that  God  is  the  author  of  regeneration.  By 
author,  in  this  connection,  he  means  the  one  who  plans  for  a 
certain  end,  chooses  it,  adopts  the  means  to  bring  it  about, 
and  actually  employs  these.  God  is  the  only  one  that  thus 
has  regeneration  in  mind,  and  thus  effects  it,  and  hence  he 
is  its  only  author.  Park  might  have  advanced  here  upon 
the  straight  road  that  lies  before  the  determinist.  He  would 
then  have  said:  God  acts  upon  the  sensibilities  and  the  in- 


530         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


tellect  directly  and  indirectly,  and  also  sets  in  action  trains 
of  motives  operating  upon  the  will,  and  thus  determines 
the  whole  man  to  the  new  act  of  repentance.  God  would 
thus  have  been  made  the  author  of  conversion.  But  of  this, 
because  it  is  the  act  of  the  will,  God  could  not  be  the  author 
without  becoming  also  the  author  of  every  other  act  of  the 
will,  and  thus  of  sin.  Hence  man  must  be  made  the  sole 
author  of  conversion,  and  God's  authorship  of  regeneration 
must  be  proved  by  a  method  which  shall  leave  out  this  ele- 
ment. But  there  is  enough  place,  in  the  composite  thing 
which  regeneration  had  been  defined  to  be,  in  the  change  of 
the  intellect  and  the  sensibility,  for  the  action  of  God;  and 
here  it  can  be  said  to  be  a  special,  supernatural  (in  distinc- 
tion from  miraculous)  exercise  of  his  almighty  power. 
Thus  Park  was  landed  in  the  strange  position  that  God  was 
the  sole  author  of  the  whole  comprehensive  change  called 
regeneration,  while  man  was  the  equally  sole  author  of  the 
act  of  conversion,  which  is  the  central  and  vital  thing  about 
it  all.  He  could  have  made  a  better  distinction,  and  one 
which  would  have  better  conveyed,  I  am  persuaded,  his  real 
thought,  if  he  had  asked  the  question :  Who  is  the  author  of 
conversion?  and  had  answered  this  question  by  saying  that 
both  God  and  man  are  its  authors — God  in  the  sphere  of 
influence,  as  the  source  of  that  series  of  influences  which  in 
their  combined  working  lead  ultimately  to  repentance,  so 
that  without  them  the  man  never  does  repent;  man  in  the 
sphere  of  pozver,  because  the  final  action  which  constitutes 
conversion,  the  choice,  is  entirely  his,  as  the  work  of  his  free 
sovereignty. 

Into  the  further  definitions  and  distinctions  of  this  sub- 
ject v/e  do  not  need  here  to  enter,  for  it  will  be  readily  un- 
derstood that  Park  would  teach  that  the  soul  is  both  active 
and  passive  in  regeneration,  and  that  regeneration,  while 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


theoretically  resistible,  is  practically  unresisted.  We  pass, 
therefore,  at  once  tO'  the  subject  of  sanctification. 

This,  according  to  Park,  is  the  gradual  development  of 
holiness  in  the  Christian  under  the  guidance  and  by  the 
agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  question  is  immediately 
suggested :  What  is  holiness  ?  And  to  the  answer  of  this  he 
turns  first.  One  would  think  that  it  had  already  been 
abundantly  answered  in  the  discussions  upon  virtue  which 
have  been  earlier  reviewed.  But  Park  now  goes  into  the 
matter  afresh,  partly  because  he  is  considering  it  upon  its 
human  side,  and  partly  because,  since  this  is  the  place  for 
the  entrance  of  "ethics"  into  the  system,  it  is  the  place  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  divergent  theories  of 
morals,  such  as  the  utilitarian. 

Virtue  is  therefore  defined  afresh,  and  this  time  as  fol- 
lows: "the  preference  of  the  greater  and  higher  sentient 
being,  on  the  ground  of  its  value,  above  the  less  and  lower 
sentient  being."  The  definition  does  not  differ  in  meaning 
from  those  already  given,  and  we  need  spend  no  time  now 
in  elucidating  that  meaning. 

The  discussion  of  Utilitarianism  is  introduced  under  the 
head  of  an  objection  to  Park's  own  theory,  that  it  is  in  es- 
sence the  utilitarian  theory.   The  utilitarian  theory,  he  says, 

pronounces  happiness  and  the  means  to  happiness,  the  chief  good 
and  only  good.  This  theory,  on  the  contrary,  makes  happiness 
the  lower  good  and  holiness  the  higher.  The  utilitarian  theory  teaches 
that  we  have  no  idea  of  right  apart  from  the  tendency  of  an  act  to 
happiness.  This  theory  asserts  that  right  is  a  distinct  idea.  The  util- 
itarian theory  teaches  that  a  thing  is  right  because  of  its  tendency, 
and  hence  that  the  love  of  the  general  happiness  would  be  wrong  if 
it  did  not  promote  the  general  happiness.  This  theory  is  that  a  thing 
has  its  tendency  to  happiness  because  it  is  right,  and  that  right  would 
be  right  whatever  its  tendency  might  be.  In  fact,  there  is  a  universally 
acknowledged  distinction  between  the  right  and  the  useful. 

Neither  is  a  thing  right  because  it  is  agreeable  to  the  will 
of  God.    Benevolence,  for  example,  is  agreeable  to  the  will 


532 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


of  God,  but  it  would  be  right  and  possess  the  attribute  of 
imperative  obh'gation  if  it  were  not  agreeable  to  the  will  of 
God.  Nor  is  right  right  because  it  is  agreeable  to  the  fitness 
of  things.  In  opposition  to  all  such  theories  Park  taught 
that 

right  is  a  simple  term,  which  can  only  be  defined  by  reference  to 
the  occasions  when  the  idea  arises  in  the  mind.  Rightness,  virtuous- 
ness,  is  that  quality  of  an  act  which  conscience  approves,  obligates 
us  to  practice,  and  feels  complacence  in ;  and  which  has  a  desert  of 
reward.  In  other  words,  right  is  the  correlate  of  conscience  which 
perceives  the  right  immediately  and  affirms  our  obligation  to  per- 
form it. 

And,  again:  "benevolence  is  right  in  itself,  eternally  and 
immutably.  It  is  right  because  it  is  right."  Park  some- 
times called  himself,  in  distinction  from  Utilitarians,  a 
Rightarian. 

Sanctification  is  the  production  of  this  holiness  more  and 
more  in  the  heart  and  life  of  the  Christian.  The  agent  of 
sanctification  is  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  means  is  the  truth.  It 
differs  in  no  essential  respect  in  its  nature  from  regenera- 
tion, except  that  that  is  the  introduction  of  the  holy  life,  and 
is  a  fundamental  reversal  of  what  has  gone  before,  while 
this  is  the  consistent  development  of  what  is  already  begun, 
and  the  strengthening  and  deepening  of  holy  habits,  or  dis- 
tinct holy  choices,  in  accordance  with,  and  in  consequence  of, 
that  first  "primary,  predominant"  choice.  We  need,  there- 
fore, spend  no  more  time  upon  this  topic.  Of  course,  the 
great  historical  controversies  into  which  American  theology 
had  fallen  over  these  themes  were  sketched  and  illuminated ; 
Oberlin  had  its  share  of  attention,  with  sharp  criticism  of 
certain  points,  but  in  the  most  kindly  spirit ;  but  Park  came 
out  in  nothing  peculiar  or  calling  for  especial  attention 
today. 

Of  justification  it  is  also  unnecessary  to  add  more  than 
that  he  made  it  synonymous  with  forgiveness,  stripping  it 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


533 


of  the  forensic  elements  of  the  older  Calvinism ;  and  that  he 
grounded  it  wholly  in  the  atonement  of  Christ. 

We  close  our  review  of  Park's  system  with  an  account 
of  his  eschatology.  He  brought  the  New  England  answer 
to  the  Universalists,  which  had  occupied  the  school  from  the 
very  beginning,  to  its  conclusion,  and  thus  completed  the 
New  England  attempt  to  render  a  service  at  this  important 
point  to  the  general  cause  of  Christian  theology  as  well  as 
to  preserve  its  own  borders  from  the  intrusion  of  what  was 
regarded  as  a  dangerous  error.  For  this  reason  alone  it 
is  important  to  know  what  Park  had  to  say.  But  in  a  pecu- 
liar degree  is  it  necessary  that  any  history  of  New  England 
theology  should  close  with  a  statement  of  the  positions  upon 
eschatology  at  which  it  arrived,  because  it  was  at  this  point 
that  the  "new  theology"  which  has  succeeded  it  among  the 
Congregational  churches  first  manifested  itself.  In  the 
theological  seminaries,  it  was  at  Andover  itself,  and  among 
former  colleagues  and  pupils  of  Park's,  that  a  proposition 
was  made  looking  to  a  modification  of  the  severity  of  the 
New  England  conception  as  to  the  condition  of  the  heathen, 
which  proved  the  entering  wedge  of  a  new  eschatology  and 
a  new  theology  of  atonement  and  incarnation.  The  new 
will  not  be  understood  except  this  New  England  back- 
ground is  clearly  understood. 

We  may  limit  our  discussion  to  the  question  of  future 
punishment,  for  this  was  to  Park,  and  is  still  in  the  thinking 
of  the  day,  the  crucial  point  of  the  whole  theme.  It  has 
been  already  pointed  out  that  Park  did  not  suppose  that  the 
great  majority  of  the  race  would  be  lost,  but  he  did  believe 
that  those  who  were  finally  impenitent  when  overtaken  by 
death  would  remain  in  sin  and  would  be  punished  by  God 
forever.  It  is  his  support  of  this  doctrine  to  which  our 
attention  is  now  called. 

The  evils  which  come  upon  men  in  consequence  of  sin 


534 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


and  which  possess  the  character  of  moral  discipline  are  di- 
vided by  Park  into  two  classes,  chastisement  and  punish- 
ment. Chastisements  are  all  those  pains  inflicted  upon  a 
sentient  being  to  prevent  or  correct  sin,  or  to  secure  or  in- 
crease the  holiness  of  himself  or  other  beings.  All  the  evils 
coming  upon  us  in  consequence  of  sin  in  this  life  are  of  the 
nature  of  chastisement.  They  come  under  the  head  of 
grace,  and  are  reformatory,  corrective,  and  directly  bene- 
ficial in  their  character.  Punishment  is,  however,  some- 
thing radically  different.  ^'Real  punishment  is  pain  inflict- 
ed by  the  Lawgiver  upon  the  transgressor  for  the  purpose 
of  satisfying  the  Lawgiver's  distributive  justice.  The  pain 
must  be  inflicted  by  the  Lawgiver,  upon  the  law-breaker, 
because  it  is  deserved,  and  in  order  to  satisfy  distributive 
justice."  The  meaning  of  distributive  justice  as  earlier 
brought  out  must  be  held  constantly  in  mind.  It  is  deter- 
mined by  benevolence;  for,  as  Park  adds  immediately  to 
the  definitions  just  given,  "the  design  of  distributive  jus- 
tice is  to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  universe." 

With  these  distinctions  as  to  discipline,  Park  now  pro- 
ceeds to  a  more  careful  explanation  of  the  design  of  punish- 
ment. "What  is  the  design  of  God  in  satisfying  his  distri- 
butive justice  ?  Why  can  he  not  let  it  go  unsatisfied,  as  men 
often  do?"    This  question  he  answers: 

1.  Punishment  is  designed  to  vindicate  the  character  of  the  law. 
The  threats  of  the  law  are  necessary  to  the  very  idea  of  law.  The 
infliction  of  the  penalty  is  necessary  to  the  reality  of  the  threats,  and 
hence  to  the  maintenance  of  the  character  of  the  law. 

2.  Hence  punishment  is  designed  to  honor  the  character  of  the 
Lawgiver.  It  expresses  his  benevolence,  because  he  thereby  inflicts 
those  evils  which  are  necessary  to  the  promotion  of  good.  It  honors 
his  distributive  justice,  his  holiness,  and  his  veracity. 

3.  Hence  the  design  of  punishment  is  to  prevent  sin  in  the  sub- 
jects of  the  law,  and  to  promote  their  holiness. 

Up  to  this  point  many  of  the  advocates  of  final  restora- 
tion would  be  willing  to  keep  company  with  Park.    He  has 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


535 


put  punishment  directly  upon  the  basis  of  the  divine  be- 
nevolence. But  he  next  lays  down  the  principle  that  "the 
punishment  of  the  wicked  will  be  eternal."  In  preparation 
for  the  proof  of  this  principle,  he  lays  down  a  number  of 
preliminary  propositions  which  contain  substantially  his 
apologetic  for  the  doctrine.    Thus  he  says : 

God's  government  respects  other  worlds  than  this.  The  Univer- 
saHst  says  that  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  God  will  make  a  race 
and  punish  the  majority  of  that  race.  But  he  might  punish  all  lor 
the  benefit  of  another  race,  or  for  many  races,  and  still  be  benevolent. 
Positive  benefits  flow  to  others  from  condign  punishment.  One  gen- 
eration receives  benefits  from  the  summary  visitation  of  the  law 
upon  a  previous  generation.  Still  we  suppose  that  the  majority  of 
this  race  will  be  saved.  Hell  in  the  universe  will  occupy  no  greater 
place  in  comparison  than  the  state's  prison  in  the  commonwealth. 
Again,  man  is  free.  He  knows  that  if  he  sins  he  shall  be  punished, 
and  he  is  free  to  sin  or  to  refrain.  It  is  the  overlooking  of  this  fact 
that  gives  so  much  difficulty  with  the  subject  of  punishment.^ 

But  Park  went  even  farther  than  this  in  his  apologetic. 
Universalism  proceeds  upon  the  supposition  that  wicked 
men  will  finally  repent.  Park  meets  this  position  by  the 
proposition  that  "men  may  be  punished  even  if  they  are 
penitent."  He  may  have  believed,  upon  the  whole,  that 
every  penitent  being  would  somehow  be  saved.  He  is  re- 
ported to  have  once  said  that  if  the  Devil  w^ould  repent, 
God  would  find  some  way  to  save  him.  I  myself  never 
heard  this  remark,  and  have  heard  him  say  that  "no  atone- 
ment had  been  provided  for  the  devils  in  hell" — which  at 
least  hints  strongly  at  the  impossibility  of  their  salvation 
even  if  they  should  repent.  All  such  questions,  however, 
he  regarded  as  belonging  in  the  region  of  groundless  and 
unprofitable  speculations,  for  he  believed  firmly  that  men 
dying  impenitent  and  the  devils  would  continue  obstinately 
in  sin,  and  that  eternally.    Still  he  would  invalidate  the  last 

®  It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  one  of  the  latest  forms  of  Universalism,  that  of 
Dr.  G.  A.  Gordon,  of  Boston,  involves  a  philosophy  of  determinism.  God  is 
finally  to  have  his  way;  and  man's  freedom  is  enswathed  in  a  divine  determinism. 


53^         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

refuge  of  his  opposers,  and  hence  he  maintained,  whatever 
might  be  our  speculations,  that  even  repentance  did  not 
carry  with  it  the  certainty  of  forgiveness,  for  "even  Christ, 
though  he  was  holy,  was  not  perfectly  happy,  but  was  the 
greatest  of  all  sufferers."  He  even  said:  "The  holier  a 
man  is,  the  greater  his  remorse  for  his  past  sins.  How  the 
redeemed  spirits  can  be  happy  in  spite  of  their  past  sins  is 
the  mystery  of  the  atonement  of  Christ." 

The  last  turn  of  thought  suggested  the  further  remark 
that 

the  distinctive  punishment  of  hell  is  remorse  and  the  other  painful 
emotions  of  conscience.  Punishment  is  rational,  that  is,  it  is  produced 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  mind.  If  there  be  physical  punish- 
ment, it  is  only  to  excite  the  action  of  conscience.  If  a  man  sin,  he 
shall  forever  reflect  upon  his  sin,  and  shall  let  conscience  work  accord- 
ing to  its  own  laws.    This  is  the  doctrine  of  eternal  punishment. 

Park  is  now  prepared  to  begin  his  proof  of  the  doctrine. 
He  sets  the  rational  arguments  in  the  front. 

1.  Sin  deserves  eternal  punishment.  Sin  deserves  remorse  of 
conscience.  This  is  an  axiom.  Now,  remorse  is  perpetual.  Guilt  is 
personal  and  eternal.  It  is  contrary  to  the  first  principles  of  the  mind 
that  punishment  should  diminish  guilt.  Once  guilty,  always  guilty. 
This  eternal  remorse  is  eternal  punishment.  "The  whole  idea  of 
hell  is  this :  You  have  been  free,  you  have  chosen  to  pursue  a  cer- 
tain course,  you  must  reflect  on  it  forever."  Thus  Park  adopted  what 
Emmons  called  his  own  special  contribution  to  the  subject  of  future 
punishment. 

2.  The  nature  of  conscience  proves  eternal  punishment.  There  is 
a  presumption  that  the  mind  will  always  act  in  accordance  with  its 
present  laws.  It  is  a  law  of  conscience  to  inflict  pain  for  sin. 
Left  to  itself,  conscience  will  always  reprove  men  of  sin.  If  this  is 
not  to  be  so,  God  must  interfere  to  prevent  the  normal  action  of 
this  power  which  he  has  given  men.  He  is  under  no  obligation  to 
do  this,  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  will,  and  ihe  very  nobility  of 
the  faculty  of  conscience  shows  how  irrational  it  is  to  suppose  that  he 
will  interfere.    Men  will  be  left  to  themselves. 

3.  The  fitness  of  eternal  punishment  to  the  nature  and  tendencies 
of  sin.  The  tendencies  of  a  single  sin  are  to  unending  evil.  Every 
sin  adds  to  the  facility  of  committing  another,  and  the  sin  of  one 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


537 


man  tempts  another  to  sin.  It  is  fit  that  the  pain  which  thwarts  these 
tendencies  should  be  unending  also. 

4.  Men  may  be  punished  as  long  as  they  sin,  and  they  will  sin 
forever.  The  mere  possibility  of  eternal  sin  renders  it  impossible  to 
prove  universal  salvation ;  for  if  men  sin  forever,  they  will  be  pun- 
ished forever.  But  there  is  more  than  a  probability  here.  There  is 
evidence  that  the  impenitent  at  death  will  sin  forever.  Their  per- 
sistence in  sin  to  the  end  of  this  life  leads  us  to  infer  that  they  will 
sin  forever,  unless  we  have  evidence  to  the  contrary,  and  there  is  no 
such  evidence.  They  have  remained  depraved  in  spite  of  good  influences, 
and  we  infer  that  they  will  remain  so  forever.  More,  they  grow 
worse  and  worse  under  good  influences.  Affliction  and  chastisement 
serve  only  to  harden  them,  if  they  remain  impenitent.  And,  then, 
the  Bible  represents  the  impenitent  as  continuing  in  sin,  as  long  as 
it  speaks  of  them  at  all,  for  they  are  sinners  through  life,  at  death,  in 
the  intermediate  state,  at  the  judgment.  Now.  after  the  judgment 
certain  great  advantages  will  be  lost  to  them;  "from  him  that  hath 
not  shall  be  taken  away  that  which  he  hath."  And  there  will  be 
positive  disadvantages :  the  power  of  habit,  intensified  and  accumu- 
lated, the  exasperating  effects  of  unsuccessful  punishment,  etc.  All 
these  things  will  operate  to  perpetuate  sin,  just  as  similar  things  will 
operate  to  secure  the  eternal  holiness  of  the  repentant.  In  one  passage 
eternal  sin  seems  to  be  asserted  of  a  certain  class :  "Whosoever  shall 
blaspheme  against  the  Holy  Spirit  ....  is  guilty  of  an  eternal  sin" 
(Mark  3:19). 

5.  The  holiness  and  sincerity  of  God.  God  is  infinitely  holy.  He 
must  be  sincere  in  exoressing  this  feeling,  and  the  sincere  expression 
of  God's  abhorrence  cf  sin  is  eternal  punishment. 

6.  The  benevolence  of  God.  We  have  already  touched  upon  this 
argument,  and  remarked  that  Park  could  not  maintain  eternal  pun- 
ishment upon  his  theory  of  the  divine  action,  unless  he  could  show  how 
benevolence  required  it.  This  he  now  more  fully  undertakes.  Avoid- 
ing the  unfortunate  expressions  of  Hopkins,  he  still  follows  the  essen- 
tial lines  of  his  argument.    His  successive  points  are: 

a)  The  eternal  and  deserved  punishment  of  sin  does  good.  It 
results  in  an  increase  of  holiness  in  the  universe,  because  men  are 
deterred  from  sin  by  the  fact  of  punishment.  It  thus  promotes  the 
general  good. 

b)  As  sin  tends  to  work  unending  injury,  benevolence  requires 
that  it  have  an  unending  connection  with  pain  which  will  counteract 
the  tendency  of  sin.  This  would  not  be  so  if  men  did  not  deserve 
to  sufifer,  but  they  do  deserve  to  suffer  all  that  is  useful  in  counteract- 
ing the  evils  which  their  sin  has  wrought. 

c)  Benevolence  requires  of  God  to  hate  sin  more  than  any  object 


538 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


in  the  universe,  and  particularly  to  hate  sin  far  more  than  pain;  and 
benevolence  requires  him  to  express  this  hatred,  for  otherwise  it  can- 
not enter  into  that  system  of  moral  influences  by  which  he  is  guiding 
the  world  to  its  salvation.  The  only  fit  expression  of  this  hatred 
is  eternal  punishment. 

d)  In  the  long  run,  benevolence  requires  what  is  fit  and  just;  and 
eternal  punishment  fits  eternal  sin. 

e)  Facts  confirm  the  supposition  that  benevolence  requires  eternal 
punishment.  In  proportion  to  men's  conception  of  the  evil  of  sin  they 
are  convinced  of  the  eternity  of  punishment.  Even  men  who  doubt  it 
are  obliged  to  use  the  scriptural  threatenings  to  the  evil-doer.  The  ten- 
dency of  men  is  to  form  low  estimates  of  any  punishment  that  will 
end;  eternal  punishment  is  adapted  to  this  peculiarity  of  the  human 
mind. 

7.  The  veracity  of  God  proves  eternal  punishment. 

Up  to  this  point  we  have  been  busy  with  the  rational  argument 
which  Park  brings  in  favor  of  the  doctrine.  With  this  head  he 
passes  to  the  biblical  doctrine;  for  it  is  his  position  that  the  Bible,  which 
is  God's  word,  has  plainly  declared  that  there  will  be  eternal  punish- 
ment, and  hence  if  God  has  told  us  the  truth — that  is,  if  he  is  Truth 
himself — punishment  for  some  must  be  eternal.  As  this  is,  after  all, 
his  decisive  argument,  we  shall  trace  it  somewhat  carefully, 

a)  Some  sins  are  certainly  threatened  with  eternal  punishment,  as 
the  sin  against  the  Holy  Ghost  (Matt.  12:31,  32),  the  sins  "unto 
death"  (I  John  5:16,  17),  and  those  who  fall  away  into  wilful  sin 
(Heb.  6:4-8;  10:26,  27;  II  Peter  2:20-22). 

h)  Some  sinners  never  will  be  saved,  e.  g.,  Judas  (John  17:9^-12; 
cf.  Mark  14:21). 

c)  The  Scriptures  declare  that  some  men  receive  their  good  things 
chiefly  in  this  life  (Luke  6:24;  16:25;  Ps.  17:14). 

d)  The  Scriptures  declare  that  men  of  a  certain  character  shall 
not  be  saved  (John  3:36;  Luke  14:24). 

'■  e)  The  Scriptures  declare  that  some  men  shall  perish,  or  be  de- 
stroyed (II  Thess.  I  :  9,  etc.). 

/)  Some  sinners  shall  be  subjected  to  the  action  of  instruments 
of  punishment  which  shall  be  eternal  (Matt.  3:12,  etc.). 

g)  The  circumstances  under  which  sinners  are  said  to  be  excluded 
from  the  kingdom  of  heaven  imply  the  doctrine  of  eternal  exclusion 
(Luke  13:23-28;  Matt.  7:21-23;  Luke  16:26.  Note  that  there  is  no 
intimation  in  these  passages  of  repentance  upon  the  part  of  the  ex- 
cluded.). 

h)  The  doctrine  of  election  implies  hopeless  punishment  of  the 
non-elect. 


EDWARDS  A.  PARK 


539 


i)  The  constant  and  great  contrast  between  the  state  of  the 
righteous  and  the  wicked. 

y)  The  express  assertions  that  the  punishment  of  the  wicked 
shall  be  eternal.  (i)  The  only  worlds  which  writers  of  the  New 
Testament  had  to  express  eternity  (alcbv,  aldvios),  they  used.  (2) 
The  same  words  are  used  to  express  eternal  misery  as  to  express 
eternal  happiness,  or  (3)   to  express  the  eternal  attributes  of  God. 

(4)  The  same  words  are  used  to  express  the  happiness  of  the  right- 
eous and  the  misery  of  the  wicked  in  the  same  verse  (Matt.  25:46). 

(5)  As  to  the  words  aiujv  and  at'wfios  the  predominant  usage  is  in 
favor  of  their  meaning  unlimited  duration.  When  not  so  used,  their 
signification  is  limited  by  the  nature  of  the  thing  to  which  they  are 
applied,  or  by  positive  announcements.  There  are  no  such  limitations 
in  respect  to  these  words  when  used  of  future  punishment.  Our  own 
use  of  the  words  "always"  and  "forever,"  "eternal"  and  "eternity," 
corresponds  exactly  to  the  biblical  usage,  and  will  suggest  the  modes 
in  which  they  are  used  in  the  Bible. 

k)  The  Bible  has  taught  the  doctrine  of  eternal  punishment  in 
every  way  consistent  with  its  style.  It  never  says  "eternity  in  the 
strict  sense  of  that  word,"  but  that  is  not  the  style  of  the  Bible.  It 
does,  however,  teach  it  by  assertion  and  implication,  in  positive  and 
negative  forms,  with  all  variety  and  great  intensity.  It  could  do  no 
more. 

Thus  we  close  our  review  of  the  greatest  of  the  New 
England  systems.  For  logical  concatenation  and  power, 
for  argumentative  force,  for  comprehensiveness,  for  genu- 
ine liberality  in  the  treatment  of  principles  and  the  empha- 
sis placed  upon  the  essentials,  for  clearness  and  luminous- 
ness  of  discussion,  and  for  loyalty  to  the  great  doctrines  of 
evangelical  theology,  it  is  unsurpassed,  if  not  unequaled,  in 
the  history  of  Protestant  dogmatics.  It  is  a  permanent 
loss  to  the  cause  that  its  author  did  not  himself  issue  it  in 
the  form  of  a  treatise.  Its  defect  was  its  failure  to  com- 
pose the  strife  between  the  idea  of  liberty  involved  in  its 
fundamental  theory,  that  of  the  nature  of  virtue,  and  its 
theory  of  the  will.  Park  did,  as  we  may  believe,  the  best 
that  can  be  done  with  the  elements  which  had  been  deliv- 
ered to  him.  His  failure  at  this  point  forces  irresistibly 
upon  us  the  question  as  to  the  possibility  of  success  in  the 


540         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

task  which  New  England  theology  had  set  before  it — to 
free  Calvinism,  while  it  still  retained  its  characteristic  fea- 
tures, from  the  paralyzing  load  of  a  doctrine  of  inability. 
Our  task  will  therefore  not  be  done  till  we  have  raised  this 
question. 


CONCLUSION 


CONCLUSION 

We  have  now  traced  the  rise,  course,  and  culmination 
of  New  England  theology  as  a  distinct  school  of  thought. 
But  nothing  is  more  remarkable  about  it  than  its  collapse. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1880  it  was  in  control  of  all 
of  the  theological  seminaries  of  the  Congregational  de- 
nomination, with  possibly  a  single  exception,  and  of  some 
of  the  Presbyterian.  At  Andover  the  chair  of  theology 
was  occupied  by  Park,  at  Yale  by  Harris,  at  Oberlin  by 
Fairchild,  at  Chicago  by  Boardman.  Fifteen  years  later 
these  teachers  had  all  been  replaced,  and  in  no  case  by  a 
man  who  could  be  considered  as  belonging  to  the  New 
England  school.  It  had  endured  more  than  150  years;  it 
had  become  dominant  in  a  great  ecclesiastical  denomina- 
tion; it  had  founded  every  Congregational  seminary;  and, 
as  it  were,  in  a  night,  it  perished  from  off  the  face  of  the 
earth.  For  this  remarkable  and  almost  unprecedented 
phenomenon  there  must  be  some  instructive  explanation. 

In  this  concluding  chapter,  therefore,  we  retrace  our 
steps  from  the  beginning,  in  the  effort  to  gain  that  wider 
understanding  of  our  history  which  the  multitude  of  de- 
tails may  have  hindered  us  from  gaining  hitherto,  and 
which  shall  disclose  to  us  the  secret  of  its  fateful  termina- 
tion. 

The  history  of  Calvinism  presents  to  the  historical 
student,  and  presented  to  the  slowly  awakening  conscious- 
ness of  our  fathers  as  they  themselves  lived  through  a  por- 
tion of  it,  a  mighty  indictment  against  the  system.  It 
seemed  in  its  beginning,  when  men  felt  themselves  the  elect 
of  God  and  predestined  to  the  pulling-down  of  strong- 
holds, a  powerful  incentive  to  faith  and  activity.  It  hurled 
the  scanty  forces  of  a  half-drowned  Holland  against  the 

543 


544 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


mightiest  empire  of  the  day  in  the  Eighty  Years'  War,  and 
gave  them  victory.  It  tore  at  the  same  time  an  empire 
from  the  grasp  of  Austria.  It  elevated  England  to  the 
position  of  the  leading  European  power.  It  created  Eng- 
lish freedom.  This  was  all  upon  a  great  scale ;  but  it  could 
also  fire  the  hearts  of  the  humble  and  enable  them  to  effect 
great  things,  and  had  forever  laid  its  claim  to  the  grateful 
appreciation  of  America  when  it  created  out  of  the  peasants 
of  Scrooby  and  Bawtry  in  Yorkshire  a  church  which  had 
the  energy  to  face  exile  and  the  unknown  dangers  of  a  new 
continent  for  their  faith's  sake.  Thus  activity  might  seem 
to  be  of  its  very  essence.  But  experience  in  the  new  land,  as 
well  as  elsewhere,  had  shown  that  this  was  not  so.  It  so 
conceived  the  sovereignty  of  God  and  so  obscured  human 
freedom  that  it  exercised,  when  operating  in  any  locality 
undisturbed  for  a  long  period,  a  paralyzing  effect  upon 
human  initiative.  Assisted,  as  this  effect  was  in  New  Eng- 
land, by  the  influences  of  a  frontier  situation,  it  proved  well- 
nigh  fatal  to  the  churches.  Theology  was  gradually 
strangling  life.  This  was  the  more  so  because,  again,  the 
system  proved  itself  to  be  non-ethical,  laying  stress  upon  the 
external,  and  not  encouraging — sometimes  discouraging — 
attention  to  the  inner  meaning  of  spiritual  processes,  mak- 
ing holiness  a  state,  entered  into  by  justification  consequent 
upon  an  experience  essentially  mysterious — faith — and  con- 
sisting in  an  attitude  of  the  soul  and  not  in  its  activities. 
What  was  holiness  in  itself?  The  system  had  no  answer. 
What  were  the  virtues?  Temperance,  meekness,  love,  etc., 
said  the  system.  Why  was  temperance  a  virtue,  and  by 
what  law  were  its  demands  to  be  formulated  and  inter- 
preted? There  was  no  answer.  How  shall  I  live  a  holy 
life  ?  Do  this,  that,  and  the  other  thing,  replied  the  system. 
Thus  all  was  external;  not  so  much  so  as  Rome  had  made 
it,  for  faith  was  still  emphasized,  and  in  some  way  souls 


CONCLUSION 


545 


whom  God  had  touched  still  found  their  way  to  personal, 
face-to-face  communion  with  him.  The  soul  could  not  pass 
from  the  cradle  to  the  grave  without  an  inquiry  as  to  its 
real  possession  of  grace,  as  it  could  in  the  old  church ; 
but  under  forensic  justification  and  the  ''imputation"  to  a 
man  of  both  sin  and  righteousness  which  were  not  his,  his 
salvation  was  in  great  danger  of  being  a  thing  in  which, 
however  great  his  concern,  his  part  was  little  or  nothing. 
The  indictment  was  that  the  system  was  injurious  to  prac- 
tical religion. 

This  indictment  was  reinforced  by  the  tendencies  of  the 
times.  New  forces  were  entering  into  the  thought  of  the 
world,  and  of  the  New  World  across  the  Atlantic,  during 
the  century  in  which  Calvinism  was  on  its  trial  there,  and 
was  getting  its  sentence.  In  1637  Descartes  had  introduced 
the  appeal  to  consciousness  into  modern  philosophy,  and 
under  Locke  (1632-1704)  it  had  become  domiciled  in  all 
English  thinking.  Consciousness  had  given  a  new  doc- 
trine of  freedom,  as  we  have  traced  in  the  pages  of  Locke 
himself,  which  was  destined  to  become  more  and  more 
clamorous  till  it  got  a  real  recognition  from,  leading  think- 
ers. A  new  religious  experience  had  come  in,  manifesting 
itself  in  world-wide  revivals  beginning  with  Edwards  in 
America  and  with  Wesley  in  England.  Gradually  a  new 
ethical  sense,  and  a  great  vision  of  the  true  meaning  of 
virtue  and  holiness,  had  dawned  upon  the  philosophic  and 
religious  mind.  And,  above  all,  the  new  method  of  dealing 
with  the  objects  of  thinking,  introduced  by  the  long  neg- 
lected treatise  of  Francis  Bacon  (1620),  the  inductive,  the 
exact  antithesis  of  the  characteristic  method  of  Calvinism, 
had  received  a  powerful  impulse  from  the  work  of  Sir  Isaac 
Newton  (1672,  etc.),  and  was  soon  (1778)  to  show  its 
importance  in  the  epoch-making  discoveries  of  Lavoisier. 
All  this  ferment  of  thought  meant  much  more  for  Cal- 


546         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

vinism  and  for  religion  than  the  protest  of  Arminianism 
had  meant,  though  at  first  it  took  the  direction  of  assisting 
the  Arminian  movement  onward.  It  meant  in  New  Eng- 
land a  thoroughgoing  criticism  of  the  system  and  its  essen- 
tial modification. 

The  study  of  the  history  just  completed  has  shown  us 
what  New  England  attempted  to  do.  Seizing  upon  these 
new  instruments  of  thought,  the  Fathers  sought  to  re- 
state the  old  theology  in  such  a  way  as  to  obviate  objections 
and  yet  maintain  it  in  all  its  great  central  positions.  The 
correctness  of  Calvinism  in  general  was  not  questioned.  It 
seemed  so  clearly  the  meaning  of  the  Scriptures,  and  their 
religious  experience  so  thoroughly  sustained  its  leading 
principles,  especially  its  great  determining  principle,  the 
sovereignty  of  God;  it  was,  further,  to  so  large  an  extent 
the  common  conviction  of  the  Protestant  theological  world, 
that  they  did  not  suspect  that  perhaps  these  new  prin- 
ciples of  thinking  might  lead  really  away  from  Calvinism 
to  something  quite  different.  Radical  as  the  positions  of 
some  of  our  divines  were,  they  always  seemed  to  them- 
selves conservative.  They  were  defending — in  a  new  way, 
possibly,  but  still  defending — the  old  system.  Till  near  the 
last  they  all  clung  to  Westminster  as  they  clung  to  Edwards. 
To  make  the  old  armor  still  more  impervious  and  still  more 
efficient  was  their  purpose  and  their  hope. 

Incidentally  they  effected  some  great  things — to  which  it 
will  be  best  that  we  turn  before  we  pass  to  the  greater  ques- 
tion of  their  ultimate  success.  The  conservative  tendency  led 
at  first  to  the  denial  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  by  Edwards. 
Still  in  him  even  the  tendency  of  the  day  toward  a  real 
freedom  was  so  strong  that  he  gave  man  practically  a  much 
larger  freedom  than  his  theory  allowed.  The  new  prin- 
ciple of  consciousness,  the  more  it  was  consulted,  spake  the 
more  clearly  for  freedom;  and  hence  the  school  went  on, 


CONCLUSION 


547 


by  very  gradual  steps,  and  with  many  a  digression,  but 
steadily,  toward  a  better  doctrine,  till  it  met  with  a  certain 
check,  upon  which  it  paused,  hesitated,  and  fell  back  into 
the  old  Edwardean  determinism.  They  also  ascribed  a  real 
character  to  God  in  teaching  that  his  moral  attributes  were 
comprised  in  love,  which  was  a  choice,  and  a  choice  of  some- 
thing which  we  can  understand,  viz.,  the  highest  good  of 
all  sentient  being.  God  was  thus  made  an  intelligible  and 
imitable  being,  and  taken  at  this  vital  point  out  of  that 
realm  of  mystery  which  may  favor  a  certain  kind  of  rap- 
ture on  the  part  of  devotees,  but  is  fatal  to  a  rational  and 
enduring  piety.  Probably  no  service  that  the  school  ren- 
dered surpassed  this  in  importance.  To  uproot  that  whole 
view  of  God  which  spoke  of  his  arbitrary  will  as  if  it  might 
effect  anything,  and  culminated  in  affirming  that  even  the 
distinction  of  right  and  wrong  depended  upon  the  divine 
fiat,  and  to  construct  our  idea  of  God  from  the  nature  of 
man  whom  God  had  made  in  his  own  image,  was  vital  to 
the  maintenance  of  religion.  For  religion  is  at  bottom  com- 
munion with  God;  and  we  cannot  commune  with  a  being 
totally  unlike  ourselves,  and  who  might  have  made  us  the 
exact  opposite  of  what  we  are.  They  thus  ethicized  theol- 
ogy, and  threw  a  flood  of  light  upon  the  nature  of  faith, 
regeneration,  conversion,  j ustification,  prayer,  the  divine  gov- 
ernment, and  the  atonement.  They  necessarily  broke  down 
thereby  the  forensic  system  of  Calvinism  and  introduced 
a  new  era  of  practical  activity  in  the  church.  Thus  Ed- 
wards was  the  greatest  evangelist  whom  New  England 
had  ever  known;  Hopkins  first  suggested  foreign  missions, 
the  direct  result  of  his  work  being  that  current  of  interest 
which  produced  the  hay-stack  prayer-meetings  and  the 
American  Board  of  Commissioners  for  Foreign  Missions; 
Woods,  a  Hopkinsian,  formed  Andover  Seminary;  the 
New  England  ministers  became  the  founders  of  that  won- 


548         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

derful  belt  of  colleges,  Marietta,  Oberlin,  Olivet,  Illinois, 
Beloit,  Iowa,  Tabor,  etc.,  etc.,  and  of  that  chain  of  churches 
of  the  Congregational  order,  which  now  extend  from 
Albany  to  San  Francisco.  Whatever  else  the  school  did  or 
failed  to  do,  it  made  it  necessary  that  the  theology  which 
should  replace  it  should  be  primarily  ethical,  both  in  its 
doctrine  of  man  and  of  God. 

Another  such  service  which  the  school  rendered  was  in 
preparing  the  way  for  a  comparatively  peaceful  and  easy 
transition  to  the  new  order  of  things  when  new  tendencies 
of  thought  came  in  to  dominate  the  mind.  Whether  com- 
petent itself  to  serve  the  new  age  or  not,  it  made  the  way 
open  for  some  other  one  to  serve  it.  It  had  familiarized 
the  New  England  mind  with  the  idea  of  theological  modi- 
•fication;  and  men  could  hence  believe  that  in  the  strange 
proposals  of  Darwinism  there  might,  after  all,  be  some 
germs  of  improvement.  When  the  storms  of  biblical  criti- 
cism burst  upon  the  American  world,  there  was  genuine 
panic  in  denominations  which  had  been  trained  under  a 
less  liberal  system;  but  Congregationalism,  especially  when 
it  had  been  taught  by  Park  to  lay  stress  upon  the  religious 
contents  of  the  Bible  in  distinction  from  its  outward  form, 
could  await  with  great  patience  for  the  outcome  of  the 
scholarly  investigations  of  trusted  leaders,  and  could  even 
afford  a  refuge  to  scholars  from  its  Presbyterian  daughter- 
church,  like  H.  P.  Smith,  till  the  stress  of  persecution  should 
be  overblown.  With  its  elastic  system  of  maintaining  ortho- 
doxy, it  could  waive  for  a  time  insistence  upon  points  of 
doctrine  as  to  which  there  was  actual  question  among  com- 
petent thinkers,  and  emphasize  essentials.  While  at  the 
present  writmg  (1906)  the  outcome  is  by  no  means  clear, 
and  the  "new  theology"  of  this  day  is  still  quite  nebulous, 
it  may  fairly  be  said  that  Congregationalism  is  in  a  state 
of  theological  peace,  and  that  its  doctrinal  discussions  have 


CONCLUSION 


549 


not  seriously  afYected  its  practical  efficiency  in  the  nation  or 
in  the  Avorld.  The  temper  of  mind  which  has  produced  this 
happy  condition  of  affairs,  and  the  denominational  atmos- 
phere which  has  rendered  it  possible,  are  the  gifts  to  the 
new  time  of  the  school  of  thought  which  has  now  passed 
from  view. 

All  these  are  wonderful  achievements,  upon  which  it 
would  be  a  happy  lot  if  one  were  permitted  to  expatiate. 
But  the  theme  presses  to  the  answer  of  the  question :  Was 
the  school  crowned  with  a  real  success  upon  the  largest 
scale?  Was  its  theology,  were  its  distinctive  theories,  its 
systematizing  principles,  of  permanent  value?  Or  did  its 
collapse,  so  sudden,  and  so  complete,  prove  that  it  had 
failed,  and  was  essentially  incapable  of  propagating  itself? 

We  m  xst  reply  ( i )  that  it  failed  when  it  sacrificed  free- 
dom to  the  Calvinism  of  the  old  system.  Calvinism  exalts 
the  sole  causality  of  God ;  and  New  England  theology  found 
a  scheme  of  determinism  essential  to  the  maintenance  of 
that  causality.  It  felt  the  force  of  the  argument  from  con- 
sciousness for  freedom;  and  that  argument  almost  carried 
the  day.  But  to  save  the  Calvinism,  at  last  the  word  went 
forth  for  determinism;  and  when  the  new  theology  uttered 
this  fiat,  it  pronounced  at  the  same  time  its  own  judgment. 
Determinism  belongs  with  materialism.  The  church  was 
moving  onward  to^  a  conflict  such  as  it  had  never  seen,  with 
materialism  in  philosophy  and  with  the  materialistic  spirit  in 
practical  life.  On  the  one  side  stood  the  theory  that  the  body 
is  the  man;  that  there  is  no  soul,  but  all  his  thoughts  and 
passions  and  purposes  are  the  fruit  of  his  brain ;  that,  there- 
fore, every  human  phenomenon  stands  under  the  strict  law 
of  cause  and  effect.  Every  deterministic  theology  is  the 
unconscious  ally  of  this  theory.  On  the  other  side  stood 
Christianity,  teaching  that  man  is  an  immortal  and  spiritual 
being,  possessing  a  body  as  the  organ  of  impressions  and  of 


550         HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 

activities,  and  possessed  of  personality  and  freedom  as 
his  inalienable  characteristics.  The  Christian  church  knew 
it  needed  a  philosophy  which  could  sustain  this  position.  It 
needed  a  clear  doctrine  of  freedom,  practical  and  theoret- 
ical. When  New  England  theology  refused  to  give  it  such 
a  doctrine,  the  church  turned  away  from  it.  The  church 
also  turned  away  from  the  other  survivals  of  an  a  priori 
conception  of  God,  from  the  contradiction  with  the  theory 
of  virtue  and  with  the  ethical  conception  of  God  which  lay 
in  the  idea  of  God's  unchangeableness,  absolute  foreknowl- 
edge and  absolute  decrees,  etc.  The  drift  of  all  the  vital 
new  thoughts  was  away  from  Calvinism ;  but  New  England 
theology  still  professed  to  be,  and  was,  Calvinistic.  This 
was  its  condemnation. 

(2)  This  troiuble  lay  in  the  a  priori  character  of  much 
of  the  reasoning  with  which  the  system  was  still  defended. 
Never  was  a  theologian  more  determined  to  pursue  the 
a  posteriori  method  than  Park;  but  even  he  had  a  priori 
suppositions  upon  these  topics  which  infected  his  system. 
The  theology  had  not  fully  grasped  the  meaning  of  the  in- 
ductive method,  because  it  did  not  yet  know  what  it  means 
to  obtain  the  facts  upon  which  an  induction  can  be  based. 
It  had  no  conception  of  such  processes  of  research  as  those 
by  which  Darwin  got  at  the  facts  upon  which  he  founded 
his  theory  of  evolution.  Its  failure  to  appreciate  Dar- 
winism largely  flowed  from  its  failure  to  understand  how 
comprehensive  and  thorough  his  experiments  had  been. 
However  hospitable  some  of  the  leaders,  like  Park,  were  to 
all  new  ideas,  and  however  careful  to  clear  the  way  for  any 
future  prevalence  of  Darwinism,  still  the  system  was  too 
fully  committed  to  a  multitude  of  presuppositions,  such  as 
the  special  creation  of  each  human  soul,  and  the  entire  sep- 
aration of  humanity  from  the  animal  world  in  dignity  and 
meaning,  to  be  able  to  survive  the  triumph  of  evolution  as 


CONCLUSION 


a  philosophy  of  man  and  of  life.  It  made  its  children  able 
to  sit  down  to  the  patient  investigations  that  lay  before  them 
in  sociology,  psychology,  and  nature;  this  was  its  immortal 
service.  But  it  had  not  itself  entered  into  the  new 
inheritance. 

Neither  did  it  succeed  (3)  in  answering  fully  the  ques- 
tions put  it  within  its  own  circle  as  to  the  central  doctrines  of 
the  Christian  system.  The  Unitarian  questionings  were  not 
met,  but  the  evangelical  doctrines  carried  by  a  tour  de  force, 
by  a  mere  appeal  to  authority ;  and  at  the  same  time  they 
were  depotentiated  in  the  interest  of  a  partial  answer  to  these 
questionings.  It  was  no  wonder,  then,  that  the  "new  theol- 
ogy" of  1880  on  depontentiated  the  Trinity  still  further,  in- 
clined away  from  a  true  incarnation,  and  preserved  only  the 
shadow  of  an  objective  atonement.  If  these  tendencies 
were  to  be  made  a  cause  of  reproach  to*  anybody,  that 
reproach  must  fall  primarily  upon  our  elder  new  theolog}'-. 
Its  failure  toi  get  any  satisfactory  answer  to  the 
objections  to  the  doctrine  of  depravity,  its  reference  of  the 
corruption  of  human  nature  to  a  "divine  constitution," 
its  blindness  to  the  help  offered  it  in  its  last  days 
by  the  Darwinian  doctrine  oi  heredity,  further  ac- 
celerated the  day  of  its  own  rejection.  A  theoloigy 
which  resorted  for  the  defense  of  the  most  important  Chris- 
tian doctrines  to  an  ipse  dixit,  even  if  this  self-contained 
and  unanswering  authority  were  that  of  the  Bible,  was 
thereby  condemned — yes,  self-condemned,  since  its  great 
principle  and  the  driving  force  of  its  long  theological  labors 
had  been  that  whatever  was  biblical  was  therefore  rational. 

Hence  there  were  three  things  in  particular  which  it  was 
a  pressing  necessity  that  New  England  theology  should  do : 

I.  Abandon  the  Calvinistic  conception  and  use  oi  the 
sovereignty  of  God  in  favor  of  a  new  recognition  of  the 
facts  of  human  nature. 


HISTORY  OF  NEW  ENGLAND  THEOLOGY 


2.  Readjust  itself  to  an  evolutionary  view  of  revelation 
and  of  human  history. 

3.  Introduce  the  new  idea  of  a  living,  and  not  an  ab- 
stract, God  into  its  Christology. 

As  a  practical  fact,  the  leaders  of  this  theology  were  un- 
able to  do  these  things.  When  their  successors  came  into 
our  theological  chairs,  they  found  they  could  not  do  their 
manifest  professional  duty  and  make  use  of  their  predeces- 
sors' labors.  It  was  necessary  to  begin  again.  Just  as  the 
old  exegesis  was  antiquated  by  a  new  point  of  view  of  all 
theological  themes,  the  old  theology  was  also  antiquated.  So 
far  as  the  theology  built  upon  the  old  at  all,  it  was  in- 
volved in  vagueness  and  confusion.  Even  such  leaders  as 
Samuel  Harris,  who  were  themselves  substantially  upon  the 
New  England  basis,  felt  compelled  to  build  their  identical 
theology  upon  other  foundations  and  with  other  instru- 
ments. The  pupils  of  Harris  took  the  new  foundations, 
and  newer  still,  and  built  something  which  was  also  new. 
And  thus  New  England  theology  perished  from  the  earth. 

Perished,  at  any  rate,  for  the  time.  The  questions  of  the 
present  hour  are  still  more  fundamental  than  those  with 
which  New  England  theology  or  its  immediate  successors 
have  had  to  concern  themselves.  A  ringing  call  is  sounding 
through  the  air  ^  to  face  the  true  issue,  the  reality  of  God's 
supernatural  interference  in  the  history  of  man  versus  the 
universal  reign  of  unmodified  law.  The  question  is  not 
whether  the  old  evangelical  scheme  needs  some  adjustments 
to  adapt  it  tO'  our  present  knowledge,  but  whether  its  most 
fundamental  conception,  the  very  idea  of  the  gospel,  is  true. 
A  religion  founded  upon  God's  self -revelation  of  himself, 
or  a  pure  rationalism  by  which  truth  in  religion  is  attained 
as  it  is  in  physics,  or  any  other  realm  of  knowledge — these 
are  the  antitheses.    Before  this  all  the  half-way  compro^ 

1  For  example,  in  George  B.  Foster's  Finality  of  the  Christian  Religion. 


CONCLUSION 


553 


mises  of  the  present  day  must  be  given  up.  Men  must  take 
sides.  They  must  be  for  the  gospel  or  against  it.  Evasions 
as  to  the  reahty  of  the  evangehcal  miracles  must  be  aban- 
doned. Criticism  which  renders  every  individual  lineament 
of  the  portrait  of  Christ  uncertain  must  put  an  end  to  its 
indefiniteness  and  either  give  us  a  Christ,  or,  confessing  that 
it  know^s  nothing  reliable  about  him,  must  attempt  the 
formulation  of  a  theology  which  has  no  Christ  except  as 
it  has  a  Socrates  and  a  Confucius,  if  it  can. 

What  the  future  may  hold,  no  eye  of  man  can  discern. 
But  if  this  great  contest  be  decided  in  favor  of  the  evan- 
gelical theology,  then  the  fundamental  distinctions  by  which 
the  New  England  Fathers  sought  to  define  the  holiness  of 
God  and  bring  the  virtue  of  man  into  harmony  and  likeness 
with  it,  their  emphasis  upon  the  work  of  Christ,  their  better 
conception  of  the  freedom  and  activity  of  man,  w^ill  no  doubt 
receive  renewed  attention.  If  the  interval  shall  have  suf- 
ficed to  break  certain  illusions  which  they  cherished,  it  will 
not  have  occurred  in  vain.  The  future  evangelical  the- 
ology even  of  New  England  will  not  be  *'the  New  England 
theology,"  but  to  it  that  theology  will  then  be  found  to  have 
contributed  some  of  its  most  important  principles. 

''Except  a  grain  of  wheat  fall  into  the  earth  and  die,  it 
abideth  by  itself  alone;  but  if  it  die,  it  beareth  much  fruit." 


INDEX 


INDEX 


(Figures  starred  indicate  the  principal  reference,  often  containing  the  biography 

of  an  individual.) 


Abbadie,  J.:  book,  313. 

Ability:  natural,  78;  commensurate 
with  obligation,  82,  90,  434;  Bel- 
lamy on,  no;  Hopkins  emphatic 
on,  177;  Taylor  on,  249;  Park 
gives  a  new  force  to,  260,  265. 

Actual  sin:  "no  other  sin  but,"  175. 
See  Sin,  voluntary. 

Adam:  connection  of  race  with,  87, 
5c8;  cf.  376,  467. 

Affections,  holy:  Edwards  on,  57; 
natural,  that  are  not  holy,  loi. 

Agency:  moral,  imphes  freedom,  248; 
human  and  divine,  as  estabhshed 
by  Emmons,  350. 

Allen,  A.  V.  G.:  book,  47;  cited,  48. 

Ames,  William:  his  Medulla  a  text- 
book, 16. 

Andover  Seminary:  founded,  280; 
takes  part  in  the  Unitarian  contro- 
versy, 289  ff . ;  parties  at  the  founda- 
tion of,  357;  unites  irreconcilable 
positions,  379;  influence  of,  289  ff., 
299>  304,  334,  471  ff- 

Anthropology:  Hopkins',  194;  New 
England  positions,  1815,  282;  1833, 
315- 

Arianism,  274. 

Arminianism:  conflict  with  Calvinism, 
6;  Wesleyan,  7;  in  New  England, 
7;  beginning  of  contest  with,  21; 
tendencies  toward,  42;  attacked  by 
Edwards,  52,  62  ff.;  defects  of,  at 
that  time,  76,  77;  an  appeal  to 
consciousness,  80;  a  source  of  Uni- 
tarianism,  273. 

Atonement:  Umited,  14;  Pynchon 
on,  16;  Norton's  definition,  18; 
Bellamy  introduces  the  Grotian 
theory,  113;  general  atonement, 
116;  Hopkins  on,  177;  chapter  on, 
189,  198;  Edwards,  Jr.,  on,  199; 
West  on,  204;  Emmons  makes  the 
idea  of  moral  government  promi- 
nent, 210;  Griffin,  212;  Burge,  212; 


Taylor,  213;  Finney,  215,  454;  ex- 
tent of  atonement  general,  216;  im- 
putation rejected,  221;  summary  to 
this  point,  223;  Channing  on,  288; 
Ware  demands  a  new  rationale  of, 
311;  progress  in,  315;  Emmons  on 
grace  in,  355;  Bushnell's  studies, 
416;  Harris  grounds  in  love,  427; 
Park's  presentation,  510;  his  theory, 
518. 

Augustine,  48,  87,  497,  502;  quoted, 
145,  174,  263;  interpreted  by  L, 
Beecher,  434. 

Baldwin,  Thomas:  sermon,  281. 
Balfour,  Walter:  Inquiry,  327;  no 

place  of  eternal  punishment,  327; 

impression  made,  328;    a  second 

Inquiry,  329;  the  Three  Essays, 
,  330;  illusion  as  to  his  own  services, 

338. 

Ballou,  Hosea:  effects  transfer  of 
Universal  ism  to  Unitarian  basis, 
317;  Treatise  on  Atonement,  318; 
denies  freedom,  319,  321;  origin  of 
evil,  320;  effects  of  sin,  321;  on  the 
divinity  of  Christ,  321;  death  of 
Christ,  322;  endless  punishment, 
322;  universal  salvation,  324;  re- 
ception of  his  work,  325. 

Baptism:  distress  about,  28;  mean- 
ing of  Roman  conception  of,  458. 

Barnard,  John:  sermon,  275. 

Barnes,  Albert,  450;  sermon  on 
The  Way  of  Salvation,  451. 

Baxter,  Richard:  adopted  the  Gro- 
tian theory  of  atonement,  114. 

Beecher,  Edward:  on  the  issue  with 
Unitarianism,  308;  his  own  solu- 
tion, 309. 

Beecher,  Lyman:  relation  to  Dwight 
362;  call  to  Lane,  430;  theology, 
433  ff. ;  illustration  of  election,  504. 

Bellamy,  Joseph:  chapter  on,  *io7 
ff.;    circumstances   in   which  he 


557 


INDEX 


worked,  107;  works,  108;  True  Re- 
ligion Delineated,  108;  relation  to 
Edwards'  theory  of  virtue,  108;  a 
Calvinist,  109;  new  preaching,  iii; 
original  sin,  112;  election,  112; 
atonement,  113;  general  atonement, 
116;  total  depravity,  117;  Permis- 
sion of  Sin,  118;  relation  to  Ed- 
wards, 119;  a  new  force  in  New 
England,  127;  referred  to,  131;  pre- 
cursor of  Hopkins  as  to  "willing- 
ness to  be  damned,"  156;  school  of, 
189;  Treatise  on  the  Divinity  0} 
Christ,  275. 

Belsham:  Life  of  Lindsley,  281. 

Benevolence:  the  essence  of  virtue, 
95;  distinguished  from  compla- 
cence, 96;  can  there  be  any  virtue 
without,  99 ;  relation  of,  to  eschatol- 
ogy.  197- 

Berkeley:  influence  of,  on  Edwards, 
48,  64;  on  West,  230;  on  the  New 
England  school,  239,  242;  on  Em- 
mons, 341,  342;  abandonment  of, 
246,  342,  472. 

Bible:  see  Scriptures. 

BuRGE,  Caleb:  Scripture  Doctrine  of 
Atonement,  212,  220;  no  imputa- 
tion, 222. 

Burton,  Asa,  214,  232;  his  Essays, 
*243;  three  distinct  faculties  of  the 
mind,  243;  "taste,"  243;  definition 
of  freedom,  244;  necessarian,  245; 
summary,  245. 

Bushnell,  Horace:  his  theology, 
401  IT.;  a  preacher,  401;  his  dis- 
advantages, 402;  his  prevalent 
method,  intuition,  403;  his  early 
difficulties,  404;  on  language,  404; 
fallacy  of  verbal  reasoning,  406; 
his  emphasis  on  the  religious  life, 
408;  on  the  Trinity,  409,  410; 
Christology,  410;  preserves  Christ's 
humanity,  410;  likeness  to  Ritschl, 
412;  on  Christian  nurture,  413; 
revivals,  413  £f.;  as  an  apologist, 
415;  on  atonement,  416;  rejects 
New  England  view,  while  sub- 
stantially holding  it,  418;  positive 
service,  419;  efforts  to  gain  an  ob- 
jective theory,  420;  his  retirement, 
422;  referred  to,  5 1 1 ;  quoted,  524. 

Calvin:   quoted,  27;   cited,  64,  87. 


Calvinism:  cycles  in,  6;  Edwards' 
high,  49,  50,  79;  deterministic,  79; 
Hopkins',  156,  171;  cannot  be 
maintained  upon  the  basis  of  free- 
dom, 446;  Park's  attachment  to 
502;  its  history  an  indictment  of, 
543;  the  forces  that  compelled  revis- 
ion of,  545. 

Campbell,  Macleod,  415. 

Cause:  defined  by  Edwards,  63,  71; 
God  the  only  efficient,  230,  241; 
second  causes  efficient,  247. 

Certainty:  Christian,  Edwards  on, 
58;  certainty  as  to  moral  action, 
248,  255,  444. 

Chalcedon  Christology,  296. 

Channing,  W.  E.:  quoted,  198;  en- 
ters on  the  Unitarian  controversy, 
281;  relations  to  orthodoxy,  282; 
Baltimore  sermon,  283  ff.;  on  the 
Trinity,  284;  Christology,  285;  dis- 
tinctive service,  287;  moral  perfec- 
tion of  God,  287;  total  depravity, 
288;  atonement,  288;  other  points, 
289;  Calvinism  contradicts  the 
divine  love,  289;  partial  justifica- 
tion of  his  views  of  orthodoxy,  290. 

Chastisement:  used  to  describe  the 
sufferings  of  Christ  by  Pynchon,  17; 
distinguished  by  Park  from  punish- 
ment, 534. 

Chauncy,     President  Charles: 

Book,  30;  read  Grotius,  114;   

Charles,  Jr.,  minister  in  Boston: 
book,  56;  cited,  90;  argues  for 
Universalism,  199,  206. 

Chauncy,  Isaac:  book,  21;  contra- 
dicts the  Nicene  Creed,  21. 

Christology;  orthodox,  challenged, 
276;  substantially  Nestorian,  276; 
Channing's  criticism,  285;  Stuart's 
discussion,  296;  Chalcedon's  fail- 
ure, 296;  Taylor  adds  nothing,  314; 
position  of,  about  1833,  314;  Em- 
mons', 344. 

Chubb,  Thomas,  66. 

Church:  Congregational  idea  of,  31. 

Clap,  Thomas:  essay  on  virtue,  150. 

Clark,  Peter:  book,  85. 

Clarke,  Samuel,  42,  66;  improves 
the  Grotian  theory,  114;  an  Ar- 
minian,  274. 


INDEX 


559 


Clarke,  W.  N.:  quoted,  525. 

CoBBETT,  Thomas:  book,  30. 

Cochran,  William:  propounds  doc- 
trine of  simplicity  of  moral  action, 
458;  contribution  to  New  England 
theology,  462. 

Complacence,  96,  98, 

Conscience,  natural,  100. 

Consciousness:  appeal  to,  made, 
238,  252,  253,  257;  evaded,  West, 
229;  Edwards,  Jr.,  238;  reason  and, 
different  sources  of  knowledge,  351. 

Constitution,  divine  :  Edwards'  use 
of  the  idea,  87;  Park's,  508. 

CoLMAN,  Benjamin:  cited,  42. 

Cooke,  Parsons:  Modem  Univer- 
salistn  Exposed,  329,  *337. 

Cotton,  John,  ^23;  and  Mrs.  Anne 
Hutchinson,  23;  not  clear  as  to 
faith,  26;  book,  30;  quoted  by 
I.  Mather,  32. 

Covenant,  Half-Way  :  beginnings  of, 
28;  franchise,  28;  described,  31; 
the  decisive  arguments  for,  34; 
effects  of,  35;  duration  of,  35; 
Edwards  against,  60. 

Co wles,  Henry,  454,  457;  book,  458; 
did  not  accept  simplicity  of  moral 
action,  458. 

Cumberland,  Richard:  De  Legibus 
Naturae,  48,  ^92;  utilitarian,  93. 

Damned,  willingness  to  be,  155. 

Dana,  D,:  sermon  313. 

Dana,  James:  on  the  will,  225,  231. 

"Danvers  Discussion,"  337. 

Davenport,  John:  book,  30;  against 
Half-Way  Covenant,  32. 

Day,  Jeremiah:  on  the  will,  246. 

Dean,  Paul:  lectures,  338. 

Decrees:  Hopkins  on,  170;  relation 
to  freedom,  172;  Park  on,  502. 

Depravity,  total:  in  Bellamy,  117; 
Channing,  288;  at  bottom  the  issue 
with  Unitarianism,  304,  307;  Woods 
defines,  304;  N.  W.  Taylor  on,  370; 
Park's  definition  of,  506. 

Dexter,  Henry  M.,  vi,  28. 


D WIGHT,  Timothy,  246,  273;  presi- 
dent of  Yale,  279;  Theology,  *36i; 
system  of  duties,  365;  not  utilita- 
rian, 365;  estimate  of,  366. 

Edwards,  Jonathan,  Sr.:  begins 
the  New  England  school,  8;  earlier 
labors,  *47;  reads  Locke,  etc.,  48; 
intellectual  and  spiritual  qualifica- 
tions, 49;  his  problem,  49;  col- 
league of  Stoddard,  51;  preaches  in 
Boston,  51;  a  seer,  52;  sermons  on 
Justification,  52;  imputation,  53; 
faith,  53;  quaUties  shown  in  his 
first  labors,  53;  on  inabihty,  55; 
Religious  Ajjectiojis,  57;  confusion 
of  the  sensibility  and  will,  57; 
Christian  certainty,  58;  Qualifica- 
tions for  Communion,  60;  Freedom 
of  the  Will,  62;  effects  of  ideahsm, 
64;  confounds  the  emotions  and  the 
will,  64 ;  opposes  Whitby,  65 ;  draws 
from  Locke,  69;  theory  of  the  will, 
69;  liberty  solely  external,  70,  73; 
alternate  interpretation,  70;  fore- 
knowledge of  God,  75;  logical  fail- 
ure, 75;  service  of  the  book,  77,  79; 
inability,  78;  the  prevention  of  sin, 
78;  high  Calvinism,  79;  probable 
effects  of  this  treatise,  81;  Original 
Sift,  82;  J.  Taylor  on,  82;  Ed- 
wards' reply,  85;  imputation,  86; 
all  sin  voluntary,  86;  connection 
with  Adam,  87;  idea  of  identity, 
88;  progress  made  at  this  point,  88; 
effect  on  Edwards  as  a  dialectician, 
89;  N attire  of  Virtue,  90;  theory 
unfruitful  in  Edwards'  own  work, 
91;  previous  history  of  ethical 
theory,  91;  Edwards'  starting-point, 
proof,  95;  relation  of  morality  and 
religion,  98;  no  virtue  without  be- 
nevolence, 99;  self-love,  100;  nat- 
ural conscience,  100;  summary  of 
his  services,  102;  followed  by  Bel- 
lamy, 108,  119;  reception  in  New 
England  at  large,  139,  225;  Hart 
replies  to  the  Nature  of  Virtue, 
144;  on  future  punishment,  193; 
criticized  by  Dana,  225  ff.;  Park's 
admiration  for,  258;  Oberlin's 
similarity  to,  457. 

Edwards,  Jonathan,  Jr.,  114,  ^189; 
on  the  atonement,  199;  summary  of 
the  Three  Sermons,  201  ff. ;  Dis- 
sertation   concerning    Liberty  and 


56o 


INDEX 


Necessity,  against  Samuel  West, 
237;  style,  237;  rejects  West's  psy- 
chology, 238;  weakens  his  father's 
causes  to  occasions,  239;  banishes 
efficient  causation  from  the  uni- 
verse, 240. 

Election:  Bellamy  on,  112;  Woods 
on,  305;  Park  on,  502  ff. ;  Beecher's 
illustration  of,  504.    See  Decrees. 

Ellis,  George  E.:  cited,  300. 

Endeavor,  Society  of  Christian, 
414. 

Emlyn,  Thomas,  42;  extracts  from 
his  Humble  Inquiry  printed  in  Bos- 
ton, 275;  challenged  orthodox 
Christology,  276;  succeeded  by 
Channing,  287. 

Emmons,  Nathaniel:  dependent  on 
Hopkins,  170,  173;  on  the  atone- 
ment, 210,  217;  on  freedom,  218; 
against  imputation,  222;  on  the 
will,  *24i;  God  creates  our  voli- 
tions, but  creates  them  free,  241; 
Park's  interpretation  of  Emmons, 
242;  modes  of  expression  on  the 
Trinity,  290,  299;  on  endless  pun- 
ishment, 330;  his  system,  340; 
philosophical  element,  341;  rela- 
tion to  Hopkins,  342;  general  view 
of  system,  343;  belongs  before  the 
great  controversies,  344;  Christol- 
ogy, 344;  eight  distinctive  tenets, 
345;  exercises,  345;  divine  and 
human  agency,  350;  appeals  to  con- 
sciousness, 35 1 ;  finally  renders  free- 
dom impossible,  352;  defective 
views  of  guilt,  353;  foundation  of 
right,  354;  atonenient,  355;  sim- 
plicity of  moral  action,  463. 

English,  G.  B.:  book,  281. 

Eschatology:  chapter  on,  189;  in- 
terest of  Edwardeans  in,  192;  Ed- 
wards, 192;  Bellamy,  193;  Hop- 
kins, Inquiry,  193;  eternal  punish- 
ment and  benevolence,  197;  num- 
ber of  the  saved,  198;  Emmons' 
contribution,  353;  N.  W.  Taylor, 
394- 

Ethical  element  in  theology,  90, 
215. 

Ethics  and  religion,  98. 
Evil,  prevention  of:  see  Sin, 
Evolution:  early  discussion  of,  by 


Samuel  Harris,  428;  H,  B.  Smith, 
fails  to  grasp,  447 ;  not  appreciated 
by  the  school,  550. 

Exercise  scheme:  Hopkins,  160; 
Emmons,  345;  in  connection  with 
the  taste  scheme,  346;  Burton's 
view,  348;  Woods  for  taste  scheme, 
360;  so  D  wight,  363, 

Fairchild,  James  H.:  on  the  will, 
253;  consciousness,  254;  falls 
short  of  freedom,  255;  cited,  454, 
457;  on  result  of  the  doctrine  of 
simpHcity  of  moral  action,  462; 
Elements  of  Theology,  ^^6g. 

Faith:  obscurity  as  to,  26;  West- 
minster Confession  on,  27;  Calvin 
on,  27;  Edwards  on,  53;  Hopkins' 
definition,  184, 

Finney,  C,  G.:  atonement,  215;  on 
the  will,  *252;  his  theology,  453; 
connection  with  N.  W,  Taylor,  453, 
467;  perfection,  457;  books,  458; 
cited,  459;  publishes  theology,  464; 
editions,  465;  freedom  basal,  466; 
on  moral  obligation,  466;  on  the 
origin  of  sin  in  the  individual,  467. 

Fisher,  George  P.,  vi;  cited,  48; 
book,  102;  cited  247;  comes  to 
Yale  Seminary,  422;  an  apologist, 
423. 

Fitch,  Professor,  246. 

Foreknowledge:  Edwards  on,  75, 
77;  Samuel  West  on,  237;  myste- 
rious, Fairchild,  255;  relation  of,  to 
election,  310, 

Foster,  John:  referred  to,  361, 

Foster,  George  B.:  book,  550. 

Frank,  Fr,  H,  R.,  446. 

Freedom  of  the  will:  Edwards' 
treatise  on,  62;  Whitby's  definition 
of,  65;  Locke's,  67,  69;  the  funda- 
mental question,  124;  Hopkins  de- 
fines anew,  167;  Emmons,  218; 
Stephen  West,  228;  Samuel  West, 
revolutionary,  232;  Burton's  defini- 
tion of,  244;  proposal  of  a  true  free- 
dom, 246;  "power  to  the  contrary," 
247;  Upham's  definition,  252; 
Fairchild  falls  short  of,  255;  Harris' 
definitions,  256;  not  exercised  in 
every  act,  262-  Park's  view  of,  266; 
election  consistent  with,  305 ;  Ballou 


INDEX 


S6i 


denies,  319;  under  the  divine  agen- 
cy, 350;  Emmons  eviscerates,  352; 
Dwight  for,  363;  Pond's  definition 
of,  437;  basal  with  Finney,  466; 
Park's  appHcation  of,  505;  his 
hesitation  between  freedom  and  de- 
terminism, 529. 

Freeman,  James  :  minister  of  King's 
Chapel,  *2  77;  becomes  a  Unitarian, 
277;  preaching,  277. 

Freiheit,  reale,  252;  referred  to  by 
H.  B.  Smith,  441, 

Gardiner,  J.  S.  J.:  sermon,  281. 

Good,  apparent:  and  the  will,  72, 
261,  262. 

Goodrich,  C.  A.,  246. 

Gordon,  G.  A.:  his  determinism  and 
universalism,  535. 

Government,  moral:  N.  W.  Taylor 
on,  393;  Finney  on,  466, 

Griffin,  E.  D.:  on  the  atonement, 

^212;  general  atonement,  217;  Park 
St.  Lectures,  313. 

Grotius,  113;  Grotian  theory  of  the 
atonement,  114;  studied  in  New 
England,  114;  God  not  the  offended 
party,  114;  Edwards'  theory  of 
virtue  and,  115;  Mayhew  adopts, 
133;  Hopkins,  177;  Woods,  306; 
misunderstood  by  H.  B.  Smith,  443. 

Hamilton,  Sir  W.,  428,  472. 

Harris,  Samuel:  on  the  will,  255; 
definitions,  255;  self-determina- 
tion, 255,  256;  distinction  between 
choice  and  volition,  256;  occupies 
the  general  New  England  position, 
424,  428,  552;  range  of  citation, 
426;  Philosophical  Basis  of  Theism, 
42  7 ;  comparison  with  Sir  W.  Hamil- 
ton, 428, 

Hart,  William:  on  Edwards'  theory 
of  virtue,  144;  Hopkins'  reply  to, 
158. 

Harvard  College:  influence  of,  131, 
146,  232,  275,  279,  304,  307  £f. 

Harvey,  Joseph:  reviews  Taylor, 
372;  rejects  new  theory  of  the  will, 
372;  discusses  permission  of  sin, 
373;  Taylor  replies,  374;  Harvey 
makes  rejoinder,  375;  further 
writings,  377. 


Hawes,  Joel,  391. 
Hayes,  Lemuel:  sermon  against  uni- 
versalism, 326. 

Heathen:  prospects  of,  138;  Bel- 
lamy on,  193;  Park  on,  504,  528, 
535- 

h!egel,  G.  W.  F.:  cited,  358,  425; 
referred  to,  500. 

Hemmenway,    Moses  :  controversy 

with  Hopkins  on  "use  of  means," 

*i46;  origin  of  his  difficulties,  147; 

summary    of    his    position,  150; 

Hopkins'  reply,  159. 
Herbert  of  Cherbury,  274. 
Heredity:  as  explanation  of  original 

sin,  442. 
HiGGiNSON,  John:  book,  30. 
History:  appealed  to  by  Norton,  302 ; 

New  England  theology  defective  in, 

476. 

Hobbes,  Thomas,  66;  ethical  serv- 
ices, 91. 

Hodge,  Charles,  431. 

Holmes,  O.  W.:  on  Edwards,  102. 

Hooker,  Thomas:  book,  30;  quoted 
by  I.  Mather,  32,  222. 

Hopkins,  Samuel:  chapters  on,  *  129, 
162;  first  New  England  system, 
129;  Sin  an  Advantage  to  the  Uni- 
verse, 130;  an  optimist,  131;  con- 
troversy with  Mayhew,  131;  use 
of  "means,"  137,  138;  controversy 
with  Mills,  140;  with  Hart,  144; 
with  Hemmenway,  146;  Inquiry 
into  the  Nature  of  True  Holiness, 
150;  wiUingness  to  be  damned,  155; 
reply  to  Hart,  158;  reply  to  Hem- 
menway, 159;  his  "System,"  162; 
Hopkins'  learning,  162;  Scriptures 
in  the  system,  165;  God,  165; 
Trinity,  166;  modifying  ideas,  166; 
on  freedom  of  the  will,  167;  de- 
crees, 170;  supralapsarianism,  174; 
original  sin,  175;  ability.  177; 
atonement,  177;  regeneration,  182; 
saving  faith,  184;  imputation,  185; 
estimate  of  the  system,  185;  school 
of  Hopkins,  189;  eschatology  of 
Hopkins,  193;  the  Millennium,  198; 
sermon  on  divinity  of  Christ,  275; 
simplicity  of  moral  action,  463; 
quoted,  479. 


562 


INDEX 


Hudson,  Charles:  Series  0}  Letters 
against  Universalism,  332. 

Hudson,  C.  F.  :  question  of  annihila- 
tion, 339. 

Humanity  of  Christ:  not  distinctly 
affirmed  by  Channing,  299;  taught 
by  Stuart,  299;  by  Andrews  Nor- 
ton, 302;  saved  by  Bushnell,  410. 

Huntington,  Joseph:  Calvmism 
Improved,  191. 

HuTCHESON,  Francis:  on  ethical 
theory,  93. 

Hutchinson,  Mrs.  Anne,  23;  her 
spiritual  exercises,  24;  adherence 
to  Cotton,  24;  meetings  at  her 
house,  24;  synod  against  her,  24; 
her  views,  24. 

Identity:  Edwards'  speculations  up- 
on, 88. 

Immortality:  apologetic  place  of  the 

doctrine  of,  395. 
Imputation:    rejected  by  Pynchon, 

17,  18;  defended  by  Edwards,  53; 

Edwards'  modifications,  86,  221; 

Hopkins'  view  of,  185;  removed 

from  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement, 

221. 

Inability,  doctrine  of,  14,  26; 
paralyzing  effect  of,  29;  breaks 
down  the  doctrine  of  the  new  birth, 
32;  the  principal  cause  of  New  En- 
gland decline,  43;  Edwards  on,  55; 
moral  defined,  73;  criticized,  78; 
blameworthy,  in;  Mayhew  on, 
132;  Hemmenway  on,  147;  Hop- 
kins begins  to  clear  up,  160;  Hop- 
kins emphasizes,  177;  Edwards' 
doctrine  criticized,  236,  395. 

Inclination:  ambiguous  term,  64, 
169. 

Infants,  salvation  of,  509. 
Inspiration:  Hopkins'  use,  165. 
Instantaneousness  of  conversion, 
i83>  527- 

Justice:  Edwards'  definition  of,  91, 
99;  distriVjutive,  new  definition  of, 
208;  God's  to  himself,  213;  finally, 
public  justice,  440. 

Justification:  Mrs.  Hutchinson  on, 
25;  Edwards'  sermons  on,  52;  de- 
fined, 53. 


Kahnis,  K.  F.  a.,  268,  500. 
Kames,  Lord,  66. 
Kenotics,  268,  499. 

Latitudinarianism,  273. 
Learning  of  the  'New  England 

divines:  considerable,  48,  162. 
Leibnitz:   correspondence  with 

Clarke,  48;  optimism  of,  120,  171, 

397>  484. 
Liberty:  see  Freedom. 
Lindsley:  Belsham's  Ufe  of,  281. 
Locke:  cited,  64;  Essay  on  Human 

Understanding,   67;    argument  on 

the  will,  67;   change  of  view,  68; 

new  division  of  the  mental  faculties, 

68;  liberty,  69;  on  ethical  theory, 

93- 

LoTZE,  Herrmann:  referred  to,  238; 
quoted,  487. 

McClure,  a.  W.  :  book,  337. 
Magoun,  G.  F.:  cited,  92;  quoted, 
93- 

Mahan,  Asa:  president  of  Oberlin, 
454;  remarkable  religious  experi- 
ence, 455;  new  doctrine  of  perfec- 
tion, 455. 

Malebranche:    cited,  48,    64,  69; 

referred  to,  120. 
Mather,  Cotton:  quoted,  27;  cited, 

34 ;  on  New  England  degeneracy,  36. 
Mather,  Increase:  book,  30;  style 

of  his  preaching,  31;  against,  and 

later  for,  Half-Way  Covenant,  32; 

book  quoted,  35;  against  Stoddard, 

38. 

Mather,  Richard:  in  favor  of  Half- 
Way  Covenant,  33. 

Mather,  Samuel:  tract  on  Believing 
the  Trinity,  275. 

Mayhew,  Jonathan:  on  inabihty, 
131;  on  means  of  regeneration,  132; 
Grotian  theory  of  the  atonement, 
133- 

Means  of  regeneration:  Mayhew 
on,  133;  Hopkins  on,  137;  com- 
prehensively, the  truth,  137,  528; 
Hemmenway  on,  146;  Spring  on, 
381;  Taylor  on,  and  controversies, 
382  ff. 


INDEX 


563 


Mill,  J.  S.:  quoted,  63;  cited,  229, 
261. 

Millennium:  Hopkins  on,  198. 
Mills,  Jedediah:   on  State  0}  the 

Unre  generate,  140. 
Ministry,  unconverted:  defended, 

40. 

Miracles:  Park  on,  495. 

Mitchell,  Jonathan:  book,  30; 
quoted,  35. 

Moody,  S.:  replies  to  Bellamy,  124. 

Morgan,  John,  454:  on  the  Gift  of 
the  Holy  Ghost,  456;  book,  458. 

Motives:  Edwards  makes  them 
causes,  69,  71;  Samuel  West  con- 
tradicts, 235;  comparison  of,  236, 
254;  Edwards,  Jr.,  makes  them  oc- 
casions, 239;  Taylor  gives  them  in- 
fluence, 248;  Park  denies  that  they 
are  causes,  259;  but  this  ineffectual- 
ly, 261. 

MuLLER,  Julius,  268. 

Murray,  John:  preaches  Rellyan 
Universalism,  190;  answered  by 
Hopkins,  194. 

Necessity:  philosophical,  72;  and 
foreknowledge,  75. 

Nestorianism:  of  Calvinism,  276; 
of  Emmons,  344  f . ;  Bushnell  repu- 
diates, 409. 

Neutrality  of  the  sensibility,  247, 

New  England  churches:  their  de- 
cline, 27;  fundamental  change  in 
constitution,  31;  dechne  in  the 
ministry,  40. 

New  England  theology:  rise,  3; 
relation  to  New  England  develop- 
ment, 3;  wider  relations,  4;  cycles 
of,  7;  begun  by  Edwards,  8;  a 
world-phenomenon,  8;  source  of 
materials,  8;  method  of  the  study  of, 
9;  genetic  history  of,  10;  summary 
of  the  story  of,  10;  definitely  ap- 
pears in  Bellamy's  writings,  127; 
best  early  summary  in  Hopkins, 
186;  position  of,  at  outbreak  of  Uni- 
tarian controversy,  282;  position  at 
its  close,  314;  condemned  by  Shedd, 
450;  its  collapse,  543;  fundamen- 
tally a  defense  546;  incidental  ef- 


fects of,  546;  preparation  of 
churches  for  the  future,  548;  three 
points  of  failure  as  a  school,  549  ff. 

New  Haven  theology,  118;  the 
later,  chapter  on,  401 ;  Bushnell, 
401;  Fisher,  422;  Samuel  Harris, 
423;  see  N.  W.  Taylor. 

New  School,  the:  in  Presbyterian- 
ism,  chapter  on,  430;  formation  of 
the  New  School  Church,  431;  theo- 
logical sterility,  432;  Lyman  Beech- 
er,  ^432;  his  writings,  433;  a  Tay- 
lorite,  433;  interprets  Augustine, 
434;  H.  B.  Smith,  435;  W.  G.  T. 
Shedd,  448;  Albert  Barnes,  450; 
Princeton  contention  justified,  452. 

Newman,  J.  H.:  quoted,  424  f, 

NiLES,  Samuel:  book,  84. 

Norton,  Andrews:  Statement  0} 
Reasons,  301;  the  Trinity  incred- 
ible, 301;  charges  Stuart  with  eva- 
sion, 301;  introduces  history  into 
the  controversy,  302;  summarizes 
Unitarianism,  303. 

Norton,  John:  definition  of  the 
atonement,  18;  his  Orthodox  Evan- 
gelist, *2o;  freedom,  21;  dying  ut- 
terance quoted,  33;  quotes  Grotius, 
114. 

Number  of  the  saved:  Hopkins, 
198;  Park,  504,  535. 

Obedience,  Christ's:  central  point 
of  Pynchon's  view  of  the  atonement, 
17;  Taylor,  the  same,  84;  imputed 
to  believers,  Hopkins,  180, 

Oherlin  Evangelist,  458. 

Oberlin  theology:  chapter  on,  453; 
Finney,  453;  character  of  Oberhn 
colony,  454;  origin  of  a  new  view 
of  Christian  perfection,  454;  point 
of  connection  with  Edwards,  457; 
simpHcity  of  moral  action,  458; 
William  Cochran,  458;  contribu- 
tion to  theology,  462;  Finney,  464; 
Fairchild,  469. 

Obligation,  moral:  Finney's  view 
of,  466;  see  Virtue. 

Occasionalism,  230. 

Optimism:  Bellamy,  120;  Hopkins, 
131,171;  N.  W.  Tavlor,  397:  Park 
48d. 


5^4 


INDEX 


Paley,  William,  477. 

Park,  E.  A.,  v,  9,  47,  439;  cited,  48; 
on  Edwards,  102;  cited,  115,  223, 
225,  237;  his  interpretation  of  Em- 
mons' second  causes,  242;  on  the 
'  will,  258;  relation  to  Edwards,  259; 
followed  the  younger  Edwards'  in- 
terpretation, 259;  divergences  from 
Edwards,  259;  on  "greatest  ap- 
parent good,"  260;  really  leaves 
motives  under  category  of  cause, 
261,  263;  "usage"  of  the  will,  261; 
no  sin  under  this  theory,  262; 
supralapsarianism,  262;  the  crux 
of  his  system,  264;  divine  perfec- 
tions, 264;  on  ability,  265;  total 
practical  outcome  of  these  positions, 
266;  used  and  refused  to  use  the 
idea  of  divine  self-hmitation,  268; 
sources  of  sketch  of  his  theology, 
269;  cited  as  to  Emmons,  341;  on 
the  Trinity,  344,  411;  atonement, 
416;  controversy  with  Hodge,  431; 
chapter  on  his  theology,  *47i;  his 
place  in  the  history,  471;  Scotch 
philosophy,  472;  relation  to  Taylor 
and  Woods,  473;  a  system,  473; 
method  inductive,  474,  550;  ration- 
alistic, 475;  use  of  Bible,  475,  478, 
492;  and  history,  476;  distinguishes 
natural  from  revealed  theology,  477; 
starting-point,  cause,  478;  course 
of  argument,  478;  earliest  proof  of 
God,  478;  relation  of  Bible  to 
natural  theology,  479;  immortahty, 
480;  prevention  of  sin,  482;  pre- 
decessors on  this  topic,  482;  agree- 
ment and  disagreement  with  Tay- 
lor, 483  f. ;  moral  government,  484; 
benevolence  of  God,  485;  philo- 
sophical skepticism,  486;  one  divine 
moral  attribute,  488;  distinctions 
as  to  benevolence,  489;  justice,  490; 
love  the  principle  of  the  theology, 
491;  the  Bible,  492,  *495;  influ- 
ence of  modern  ideas,  493  f.;  mir- 
acles, 495;  Trinity,  496;  humanity 
of  Christ,  497;  divinity  of  Christ, 
498;  defects  of  his  treatment,  499, 
501;  the  Holy  Spirit,  499;  defini- 
tion of  the  Trinity,  500;  the  "New 
School,"  500;  decrees,  502;  apph- 
cation  of  freedom,  505;  sin,  505; 
original  sin,  507;  the  fall,  508;  our 
connection  with  Adam,  508;  salva- 
tion of  infants,  509;  atonement,  510; 


previous  New  England  positions, 
510;  Park's  presentation  deter- 
mined by  historical  reasons,  511; 
definitions,  512;  largeness  of  out- 
look, 513;  analysis,  513;  sacrifice, 
515;  sufferings  of  Christ,  515;  con- 
nection of  human  and  divine  govern- 
ments, 515;  the  "appeal"  of  the 
atonement,  516;  the  theory,  518; 
influence  of  this  theory  in  New  En- 
gland, 524;  regeneration,  525;  does 
not  discuss  Taylor's  proposals,  525; 
definitions,  526;  hesitation  between 
freedom  and  determinism,  529; 
God  the  author  of  regeneration,  529; 
man  the  sole  author  of  conversion, 
530;  sanctification,  531;  justifica- 
tion, 532;  eschatology,  533. 

Pelagianism:  of  the  Arminians,  76, 
77;  of  Hart,  144;  of  Ware,  308, 
309;  charged  against  Taylorism, 
431;  Beecher  repels  the  charge  of, 
434,  435- 

Pilgrims,  from  Scrooby,  12;  not 

theologians,  12. 
Plan  of  union,  430. 
Platonists,  Cambridge:  on  ethics, 

92. 

Pond,  Enoch,  ^435;  pupil  of  Em- 
mons, 436;  witness  of  the  Spirit, 
436;  on  Trinity,  437;  will,  437; 
other  points,  438. 

Porter,  Noah:  quoted,  246. 

Power:  West's  discussion  of,  229; 
"power  to  the  contrary,"  247. 

Preaching:  early  New  England,  de- 
pressing, 30;  Bellamy  introduces  a 
new  style,  iii;  Hopkins  helps,  184. 

Presbyterianism:  see  New  School. 

Princeton:  antagonism  to  every- 
thing New  England,  431;  justified 
by  the  history,  452. 

Psychology:  Edwards',  bad,  64ff.; 
Hopkins',  168;  Burton  and  Taylor's 
improvement  of,  412;  Samuel 
West's  improvements,  232;  Ed- 
wards, Jr.,  reactionary,  238;  Bur- 
ton's introduction  of  a  new,  243  ff.; 
Taylor  adopts  it,  247;  Upham's 
contributions  to,  249;  Harris',  257; 
Park's,  259. 

Punishment:  design  and  nature,  534; 
Park  on  eternal,  535. 


INDEX 


Puritans,  15. 

Pynchon,  William:  founder  of 
Springfield,  *i6;  his  book,  Meri- 
torious Price,  16;  criticizes  current 
theory  of  the  atonement,  16;  antici- 
pates later  definitions,  17;  against 
imputation,  17;  his  theory,  17; 
second  book,  19;  uttered  a  protest, 
not  constructive,  20;  influence,  20; 
cited,  114. 

Rationalism,  300;  of  Emmons,  341; 

of  Park,  475,  493. 
Reductio  ad  ahsurdum:  the  argument, 

68,  74;    turned  against  Edwards, 

235- 

Reformation,  the:  cycles  of  events, 
5- 

Regeneration  (see  Means):  Hop- 
kins' viev^  of,  as  consisting  in  a 
change  of  the  will,  182;  instantane- 
ous, 183;  in  connection  with  the 
exercise  and  taste  "schemes,"  346 
£f.;  D wight,  364;  Taylor's  defini- 
tion, 383;  still  a  matter  of  power, 
435;  Park's  discussion,  525  ff. 

Religion,  essence  or:  Edwards,  97, 
98. 

Relly,  James:  on  Union,  190. 

Rellyanism:  anticipated,  25;  intro- 
duced into  America,  190;  Hunting- 
ton's, 191;  Smalley's  reply,  199; 
Strong's  reply,  209;  the  occasion 
of  promulgating  the  New  England 
doctrine  of  the  atonement,  199,  454. 

Restorationist  Association,  332, 
338. 

Revival:  in  Northampton,  56;  Bush- 
nell  on,  413  ff.;  philosophy  of,  Park, 
527  ff. 

Richards,  James,  441. 

Riley,  J.  W.:  cited,  279. 

Ritschl,  Albrecht:  Bushnell  re- 
sembles, 412,  415. 

RoBBiNS,  Thomas:  sermons,  313. 

Robinson,  John,  *i2;  writings,  12; 
Defence,  12;  Calvinist,  13;  on  pre- 
vention of  sin,  13;  on  freedom,  14; 
on  inability  of  man  to  do  good,  14; 
limited  atonement,  14. 

Rogers,  Samuel:  book,  391. 

Royce,  Andrew:  book,  337. 


Sacrifice:  Park  on,  515  ff. 
Sanctification  :    OberHn  views  on, 

454,  458. 
Schleiermacher,  8. 

Scotch  school  of  philosophy:  in- 
fluence of,  246,  342,  472. 

Scriptures:  Edwards'  proof  of,  58, 
59;  Hopkins',  164;  Park's,  493. 

Self-determination:  Edwards  on, 
65  ff.;  Stephen  West  on,  234  ff.; 
Upham,  252;  Harris,  255. 

Selfishness:  the  essence  of  sin,  118; 
so  in  Hopkins,  153;  Harris'  better 
statement,  426. 

Self-limitation,  divine,  268;  in  re- 
spect to  power,  374  ff.;  denied  by 
H.  B.  Smith,  445;  in  Park,  268. 

Self-love:  in  sense  of  selfishness,  in 
Edwards,  100;  in  Hopkins,  152; 
essence  of  sin,  153,  426;  in  sense  of 
desire  of  happiness,  in  N.  W.  Tay- 
lor, 383  ff.;  misunderstood  by  H, 
B.  Smith,  445. 

Shaftesbury:  on  ethical  theory,  93. 

Shedd,  W.  G.  T.:  quoted,  260;  New 
School  Presbyterian,  *448;  con- 
demns New  England  theology,  450; 
use  of  history,  476. 

Sherman,  John:  defends  Unitarian- 
ism,  279. 

Simplicity  of  moral  action:  Ober- 
lin  position  on,  458;  appears  in  Em- 
mons, 463;  and  in  Hopkins,  463, 
note. 

Sin:  prevention  of,  78,  118,  130,  370 
ff.,  396,  444,  482;  author  of,  79,  126; 
an  infinite  evil,  85,  196;  all  sin  vol- 
untary, 86,  176,  505;  Edwards'  gain 
in  the  discussion  of,  88;  original, 
Bellamy  on,  112;  Park,  507;  con- 
sists in  selfishness,  118,  394,  426; 
necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good,  123,  173,  227,  371,  444;  an 
"advantage,"  130;  origin  of,  in  in- 
fant, 376,  467. 

Smalley,  John:  on  Universalism  and 
the  atonement,  *i99,  221. 

Smith,  H.  B.:  quoted,  72,  346,  358; 
cited,  364,  400,  432;  education, 
*435;  studied  Emmons,  438;  was 
his  theology  New  England  theology  ? 
439;  Edwardean  as  to  will,  440;  on 


566 


INDEX 


the  atonement,  442;  misunder- 
stands Grotius,  442;  and  Taylor, 
443;  relation  to  Taylorism,  444;  as 
an  original  theologian,  446;  as  an 
apologist,  447;  on  evolution,  447; 
quoted,  474,  514. 

Smith,  H.  P.:  referred  to,  548. 

Smith,  Matthew  Hale:  book,  326. 

Smyth,  E.  C:  book,  102. 

Soul,  substantial:  Emmons'  doubt- 
ful position,  341  ff.;  Dwight  strong 
for,  363. 

Sources  of  this  history,  v. 

Sovereignty  of  God:  effects  of  the 
doctrine  of,  29;  Edwards'  view  of, 
49;  Bellamy  on,  112, 

Spinoza:  referred  to,  313. 

Spring,  Gardiner:  Dissertation  on 
the  Means  of  Regeneration,  381; 
makes  them  no  means,  382, 

Spring,  Samuel:  cited,  153, 

Stearns,  L.  F.:  cited,  437. 

Stebbing,  66. 

Stevens,  G.  B.:  article,  412. 

Stoddard,  Solomon:  book,  30;  ad- 
mits the  unregenerate  to  the  Lord's 
table,  32;  on  observance  of  the 
Supper,  36;  introduces  his  method, 
to  the  general  practice,  *37;  his 
doctrine,  38;  not  accurate,  39;  de- 
fends unconverted  ministry,  40; 
connection  with  Edwards,  51. 

Stone,  Samuel:   Body  of  Divinity, 

*22. 

Strong,  Nathan:  rephes  to  Hunt- 
ington, ^209. 

Stuart,  Moses,  9 ;  reply  to  Channing, 
^289;  emphasizes  the  numerical 
unity  of  God,  291;  discusses  the 
word  "person,"  291;  prefers  the 
word  "distinction,"  292;  rejects 
"eternal  generation,"  293;  objects 
to  the  Nicene  creed,  293;  Letters  to 
Dr.  Miller,  294;  Unitarians  incom- 
petent to  define  the  divine  unity, 
295;  three  not  one,  296;  Christol- 
ogy,  296;  fails  to  maintain  the 
unity  of  Christ's  person,  298;  as 
an  exegete,  299;  humanity  of  Christ, 
299;  in  the  Universalist  contro- 
versy, 334. 

Sublapsarianism,  14. 


Supralapsarianism,  21,  23;  of  Ed- 
wards, 79;  Hopkins,  174;  Park, 
225,  262;  inconsistent  with  the  Ed- 
war  dean  theory  of  virtue,  264;  Ware 
charges  it  upon  Woods,  310. 

Synod,  reforming,  of  1679,  36;  re- 
sult, 37= 

Systems  of  divinity,  20,  21,  22,  129, 
162,  *34off.,  423'  436,  439'  448, 
464,  469,  471. 

Taste:  i.  q.  sensibiHty,  proposed  by 
Burton,  243;  "taste  scheme":  see 
Exercise. 

Taylor,  John,  42,  66;  on  Original 
Sin,  82;  Edwards'  reply,  84;  Wes- 
ley, 84. 

Taylor,  N.  W.,  9,  118,  126;  on  the 
atonement,  213;  better  psychology, 
213;  takes  up  Burton's  proposals, 
^246;  adopts  Scotch  school  of  philos- 
ophy, 246;  the  threefold  division  of 
the  mind,  247;  efficiency  of  second 
causes,  247;  "power  to  the  contra- 
ry," 247;  certainty,  248,  377; 
abihty,  249;  on  Trinity  anticipated 
by  Stuart,  295;  closes  the  New 
England  reply  to  Unitarians,  313; 
their  fundamental  fallacy,  313; 
chapter  on,  369;  the  Concio  ad 
Clerum,  370;  positions  on  moral 
depravity,  370;  the  strange  element 
in  his  positions,  370;  new  idea  on 
the  prevention  of  sin,  371;  contro- 
versy with  Harvey,  372;  pressed 
hard  as  to  certainty  of  sin,  and  ori- 
gin of  sin  in  child,  375;  explains 
original  sin,  376;  fails  to  explain 
certainty,  377;  controversy  with 
Woods,  377;  Woods  fails  to  get  his 
point  of  view,  378;  both  Woods  and 
Harvey  outside  the  current  of  de- 
velopment, 379;  Taylor  replies, 
380;  controversy  with  Tyler,  381; 
Spring's  Dissertation,  381;  Taylor's 
review,  382;  seeks  neutral  point  in 
mind,  383;  defines  regeneration, 
383;  process  of  regeneration,  383; 
self-love,  384;  suspension  of  selfish 
principle,  384;  agent  of  regenera- 
tion, 385;  Tyler  rephes,  386;  Tay- 
lor reviews  Tyler,  390;  declares 
they  agree,  391;  on  Moral  Govern- 
ment, 393;  predecessors  on  this 
topic,  393  f.;  departs  from  Edwards, 


INDEX 


567 


395;  prevention  of  sin,  396;  ad- 
vance on  the  Concio,  398;  summary 
of  Taylor's  services,  399;  connec- 
tion with  Finney,  453;  relation  to 
Park,  473  ff.;  cited,  480. 

Testimony  of  the  Spirit,  58,  59. 

Tenney,  H.  M.,  269. 

Thomasius,  G.,  V,  268, 

Tillotson,  Abp,,  42. 

Tracy,  Joseph:  cited,  54. 

Trinity:  Channing's  objections  to, 
284;  Stuart's  defense,  291 ;  position 
of  the  doctrine  in  New  England, 
300;  Stuart's  Trinity  modal,  302; 
Taylor's  definition  of,  313;  position 
of  doctrine  about  1833,  314. 

Trumbull,  B.:  quoted,  37,  42. 

TURNBULL,  66. 

TuRRETiN,  Francis:  cited,  424. 

Tyler,  Bennet:  Strictures  on  N.  W. 
Taylor,  386;  misunderstandings, 
386;  denies  neutrality  of  any  voli- 
tion, 387 ;  seven  questions  to  Taylor, 
389;  later  events  of  the  controversy, 
391  ff. 

Tyler,  E.  R.:  Lectures  on  Future 
Punishment,  383;  sermon  on  Holi- 
ness Preferable  to  Sin,  381. 

Uniformity  of  human  action:  ex- 
plained by  Harris,  257. 

Unitarianism,  8,  190;  Unitarian  con- 
troversy, chapter  on,  273;  rise  in 
New  England,  274;  Emlyn's  Hum- 
hie  Inquiry,  275;  effect  of  Revolu- 
tion, 277;  King's  Chapel,  277; 
events  in  Connecticut,  278;  Yale, 
279;  Harvard,  279;  Noah  Worces- 
ter's book,  280;  pubHcation  of  Bel- 
sham's  Life  of  Lindsley,  and  out- 
break of  controversy,  281;  Chan- 
ning's entry  on  the  scene,  281 ;  state 
of  New  England  theology  at  this 
point,  282;  Channing's  summary 
of  Unitarianism  at  Baltimore,  283 
ff.;  Stuart's  reply,  ^289;  criticism, 
298;  biblical  discussion,  299;  re- 
sult of  the  Channing-Stuart  discus- 
sion, 300;  Andrews  Norton,  301; 
summary  of  Unitarianism,  303; 
Woods  repHes  to  Channing,  ^304; 
Ware,  *3o6;  Taylor  closes  the  con- 
troversy, 313;  position  gained  by 
New  England  theology,  314, 


Universalism,  8;  introduced  into 
America,  190;  Rellyan  variety  of, 
190;  Huntington,  191;  progress  of, 
199;  Chauncy's  Salvation  of  all 
Men,  206;  Edwards'  reply,  207; 
Strong's  reply  to  Huntington,  209; 
change  to  the  Unitarian  type,  316; 
Winchester,  316;  Ballou,  317;  re- 
linquishment of  the  controversy, 
325;  Walter  Balfour,  326;  Em- 
mons, 330;  Hudson,  332;  Restora- 
tionist  Association,  332;  Stuart  re- 
plies to  Balfour,  334;  outcome,  338. 

Upham,  T.  C,  *249;  on  the  will,  250; 
threefold  division  of  the  mind,  250; 
laws  of  the  will,  251;  freedom,  252. 

Utilitarianism:  in  Cumberland,  93; 
in  Hutcheson,  94;  Bellamy  against, 
109;  Dwight  not  for,  365 ;  Park  dis- 
cusses, 531. 

Vincent:  explanation  of  the  cate- 
chism, on  holiness,  151. 

Virtue:  Edwards'  theory  of,  57;  de- 
termining principle  of  the  school, 
91,  *95;  influence  on  election,  113; 
relation  to  the  use  of  "means,"  133; 
Hart  replies  to,  144;  controverted, 
by  Clap,  150;  refutes  supralap- 
sarianismi,  264. 

Walker,  Professor  W.:  cited,  28. 

W^ardlaw,  Ralph:  discourses,  313. 

Ware,  Henry,  279;  Letters  to  Trini- 
tarians, etc.,  306;  view  of  man,  307, 
308;  use  of  supralapsarianism,  310; 
demands  a  new  rationale  of  the 
atonement,  311;  his  own  view,  311. 

Welde,  T.:  Short  Story,  24. 

Wesley,  John:  replies  to  Taylor  on 
Original  Sin,  84;  quoted,  456. 

West,  Samuel:  Essays,  ^23 2;  pro- 
poses a  new  psychology  of  volition, 
232;  distinction  between  emotion 
and  will,  233;  self-determination, 
233  £f. ;  opposes  Stephen  West  on 
sole  causaHty  of  God,  236. 

West,  Stephen:  on  the  atonement, 
^204,  216;  on  the  will,  227;  agrees 
with  Hopkins,  228,  231;  denies  the 
appeal  to  consciousness,  229;  dis- 
cusses power,  229;  puts  all  efficient 
causation  in  God,  230;  contribu- 
tion to  the  system,  230;  new  edition 


568 


INDEX 


of  the  book,  231;  on  the  divinity  of 
Christ,  313. 

Westminster  Confession,  7;  adopted 
in  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut, 
15,  21,  22;  on  faith,  27;  Edwards, 
59;  Bellamy,  119;  on  unregenerate 
works,  139;  Hopkins,  163,  166,  180, 
185;  relation  of  school  to  about 
1815,  282;  Woods's  relation  to,  309, 
357;  Harris  cites,  424;  standard  of 
New  School  Presbyterianism,  432, 
433;  influence  on  H.  B.  Smith,  441; 
influence  on  Albert  Barnes,  452; 
Finney's  relations  to,  454;  Park, 
502,  507. 

Wheelwright,  John,  15. 

Whitby,  Daniel,  42;  Six  Discourses, 
^65;  definition  of  freedom,  65,  76; 
Arminian  and  Unitarian,  274. 

White,  Jeremiah:  Salvation  of  All 
Men,  194. 

Whitefield,  George,  41,  56, 

Whittemore,  Thomas:  Plaiit  Guide 
to  Uiiiversalism,  338. 

Wigglesworth,  Edward,  275. 

Will:  confounded  with  the  emotions, 
64;  Edwards'  theory  of,  69;  is  as 
the  greatest  apparent  good,  72 ;  self- 
determining  power,  74;  Hopkins' 
modifications,  167;  chapter  on,  224; 
tragic  elements  in,  225;  Dana's 
Examination,  225;  Stephen  West, 
227;  Dana's  second  book,  231; 
Samuel  West,  Essays  on  Liberty 
and  Necessity,  232;  Edwards,  Jr., 
Dissertation,  237;  Emmons,  241; 
Burton's  Essays,  the  beginning  of  a 


new  view,  243;  Burton  necessarian, 
245;  N.  W.  Taylor  proposes  a 
theory  of  freedom,  246;  Upham, 
249;  Finney,  252;  Fairchild,  253; 
Harris,  255;  Park,  258. 
WiLLARD,  Samuel:  Complete  Body  of 
Divinity,  *22;  anthropology  con- 
fused, 22. 

Williams,  Samuel:  book,  133. 
Winchester,  Elhanan:  restoration- 
ist,  316. 

WiNSLOw,  Hubbard:  book,  391. 
WoLLEBius,  15. 

Woods,  Leonard:  cited,  280;  Letters 
to  Unitarians,  *304;  depravity,  304; 
election,  305 ;  limitations  in  contro- 
versy, 309;  subsequent  writings, 
312  ff.;  Theological  Lectures,  357; 
compared  with  Emmons,  359;  con- 
troversy with  Taylor,  377;  position 
on  the  will,  378. 

Worcester,  Noah:  Bible  News,  280; 
the  Son  of  God  a  being  derived 
from  God,  280;  cited,  295;  Atoning 
Sacrifice,  313. 

Wright,  G.  Frederick:  cited,  453; 
quoted,  463. 

Wright,  W.  E.  C:  cited,  467. 

Yale  College:  influence  of,  3,  47, 
48,  107,  129,  150,  204,  209,  246,  273, 
279,  289,  361,  369  ff.,  401  ff.,  431, 
432,  453,  467,  473. 

Yates,  Richard:  Vindication,  313. 

Zaleucus:  illustration  from,  200. 


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